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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

The Noun International Journal of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution is a product of the Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria. The vision behind this academic journal is to:

- i. promote sustainable research culture among the academia for the enhancement and development of the intellectual capacity of both the authors and the readers.
- ii. aid the promotion and assimilation of the values of Peace and Conflict Resolution in our societies.
- iii. provide a platform for espousing writers and well researched academic works for reference and teaching purposes.

The journal will also aid the promotion and assimilation of the values of Peace and Conflict Resolution in our societies. The Journal is published twice a year, first publication in March and the second in August and may also feature special editions as may be deemed fit at any material time.

The articles in this journal have been carefully selected, effectively reviewed and edited by the Editors who are tested and proven in their various fields of study and practices as seasoned academician and practitioners and I believe it will be a worthwhile reference material.

The journal has an online presence, thus making it a reference material which is easily accessible at any point in time and has become widely acceptable within the academic world both locally and internationally.

This invaluable work has become a continuous success because of the support and contribution of the Editors, the members of the Department and the management of the National Open University. Special appreciation goes to the harem of our Professors in the Editorial Board who despite their busy schedules have not relented in providing

mentorship opportunity for every member of the Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, NOUN.

I must of necessity appreciate all members of my team who have worked tirelessly to ensure the sustenance of this vision.

On a final note, I do appreciate the Almighty God who has been the source of my inspiration and from whom I draw the energy which mobilizes me for performance.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, featuring a stylized 'S' and 'O' followed by a long horizontal line.

Dr. Samuel Opeyemi Iroye
Editor-in-Chief/ HOD, Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution

NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [NIJPCR]

CALL FOR PAPERS

The **NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [NIJPCR]** is a peer-reviewed journal publication of the **Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution**, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja, which publishes twice a year but may also feature special editions as may be deemed fit at any material time. The Editorial Board of the journal welcomes well-researched original papers, for publication in the Journal which is released in the Months of March and August every year.

Paper submissions are welcome in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution any relative areas and they should adhere to the following guidelines.

1. Length of paper: Paper submissions should not be more than 5,000 words including footnotes and references.
2. Reference Style: All paper submissions must adhere to the current and recent edition of APA Style of Citation.
3. Font style and size: All submissions should use the Times New Roman fonts (12 font size) including the References. The manuscript should be formatted using 1.5 line spacing.
4. Abstract: Manuscripts must contain an abstract of not more than 250 words, which explains the content of the paper. The abstract must be expressed in clear words in the following format: the background of the research; description of the research problem; explanation of the research methods adopted; explanation of the findings, conclusion and recommendations.
5. Keywords: Manuscripts should contain at least three keywords (not more than five keywords) for indexing purposes. This should be inserted immediately after the abstract.
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- by-section) process of resolving the problem. If the paper utilizes non-doctrinal methods, these should be clearly explained in the introduction.
7. Conclusion: Manuscripts must contain a conclusion section, which explains the findings of the paper and how the research problem was resolved. Where necessary, the conclusion should also contain the recommendations.
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PEACE CLUBS FOR IMPROVED STUDENTS' ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE AND MITIGATION OF VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF CONCENTRIC SECONDARY SCHOOL, OYE-EKITI, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Schools are not spared of violence that occur in the larger society. Students are influenced by environmental violence and this poses challenge to students' academic life in and out of school. This study appraises the efficacy of peace club to mitigate violence and promote students' academic performance in school. Quantitative method was used in the study, and primary data collection was done through use of questionnaires and secondary data sourced from literature. Random and purposive sampling techniques were used in the study. 60 students/members of peace clubs were administered questionnaires and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse the data collected. Result shows that peace club is effective in mitigating violence in schools. It reveals that peace clubs positively influence the academic performances of students.

Keywords: Peace Club, Violence mitigation, Students, Academic performance

Introduction

Conflicts arise as a result of strained relationships between individuals, communities, and nations (Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology, 2014). Conflicts and violence in schools can have significant long-term effects on society because according to Thompson (2017), they are acts of violence against children who are still in their formative years and are the nation's future. The type of violence that occurs either inside or outside of a classroom at

a school is known as "school-based violence." on the assembly ground, the sports complex or field, or the student route home. School-based violence is multifaceted and manifests in a variety of ways. How it shows itself frequently relies upon the setting in which it emerges.

School-based violence is an aggressive behaviour that frequently involves physical combat and has the potential to cause harm to both the perpetrators and innocent victims, both physically and psychologically (Hamby, 2017). It could be described as disorderly conduct committed by its perpetrators as a means of expressing their anger and dissatisfaction with some social issues that they believe have impacted them. To put it another way, it could be defined as when students or groups of students in an educational system overstep their boundaries, either legally or illegally, in an effort to express certain ill feelings or demands to the point where students or other individuals or groups in the system are subjected to some degree of the system's constraints. One of the biggest problems facing today's society and education system is school violence. Most of the time, violence has a negative impact on a lot of things in the school system. Some students' violent behaviour can even endanger themselves or others, damage a lot of properties, and some violence make it hard for academic processes to run smoothly.

It is a problem that has attracted the attention of all stakeholders in both the larger society and educational environments; they include students, teachers, school administrators, parents and government. It is a great threat to peace and stability in schools, causing unnecessary and avoidable disruptions to the academic calendar and impacting negatively on the quality and standard of education. Most often, school violence is a by-product of domestic violence. School violence has become a catastrophe and its causes could be traced to a number of individuals, school, family and a broader community-level risk factors that coalesce to create vulnerability for violence. Interventions to reduce violence in schools need to extend beyond the school itself, and involve community and government (Burton and Leoschut, 2013).

In order to achieve lasting peace in schools, some interested academics and activists have taken the initiative to either create or construct infrastructure for peace. This involves creating a variety of peace enhancing programs and structures such as peace clubs in schools with a view to curtailing school-based conflicts. Students can benefit from peace education that properly prepares them to be peacemakers wherever they go. Education is regarded by Rukarial and Wanjiku (2020) as one of the most important interventions in conflict management and peacebuilding around the world. Additionally, instructors in peace clubs have access to a viable platform and forum through which education for peace programs can be successfully and sustainably implemented.

It is against this backdrop that this study was designed to investigate the efficacy of peace club in responding to conflicts with a view to mitigating violence and promoting academic performance of students in schools. The study uses Concentric School at Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria as a case study for the research.

Education for Peace

Education in Oxford English Dictionary is referred to as the process or art of imparting knowledge, skill and idea. It could be regarded to as a way of learning either formerly or informally. Education for Peace was actually defined in two different ways by Herbert Read. A process of education meant to make people more peaceful was the initial definition. Reformatory education is required, as is the process of designing education for men in peace. This would mean raising kids in a positive outlook in friendly solidarity and imaginative movement (Read, 2012).

Education for Peace' as a concept, evolves from the United Nations Charter that was signed exactly on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco. This charter reaffirms faith in the fundamental human rights leading people to express love, practice tolerance and co-exist together in peace with one another in the society as good neighbours. However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is really an important document, although, it is not legally binding. It is as well important for critical peace education majorly because it

recognizes the existence of tension and conflict among various groups for power (Sharma, 2013).

This concept of peace education is crucial to the survival and development of schools and society at large. In essence, peace education should be reflected in every school environment and the high-quality education received by students, i.e. in all learning, peace should be included. Learning about peace means obtaining knowledge and understanding of what contributes to peace, and what is the role of the student in the maintenance of peace in the school system (Laurate, 2014). Learning peace means acquiring the knowledge needed to deal with conflicts without recourse to violence (restiveness), learning to creatively apply the methods of active non-violence, and learning to deal with deficiencies in the school environment in constructive ways.

Peace Club

Peace clubs are operating throughout the continent at various levels of formality and types. The first peace clubs in Africa were established in Zambia in 2006. Since then, peace clubs have been created in some other parts of the continent including Burundi, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, South Africa and Nigeria (Juma, 2019). There has been little written about peace clubs at the academic level. Peace clubs serve as platforms where young people can learn skills, exchange experiences, teach others and apply the knowledge of peace in their everyday life.

According to Irene (2016), peace clubs are made up of learners and teachers who meet voluntarily with objectives along the following: to understand the meanings of conflict and violence and that conflict is inevitable while violence is a choice; to learn and practice the basic communication skills – both listening and speaking – which are central to the resolution of conflict; to support each other in dealing with the conflict and violence issues which club members face; and to find ways to contribute to a more peaceful school environment.

Peace club infrastructures contributes in improving participants' knowledge in conflict resolution, built participants' skills in resolving their own conflicts amicably,

promotes positive attitudinal change of participants and peaceful learning environment which enhances students' academic performances. According to Haft and Weiss (2000), peace club infrastructures can assist members in resolving conflicts before they escalate into physical violence, as well as instilling a peace perspective and encouraging peace institutionalization in schools.

Methods

This paper adopted Quantitative methodology as the main method of analysis. Questionnaires were shared and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for the analysis of the data collected. Quantitative research design was adopted for this study. Mugenda (1999) suggests that research design deals with the detailing of procedures that will be adopted to carry out the research study, this study will be using quantitative research design. The population for this study consists of members of peace clubs at the selected school and their teachers. So also, the targeted population will also include the management staffs of the school who are and are-not involved in facilitation of the peace clubs. The population will be an aggregate of 65 persons, i.e. sixty (60) students and five (5) management of the school. Hair (2003) described the research population as an identifiable total group and or aggregate people or elements that a researcher is interested in choosing and they are pertinent to the specified information of any given problem. This includes defining the population from which our sample is drawn.

The study adopted stratified random sampling technique to select a sample of members of the peace clubs at the selected school. Sample has been described as a subsection of populations that is chosen in such a way that their characteristics reflect those of a group from which they were chosen (Henn, Weinstein and Ford, 2006). For the selection of the teachers and management staffs as samples for the study, purposive sample approach was adopted. According to Oso and Onen (2005), “purposive sampling always starts with a purpose in mind and the sample is thus selected to include people of interest and exclude those who do not suit the purpose”.

Result

The result is presented in a way that expresses the influence of peace clubs in violent mitigation and student academic performance in the selected school for the study. The research questions are: i. Does peace club have effect in conflict mitigation in school? ii. Does peace club have significant contribution to student academic performance in school? Sixty-five (65) respondents were targeted for the study, but Sixty-two (60) respondents gave a full response to the questionnaires. This constitutes an overwhelming (92.7%) response rate which according to Coopers (2009) is considered adequate for the study. This is presented in the table below.

Personal Data

Variables	Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Age	5 – 10	11	18.3
	10 – 15	41	68.3
	15 – 20	8	13.3
Gender	Male	27	45.0
	Female	33	55.0
Class	JSS 1 – 3	28	46.7
	SSS 1 – 3	32	53.3
	Total	60	100.0
Membership Status	Members	53	88.3
	Non members	7	11.7
	Total	60	100.0
Peace-club positively influence school violent mitigation program	Yes	57	95.0
	No	2	5.0

Peace clubs and violent mitigation

Statement	Response	Frequency	Percentage
Does peace club mobilize peace activities to help reduces conflict among students in your school?	Yes	57	95.0%
	No	3	5.0%
Do you think that the activities peace club engages on promote amicable conflicts resolution among students?	Yes	57	95%
	No	3	5.0%
To what extent do peace club activities help mitigating violence among students?	Very High Extent	44	73.3
	High Extent	14	23.3
	Moderate Extent	2	3.4
	Low extent	0	0.0%
	Very low extent	0	0.0%

As shown in the table above, 95% of respondents agree that peace clubs' activities help reduce violence in the school for the study. When asked to what extent do peace activities help in promoting the mitigation or reduction of violence among students? 73.3% of respondents' responses indicates a very high extent.

Impact of Peace Club

S/N	Statements	SD	D	MA	A	SA
1	Peace club has helped me to build skills in managing and resolving my conflict	4 (6.7%)	4 (6.7%)	1 (1.7%)	12 (20.0%)	39 (65.0%)
2	Peace clubs has contributed in promoting peace in my school	4 (6.7%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (3.3%)	11 (18.3%)	43 (71.7%)
3	Violent among students has reduced as a result of peace club	5 (8.3%)	1 (1.7%)	4 (6.7%)	12 (20.0%)	38 (63.3%)

4	Peace club employs a coherent conflict resolution approach which help resolve conflict and promote dialogue among students	5 (8.3%)	1 (1.7%)	1 (1.7%)	14 (23.3%)	39 (65.5%)
5	Peace club is transparent in dealing with all forms of conflict that may arise in school	6 (10.0%)	2 (3.3%)	4 (6.7%)	8 (13.7%)	40 (66.7%)

The above table shows the impact of the peace club on participants in the school for the study. 20.0% agree and 65.0% of respondents strongly agree that peace club has helped them to build their skills in managing and resolving their conflicts, making a total of 85% who are positive about it. 18.3% agree and 71.7% of respondents strongly agree that peace clubs contribute in promoting peace in their school making a total of 90% who are positive about it. 20% agree and 63.3% strongly agree that violence among students has reduced as a result of peace club. 23.3% agree and 65.5% of respondents strongly agree that peace club employs a coherent conflict resolution approach which help resolve conflict and promote the use of dialogue by students in tackling conflicts, making a total of 88.8% who share the view. 13.7% of respondents agree and 66.7% strongly agree that peace club is transparent in dealing with all forms of conflict that may arise in school, making a total of 80.4% who support position. These are indications that peace club made positive impact on participants (students) and the school in general. Peace club uses transparent method to deal with conflict in order to build the capacity of students and thereby generate peace building agents or ambassadors even in schools.

Below, student's consent that the organization of peace club really have impact on their academic performances. The response rate above shows that 91.7% of the responses support that peace club affect their academic performances positively, while only 8.3 percent (minority) decline that peace club did not make positive impact on their academics.

Peace Club and Academic Performances

Statement	Response	Frequency	Percentage
Do Peace Club has any positive impact on student academic performances?	Yes	55	91.7%
	No	5	8.3
To what extent does peace clubs impact students' academic performances positively?	Very High Extent	48	80.0
	High Extent	7	11.7
	Moderate Extent	4	6.7
	Low Extent	1	1.7
	Very low extent	0	0.0%

Peace Club Educational Activities and Academic Excellence

S/N	Statements	SD	D	MA	A	SA
1	Peace Club involves activities that teach and emphasize the culture of peace through peace education	5 (8.3%)	2 (3.3%)	1 (1.7%)	16 (26.7%)	36 (60.0%)
2	Peace Club involve teaching and learning that promote moral discipline emotional maturity which helps in performing well academically	4 (6.7%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (10.0%)	7 (11.7%)	43 (71.7%)
3	Peace Club encompasses activities that promotes seriousness and diligent of students which enhance activation of student's capacity towards academic's success.	4 (6.7%)	1 (1.7%)	2 (3.3%)	14 (23.3%)	39 (65.0%)
4	Peace club help me in attain academic excellence	4 (6.7%)	0 (0%)	3 (5.0%)	9 (15.0%)	44 (73.3%)

Respondents agree that peace club has activities that teach and emphasize a culture of peace through peace education. 26.7% respondents agree and 60% strongly agree to this as seen in the above table. 71.7% of respondents strongly agree that peace club involve teaching and learning that promote moral discipline emotional maturity which helps in students to perform well academically. 65.0% of respondents agree that peace club encompasses activities that promotes seriousness and inculcate diligent spirits on students, and this enhance and activate students' capacity to achieve academic success. 73.3% of respondents strongly that peace club help them in attaining academic excellence.

Promoting Peace Club

Statement	Response	Frequency	Percentage
Do you recommend to promote peace club in schools?	Yes	58	96.7
	No	2	3.3

The result in the table above shows the commentative opinion of these students as over 96.7 percent of them recommended the creation of peace clubs in schools. The recommendation is based on the explicable experience they had gotten at the course of the peace club process.

Discussion of Results

The results of the data collated revealed that most of the respondents are high school students.68.3% of these students are between the ages of 10-15 years, while 31.7% in the range of 16-20 years. 55% of these students are female, while 45% of the respondents are males. 53% of the respondents are in junior secondary classes, while 47% of the respondents are in senior secondary school classes. Majority of the respondents are members (88.3%) of the peace club organized in the school, while only few are not members of the peace club but selected teachers and management staff who observed the peace clubs in the school. Thus, 95% of the respondents accept that peace clubs contribute greatly to the reduction of violence in the school.

The study shows that the nature of conflicts that usually take place in the school are mostly interpersonal and inter group conflicts, and that peace club has helped in the mitigation of violent conflict. 44.8% of the respondent agree that peace club help them build their capacity to handle conflict. 92% agree that peace club has help in promoting peace in their school. 55.5% of the students/participants opine that peace clubs have helped them build capacity in resolving their disputes. 76.8% of the student also agree that peace club employs transparency tools when dealing with conflicts.

Peace club also positively influences students' academic performances. 80% of respondents agrees that peace club engage in activities that promote peace in school. 91% of respondents also agree that, peace club has a great impact on their academic performances. 96.7% of the respondents (peace club members/students, selected teachers & selected management staff) agree to promote peace club in the school, and to promote and recommend peace clubs to other schools (primary and secondary/high schools) they have access to.

Conclusion

Conclusively, the nature of conflicts that usually take place in schools are mostly interpersonal and inter group conflicts. Experiment involving creating peace club in school did not only prove that peace club contributes to violent mitigation but also that it positively influences students' academic performances. In other words, the study reveals that peace club has positive impact in mitigating violent in schools. Also, that peace club has no adverse effect on student academic performances, rather it has a great positive impact in students' academic.

The respondents in this study were mainly peace club members. 92% of the respondents in this study agrees that peace club experience in their schools helped in promoting peace. 80% of respondents agrees that many peace club activities are peace enhancing and thus readily promote peace. 91% of these students also agree that peace club has a great impact on their academic performance. 80% of the respondents in this study agree that the activities peace clubs engage in, promote peaceful relationship among students. From

all indications following this study, one can conclude without mixing words that peace clubs in schools contribute significantly in mitigating school-based violence, promote peaceful learning environment and students' academic performance.

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HOST COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TRUST FUND AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES OF BAYELSA STATE: AN ANALYSIS OF NEMBE OIL SPILL

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ABSTRACT

The environmental impact of oil and gas industry on host communities is extensive and expansive, especially in Bayelsa State. The purpose of the study is to examine the host community development trust fund of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) in the management of oil spill-related conflict in oil-producing communities in Bayelsa State with particular reference to the Nembe oil spill that occurred on 5th December, 2021 discharging about two million barrels of crude into the environment. The report of the Joint Investigation Visit (JIV) exonerated the company of negligence and blamed the incident on third party interference, while the State government and host community claimed equipment failure. The JIV report is critical in determining culpability, compensation and cleanup by the company. The environmental conflict theory was adopted as the tool of analysis, while the methodology was the systematic qualitative content analysis derived mainly from secondary sources. Key findings of the study identified gaps in JIV membership and lack of transparency in its processes. Consequently, the study recommends inclusion of independent stakeholders in JIV as well as more transparency in its processes.

Keywords: Conflict Management, Host Community, Trust Fund.

Introduction

Bayelsa State is the cradle of hydrocarbon production in Nigeria, and one of the most oil polluted places in the world (Bassey, 2021). From Southern Ijaw to Sagbama local governments, local communities are faced with the problem of continuous oil spill. This in turn has brought about conflicts between host communities and oil companies. These conflicts in some instances led to shut down of operations of oil companies, vandalism, and reduction

of Nigeria's crude export. Commercial oil was first discovered in Nigeria at Oloibiri in 1956. In the decades since, oil spills have had a catastrophic impact on communities where people have no other water supply than creeks and rely on farming and fishing.

Oil spills, sometimes due to vandalism or corrosion, are common in Bayelsa state, a vast maze of creeks and mangrove swamps criss-crossed by pipelines and blighted by poverty, pollution, oil-fuelled corruption and violence. According to industry watchers, there were 89 oil spills in the past three years, resulting in 1,219 barrels spewed into the environment, making the state the third highest in Nigeria (NOSDRA, 2021). See table 1 below.

Table 1: Ten states with the highest oil spills in Nigeria (2019-2021)

States	Incidents	Barrels reported spilled
Rivers	352	26267.83
Delta	233	9133.99
Bayelsa	89	1219.1
Abia	41	1599.58
Imo	31	2189.89
Akwa Ibom	26	1.29
Edo	19	93.45
Lagos	11	100.63
Kaduna	2	41
Ondo	2	8
Total	881	42565.42

Large scale oil spills can happen when pipelines break or drilling operations go wrong if timely intervention is not put in place. Consequences to ecosystems and economies can be long lasting if a large oil spill occurs. This most often comes with little or no immediate attention from either the federal government or oil companies. Flaring of gas has led to acid rain falling on the area, while contributing to making Nigeria the largest producer of

greenhouse gas emissions in the world. The effect of gas flares on vegetation and human health is monumental. Environmental degradation by operations of oil companies is one of the most potent drivers of volatility in oil producing communities and sets the Niger Delta apart from other poor regions in the country (Francis et al, 2011).

In 2014, the Bayelsa State government reported 800 spills from Agip oil fields, out of which less 20 were remediated and cleaned (Eziukwu, 2015). In 2015, there were 200 spill incidents (ibid). In April 2021, SPDC confirmed an oil pipeline spillage at the Okordia-Rumekpe 14-inch crude truckline, discharging about 213 barrels of crude oil into Ikarama community. In July 2021 (Premiumtimes, 2021), In addition, SPDC reported an oil spillage at its facility in Ekeremor Local Government Area, which discharged an unspecified volume of crude oil into the environment. A report suggested that Shell recorded over 1,000 spills with about 110,535 barrels of crude or 17.5 million litres lost since 2011 (Olisah, 2021). Some experts and stakeholders however, believe that the figure could be more. Furthermore, on June 29, 2022, gas leak was reported in Sangana community from an Adriatic 1 offshore platform owned by Consolidated Oil Limited (Conoil). In a SOS message, the community lamented that the leak from the rig spewed toxic gas into the sea and into the community, resulting in severe environmental and

The concern of many people however, is that oil companies have a penchant for not accepting responsibility and blaming oil spills on human interference. Therefore, getting oil companies to clean-up or pay for environmental crimes is difficult in Nigeria. Legal claims for compensation can take years even decades, and companies are expected to pay relatively little in fines when they err, engendering frustration and tension in host communities. Since the ascension of the PIA, there is little or no sufficient scholarship to interrogate how the host community development trust fund can effectively engender peace in host communities with emphasis on oil spillage. The study is therefore informed by not only the desire to contribute to extant knowledge but also the need to fill the gaps in the scanty literature on the subject-matter.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

The following concepts are clarified and contextualized for proper understanding.

Conflict Management

Conflict management denotes mitigating conflict through peaceful means between parties. According to Akpuru-Aja (2007), conflict management is the use of dialogue to assist opponents or parties in conflict. In other words, conflict management is concerned with the ways and means of controlling and harmonizing conflicting relationships within an interaction process.

Host Community

In this context, this is oil-producing or oil-bearing community that oil and gas is discovered or produced. Agim, (1997) defines oil producing communities as those communities in whose territory oil is discovered and from where it is exploited. Oil producing communities in the Bayelsa State are rural communities.

Trust Fund

The Host Community Development Trust Fund (HCDTF) also known as the 'Trust' is aimed at driving direct social and economic development from petroleum operations within their communities. With the enactment of PIA, settlers¹ are required to set up a host community development trust ('HCDT' or 'Trust'), for the benefit of their respective host communities and contribute 3% of the operating expenses of their previous financial year to the Trust's fund. The Board of Trustees (BOT) comprising representatives of stakeholders is responsible for the general management of the Trust including approval and supervision of projects to be funded by the Trust's funds. The costs of disruption of petroleum operations attributable to actions of the host community are deductible from the settlor's contribution to the Trust's fund.

Overview of Nembe Oil Spill

The blowout at a non-producing well in the Santa Barbara field in Worikumakiri in Nembe Local Government Area in Bayelsa State, has caused extensive pollution of rivers and

farmlands. The oil spill occurred on November 5, 2021, following the blowout from the OML 29 Well Head 1, which was operated by Aiteo Eastern Exploration and Production Limited, an indigenous oil company jointly owned by Aiteo and NNPC. The well is part of assets that Aiteo purchased from Royal Dutch Shell in 2015. After one month, the Oml 29 blowout was still spewing out crude oil and gas onto the rivers and creeks of Opu-Nembe and surrounding communities, with well owners unable to contain the spill. The spill was plugged on December 8 after 32 days, while 16,280 barrels of crude and crude sediments were recovered from the incident site (Premiumtimes, 2022). The spill in Bayelsa State was yet another incident that would devastate the marine ecosystem on which most fishing depended.

Impact of oil and environmental pollution on host communities

Oil pollution and environmental degradation are major issues in host communities. These problems result from oil spills, natural gas flaring and deforestation (Azaiki, 2008). Oil pollution impacts on the environment, health and livelihood of communities. Discharging crude oil into the environments of the communities destroys flora and fauna, contaminates creeks which the people rely for fishing activities, drinking water and domestic use. For example, an oil spill that occurred in September 2021 from a facility suspected to belong to Conoil Sangan Community in Brass LGA caused immeasurable agony and suffering for the residents, damaging flora and fauna of Akassa Kingdom. Findings indicated that three species of croaker fish family were badly affected, while silver catfish and tilapia were also involved.

Studies have shown that the environmental base of oil-producing areas has been seriously depleted as a result of oil production activities. Nsirimovu (2000) notes that:

during exploration, drill cutting, drilling mud and fluids are used for stimulating production. The major constituents of drill cutting such as barites and bentonitic clays when dumped on the ground prevent local plant growth until natural processes develop a new topsoil. In water these materials disperse

and sink and may kill local bottom-living plants and animals by burying them... In addition to the pollutants introduced into the environment from exploration and exploitation operations, refinery wastes also have characteristics which constitute potential land, water and air pollutants...Further, flaring of natural gas has also been identified by several studies to damage the environment.

Some of these environmental hazards include:

Land Degradation: This concerns inappropriate waste management, oil spillage and industrial pollution with lasting effects on the soil. Most forms of land degradation are linked to intensive extraction and exploration of oil that renders the soil infertile and inhabitable.

Biodiversity Depletion: This relates to air pollution, deforestation, urbanization and over-exploitation that destroy the ecosystem.

Health Problems: Several health problems have been traced to toxic emissions and poor management of hazardous wastes.

Sedimentation and Siltation: This is related to the narrowing of creeks, reduction in creek depth, increase in inter-tidal zones, farming and dam construction.

Degradation and Depletion of Water and Coastal Resources: This is concerned with industrial effluent, oil pollution, salt intrusion, industrial wastes, watershed degradation and invasion of aquatic weeds.

Role of Joint Investigation Visit (JIV)

The Joint Investigation Visit (JIV) is a statutory probe that follows every reported leak incident. The JIV is usually convened by the operator of the leak facility and it comprises representatives of the oil firm, affected communities, regulators (the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) and the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) and state Ministry of Environment. In this regard, the oil companies and other stakeholders usually embark on Joint Investigation Visit (JIV), to identify the causes of an oil spill, its impact and by extension value of damaged properties. The JIV report is extremely important as it

is the basis for deciding whether communities receive compensation for damage to their homes, fields and fisheries and may affect the extent and quality of clean up. If a spill is found to be due to sabotage or third-party interference then the community gets no compensation from the oil company, regardless of the damage caused. The JIV report on the Nembe incident attributed the spill to sabotage, which has been rejected both by the Bayelsa State government and the host community. The Bayelsa State government is not a member of the JIV.

Findings

From the analysis of the data, the findings of the study are as follows:

In restructuring the management of host communities' relations, the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) provided for the creation of the host community development trust fund (HCDTF), aka Trust, for the benefit of the host communities to which oil and gas operators (described as "settlers") are obliged to make annual contributions based on 3 per cent of their yearly operating expenditure. The HCDT is expected to improve the quality of life of the host communities' populations, and improve accountability in the management of development funds. Prior to the enactment of PIA, there were two broad categories of host community development initiatives.

One of the key gaps of the Act is the absence of a provision for management of conflict among the critical stakeholders of the HCDT, especially the settlers and the host communities. Compensatory payments are contentious due to disagreement on the cause of spillage by stakeholders. This is critical owing that compensatory payments are based on the cause of spillage. Significantly, most JIV reports are blamed on third party interference.

Despite the incidence of oil theft, head of Pollution Control, Bayelsa Ministry of Environment, however, said that the inspection was inconclusive because the JIV team could not see the exact point of the leak. The indigenes of the host community claimed that the spill was due to equipment failure. Similarly, Niger Delta

environmental activists claimed that most of the pipes and other facilities have outlived their life span and they cannot withstand the high pressure of the crude oil or gas flowing through them, hence the bursting and leakages. The other concern is the under reporting of the volume and spread of each spill with a view to avoiding the correct payment of compensations. The perception is that the oil companies hide under oil theft to deny oil spill victims compensatory payments. (Akene, 2022).

Conflict management promotes dialogue and compromise for mutual satisfaction that is win-win. But legal provisions are adversarial and win-lose that engenders lasting disaffection and animosity in relationship. Most JIV reports have been criticized for some reasons. The JIV findings have never been subject to any independent or effective monitoring or verification. In most cases the oil company has substantial influence in determining the cause of a spill. This is partly due to the fact that the company has the technical expertise and neither the regulators nor the communities have the means to challenge their assessment. The presence of regulators and community representatives during a joint investigation should, in theory, ensure the outcome is credible.

However, in practice, both regulators and community representatives have very limited technical expertise and are reliant on the company's assessment. Lack of transparency occurs at different points in the oil spill investigation process. For example, there can be a lack of transparency during the field investigation about how key data, such as the volume of oil spilt, are established. The lack of transparency around oil spill investigations, and the related claims made by Shell, has affected efforts by communities to gain access to remedies, including clean-up of pollution (Amnesty, 2012). Additionally, the Nembe community reported that the oil spill began on December 1, the JIV report stated that the spill began on December 5, 2021. This is to deflect the actual volume of spill in terms of environmental impact and clean-up.

Condition of pipes not disclosed: Although numerous spills are due to corrosion of the oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta, operators have refused to make public the condition of their oil pipeline. This failure has exacerbated community tensions around the oil spill investigation process, as lack of transparency on the state of oil infrastructure calls to questions the integrity of the JIV.

Conclusion

The study examined the host community development trust fund of the PIA and the management of conflict arising from oil spillage in Bayelsa State. The HCDTF is innovative as host communities will be directly involved in the management of the fund. Nonetheless, the Trust is yet not magical solution to the complicated problem of oil spillage and compensation, especially the lack of transparency in the management of the JIV.

Recommendations

- i. There is need for the JIV to ensure openness and transparency in its activities, so that reports are accessible to stakeholders:
- ii. Membership of the JIV should include independent stakeholders for credibility and integrity; and
- iii. The JIV should develop new template of engagement with host communities. Unless suspects are apprehended, it's illogical to hold host communities liable for the crimes of elements who may not necessarily be members of the community.

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ANXIETY OF THE POST-COLD WAR: CONCEPTUALIZING ETHNO-NATIONALIST REGIME IN THE NIGER DELTA

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ABSTRACT

This paper dialectically investigates the suppository effects of the Post-Cold War in Africa, especially in areas that constitute the resource-base of some particular nations. Using the social conflict theory, particularly its collaborative problem-solving methodology to conflict management, the paper interrogates the possibility for the bottom-top approach to conflict management in order to promote a sustainable peace process and advanced socio-economic cum political transformation in Nigeria, particularly the Niger Delta area. The paper reveals a lopsided ratio of exploitation and development, which graphically defines the anxiety model of the politics of resistance and resilience, and by extension, located around elite supremacy and minority fixation. Beyond simplistic evaluation, the consistent interface between the two principals is subsumed in the policy thrust of the “new politics” in the Niger Delta Region. It thus, recommended the bottom-top approach to conflict management for the realization of sustainable peace process and socio-economic advancement cum political transformation in Niger Delta, and Nigeria at large.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Derivative Principles, Ethno-Nationalist Movement, Niger Delta Region, Resource Control.

Introduction

Over forty years, the international system was held hostage by the dual hegemony of United States and USSR. Given this period, the sovereignty of state was drastically reduced as they yielded their allegiance to the hegemons. The relationship was heavily pinned to states (hegemons) and sub-states (aligned nation) status, thereby placing limited bias on their independence level. This period aptly defines a vertical structure of administration in the global system as all the sub-states had all their interests and bias tied to a particular hegemony and all their sentiments, philosophy and value preferences guided by same influence. It was an ideological confrontation meant for status hegemony and preponderance of power between the US and USSR (Ryan, 1990; Lake & Rothchild, 1998).

By the end of 20th century, the dual hegemonic contest became history with the collapse of the communist dictatorship. The Soviet Union with its studded military function-Warsaw Pact was phased out. Primarily, many states under its yoke started to break away, thus changing the security landscape of Eastern Europe, the structure and order of global political network. This led to the mapping of ethnic interest in nationalist insurgent groups thereby overhauling vertical power design. This proved constructive in Eastern Europe, because the period that marked this revolution, though tough was adjusted to suit the trend of “New World Order.” The reason responsible for this is the reduced quantity of ethnic and cultural fragmentations compared to Africa with its extra number of ethnic and cultural arrangements.

This era of change graphically enunciates the shift from bipolar global structure to unipolar system thus defining globalization in its best of form, style and shape. The precedent era is proven with the characteristic access and exploit of realist propensity, which is opposed to the globalization period controlled by strong idealist temperament and market economy. This ultimately broadens the scope of capitalism and participation. The question of a single dominant-state is therefore, heavily queried on its political, cultural, economic and social capacity as against the dependent variable of military might. The global melt-down that swept all the economies of the world, except China, attests to this fact as US economy was relegated

to the background. In simple term, globalization, which is the staple structure of global diplomacy is an expression of inter-dependent homogeny culture in any shade of interaction (Ekeh, 1975). Given this backdrop, this paper interrogates the possibility for the bottom-top approach to conflict management in order to promote a sustainable peace process and advanced socio-economic cum political transformation in Nigeria, particularly the Niger Delta Area.

Niger Delta and Post-Cold War Ethno-Nationalism

The radical and psychological negotiations of insurgent nationalism from 1989 denote the second independence that touches directly on the periphery or the marginalized segments of the African society. In the early 1990s and thereafter, Africa has been a very busy continent with the continuous oscillation between regional nationalism and state-centric nationalism. Ranging from Cape to Cairo, there were unending counter-nationalist assaults between the numerous states and sub-states actors. This left the nascent democracy trend in Africa vulnerable to reduced development. This reductionist nationalism has been heavily asserted in Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Bissau, Ivory-Coast and Nigeria in West Africa. Beyond the coast of West Africa, there are insurgent revivals in Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, Somali, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The list goes on.

The resultant conflict emanating from the risks and challenges of the Post-Cold War has reduced Africa to a market point of the industrialized power that continues to fuel the flames of conflict by supporting both the state and insurgent groups. The only derivable factor is poor economy as many African states are termed failed states and are held hostage by international aid donors (Keller 2002). Simply put, conflict places the continent in a perpetual state of dependent position which dampens the level of sovereignty that will ultimately lead to economic reform and external pressure of failed regimes to organize a transition framework to catalyse an organic civil society (Harbeson et al 1994).

It is apparently evident that in the Cold War era, the two protagonists pursued their ideological preference across the globe, and most subaltern states yielded their allegiance to

the superpowers, thereby reducing ethnic rivalry in the domestic environment. With the end of the Cold War the superpowers have become aliens and are now reluctant to intervening in Africa's political issue, except for humanitarian purpose. Most international organizations have also followed this dimension (Keller 2002). The circumstances foregrounding the antagonist relationship linger from the realm of history. It is a constitution of historical bias so established between the ruling ethnic group and the subaltern in the south. The unequal relationship reveals the polarization of the different regions in Nigeria, with the root causes heavily hinged on the central elite greed, concentration of political resources in the north, coupled with the organized exploitation of the peripheral region. This marks a lopsided exchange between the centre and the margins.

The dynamics of the social movement in Niger Delta is heavily entrenched in the pursuit of derived socio-economic rights. This is one of the factors responsible for its intractability and this enunciates the geometric development of the attending violence. Most probably, the Nigerian state is not alone in the suppression of this region, as it has been noted that the MNCs provide logistic and military support for any government in power. This has invariably improved the perpetrator position, thereby reducing this region to mere victim of its resources. Right from time, this region has repudiated this victimizing syndrome by maintaining an erect position. The symbolic relationship between the State and MNCs relevantly and alternatively promotes their hegemony and exploitation of mineral resources respectively.

Without mincing words, the Post-Cold War anxiety bears its suppository effect in Niger Delta. This is because of the complexities and non-descript dimension of its relationship with the state. The Cold War era marked an ideological dichotomy in the global network, but functionally stabilizing the politics of the developing world. Basically, the varying historic peripheries were responsible to the duo. This period placed the African rulers in vantage position, as they were overlooked by the different ethnic fragments. The eventual collapse of the communist world led to the end of the Cold War and thus a shift in the paradigm of

international diplomacy. This era was and is marked by globalization that broadens the scope of capitalism and the attending political and economic liberalization (Harbeson, et al, 1994).

Young (2003) pointed out that trans-national movements have most effective response to patriarchal national imperialism. This becomes the best alternative to oppressive government by cutting across boundaries and beyond. This expressively shows that the uncontrolled reaction in Niger-Delta in this assessment is fundamental to addressing the dialectical material allocation so established between the hegemony and the Niger-Delta margin. Beyond this scope, it enunciates the desire of primordial public in the developing world to participate directly with the cosmopolitan civic centres. This sheds light on the dynamics of capitalism in the phenomenon. Young (2003: 137) sums it thus: “Capitalism has apparently managed to commodity resistance to its self to the extent that it also organizes the production of that resistance”.

The Insurgent Ethno Nationalism in Niger Delta

The insurgent nationalism that defines Niger Delta can be pinned to a response to global economic and political trend. This revolution is erupting from the under because the liberal process has been inhibited from reaching the grassroot by the many impermeable governments. The quest for emancipation is even more provoking considering the position this region bears as foundation of the state’s superstructure as it continues to bear the burden of history. With the demise of the Cold War, there is a dimensional curve in conflict scholarship that apparently envisions global truce and freer systemic international diplomacy with massive appropriated support from the domestic sites (Onoge, 2004; Onoge, 1978).

Most popular among the scholarship drive is the work of Frank Fukuyama’s End of History. The text projects the consequences of the end of the Cold War within its immediate borders. From all indications, the word-phrase “history” could be synonymously applied to mean conflict, and by that understanding limiting conflict. In reverse term, the end of history is categorized on a short-term effect of the Cold War specifically in the West because of the attending crises that are heterogeneous in Africa in the first decade of this post. The word

“history” is figuratively used to mean conflict. This theorist cartographed his thesis on the new truce of the old hegemony that expressed their interest through political might as against the new relationship entrenched in economic participation and competition. This paradigm-curve simultaneously changed the dynamic control once assumed by the protagonist over their spheres of influence (Onoge, 2004; Okolo, 2010).

Though relative global international peace continues to prevail in the Post-Cold War era, the former existential borders have been ruptured, thereby enhancing domestic violence built on ethno-nationalist surge. To be more precise, the colonial and post-independence periods mark the incubation period of Niger Delta ethnic grouping. The failure of Isaac Boro first initiated counter-mission to transcend the marginal limitation placed on it by the state could be traced to the shortfall of the level of orientation of the primordial public. But Post-Cold War marks the eruption of insurgence nationalism that constitutes the formation of the Movement of the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) which under the leadership of Ken Saro Wiwa hit its limelight when it had a direct interface with the Sani Abacha led military administration. The Niger-Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF) was instituted by Asari Dokubo. This leader had regular clashes with government forces. He was arrested, detained and later released after reaching a truce with the state (Okolo, 2010).

There are other led movement in the like of Egbema National Front, National Youth Council of Ogoni People, Niger Delta Volunteer Force and Ethnic Minorities Right Organisation of Africa. The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta maintains a unique place in the present dispensation. This group has resisted all means to forestall the pursuit of its goals. The quest of these numerous groups emanates from the nationalist agitation of the colonial era as template to the problem of distributive justice. This era has broadened the scope of insurgency by enlarging their coast in addressing constitutional issues, human right, equitable distribution of resources in areas of location, degradation, just and fair socio-economic proposition as least to minimize marginalization by the centre. The terse relationship between these groups and the state reflects the stasis of civic centre to pursuing

its exploitative tendencies, while subordinate groups are massively opposed to this tradition (Ojakorotu & Okeke-Uzodike, 2010; Okolo, 2010).

The nationalist agitation is not relatively masculine, but absolute as it includes the active participation of women. The role of women in this perspective is a stereotype of the Aba women riot of 1929 that contested the taxation of women. The function of women resolve in socio-political and economic issues has been fairly successful compared to the menfolk. Most precisely in 1986 August 26, Mrs. Patrick Dorcas led a revolution against NNPC and MNCs. She mobilized 10,000 women of Ekpan and Uvwie origin. The factors responsible for this development was the lack of social infrastructural development and provision of jobs as negotiated before the establishment of the corporation. This alienation at the home front was contested in the midst of gun threat and teargas. This yielded strong psychological boost and firm foundation for other women in the quest for feminist agitation and militancy by the wayside. It also shows a new society fostered by feminist strength with linear historical mode of nationalism in Niger Delta that goes a long way to checking internal colonization, especially in the era of globalization where the sanctity of freedom remains demystified. The ideological content, therefore, lies in the effort to overhaul widespread poverty in the midst of widespread resources (Okolo, 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; Okolo, 2010; Ryan, 1990; Ojakorotu & Okeke-Uzodike, 2010).

Okeji (2007: 24) reports the revolution organized by Igbeku-Amukpe and Ejekimoni women to forestall the dismal activities Shell Petroleum Development Commission (SPDC) and MNCs. It was alleged that the company buried toxic waste in the land and this has led to sharp reduction in farm yield. To pursue this interest, they led a march to Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) headquarters in Warri to state their grievance. Their demand was 1.7bn Naira compensation. Niger Delta exhibits cluster a of feminist revolts that help define the abysmal state the region has been plunged into, thereby becoming a dominant frame of reference for a people relegated to the fringes (Onoge, 2004)

Ikelegbe (2005) identified that the 1990s marked the climax of insurgence regime that culminated reciprocated assaults between ethnic groups and state. This viewpoint brings to light the imbalance so established between the centre and subaltern in areas of trade, social and political development. He noted that:

By the 1990s, the region was mobilized enough by a flowering of civil society, intense identity mobilization and ethnic nationalism, community activism of extensive resistance. Further, that began as mere articulation by the region's elites became a mass protest of whose content of demands, methods and strategies of struggle had been transformed considerably (Ikelegbe, 2005: 215).

By 1992, the Oil Minerals Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) was established to assess the problems of the oil-resource areas and execute relevant projects to alleviate the suffering and hardship of the people. This prospect was poorly funded and sabotaged as no meaningful development took place to reciprocate the measure of exploitation. This is responsible for the strong military attachment to the nationalist tremor. Right from history, it has been observed that any nationalist tendency bears definite militancy bias. The case of this region is not an exemption to the rule, but a response to the militarization of the area by the state security agencies of Joint Task Force (JTF), Operation Restore Hope and a host of Naval and Military build-up in the coastal margins.

Unfortunately, over the years oil production has specifically reduced returns from agriculture. Moreover, the parameters of exploiters concept can be used to gauge the local imperialist model. as the resource location becomes the most economically disadvantaged and dependent on the ruling hegemony. The postulation of imperialist culture is built around preponderance of power and distribution of resources. The synergistic variation of the parties of imperialist constitutes the dialectical tension evolving from the Post-Cold War, which displays a largely centralized and concentrated power-resource at the centre. The Cold War period kept the subaltern group in a supine position with the creation of totalitarian governments, especially in Africa, but there is a dimensional curve in the Post-Cold War which sets the varied ethnic nations to discharge their incubated aggression. The highly aggregated

structure of local imperialism is, therefore; exposed to critical opposition because of its resistance to the adjustment of globalization (Keller, 2002).

The Ethnic Nationalist Propensities in Niger Delta

The ethnic nationalist propensities in Niger Delta are a unit of agitation process that characterizes the Post-Cold War tensions. Africa leaders differ in characterization and articulation of the prevailing global diplomacy, when the connection and physical contestation between post nationalist-militant insurgent groups and state security agency are considered. The term “militancy” has become so diffuse. To the state, it is a militant association with strong radical posture meant to disrupt the structure and pursuit of the state, because it is produced and consumed by a particular ethnic group. From all indications, this nomenclature is empirically misleading and unproductive as it fails to take note of the prefix “post” which defines nationalism after independence that is hinged on the depredation of neo-colonialism and the determining reference of history and socio-political development (Onoge, 2004).

Niger-Delta remains a site marked with upward nationalist trajectory. However; the ethno-nationalist principle has been simplified and reduced to militant arrangement, thereby ignoring the marginalist thrust and bias characterizing the region’s history that typifies the return of domestic imperialism. Zeleza (2006: 122-123) captures the Post-Cold War meta-nationalism formed around resistance of the youths, peasants and workers in the subaltern communities.

Basically, dominant liberal view aptly props the concern of the state, while the latter supports ethnic identity formation and arrangement. It was based on the latter that Ken Saro Wiwa reactivated Movement for Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) to contest issues with the state under the rulership of Gen Sani Abacha, a military dictator. The primary goal of this body was to checkmate the ugly advances of oil MNCs operating in the area. This was resisted by the state power that assumed this move to mean self-determination. The reprisal is recorded in history as there were thousands of deaths, exile, wanton destruction and material disengagement. Same course of action and result were witnessed in the Odi assault in 1997

in Bayelsa state under the watch of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (Okolo & Inokoba, 2014; Okolo, 2010).

The President, Yar Adua, followed this reactive principle to its logical conclusion when he ordered a linear arrangement in Gbaramatu kingdom in 2009. All the same, the triple assault commanded very fierce result rendering the people almost de-stated. However, there is a marginal assault on the state security agent in the various exercises. The response of the state reveals a distinct variable with two unique determinants. One, the people have become physical exile in their home base. Two, even as they live in their primordial base, they remain exiles because they have been continuously exiled from the benefits of the available resources in their region. This is psychological exile at the domestic front. Moreover, Gbararmutu incident reveal a mark of distinction. The federal government having noticed the flaw associated with its realist intervention at the domestic site introduced the pacifier project - amnesty. By this measure, the various member of the insurgent group are expected to denounce their membership of the called militant groups and yield their instrument of warfare to the amnesty body in charge of this endeavour. This is paradigm shift from the realist to the idealist, viewed from the apparent dimension. It is needless to say that these three states are the highest oil producing state in country, and by cartographic configuration, they are linearly arranged in sequential order (Okolo, 2010; Onoge, 2004).

The realist and resistant posture of the state is heavily biased on the misconception of the ethno-nationalist desires without considering the relatively marginalization milieu. This counter-discourse relatively emphasizes the compromising stance established by the dual political views - dominant liberal and pluralist. The scope of the first view is broad and it entails even distribution of right and privileges to all its citizenry without due consideration of the primordial base. The second favours the sub-national identity as the basis of appropriation of resources. Ejibowah (2000: 31) juxtaposes the variances of the two modes of citizenship in an emphasis that the dominant liberal view “gives rise to constitution that have no obligation

to particularistic communities” while the contending view asserts “that each group in the country will withdraw behind the boundary of its identity”.

The controversy therefore lies in the derivation formula obtainable in the era of regionalism that heavily profited the tripartite ethnic hegemonies. It must be noted that within this period, the revenue sharing principle was 100% multiplier returns to source. The asymmetric relation lies in maladjustment of this same standard with the emergence of oil resources located in the Niger Delta. Most precisely, the insurgence nationalism is inspired by the minority bias as against the same sovereign privilege granted the three elite regions with the assumed command of the economy of the state.

Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

The extraction of the revolutionary paradigm from this confusion, denotes the antithesis of this arrangement vis-à-vis the two- actor insurgent group and the state institution. The state believes this concept is relevant to discharging the coordinated strength and influence of the post-nationalist institution. On the other side, this body considers the idea as a framework of hypothesis, and by all calculation, the conceptual solvency has to be tested, hence, the massive positive response to the amnesty call, at least, to define and resolve the perpetrator-victim relationship.

The central position and continuous marginal status of Niger Delta guarantees its regular periodic evolution in the socio-political and economic arrangement of the state. This is relevant measuring the relationship bordering on the reverberation of the Post-Cold War influence two decades after. This is configured on the dialectical face-off in the realities and speculations characterizing the upward trajectory of the organized ethnic nationalist insurgences and the state institution cum its systemic regime. Notwithstanding, the implosion that was witnessed during the Cold War in the clientele state has been mechanically transformed into the proactive explosion ranging from communal to ethnic restiveness. This is antithetical to the ‘New World Order’ that is formed around free international economies and reformed democracies.

The paper reveals a lopsided ratio of exploitation and development, which graphically defines the anxiety model of the politics of resistance and resilience, and by extension, located around elite supremacy and minority fixation. Beyond simplistic evaluation, the consistent interface between the two principals is subsumed in the policy thrust of the “new politics” in the Niger Delta Region. It thus, made two key recommendations that:

- i. the Government of African countries like Nigeria should adopt bottom-top approach to conflict management for the realization of sustainable peace process and socio-economic advancement cum political transformation in its resourceful Niger Delta region, and the country at large.
- ii. resourceful African countries like Nigeria should ensure to address and remediate the inordinate surge of ethnic nationalism as cardinal factor of overhauling the vertical cum exploitative propensity of the hegemonic government with its irresistible device of maintaining the status quo to reduce conflict in its resourceful region like the Niger Delta.

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AN ASSESSMENT OF TERROR-RELATED ATTACKS AND FATALITIES IN NIGERIA (2010 – 2020)

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ABSTRACT

The increase in fatalities as a result of terror-related attacks has been a major challenge to the Nigerian government in recent times. Against this background, the study examines the relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria (2010-2020) as well as their concomitant effects on Nigerian society. Premised on frustration-aggression theory, the study adopted a correlational design with the use of secondary data gathered and sorted out from Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), newspapers, and related journal articles on security issues. Descriptive (frequency-count) and inferential (Pearson moment correlation) statistics were employed for the analysis at a 0.05 alpha level of significance. Findings show the highest number of fatalities was recorded in the year 2014 with 15,600 deaths while the lowest was in 2011 with only 1,096 deaths. Likewise, the result shows a weak and insignificant association between terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria ($r = 0.385$; $P > 0.05$). Consequently, terror-related attacks continued to result in the loss of lives, properties, and peaceful living and thereby impacting negatively national development by making the government divert resources meant for development purposes to security votes. Hence, a steady increase in terror-related attacks in Nigeria. The paper therefore, recommends that government must tackle the root causes of terrorism and insurgencies to bring out a holistic blueprint and the political will to deal with offenders decisively.

Keywords: Terrorism, Insurgency, Terror-attacks, Fatality

Introduction

Terrorism has become a global threat. Various organizations, such as the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the National Security

Research Division at the RAND Corporation, the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), and others have made intensive research on terrorist attacks to develop countermeasures that mitigate or eliminate the negative impacts of terrorism. However, terrorist attacks still present a serious tendency. In 2012, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) responded to 8441 attacks in the world, a sharp increase of 66.6% from the year 2011. The 8441 attacks caused 15401 fatalities, a significant increase of 88.9% compared with 2011. According to Guohua et. al. (201), after 2004, the numbers present a significant increase and reach a peak in 2012. Meanwhile, in 2012, the fatalities and injuries all reach their peak and are more than any year before.

Conflict remains the primary driver of terrorism, with over 96 percent of deaths from terrorism in 2019 occurring in countries already in conflict. The ten countries with the highest impact of terrorism are all engaged in at least one-armed conflict as reported by Institute for Economics and Peace in the 2020 Global Terrorism Index. Despite the overall fall in the impact of terrorism across the world, it remains a significant and serious problem in many countries.

It was recorded that in 2011 alone, over 15,000 people were killed in terrorist-related attacks around the globe. This was due to the collective activities of the Al-Qaeda affiliate's terrorist groups (AQAP, AQIM, AQI, and AQKB) the Pakistan Taliban, the Somalia Al-Shabaab, and another local terrorist group. In 2015 four groups were responsible for 74 percent of all deaths from terror-related attacks. They are ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda. ISIL surpassed Boko Haram as the deadliest terrorist group in 2015. ISIL undertook attacks in 252 different cities in 2015 and was responsible for 6,141 deaths in the year. Boko Haram had an 18 percent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 5,478 deaths during the year. Al-Qaeda had a 17 percent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 1,620 deaths in the year. The Taliban in Afghanistan had a 29 percent increase in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 4,502 deaths from terrorism during the year.

The most significant security challenges and violent conflicts are banditries, farmer-herder conflicts, terrorism, secession agitations, kidnapping, cultism, and gang wars, communal clashes, and maritime piracy (Nextier SPD, 2021). These security threats and violent conflicts result in records of daily deaths, kidnappings, loss of property, and injuries. It is against this background that this paper examines terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria from 2010 to 2020, with the view to unravelling the situation and the contribution of terror-related attacks to the overall fatalities in Nigeria. To carry out this task successfully, the under-listed research questions and objectives are raised.

Regardless of the devastating and negative impact of terror-related attacks on the lives and livelihoods of Nigerians, there are strong pieces of evidence of efforts by state and non-state security actors and local stakeholders to curtain these menaces and entrench peace and security. In light of the foregoing, this study was designed to determine the frequency of terror-related attacks in selected states in Nigeria concerning fatalities resulting from the terror-related attacks. The study also responds to key research questions which bothered on:

- i. What is the general assessment of fatalities in Nigeria?
- ii. What is the frequency of terror-related attacks to fatalities?
- iii. To what extent are the terror-related attacks on fatalities in Nigeria?

To look at the relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities emanating from the attacks, a null hypothesis was formulated stating that: there is no significant relationship between the terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria.

Conceptual Framework

Terrorism

Terrorism comes from the term terror, which conjures up thoughts of dread and panic. It is an unprovoked, random, and unpredictable act meant to instil fear in the targeted victim (s). Terrorism remains a challenging topic to define and operationalize. This is due to the intangibility of the phenomena, which varies based on the historical and geographical contexts in which it is applied making it a value-laden notion. The United Nations issued the most

widely accepted definition of terrorism in 1992, defining it as "an anxiety-inducing method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, where the direct targets of violence are not the primary targets, in contrast to assassination" (White, 2004, p.4). Terrorism is defined as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to achieve a political, economic, religious, or social purpose through fear, coercion, or intimidation," according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which provided the data for this study (GTD, 2016: 9). Terrorism is regarded as a form of insecurity. It is the deliberate use of threat or violence by subnational groups to achieve political or self-interest aims through intimidation of individuals, as well as attacks on states and territories, including bombings, hijackings, and suicide attacks. It refers to deliberate, politically motivated violence done by subnational groups or clandestine operatives against non-combatant targets (US Commission, 2012; Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamuose, 2013).

Domestic and global terrorism have been characterized as distinct types of terrorism. Domestic terrorism refers to terrorist operations carried out in a host country against fellow citizens, their property, and the country's institutions and policies, whether for political or other causes. Consider the terrorist operations of Boko Haram in Nigeria and Sri Lankan Tamils. Transnational terrorism, on the other hand, involves more than one country. This can be due to the victims, targets, institutions, and supporters, terrorists, or the consequences (Sandler and Ender 2008). The 9/11 incident in the United States is a good illustration of global terrorism.

Insurgency

Fatality

A fatality is the death of a human-caused by an accident or is the quality of the disaster being able to cause the death of a human(s). Other causes of fatality exist in Nigeria such as neonatal disorders, communicable and non-communicable diseases, man-made and natural disasters maternal mortality among others. Fatality in the context of terrorism is a death caused by the activities of terrorists, on the way to and from the workplace, market, within the surrounding,

or during other works or movements directly or indirectly related to the occupation. Between 2011 and 2021, Boko Haram was responsible for thousands of fatalities in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Nigeria is the country most affected by the terrorist group's attacks. States in the Northeast register the highest number of fatalities. Borno is by far the most threatened state, in that, Boko Haram has caused over 34 thousand deaths in this area. For this paper, we are concerned with fatalities caused by the conflict in terror-related attacks.

Insecurity

The concept of insecurity is a multi-faceted and cross-cutting topic that has sparked controversy. Varied researchers have different perspectives on insecurity, with some linking it to how it affects individual lives and existence. Human security, according to the UNDP (1994), includes chronic dangers such as starvation, sickness, and repression. Insecurity is defined as a condition of worry or anxiety caused by a real or perceived lack of protection or inadequate freedom from danger (Beland, 2005; Achumba, Ighomeroho, and Akpor-Robaro, 2013). Achumba et al. (2013), on the other hand, believe that insecurity is a state of being exposed to danger, risk, or anxiety. When a person or thing is not in danger or at risk of physical or moral violence, accident, theft, or decay, it is said to be secure (Eme and Anyadike, 2013).

Remote variables, as well as direct and proximate factors, were highlighted by Achumba, Ighomeroho, and Akpor-Robaro (2013) as two (2) key contributors to insecurity. Lack of institutional capacity resulting in government failure; pervasive material inequities and injustice; ethnoreligious conflicts; public-government perception conflict; inadequate security system; loss of socio-cultural and communal value system are some of the remote variables. Immediate and proximal factors, on the other hand, include permeable borders, rural/urban drift, corporate social irresponsibility, unemployment/poverty, and terrorism.

Theoretical Framework

This research paper employed the Frustration – Aggression theory as its analytical framework. The Frustration-Aggression theory was propounded by Dollard, Miller, Mowrer, Sears, and

Doob in 1939 and later developed by Miller in 1941 and Berkowitz (1969) is commonly known as the frustration-aggression-displacement theory. The theory says that aggression is the result of blocking or frustrating, a person's efforts to attain a goal (Breuer and Elson, 2017). Frustration is that feeling which is experienced when what is being expected is not achieved or when there is an interference in gaining the desired goal. When first postulated, the theory states that frustration always precedes aggression, and aggression is the consequence of frustration. Dollard et al. (1939) put forth the suggestion that the strongest aggressive reactions are those directed toward the perceived sources of frustration. Aggression towards the source of frustration is one type of retaliatory behaviour (Breuer and Elson, 2017).

Nnoli (2006) argued that political exclusion, economic marginalization, and social discrimination threaten the security of citizens to such an extent that they regard the state as the primary threat to their survival. In a desperate attempt to protect their essential principles from the prospect of unjust government policies, victimized citizens take the law into their own hands. In short, poverty, displacement, and the Boko Haram insurgency all motorized each other in the region because they have a symbiotic relationship, with disenfranchisement and injustice as the main causes. Corroborating this view, Saleem (2012) noted that the Nigerian government cannot manage corruption, the rising inequality between rich and poor, the gross violation of human rights, and inaccessible education are responsible for the high level of radicalization.

Similarly, the theory's premise and insights will be extremely useful in the efforts to provide ways for addressing security concerns that security budgets in the country have failed to solve. Ethnicity which is already an existing problem become so heightened in recent times with loud hues of marginalization manifesting in forms of resource control, and secessionist agitations among others. More so, the reactive response of the government in this respect has escalated the spate of terrorist attacks, most especially as the act of criminality has been diversified to incorporate kidnapping, and banditry among others. These have overstretched

the security architecture of Nigeria which has resulted in the high rate of terror-related attacks and fatalities.

Methodology

This study used correlational designs, a non-experimental design in which relationships between or among variables are assessed without manipulating independent variables or randomly assigning participants to different conditions (Kerlinger and Lee, 2010). The choice of correlational research design is due to its suitability in obtaining information that is related to the degree of relationship between two or more variables (Cohen and Manion, 2009).

The data were gathered and sorted out by the researchers from Nigeria Security Tracker (NST). Descriptive statistics comprising frequency and percentage were used to analyse and answer the research questions. The relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities was analysed using Pearson Product Moment Coefficient (PPMC) at 0.05 level of significance to test the hypotheses. The use of PPMC allows data analysed to be correlated with less error (Sambo, 2008). It is therefore suitable for correlating terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria.

Data Presentation and Analysis

Research Question One: What is the general assessment of fatalities in Nigeria?

Table 1.1: Fatalities in Nigeria




Table 1.1 shows the highest and lowest fatalities in Nigeria from 2011 to 2021. The highest number of fatalities was recorded in the year 2014 with 15,600 deaths while the lowest was in 2011 with only 1,096 deaths. While there was a steady increase in fatalities recorded from 2011 (1,096), 2012 (3,761), 2013 (7,276) to 2014 (15,600), in the years 2015 (12,795), 2016 (5,748), and 2017 (4,633), there was a significant decrease in the number of deaths recorded. However, from 2018 (6,545), 2019 (8,340), 2020 (9,694) to 2021 (10,398) there was a steady and significant increase in the number of fatalities.

Research Question Two: What is the frequency of terror-related attacks to fatalities?

Table 1.2: Location, frequency, and percentage of terror-related attacks

Locations of Attack

Location	Freq.	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	108	.9	.9	.9
Abia	129	1.1	1.1	2.0
Adamawa	325	2.7	2.7	4.6
Akwa Ibom	164	1.4	1.4	6.0
Anambra	229	1.9	1.9	7.9
Bauchi	136	1.1	1.1	9.0
Bayelsa	319	2.6	2.6	11.7
Benue	509	4.2	4.2	15.9
Borno	2050	16.9	16.9	32.8
Cross River	187	1.5	1.5	34.4
Delta	596	4.9	4.9	39.3
Diffa	61	.5	.5	39.8
Ebonyi	156	1.3	1.3	41.1
Edo	290	2.4	2.4	43.5
Ekiti	174	1.4	1.4	44.9
Enugu	143	1.2	1.2	46.1
Extrême-Nord	67	.6	.6	46.6
FCT	241	2.0	2.0	48.6

Gombe	82	.7	.7	49.3
Imo	2	.0	.0	49.3
Imo	253	2.1	2.1	51.4
Jigawa	56	.5	.5	51.9
Kaduna	828	6.8	6.8	58.7
Kano	221	1.8	1.8	60.6
Katsina	350	2.9	2.9	63.5
Kebbi	29	.2	.2	63.7
Kofia	1	.0	.0	63.7
Kogi	1	.0	.0	63.7
Kogi	263	2.2	2.2	65.9
Koza	1	.0	.0	65.9
Kwara	141	1.2	1.2	67.1
Lac	2	.0	.0	67.1
Lac	26	.2	.2	67.3
Lagos	443	3.7	3.7	71.0
Maradi	2	.0	.0	71.0
Mayo Moskota	1	.0	.0	71.0
Mbreche	2	.0	.0	71.0
N'Djamena	3	.0	.0	71.0
Nasarawa	135	1.1	1.1	72.1
Nassarawa	80	.7	.7	72.8
Ngouboua	1	.0	.0	72.8
Niger	266	2.2	2.2	75.0
Nord-Ouest	1	.0	.0	75.0
Ogun	275	2.3	2.3	77.3
Ondo	279	2.3	2.3	79.6
Osun	171	1.4	1.4	81.0
Oyo	216	1.8	1.8	82.8
Plateau	499	4.1	4.1	86.9
Rivers	549	4.5	4.5	91.5

Sagme	1	.0	.0	91.5
Sokoto	115	1.0	1.0	92.4
Tahoua	2	.0	.0	92.4
Taraba	312	2.6	2.6	95.0
Tillabéri	4	.0	.0	95.0
Yobe	237	2.0	2.0	97.0
Zamfara	363	3.0	3.0	100.0
Total	12097	100.0	100.0	

Source: Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), (2022).

Table 1.2 shows the location, frequency, and percentage of terror-related attacks in Nigeria. Borno State experienced the highest frequency of terror-related attacks with 2,050 contributing 16.9% (valid) and 32.8% cumulative percent respectively. Kebbi state has the lowest frequency of terror-related attacks with 29 frequency, 0.2 valid, and cumulative percentages respectively.

Research Question Two: To what extent are the terror-related attacks on fatalities in Nigeria?

Table 1.3: Terror-related attacks in Nigeria from 2011 – 2021




Table 1. 3 shows the number of terror-related attacks in Nigeria from 2011 to 2021. The year 2011 has the lowest number with only 203 while the year 2021 has the highest number with 2,283. In the years 2011 to 2016, there were increases and decreases, on the one hand, the years 2017 to 2021 experienced a steady increase in the number of terror-related attacks. The implication is that, as the number of terror-related attacks increases, the number of fatalities also increases.

Hypothesis H₀: There is no significant relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria

Table 1.4: Relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria
Correlations

		Number of Attacks	Number of Death
Number of Attacks	Pearson Correlation	1	.385
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.121
	N	11	11
Number of Death	Pearson Correlation	.385	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.121	
	N	11	11

Table 1.4 presents the Pearson coefficient of correlational analysis in the terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria. The findings showed that ($r=0.385$; $P>0.05$) meaning that there exists a weak positive but insignificant correlation between the two variables, thus we have to accept the null hypothesis which states that there is no significant relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria, implying that increase in terror-related attacks does not have a significant relationship to increase in the rate of fatalities in Nigeria.

Discussions and Findings

Based on the results of the analysis herein above stated, the study discovered that 2014 recorded the year with the highest number of fatalities followed by 2021 and 2011 with the lowest as shown in Table 1.1. Furthermore, Table 1.2 confirmed that in the period under review, Borno State experienced the highest frequency of terror-related attacks with 2,050, with Kebbi State having the lowest. Similarly, Table 1. 3 showed that the year 2011 has the lowest number of terror-related attacks with only 203 while the year 2021 has the highest number with 2,283.

More so, the study also finds that terror-related attacks are not the highest cause of fatality in Nigeria. This assertion is confirmed in Table 1.4 (correlation table) where the computed r value is 0.385 and $P > 0.05$ indicates the 2 variables; terror-related attacks and fatalities are not significantly related/correlated as there is not enough evidence to show that the two variables have strongly associated, hence the null hypothesis is accepted. This finding disagrees with the studies of Nextier SPD (2021), Global Peace Index (2020), Mueller (2013), and Hanna et al., (2021) who found that terror-related attacks and fatalities correlated with each other. These studies showed that terror-related attacks have no significant impact on fatalities in Nigeria. This finding implies that, even though terror-related has no significant correlation with fatalities in Nigeria, the attacks still play a vital role in the number of fatalities in Nigeria, government and security forces should be helped by all stakeholders to provide credible intelligence that will lead to forestalling terror-related attacks as well as reducing the number of fatalities from these attacks.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Nigeria is facing an increasing threat of terror-related attacks, which has serious implications for the development of the country, even though not at a significant level to overall fatalities recorded in Nigeria. In the last decade, many Nigerians have fled from their homes as a result of those incidents to other states and neighbouring countries. The Federal government has numerous military operations, but the impact has been insignificant. While reduction in terror-

related attacks by the dreaded Boko Haram terrorist and ISWAP, there were renewed attacks in the last 2 years by the newly declared terrorist group “Bandits”. The mass kidnapping of innocent citizens with a high ransom demand, killing, abduction, and arrogant counter-show of force by the bandits concerning military operations, shows that the government’s effort to counter-terrorism has not yielded the desired results. Against this backdrop, government must address the root cause of terrorism which is the structural inequalities that drive people to terrorism.

In the light of the above, the study makes the following recommendations:

- i. Nigerian government must fix the root causes of terrorism and address the political and socio-economic factors (inequality, poverty, and unemployment among others) that birthed terrorism amongst the once peace-loving people of Nigeria.
- ii. Second, the country’s political elite must rise to the governance challenges, including the arduous efforts required to deliver developmental projects, social actions, and people-oriented programs to alleviate their suffering.
- iii. Third, there is a need for a more responsive and inclusive system of government anchored on strong democratic institutions.
- iv. There is need for security sector reform. The inability of the government security agencies to rise to the threat from non-state violent actors is a manifestation of the State’s weakness;
- v. security operatives at national and regional levels should work together to deploy surveillance over the borders; and
- vi. Nigeria has many ungoverned spaces or places with minimal government presence. Terrorists and other miscreants use these spaces as safe havens.

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILES AND DYNAMICS OF INTER-COMMUNITY CONFLICTS AMONG FISHERFOLKS IN BAYELSA STATE, NIGERIA: A STUDY OF THE OGBIA, YENAGOA, AND BRASS LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the socioeconomic characteristics of fishing households in the Ogbia, Brass, and Yenagoa local government areas (LGAs) of Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Its main objective is to investigate the factors contributing to inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups in these LGAs, with the aim of advancing knowledge on conflict resolution and socioeconomic development in fisherfolk communities. A three-stage sampling technique was utilized to select 120 fishing households from six villages within the LGAs. Descriptive statistics and analytical techniques, including the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test, Bartlett's Test of Sphericity, and Principal Component Analysis (PCA), were employed for data analysis. The KMO test assessed data suitability for factor analysis, while Bartlett's Test of Sphericity determined the appropriateness of the correlation matrix. PCA was used for dimensionality reduction and analysis. The findings reveal a higher proportion of male fishing households across all three LGAs, with different age group distributions. Younger individuals are involved in Ogbia LGA, while those aged 36-45 are actively engaged in Brass and Yenagoa LGAs. Strong family structures were evident, with married fishing households being predominant in Ogbia and Yenagoa LGAs. A considerable percentage of fishing households in all three LGAs had tertiary degrees, and household sizes varied between the LGAs. Factor analysis identified multiple elements contributing to conflicts among fisherfolk communities, including loss of income, food insecurity, destitution, reduced access to social amenities, environmental degradation, disruption of fishing activities, loss of livelihoods, and economic decline. Understanding these factors can assist policymakers and stakeholders in developing targeted interventions to address the root causes of conflicts and promote peace, stability, and sustainable development within fisherfolk communities.

Keywords: Conflict resolution, Fishing households, Socioeconomic profiles, Sustainable fisheries management, Bayelsa State, Inter-community conflicts

Introduction

Socioeconomic disparities act as underlying triggers for inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups. Unequal access to productive fishing grounds, declining fish stocks, and limited livelihood opportunities intensify competition and tension between communities, exacerbating conflicts. External factors like environmental changes, policy decisions, and globalization further contribute to these conflicts, impacting the well-being and resilience of coastal communities. Social networks and identity also significantly shape inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups. Strong social ties within and between communities' foster cooperation and reduce conflict likelihood, while social divisions based on ethnicity, religion, or cultural differences can escalate tensions and violence (Pomeroy, Gente-Ferrer, and Pedrajas, 2017; Crona, Van Holt, Petersson, Daw, & Buchary, 2015).

Bayelsa state, Nigeria is one of the most resource-rich regions in Africa, with significant oil and gas reserves, as well as abundant fisheries resources (Ibeanu, 2011). However, the region has been plagued by conflict for several decades, with inter-ethnic and inter-community conflicts being a significant challenge. These conflicts are often fueled by political, economic, and environmental factors, leading to the displacement of people, destruction of property, and loss of lives (Ibeanu, 2011). Fishing is one of the major economic activities in the Bayelsa state, providing livelihoods for millions of people (UNDP, 2006).

However, fishing activities in the region have been adversely affected by the persistent inter-community conflicts. Inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups pose persistent challenges in coastal regions worldwide, arising from a complex interplay of socioeconomic factors, resource competition, governance issues, and social dynamics within and between fishing communities. These conflicts have resulted in the destruction of fishing equipment, disruption of fishing activities, and displacement of fishing communities (Grüss, 2014). The fisherfolk have also been victims of attacks, with many losing their lives or sustaining injuries (Okonta and Douglas, 2001).

Inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups have far-reaching socioeconomic impacts on the affected communities. These impacts include loss of income, food insecurity, poverty, and reduced access to social amenities. The destruction of fishing equipment and disruption of fishing activities have led to a decline in fish production, leading to reduced income for the fisherfolk (Alvernia, Utomo, Soesilo, Herdiansyah, 2021). The fisherfolk have also been forced to abandon their fishing communities and relocate to other areas, leading to a loss of land and property.

Understanding the socioeconomic profiles and dynamics of these conflicts is crucial for developing effective strategies to manage tensions, promote social cohesion, and ensure sustainable resource management (Allison, Neil, and Oliver, 2018). While numerous studies have explored the socioeconomic characteristics of fishing communities in Bayelsa State, there is a research gap in assessing the specific socioeconomic factors contributing to inter-community conflicts. Additionally, the dynamics of community conflicts among fisherfolk groups and their implications have not been comprehensively explored in the context of the Ogbia, Yenagoa, and Brass Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Therefore, this research aims to bridge these gaps by conducting a comprehensive study on the socioeconomic profiles and dynamics of inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups in the aforementioned LGAs of Bayelsa State, Nigeria.

Objectives of the study

- i. Investigate the socio-economic dynamics within fishing households in Ogbia, Brass, and Yenagoa LGAs of Bayelsa State, Nigeria.
- ii. Assess the factors contributing to inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups in Ogbia, Yenagoa, and Brass LGAs of Bayelsa State, Nigeria.
- iii. Examine the interconnections and relationships among the identified factors to understand the complex dynamics of inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups in the study areas.

- iv. Identify potential policy interventions and strategies to mitigate inter-community conflicts, promote peace and stability, and foster sustainable development within the fisherfolk communities of Ogbia, Yenagoa, and Brass LGAs

Materials and Methods

Bayelsa State, situated in southern Nigeria, shares borders with Rivers State and Delta State. It is located in the resource-rich Niger Delta region, famous for its abundant oil and gas reserves. The state boasts an intricate network of rivers, creeks, and mangrove swamps. Its population is diverse, encompassing ethnic groups like Ijaw, Ogbia, Nembe, and Epie-Atissa. Agriculture, fishing, and palm oil production play pivotal roles in the state's economy. Bayelsa State, Nigeria is located between approximately 4.8107° N to 6.1656° N latitude and 5.5674° E to 6.7040° E longitude. In the wet season, temperatures range from around 21°C to 25°C (70°F to 77°F) minimum and 28°C to 32°C (82°F to 90°F) maximum. In the dry season, temperatures range from approximately 23°C to 27°C (73°F to 81°F) minimum and 32°C to 36°C (90°F to 97°F) maximum.

Bayelsa State, Nigeria has abundant water resources, including rivers, creeks, and mangrove swamps, supporting diverse fish species. Its proximity to the Atlantic Ocean enhances fish production potential. Fishing communities with extensive knowledge contribute to the region's fish production. The state government implements initiatives for sustainable fishing, while the substantial population of fisherfolks relies on fishing for livelihood, making a significant impact on the fishing industry. In Bayelsa State, Nigeria, there are several local government areas (LGAs) that are known for their significant fishing activities. Ogbia, Brass, and Yenagoa LGAs in Bayelsa State, Nigeria has significant fishing communities like Otakeme, Otuabula, Twon-Brass, Odioma seaside, and Agbura. These areas are renowned for fishing activities, contributing to fish production, local economy, and food security, making them vital for the state's development

The study employed a three-stage sampling technique to select the research locations and participants. In the first stage, three local government areas (LGAs) in Bayelsa State,

Nigeria, namely Ogbia, Brass, and Yenagoa, were purposively chosen based on the intensity of fishing activities. In the second stage, two fishing communities were randomly selected from each LGA. These included Otakeme and Otuabula from Ogbia LGA, Twon-Brass and Odioma seaside from Brass LGA, and Yenagoa and Agbura community from Yenagoa LGA. Lastly, in the third stage, a simple random technique was used to select twenty fishing households from each of these villages, resulting in a total of 120 fishing households.

Analytical Techniques

Descriptive statistics such as Mean = (Sum of all values) / (Number of values); Percentages (Part / Whole) *100. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test is a measure of sampling adequacy used in factor analysis to assess the suitability of the data for this analysis. The KMO test produces a value between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating better suitability for factor analysis. Calculate the KMO statistic using the following formula: $KMO = SPSS / (SPSS + SMR)$. The KMO value ranges from 0 to 1, where values close to 1 indicate a high degree of sampling adequacy, suggesting that the dataset is suitable for factor analysis. Values below 0.6 are generally considered unacceptable for factor analysis.

The KMO statistic is typically accompanied by a significance test to determine if the KMO value is significantly different from 0. A significant KMO value indicates that the dataset is suitable for factor analysis. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity: Bartlett's Test of Sphericity involves calculating the test statistic, which follows a chi-square distribution. Here's an overview of the formula:

Compute the correlation matrix, denoted by R , based on the dataset containing the variables of interest for factor analysis.

Calculate the determinant of the correlation matrix, denoted by $|R|$.

Determine the sample size, denoted by n , which is the number of observations or cases in the dataset.

Calculate the test statistic, denoted by T , using the following formula:

$$T = - (n - 1 - (2p + 5) / 6) * \ln(|R|)$$

In this formula: n is the sample size and p is the number of variables included in the analysis. Compare the calculated test statistic, T , to the critical value from the chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom based on the sample size and the number of variables. The degrees of freedom for Bartlett's Test of Sphericity are calculated as:

$$df = p * (p - 1) / 2.$$

The critical value is determined based on the desired level of significance (e.g., $\alpha = 0.05$) and the degrees of freedom. If the calculated test statistic, T , is larger than the critical value, reject the null hypothesis. This indicates that the correlation matrix is not an identity matrix and is suitable for factor analysis. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a technique used for dimensionality reduction and data analysis. It aims to transform a set of correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components. The formula for transforming the original data matrix X into the principal component matrix Y can be represented as:

$$Y = X * W$$

Where:

Y is the transformed data matrix of size $n \times m$, where n is the number of data points and m is the number of selected principal components. X is the original standardized data matrix of size $n \times p$, where p is the number of variables. W is the matrix of eigenvectors of size $p \times m$, where each column represents a principal component.

Results and Discussion

Table 1. Socioeconomic Profiles of Fishing Households in Ogbia, Brass, and Yenagoa LGAs

Profiles	Variable	Ogbia	Brass	Yenegoa	Total
Gender	Male	23 (57.5%)	26 (65%)	31 (77.50)	80 (66.70)
	Female	17 (42.5%)	14 (35%)	9 (22.5%)	40 (33.3%)
Age	18-25	12 (30%)	7 (17.5%)	3 (7.5%)	22 (18.3%)
	26-35	11 (27.5%)	7 (17.5%)	6 (15%)	24 (20.00%)
	36-45	9 (22.5%)	19 (47.5%)	20 (50.00%)	48 (40%)

	46-55	6 (15%)	6 (15%)	5 (12.50%)	17 (14.20%)
	56 and above	2 (5.00%)	1 (2.50%)	6 (15.00%)	9 (7.50%)
Marital Status	Married	24(60.0%)	2(5.0%)	33(82.5%)	59(49.2%)
	Single	12(30.0%)	38(95.0%)	1(2.5%)	51(42.5%)
	Widowed	4(10.0%)	0(0.0%)	6(15.0%)	10(8.3%)
Educational Background	Non formal	4(10.0%)	6 (15.0%)	10(25.0%)	20(16.7%)
	Primary	4(10.0%)	0(0.0%)	4(10.0%)	8(6.7%)
	Secondary	14(35.0%)	10(25.0%)	5(12.5%)	29(24.2%)
	Tertiary	18(45.0%)	24(60.0%)	21(52.5%)	63(52.5%)
Household Size	1-3 people	9(22.5%)	0(0.0%)	15(37.5%)	24(20.0%)
	4-6 people	17(42.5%)	37(92.5%)	14(35.0%)	68(56.7%)
	7-9 people	9(22.5%)	1(2.5%)	11(27.5%)	21(17.5%)
	10 or more people	5(12.5%)	2(5.0%)	0(0.0%)	7(5.8%)

The data presented reveals the socioeconomic profiles of fishing households in three local government areas (LGAs) within Bayelsa State, Nigeria: Ogbia, Brass, and Yenagoa. The information provided includes variables such as gender, age, marital status, educational background, and household size. In terms of gender distribution, across all three LGAs, a higher percentage of fishing households are male. In Ogbia LGA, approximately 57.5% of fishing households are male, while 42.5% are female. Brass LGA shows a similar trend, with 65% being male and 35% being female. Yenagoa LGA has the highest male representation, with 77.5% of fishing households being male and 22.5% female. Overall, males constitute about 66.7% of the total fishing households, while females make up around 33.3%. The gender distribution among fishing households in the three LGAs has several implications for understanding the dynamics and challenges within these communities.

Firstly, the higher representation of males in fishing households indicates a traditional division of labor where men are primarily responsible for fishing activities. This reflects entrenched gender roles and norms within the communities. Consequently, women may be

engaged in other roles within the household or community, potentially limiting their participation in fishing-related activities. Understanding the implications of the gender distribution among fishing households in the three LGAs is crucial for promoting gender equality, sustainable development, and targeted interventions. By addressing issues related to gender roles, economic disparities, access to resources, and decision-making, these communities can strive towards more equitable and inclusive societies that benefit both men and women.

Regarding age groups, the data reveals different distributions across the three LGAs. In Ogbia LGA, the largest age group among fishing households is 18-25, comprising 30% of the population, followed by the 26-35 age group at 27.5%. In Brass LGA, the largest age group is 36-45, accounting for 47.5%, while in Yenagoa LGA, it is 36-45 as well, constituting 50% of the fishing households. Overall, the most populous age group across all three LGAs is 36-45, making up 40% of the total. The implications of the age group distribution among fishing households in the three LGAs can provide insights into the demographics, labor force composition, and potential challenges within these communities. The distribution of age groups among fishing households indicates the composition of the labor force engaged in fishing activities. The higher representation of the 18-25 age group in Ogbia LGA suggests the involvement of younger individuals in fishing-related work. This may be attributed to factors such as physical strength, availability of job opportunities, or cultural practices. The larger presence of the 36-45 age group in Brass and Yenagoa LGAs suggests that individuals in this age range are actively participating in fishing activities.

Examining marital status, it is evident that the majority of fishing households in Ogbia and Yenagoa LGAs are married. In Ogbia LGA, 60% of fishing households are married, 30% are single, and 10% are widowed. However, Brass LGA exhibits a significant difference, with only 5% of fishing households being married and a striking 95% being single. Across all three LGAs, approximately 49.2% of fishing households are married. The higher percentage of married fishing households in Ogbia and Yenagoa LGAs suggests the presence of established

family structures. Marriage often signifies a partnership and shared responsibilities, which can contribute to a stable support system within the household. The presence of married couples may indicate the availability of social support, shared decision-making, and resource pooling among family members. Understanding family structures can help identify potential sources of support and leverage them for community development initiatives. By recognizing the implications of marital status distribution, policymakers and community stakeholders can develop targeted interventions and support systems that cater to the diverse needs and challenges of both married and single individuals within fishing communities. Addressing social, economic, and gender dimensions can contribute to the overall well-being, resilience, and development of these communities.

The educational background of the fishing households demonstrates varying levels of education attainment. In Ogbia and Yenagoa LGAs, the highest percentage of fishing households have attained a tertiary education, accounting for 45% and 52.5% respectively. Brass LGA shows an even higher percentage, with 60% of fishing households having a tertiary education. The lowest educational level observed across the LGAs is non-formal education, making up 16.7% of fishing households. Overall, a majority of fishing households, approximately 52.5%, have completed tertiary education.

The higher percentages of fishing households with tertiary education in Ogbia, Brass, and Yenagoa LGAs suggest the presence of individuals with higher levels of human capital and skills. Education plays a vital role in equipping individuals with knowledge, skills, and capabilities that can contribute to their economic productivity and overall well-being. Higher levels of education can enhance the capacity of fishing households to engage in diverse economic activities, make informed decisions, and adapt to changing circumstances. By recognizing the implications of educational background distribution, policymakers and community stakeholders can develop strategies to further strengthen educational systems, improve access to education, and promote lifelong learning within fishing communities. This

can enhance the human capital, economic prospects, and overall well-being of fishing households while fostering sustainable development in the LGAs.

Regarding household size, the data shows different distributions across the three LGAs. In Ogbia LGA, the most common household size category is 4-6 people, accounting for 42.5% of fishing households. In Brass LGA, the majority of fishing households have a larger household size, with 92.5% falling into the 4-6 people category. On the other hand, Yenagoa LGA exhibits a higher percentage of smaller households, with 37.5% falling into the 1-3 people category. Across all three LGAs, the most prevalent household size category is 4-6 people, making up 56.7% of the total. The varying distributions of household sizes across the LGAs indicate differences in resource allocation and management. Larger households, such as those in Brass LGA, may face challenges in managing and providing for the needs of a larger number of family members. They may require access to a greater quantity of resources, such as food, water, housing, and healthcare, to meet the demands of their household size. Understanding these resource allocation dynamics can inform strategies to ensure equitable distribution and support the well-being of larger fishing households.

Table 2: KMO and Bartlett's Test for Factors Contributing to Inter-Community Conflicts Among Fisherfolk Groups in Ogbia Yenagoa and Brass LGA

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.804
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	991.075
	df	55
	Sig.	.000

The statistical tests presented in Table 2 provide insights into the adequacy of the sample for factor analysis. Firstly, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure assessed the sample's suitability, yielding a value of 0.804. An acceptable KMO value is typically above 0.6, and in this case, the obtained value of 0.804 indicates that the sample is appropriate for factor analysis. Secondly, Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was conducted to examine the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix represents an identity matrix, implying no correlation between the

variables. The test yielded a statistic of approximately 991.075, which adheres to a chi-square distribution.

The significance value associated with Bartlett's test was found to be 0.000, indicating that the null hypothesis can be rejected at any reasonable significance level, such as 0.05 or 0.01. This suggests strong evidence of significant correlation among the variables in the correlation matrix, contradicting the assumption of an identity matrix. In conclusion, the results of the KMO measure and Bartlett's test demonstrate that the sample is suitable for factor analysis based on the KMO measure, and there is significant correlation among the variables based on Bartlett's test.

Table 3: Component Factors Contributing to Inter-Community Conflicts Among Fisherfolk Groups in Ogbia Yenegoa and Brass LGA.

Factors	Communality (CEI)	Component	
	Extraction Index	1	2
Loss Of Income	.800	.894	
Food Insecurity	.682	.815	
Destitution	.690	.826	
Reduced Access to Social Amenities	.533	.699	
Environmental Degradation	.838		.901
Disruption Of Fishing Activities	.731	.855	
Loss Of Livelihoods	.795		.778
Economic Decline	.688	.829	
Poverty And Income Inequality	.494	.696	
Social Unrest and Tension	.344	.419	
Displacement Of Communities	.880	.933	
Diagnostic statistics			
Initial Eigenvalues		5.801	1.674
% of Variance		52.736	15.219
Cumulative %		52.736	67.955

In Table 3, the analysis utilized Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as the extraction method, along with Varimax rotation and Kaiser Normalization. The Communality (CEI) measure represents the proportion of variance in each item that can be attributed to the extracted components. It indicates the strength of the association between each item and the underlying factors. Higher communality values, ranging between 0 and 1, indicate stronger relationships with the factors.

The Component Extraction Index indicates the intensity of the relationship between each item and the extracted components. Higher values indicate a stronger association with the respective component. Regarding the rotated component matrix, in Component 1, the analysis reveals that the factor of Loss of Income is strongly associated with the extracted components, as evidenced by its communality of 0.800 and a high component extraction index of 0.894. Similarly, Food Insecurity exhibits a significant relationship with the components, indicated by a communality of 0.682 and a component extraction index of 0.815. Destitution also demonstrates a substantial connection, with a communality of 0.690 and a component extraction index of 0.826. Reduced Access to Social Amenities shows a moderate association, with a communality of 0.533 and a component extraction index of 0.699. The finding is in line with Nyborg et. al. (2012) who noted that the effect of community conflict included limited access to the market due to security checkpoints, psychological stress, and continued fear, and insecurity limits participation in recovery activities (particularly women).

These factors, namely Loss of Income, Food Insecurity, Destitution, and Reduced Access to Social Amenities, are interrelated and signify a complex socio-economic issue. In light of this analysis, policy interventions aimed at addressing these issues could prioritize the implementation of poverty alleviation programs, the establishment of social safety nets, and targeted initiatives to enhance access to fundamental amenities such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Additionally, measures to promote income generation, job creation, and skills development could be considered as part of the policy framework to address this multifaceted challenge

In Component 2, the analysis reveals that environmental degradation exhibits a strong relationship with the extracted components, as indicated by its high communality of 0.838 and a significant component extraction index of 0.901. Similarly, disruption of fishing activities demonstrates a considerable association, with a communality of 0.731 and a component extraction index of 0.855. Loss of livelihoods also shows a moderate relationship, with a communality of 0.795 and a moderate component extraction index of 0.778. Economic decline is suggested to have a significant relationship, as it has a communality of 0.688 and a component extraction index of 0.829.

Furthermore, there are additional components that were not specified in the analysis. For instance, poverty and income inequality display a moderate association, with a communality of 0.494 and a component extraction index of 0.696. Social unrest and tension indicate a relatively weak relationship, with a communality of 0.344 and a component extraction index of 0.419. In contrast, displacement of communities demonstrates a strong association, as reflected by its high communality of 0.880 and a significant component extraction index of 0.933.

The Diagnostic Statistics

The Initial Eigenvalues indicated the amount of variance explained by each extracted component. Component 1 had an initial eigenvalue of 5.801, accounting for 52.736% of the variance, while Component 2 had an initial eigenvalue of 1.674, explaining 15.219% of the variance. The Cumulative Percentage represented the cumulative variance explained by each component. At the end of Component 1, 52.736% of the total variance was explained. Adding Component 2 increased the cumulative percentage to 67.955%.

The rotated component matrix offers insights into the relationship between each item and the extracted components in the factor analysis. Component 1 is associated with factors such as loss of income, food insecurity, destitution, and reduced access to social amenities. Component 2 is linked to environmental degradation, disruption of fishing activities, loss of livelihoods, and economic decline. Additionally, there are other components that include

poverty and income inequality, social unrest and tension, and displacement of communities. The initial eigenvalues and cumulative percentages provide information about the amount of variance explained by each component.

Table 4: Factors Contributing to Inter-Community Conflicts among Fisherfolk Groups in Ogbia LGA

Factors		Component		
	Extraction	1	2	3
Loss Of Income	.778	.752	.456	.066
Food Insecurity	.760	.771	.300	-.276
Destitution	.646	.761	.029	.257
Reduced Access to Social Amenities			.009	-.020
Environmental Degradation	.676	-.001	.012	.822
Disruption of Fishing Activities	.719	.788	-.035	.313
Loss of Livelihoods	.569	.192	.182	.707
Economic Decline	.653	.209	.757	.191
Poverty And Income Inequality	.578	.401	.524	.378
Social Unrest and Tension	.773	.330	-.811	.078
Displacement Of Communities	.704	.786	-.158	.249
Diagnostic statistics				
Initial Eigenvalues		4.240	1.719	1.353
% of Variance		38.549	15.629	12.299
Cumulative %		38.549	54.178	66.476

Table 4 presents the rotated factor loadings for the factors contributing to inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups in Ogbia LGA. The results from the rotated component matrix and diagnostic statistics indicate that various factors, including economic challenges, environmental factors, social tensions, and displacement, play significant roles in these conflicts. These findings have important implications for policymakers and stakeholders who

can utilize them to design targeted interventions aimed at addressing these factors and fostering peace, stability, and sustainable development within the fisherfolk communities.

Diagnostic statistics

The initial eigenvalues represent the amount of variance explained by each component individually. In this case, Component 1 has the highest initial eigenvalue of 4.240, explaining 38.549% of the variance. Component 2 has an initial eigenvalue of 1.719, accounting for 15.629% of the variance, and Component 3 has an initial eigenvalue of 1.353, explaining 12.299% of the variance. The cumulative percentages indicate the total amount of variance explained by each component and the cumulative progression. After Component 1, the cumulative percentage of variance increases to 54.178% with the addition of Component 2, and it reaches 66.476% when Component 3 is included.

Table 5: Factors Contributing to Inter-Community Conflicts Among Fisherfolk Groups in Yenegoa LGA

Factors	Extraction	Component	
		1	2
Loss of Income	.978	.987	-.062
Food Insecurity	.802	.889	-.110
Destitution	.718	.847	.029
Reduced Access to Social Amenities	.541	.721	.145
Environmental Degradation	.955	-.205	.956
Disruption of Fishing Activities	.923	.955	-.108
Loss of Livelihoods	.822	.369	.829
Economic Decline	.987	.988	-.105
Poverty And Income Inequality	.691	.773	-.305
Social Unrest and Tension	.669	.491	-.654
Displacement of Communities	.933	.953	-.156
Diagnostic statistics			
Initial Eigenvalues		6.960	2.060
% of Variance		63.275	18.728
Cumulative %		63.275	82.003

The rotated component matrix in Table 5 provides insights into the interconnections among the factors contributing to inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups in Yenegoa

LGA. In Component 1, factors such as loss of income, food insecurity, destitution, reduced access to social amenities, environmental degradation, disruption of fishing activities, loss of livelihoods, economic decline, poverty and income inequality, social unrest and tension, and displacement of communities demonstrate high loadings above 0.7, indicating a significant and strong association with Component 1. Component 2 also exhibits notable loadings for environmental degradation, disruption of fishing activities, and displacement of communities, suggesting a moderate to strong association with Component 2.

These findings imply that the factors linked to economic challenges, food insecurity, environmental degradation, social tensions, and displacement are interconnected and play a role in inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups in Yenegoa LGA. The substantial and moderate associations observed in the rotated component matrix underscore the relevance of these factors in comprehending the underlying dynamics of inter-community conflicts.

Table 6: Factors Contributing to Inter-Community Conflicts among Fisherfolk Groups in Brass LGA

Factors	Component	
	1	2
Loss of Income	.609	.637
Food Insecurity	.996	.057
Destitution	.996	.057
Reduced Access to Social Amenities	.996	.057
Environmental Degradation	-.282	.907
Disruption Of Fishing Activities	.155	.909
Loss Of Livelihoods	.836	.543
Economic Decline	.183	.923
Poverty And Income Inequality	.955	.029
Social Unrest and Tension	.539	.660
Displacement Of Communities	.941	.332

The rotated component matrix presented in Table 6 offers valuable insights into the interconnections among the factors contributing to inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups in Brass LGA. Component 1, characterized by high loadings ranging from 0.609 to 0.996, demonstrates a strong association with factors such as loss of income, food insecurity, destitution, reduced access to social amenities, loss of livelihoods, poverty and income inequality, social unrest and tension, and displacement of communities. These findings suggest that these factors are closely linked and contribute significantly to Component 1. On the other hand, Component 2 exhibits notable loadings ranging from 0.543 to 0.923 for factors including environmental degradation, disruption of fishing activities, economic decline, and social unrest and tension. This indicates a moderate to strong association between these factors and Component 2. While they contribute to the overall understanding of inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups in Brass LGA, their influence is relatively less pronounced compared to the factors in Component 1.

The associations observed in the rotated component matrix enhance our comprehension of the underlying dynamics of inter-community conflicts among fisherfolk groups in Brass LGA. Specifically, Component 1, primarily driven by factors related to economic challenges, food insecurity, poverty, social tensions, and displacement, emerges as a significant contributor to these conflicts. Component 2, which encompasses factors associated with environmental degradation, disruption of fishing activities, economic decline, and social unrest and tension, also plays a role, albeit to a lesser extent.

Conclusion

The analysis of the socioeconomic profiles of fishing households in Ogbia, Brass, and Yenagoa LGAs in Bayelsa State, Nigeria, provides valuable insights into the gender distribution, age groups, marital status, educational background, and household sizes within these communities. The findings highlight important implications for understanding the dynamics, challenges, and potential interventions to promote sustainable development and inclusive societies.

The study reveals a higher representation of males in fishing households across all three LGAs, indicating a traditional division of labor where men are primarily responsible for fishing activities. This reflects entrenched gender roles and norms within the communities, potentially limiting women's participation in fishing-related activities. The age group distribution among fishing households varies across the LGAs, with the 36-45 age group being the most populous. This suggests active participation of individuals in this age range in fishing activities. The prominence of the 36-45 age group highlights the importance of intergenerational knowledge transfer and succession planning within fishing households. Ensuring the transfer of knowledge and skills to younger generations is crucial for maintaining fishing livelihoods and preserving cultural heritage.

Marital status distribution reveals that the majority of fishing households in Ogbia and Yenagoa LGAs are married, indicating the presence of established family structures and potential sources of support within the households. Recognizing family structures can help develop targeted interventions and support systems that cater to the diverse needs and challenges of both married and single individuals within fishing communities. Educational background distribution highlights higher levels of education attainment among fishing households in all three LGAs, particularly in Ogbia, Brass, and Yenagoa LGAs.

This suggests the presence of individuals with higher levels of human capital and skills. Strengthening educational systems, improving access to education, and promoting lifelong learning within fishing communities can enhance the human capital, economic prospects, and overall well-being of fishing households. The distribution of household sizes demonstrates differences in resource allocation and management across the LGAs. Larger households may face challenges in managing and providing for the needs of a larger number of family members. Understanding resource allocation dynamics can inform strategies to ensure equitable distribution and support the well-being of larger fishing households.

The statistical tests, including the KMO measure and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity, indicate that the sample used for factor analysis in studying inter-community conflicts among

fisherfolk groups in Ogbia, Yenagoa, and Brass LGAs is suitable and demonstrates significant correlations among the variables. Economic challenges, such as loss of income, food insecurity, destitution, poverty, and income inequality, have been identified as major contributors to conflicts. These factors highlight the need for policies and interventions that focus on poverty alleviation, income support, and economic diversification to reduce dependence on fishing and improve the economic conditions of the fisherfolk communities. Environmental degradation and the disruption of fishing activities have also been found to play a significant role in inter-community conflicts. Furthermore, social tensions and the displacement of communities have been identified as factors that contribute to inter-community conflicts.

Recommendation

- i. Develop and implement programs that challenge traditional gender roles and norms, promote women's participation in fishing-related activities, and enhance their access to resources, decision-making, and economic opportunities;
- ii. Establish initiatives to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and skills from older generations to younger ones within fishing households;
- iii. Promote sustainable fishing practices, environmental conservation, and responsible resource management within fishing communities;
- iv. Establish social safety nets and support systems to address the vulnerabilities and socio-economic challenges faced by fishing households to include access to healthcare, social security, microfinance services, and community-based initiatives;
- v. Implement targeted programs to address economic challenges faced by fisherfolk communities, including income generation initiatives, vocational training, access to credit and financial services, and support for alternative livelihood options beyond fishing;

- vi. Facilitate community dialogues, promote social cohesion, and establish mechanisms for conflict resolution and dispute settlement. Strengthen community-based organizations; and
- vii. Foster inclusive and participatory decision-making processes by involving fisherfolk communities, local government authorities, civil society organizations, and relevant stakeholders in the development, implementation.

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PATTERN AND IMPACT OF PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL ABUSE ON WOMEN IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Physical and emotional abuse has been recognised as the most common form of spousal abuse among women in Nigeria. This study aims to determine the pattern and impact of physical and emotional abuse among women in Nigeria. A systematic review method was employed. Data were extracted from the articles with relevant information and also from the 2008, 2013, and 2018 Nigeria Demographic and Health Surveys. The prevalence of physical and emotional abuse is high and has risen substantially in recent years. The most commonly reported form of physical abuse by the women was being slapped by their spouses, while the most frequently reported form of emotional abuse was being insulted or being made to feel bad about themselves. Those most affected include those employed not for cash; those divorced, separated or widowed; those with primary education; those in the middle wealth quintile; those whose husbands get drunk very often; and those whose fathers beat their mothers. The most common types of injuries experienced by the victims of spousal abuse were cuts, bruises or aches, followed by eye injuries, sprains, dislocations, or burns. Physically and emotionally abused women were less likely to use antenatal care and delivery services, and more likely to experience pregnancy termination and lose a child under five years old. This study showed a high prevalence of physical and emotional abuse among women in Nigeria with a severe negative impact on their physical, mental and reproductive health. Routine screening for spousal abuse among women for early detection and intervention, women empowerment, and stiff penalties for the perpetrators were recommended to safeguard women's health and well-being.

Keywords: Abuse, Physical, Emotional, Pattern, Impact, Women

Introduction

Physical and emotional abuse has been recognised as the most common form of spousal abuse among women in Nigeria. They are sub-sets of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) which generally refers to violence against women perpetrated by their husbands or their male partners in the event of not being legally married (World Health Organization, 2013). All social, economic, religious, and cultural groups are affected by it (Ellsberg & Heise, 2005). It is an act, attitude, or circumstance that produces or is likely to cause bodily harm, sexual assault, or emotional anguish. (Ellsberg *et al.*, 2008). It covers physical abuse like slapping, hitting, kicking, or beating; emotional/psychological abuse like intimidation, constant belittling, or humiliation; forced sexual contact and other types of sexual coercion; or any other forms of controlling behaviour like isolating a partner from family and friends, watching a partner's every move, keeping tabs on their activities, and limiting access to information or assistance (Krug *et al.*, 2002a; World Health Organization, 2013). Activities that are violent by nature include threats and intimidation since they result from a power dynamic (Krug *et al.*, 2002b).

Any nonphysical action or attitude that aims to humiliate, intimidate, punish, or isolate another person is considered emotional abuse (Engel, 2002). Verbal abuse, domination, control, seclusion, mockery, or using private information for degrading purposes are all examples of emotional abuse (Follingstad, Coyne, & Gambone, 2005). The victim's emotional and psychological health is the primary focus of emotional abuse, which frequently comes before physical violence. According to Gondolf, Heckert, and Kimmel (2002), there is a strong association between physical and emotional abuse in batterer populations, and verbal abuse during the early stages of a relationship is a strong indicator of later violent spousal abuse (Schumacher & Leonard, 2005). As a result, there is an increasing focus on comprehending emotional abuse as a concept distinct from physical abuse, deserving of its own theories and prevention methods (O'Leary & Maiuro, 2001).

Marriage has many advantages, including the best conditions for childbirth and raising children, encouraging a healthy lifestyle, offering emotional support, and lowering depression, marriage issues may be disastrous if domestic violence is rampant (Tanimu *et al.*, 2016; Onigbogi *et al.*, 2015; Campbell, 2002). Abuse however, destroys lives, shatters communities, and prevents progress (World Health Organization, 2013). It seriously affects the health and well-being of women, and it comes at a tremendous cost to people, healthcare systems, and society as a whole (Garcia-Moreno *et al.*, 2005).

In sub-Saharan Africa, the IPV prevalence ranges from 30.5 percent in Nigeria to 43.4 percent in Zimbabwe, 45.3 percent in Kenya, 45.5 percent in Mozambique, 53.9 percent in Zambia, and 57.6 percent in Cameroun (Bamiwuye *et al.*, 2014). According to a Tanzanian study, 61 percent of women experience physical or sexual IPV; the prevalence rates varied by sociodemographic factors, with younger women, women who dated younger males, and women with lower levels of education having substantially higher prevalence rates (Kapiga *et al.*, 2017). Thirty-six percent of women in urban sub-Saharan Africa said they had at least one type of IPV (Izugbara *et al.*, 2020). Thirty-one percent of South African women reported experiencing physical IPV (Gasset *al.*, 2011). In Tanzania, 27% of women reported having engaged in physical or sexual IPV in the previous year (Kapiga *et al.*, 2017). In Ghana, almost 34% of women reported IPV in the last year; 21.4 % reported physical or sexual assault, and 24.6 % reported emotional abuse (Alangea *et al.*, 2018).

Given the high prevalence of physical and emotional abuse among married women in Nigeria, and their adverse effects on these women, their children and families and the community at large, it is imperative to examine the trend of these conditions and their impact on the victims, particularly, with the consistently increasing poverty rates and other risk factors of the phenomenon. This study aims to determine the pattern and impact of physical and emotional abuse among married women in Nigeria.

Theoretical framework

This research adopted the integrated ecological framework by Heise (1998) as its theoretical framework. According to the framework, various elements in the social environment (including the personal history of the individual concerned, the microsystem, the exosystem and the macrosystem) impact IPV and other types of gender-based violence.

The literature has repeatedly identified many risk factors for IPV, including being a young woman, having little education, living in poverty, having experienced parental violence, having been sexually abused as a kid, and generally accepting violence (Sabri & Campbell, 2015; Rapp *et al.*, 2012; Jewkes, 2002). The interplay of social, cultural, political, economic, and biological elements underlies the complex social issue of abuse of women in intimate relationships (Dahlberg & Butchart, 2005). The views, prevalence, and manifestations of IPV are influenced by social, cultural, and religious beliefs worldwide. In some traditional societies, a man's right to physically punish his wife is often viewed as the cause of wife-beating (Krug *et al.*, 2002b; Gage & Thomas, 2017; Linoset *al.*, 2013).

According to research conducted in Nigeria, where husbands have the legal right to abuse their wives physically, the odds of spousal violence at the state level appeared significantly higher (Linoset *al.*, 2013). Additionally, the protective effect of higher status on the likelihood that women will experience IPV was reversed (Beneboet *al.*, 2018). Nigerian men are willing to follow the traditions that call for them to manage their homes and correct their partners when necessary (Beneboet *al.*, 2018). Although men can also be targets of this kind of violence, men commit the vast majority of IPV worldwide against women, and women are disproportionately injured by IPV (Caldwell *et al.*, 2012; Carmoet *al.*, 2011).

Results and Discussion

Prevalence of physical and emotional abuse among women in Nigeria

Studies conducted across Nigeria majorly reported high physical and emotional abuse prevalence rates among women, with emotional abuse being the most common type across the country. A hospital-based study in Kano, Nigeria, found that 42.0 percent of women had

suffered IPV, with 46.6 percent having experienced emotional/psychological violence, 29.0 percent experiencing physical violence, and 21.9 percent experiencing sexual abuse (Tanimu *et al.*, 2016). Research conducted in various regions of Nigeria discovered that the kind of marriage and the partner's alcohol usage were significant predictors of IPV (Tanimu *et al.*, 2016; Onigbogi *et al.*, 2015). According to a household survey of IPV in two states of Nigeria, the prevalence of IPV during the most recent pregnancy was 22 percent in Cross River and 9 percent in Bauchi, with the risk being lower for low-income partners with higher education (Ansari *et al.*, 2016). A hospital-based study in southwestern Nigeria found that 31.2 percent of women had IPV related to infertility and that IPV predictors included unemployment and chronic marital infertility (Adulogu *et al.*, 2015). In a study of male civil servants in Ibadan, Nigeria, 31.2 percent of the men admitted to sexual abuse, 23 percent admitted to psychological abuse, and 11.7 percent admitted to physical violence against their intimate partners the previous year. About 30.7 percent of the men supported wife beating under certain conditions (Adejimi *et al.*, 2014).

The findings from studies conducted across Nigeria align with the results of the previous Nigeria Demographic and Health Surveys in which emotional abuse was the most prevalent form of spousal abuse among women, followed by physical abuse (NPC, Nigeria & ICF Macro, 2009; NPC, Nigeria & ICF International, 2014; NPC, Nigeria & ICF, 2019). An examination of the trend of the phenomenon shows that while the prevalence of emotional abuse decreased from 23.6 percent in 2008 to 19.2 percent in 2013, it rose substantially to 31.7 percent in 2018. Also, while the prevalence of physical abuse fell from 17.5 percent in 2008 to 14.4 percent in 2013, it increased considerably to 19.2 percent in 2018. (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Prevalence of physical and emotional abuse among women in Nigeria

Common forms of physical and emotional abuse among women in Nigeria

The most commonly reported form of physical abuse by the women was being slapped by their spouses, while the most frequently reported form of emotional abuse was being insulted or being made to feel bad about themselves (Table 1).

Variables	NDHS 2008 Condition (%)	NDHS 2013 Condition (%)	NDHS 2018 Condition (%)
Physical abuse			
Most common forms experienced	Slapped her (16.0)	Slapped her (12.7)	Slapped her (16.0)
	Kicked, dragged, or beat her up (6.0)	Pushed, shook, or threw something at her (6.7)	Kicked, dragged, or beat her up (9.0)
	Pushed, shook, or threw something at her (5.4)	Kicked, dragged, or beat her up (5.2)	Pushed, shook, or threw something at her (7.0)
Emotional violence			

Most common forms experienced	Insulted her or made her feel bad about herself (16.6)	Insulted her or made her feel bad about herself (15.5)	Insulted her or made her feel bad about herself (28.0)
	Said or did something to humiliate her in front of others (14.9)	Said or did something to humiliate her in front of others (10.7)	Said or did something to humiliate her in front of others (10.7)

Factors associated with physical and emotional abuse among women in Nigeria

The proportion of respondents with physical or emotional abuse was consistently and significantly highest among respondents who were employed not for cash; those who were divorced, separated or widowed; those with primary education; those in the middle wealth quintile; those whose husbands get drunk very often, and those whose fathers beat their mothers (Table 2). The higher prevalence of physical and emotional abuse among those employed not for cash is not surprising as they bear a double tragedy of work stress, which makes it difficult for them to fulfil their duties at home, and the financial burden of not being paid in cash. Similar to the finding in this study, high levels of conflict have been observed in marriages when the female has full-time work (Kamp Dush & Taylor, 2012). Full-time jobs are often more taxing for women than men since they regularly conflict with additional duties at home. Also, due to their long work hours, the effects of work stress on women may make it more difficult for them to handle interpersonal issues.

Table 2: Factors associated with physical and emotional abuse among women in Nigeria

Variables	NDHS 2008 Condition (%)	NDHS 2013 Condition (%)	NDHS 2018 Condition (%)
Current age			
Lowest prevalence	15-19 (22.4)	15-19 (14.9)	15-19 (23.4)
Highest prevalence	30-39 (30.8)	30-39 (27.2)	25-29 (37.9)
Employed past 12 months			
Lowest prevalence	Not employed (25.6)	Not employed (18.0)	Not employed (31.6)
Highest prevalence*	Employed not for cash (38.0)	Employed not for cash (45.5)	Employed not for cash (48.5)

Number of living children			
Lowest prevalence	0 (22.7)	0 (16.5)	0 (31.8)
Highest prevalence	5+ (34.4)	3-4 (26.7)	3-4 (38.4)
Marital status and duration			
Lowest prevalence	Married only once, 0-4 years (24.4)	Married or living together (23.5)	Married or living together (35.4)
Highest prevalence*	Divorced/separated /widowed (43.5)	Divorced/separated /widowed (40.7)	Divorced/separated /widowed (49.2)
Residence			
Lowest prevalence	Urban (27.5)	Rural (22.8)	Urban (33.5)
Highest prevalence	Rural (31.9)	Urban (27.4)	Rural (38.3)
Zone			
Lowest prevalence	South West (17.6)	North West (11.6)	South West (20.3)
Highest prevalence	South-South (45.8)	South-South (35.8)	North Central (50.1)
Education			
Lowest prevalence	More than secondary (21.0)	No education (16.2)	More than secondary (25.6)
Highest prevalence*	Primary (38.1)	Primary (34.5)	Primary (40.4)
Wealth quintile			
Lowest prevalence	Highest (26.3)	Lowest (15.4)	Highest (28.9)
Highest prevalence*	Middle (35.0)	Middle (29.3)	Middle (39.8)
Husband's/partner's alcohol consumption			
Lowest prevalence	N/A	Does not drink alcohol (18.9)	Does not drink alcohol (30.2)
Highest prevalence*	N/A	Gets drunk very often (68.7)	Gets drunk very often (82.9)
Respondent's father beat her mother			
Lowest prevalence	No (26.3)	No (26.3)	No (31.7)
Highest prevalence*	Yes (53.3)	Yes (53.3)	Yes (65.5)

*Consistently and significantly highest; NA: Not available

Impact of Physical and Emotional Abuse on Married Women in Nigeria

Globally, both directly and indirectly, violence against women is linked to short- and long-term adverse health effects for women and children, and Nigerian women are no exemption

(WHO, 2013). Women who had undergone IPV reported worse health, more significant emotional distress, and more suicidal thoughts and attempts than women who had not had IPV, according to a WHO multi-country research (Garcia-Moreno *et al.*, 2005). Women comprise two out of every three victims of family/intimate partner-related homicide (WHO, 2013), Hindin *et al.*, 2008). IPV restricts a woman's ability to make choices about her reproductive health, increasing her risk of STIs and unintended births. Partner abuse during pregnancy has been linked to poor prenatal and postnatal care attendance, which raises the risk of preterm births, low birth weight babies, and neonatal intensive care admission (Hindin *et al.*, 2008).

Physical and emotional abuse during pregnancy can result in physical injuries, haemorrhage, mental health disorders and poor attendance to antenatal and postnatal care (Martin *et al.*, 2006; Mahenge *et al.*, 2013). Pregnant women subjected to IPV have a higher chance of developing mental health issues such as depression, PTSD, suicidal thoughts, and psychosis (Martin *et al.*, 2006; Mahenge *et al.*, 2013; Lau & Chan, 2007). Fetal and neonatal complications associated with IPV include miscarriage, prematurity and its consequences, low birth weight, premature separation of the placenta, stillbirth, preterm delivery and neonatal intensive care admission (El Kadyet *et al.*, 2005; Fanslowet *et al.*, 2008).

Several short-term adverse effects and long-term negative impacts of physical and emotional abuse have been documented among married women in Nigeria. Findings from the Nigeria Demographic and Health Surveys showed a high prevalence of different types of injuries among women following spousal violence. The most common injuries include cuts, bruises or aches, followed by eye injuries, sprains, dislocations, or burns. In addition, the prevalence of women who had experienced any injury in the past 12 months rose from 32.1 percent in 2008 to 33.0 percent in 2013 and 33.4 percent in 2018. Reports from studies conducted across Nigeria also show that in addition to causing injuries to women which has resulted in death in several cases, physical and mental abuse have serious adverse effects on

their reproductive health, utilisation of antenatal care services, and the health and well-being of their children.

It follows that there is now a severe risk to the health and welfare of women and children in Nigeria due to physical and emotional abuse of women. These findings underscore the need for family members, health workers, community and religious leaders, maternal and child health issues stakeholders, and women's rights activists to screen pregnant women for spousal abuse for early detection and intervention to safeguard their health and well-being.

Table 3: Types of injuries sustained by women in Nigeria following spousal violence

Types of Injuries	NDHS 2008 Percentage	NDHS 2013 Percentage	NDHS 2018 Percentage
Cuts, injuries or aches	28.2	28.8	29.7
Severe burns	6.9	NA	NA
Eye injuries, sprains, dislocations, or burns	13.4	13.3	13.6
Deep wounds, broken bones, broken teeth, or any other serious injury	6.7	6.6	10.2
Any of these injuries	32.1	33.0	33.4

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study showed a high prevalence of physical and emotional abuse among women in Nigeria with a severe negative impact on their physical, mental and reproductive health. Family members, health workers, community and religious leaders, maternal and child health issues stakeholders, and women's rights activists should periodically screen pregnant women for spousal abuse for early detection and intervention to safeguard their health and well-being. In addition, the government should prioritise women's empowerment through female education, female employment, and female emancipation (through promulgation and

enforcement of the necessary laws to protect women's rights and safety). Finally, perpetrators of women abuse should face stiff penalties to serve as deterrents to others.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT AS TOOL FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEBUILDING IN RURAL NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines local government as a tool for socio-economic development and peace-building in rural areas in Nigeria. It adopted the localism theoretical framework and relied on qualitative data, with extensive utilization of journal articles, monographs, magazines, and relevant web pages. The analysis was purely descriptive and content based (content analysis), wherein inferences were drawn. It unravelled that creation of local governments in Nigeria has made little or no positive impact on socio-economic development and peace-building in Nigeria's rural areas. The resultant effect is the decay of such vital services as accessible roads, good primary education, good primary health care, maintenance of streets and street lighting, skill development programme, electrification, drinkable pipe borne waters among others; and the escalated security threats and conflicts in the rural areas of Nigeria. The paper therefore suggested among others that the policies of local government should be directed at ensuring socio-economic development and peace for the rural populace such as curbing rural social vices and militia activities for purpose of sustainable peace-building, pipe-borne water provision, electricity, accessible roads, etc., and funds generated/allocated to the local government councils should be appropriately directed at socio-economic development and peace-building to improve living standard of the rural populace in Nigeria.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Derivative Principles, Ethno-Nationalist Movement, Niger Delta Region, Resource Control.

Introduction

Generally, local government all over the world is created (established) to exert basic services to the populace in a particular local government area. These services can be classified as socio-economic, political and security services (Ohwona, 2019; Okolo, 2017; Christmas, 2018). Such as ensuring lasting peace (which include remediation of social vices and militia activities for the purpose of protecting lives and properties), construction/maintenance of roads, market, primary education, primary health care, maintenance of streets and street lighting, collections of rates, rents, birth registrations, death, voter and other national functions that the local government collaborate with the state and central government to achieve its aim of creation.

However, since the colonial era, to independence and the 1976 local government reform and other reforms introduced in the local government system anchor on the political exigency. Notably, local governments have not justified its creation and not lived up to the expectations of the people in Nigeria in terms of socioeconomic development and peacebuilding, and particularly to the rural/local people who need the services of the local government directly. Relying on the collection of peace development indicators by the World Bank in 2015, the local populace in Nigeria accounts for 52.22%, and according to Albert (2001), rural are more bedeviled with security threats. Poverty is ravaging the rural dwellers, 80% of the inhabitants of the rural areas are deep in poverty with limited infrastructural and social facilities (International Food and Agricultural Development IFAD in Abdul, 2012; Okolo & Kasikoro, 2021; Okolo & Karimo, 2019; Cheng- Hopkins, 2010).

Similarly, local government efforts on rural socio-economic development and peacebuilding also faces a lot of external control imposed by government at the state level. The local government Service Commission which is in-charge of the employment, promotion and placement of personnel employed by the commission, most times employs manpower that is not needed by the local government. Presently, the majority of local governments in Nigeria cannot perform their statutory functions of security of lives and properties for the purpose of peacebuilding, and rural development; aggregation and mobilise of people to ensure national

development, with reason being that local government is over staff and the personnel deployed or imposed by the state government are not qualified (Okolo & Boubai, 2022). Nwosu and Umezurike (1989) cited in Eseduwo (2010) argued that few factors inhibited local government from serving as effective instruments of social mobilisation, peacebuilding, and community development. According to them, these include shortage of funds, lack of political and economic autonomy, shortage of qualified manpower and structural problems,

It is quite obvious that the rural areas in Nigeria lack good health care facilities, standard primary school system, pipe-borne water, lack of roads; the market are collapsing, there is upsurge rural to urban migration because rural areas in Nigeria lack basic social amenities to attract rural dwellers to stay in villages, and most devastating is the tense security challenges in rural communities, as experienced in the north, south and eastern parts of Nigeria. Thus, life sustenance became extremely problematic, particularly in the rural localities (Okolo & Boubai, 2022). In view of this backdrop, it is apparently imperative that this attempt is been made to investigate the issues of local government in relation to socio-economic development and peacebuilding in rural areas of Nigeria.

Conceptualization/Review

Giving the complexity, ambiguity and plethoric nature of concepts, particularly in the less scientific sphere, it is paramount to define and properly clarify on the use of concepts, thus, the major concepts are addressed herein.

Local Government

The term local government is difficult to obtain a generally accepted definition. It may be called the primary government established by law, having jurisdiction over its operation and recognised by the constitution. As stated by the United Nations Office of Public Administration-UNOPA (1976) cited by Okolo and Osimerah (2017), a local government is a politically subdivided unit of a given country (within a federal governance system) consisting of laws that substantially control local affairs, including powers that are constitutionally mandated purposes of taxation.

As an element of decentralisation, local government is a consequence of decentralisation. As noted in the literature by Olowu (1988), there are two advantages in the definition of local government. In terms of comparative studies, all these state agencies are considered as central government under the government at the central level. Secondly, the special features and details of the local government are determined in a more cautious manner. These salient features are concentrated in the following five areas: (1) legal personality, (2) locality, (3) effective citizen participation, (4) broad budgetary and employment self-sufficiency in terms of limited central authority control, and (5) performing peculiar functions with unique ascribed powers (special powers to perform various functions).

Furthermore, it should also be noted that this division of responsibilities is based on political interests and political agendas. Ohwona (2019) divide it as follows. (1) Requests and progress to improve the local government system under democratic support. (2) local government directs national and regional development. (3) Equitable distribution of financial resources between central, provincial and local authorities. (4) Equitable distribution of labor between the central administration and local administrations. (5) The balance between exchange and local government is efficient. (6) Information sharing and dissemination at all levels is accurate and consistent, and consultations are accurate and complete. (7) the expansion of democracy in all aspects of government, such as the full expectation of all citizens, regardless of gender or race, at the executive and governmental levels; (8) Social and political harmony. (9) Clarifying intergovernmental issues and the ability of central governments to pressure local governments to change laws. (10) The basic principles of governance are trust and justice and (11) the ability to innovate.

The definition proposed by Ibodje (2007), despite its obvious weaknesses, captures the essence of local government, which is closely related to many of the characteristics that Marshall recognised. At its core, local government is a government agency that exercises power in a restrictive manner, defining power within specific geographic boundaries and statutory jurisdictions. The main attribute of local government is the power to approve

legislation in terms of specific control, so autonomy is enjoyed in moderation. These attributes of local government are crucial considerations when local government is restructured, as it ensures that the fundamentals of local government are not overlooked.

Socio-Economic Development

Socio-economic generally refers to the economic life and behaviour of the people in a particular society. Socio-economic can be measured by what the people do for a living. What people do about work, income, social life, religion, political, economic and wealth creation, Socio-economic determines how people relate to others. The socio-economic life determined how the people related to good health, good education, and good roads (Abdul, 2012). The socio-economic generally refers to what improves the life of the citizen living within a defined area.

Eseduwo (2010) noted that socio-economic issues are confronting issues that the living behaviour of the people in the manner that relate to economic activity as unemployment, poverty, lack of education, e.t.c. Socio-economic is not only concerned with the income an individual has to better his living standard, but also a high level of employment, infrastructure, stressing values rather than achievement. The socio-economic development process comprising provision in relation to needs of infrastructures by the rural populace for the welfare of the people, particularly, the peasants, which if not addressed properly will result to development crisis (Okolo & Rufus, 2019). In this regard, socio-economic is used in this paper to mean the infrastructural need of the people which include; roads, water supply, hospitals, bridges, houses, employment creation and active participation in policymaking.

In aggregation, socio-economic development is a concept that underlies all changes in the socioeconomic field. Its importance is demonstrated by Stemlovsky (1987: 5) emphasises that "the concept of development is that which emanates from what is considered as a vision that is optimistic, an expression of concerns of social life and an analytical tool". Other concepts of development can be found in social and economic development studies.

Instead of discussing them, it is better to focus on constructing the concept of socio-economic development from the area of provision socio-economic services.

Peace building

The concept peacebuilding was first used in the 70s by John Galtung, in one of his presented documents when he recommended for the establishment of peace building structures to promote a sustainable peace to tackle the root causes of violent conflict and more so, promoting indigenous institutions for peace management and conflict resolution (Galtung, 1996). This implies that peacebuilding is targeted at constructing a better society. A report from the former Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 titled 'An Agenda for Peace' popularized the concept of peacebuilding in the international scene. For him, he sees peacebuilding as an action put to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict.

Christmas (2018) contended that peacebuilding focus on outside interventions that are designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict within a country by establishing a sustainable peace. He inferred further that peacebuilding activities addresses the remote and immediate causes of violence, create in the mind of the people a peaceful conflict resolution and stabilize the community politically cum socio-economically. In the same vein, Albert (2001), viewed peacebuilding as an art that repairs relationships, institutions, and social facilities and put in place possible schemes that can help bring back the disputing parties or communities together once again. More so, the concept can also be perceived to mean to preserved and ensure an enduring peace in the society, by treating the root causes of the crisis and genuinely reconciling the aggrieving parties (Nwolise, 2005).

Peacemaking in essence, allow for harmonious relationship that permits discussion, negotiation and promotion of understanding to resolve gray areas that triggers the conflict in the first instance. Peacemaking attempt to bring out the nitty-gritty of the facts that is causing the grievances, over reaction, etc., that led to the disputes and resolve them mutually with

agreements to maintain and work towards keeping the peace at all time by both parties (Christmas, 2018).

Theoretical Explanation and Methodology

The localism theory is adopted in this paper to explain the puzzle. The theory postulated that the development of the local or over-all with rural people, utilisation of resources from the locality (Paul, 2016). The localism theory postulated that local government should be represented by elected people from the locality. Localism means that the existence and practice of grassroots administration is rooted in the collective preferences of local people. Igwe (2007) observed that for local governments to remain local, it is expected that they adequately attend to stimuli from local in a way to reflect the aspirations of local populace

The theory of localism implies locality, local representation and the power to allocate substantial resources and manage a range of functions, which benefit most people in rural areas. The main features of the theory of localism are: local governments are seen as effective institutions for delivering local services, because of their proximity to the people, they can deliver certain services more effectively than other levels of governmental levels; assist other governmental levels in carrying out their functions and policies; Review knowledge domains and perform word segmentation; and engage various local communities in holistic development of the said area of the people (Ibietan, 2008).

The theory of localism was developed in the 20th century by Leopold Kor, E.F. Schumacher; Wendell Berry; Alexis de Tocqueville and Kirkpatrick Sale et al. (Igwe, 2007). Regionalism is based on large-scale movements and interests, and by moving democratic and economic relations to the local level, more social, economic and environmental problems emerge and solutions are more likely to emerge. It is obvious that several scholars as well as political campaigners have contributed immensely, as they agreed that democratising local entities, fully empowering local governments and empowering them to perform their functions will contribute to local development.

Methodologically, the paper adopted the qualitative research method, with extensive utilization of archives, texts, journal articles, monographs, magazines, and relevant web pages. The analyses were purely descriptive and content based (i.e content analysis), wherein inferences were drawn (Eneanya, 2012; Okolo & Boubai, 2021; Boubai, 2021).

The Philosophy Behind Local Government in Nigeria

Aside from the practical services they provide to citizens, Akani (2017) stated the fact that local authorities play a less visible but vital role equally in a democracy-based society. On the one hand, it secures an arena for civic related actions, as well as civic school. Those is imperative due to the fact that many citizens rightly feel helpless in the face of national as well as issues. Affairs at the national as well as international levels may seem overtly big and distant to affect groups of people living in remote places.

As Laski asserts that it quite difficult to realise fully as a government that is democratically oriented unless it first admits to the fact that problems at all levels are never central as well as the consequences of their occurrence need to be determined locally, by people, where and by what benefit. Who feels the most about the onset. This constitutes a real problem for local government, and hence the need for decentralisation. Decentralised governance allows for more direct participation in the governance process and empowers those who were rightly excluded previously from making the right decisions. By empowering communities and entities at the local unit to manage the affairs peculiar to them and by strengthening the close links that design central and local authorities' nexus, decentralisation makes development more responsive to people's priorities as well as needs and through true ownership, makes it effective.

Similarly, Decentralisation is a global trend for local government in a number of sovereign countries in the Middle East and Africa, Europe and North America as well as Latin America and Asia. Carlin cited in Eboh and Diejomaoh (2010) gave four reasons to strengthen local government. These reasons are as follows:

- a. local governments are more accessible and responsive, by which adaptability to local programs as well as security services can be exerted easily to meet the needs of a particular area.
- b. Resource allocation is efficiently done mostly by assuming responsibility for each expenditure at the level of government closest to the beneficiaries.
- c. local governments help reduce costs. When local people consider the money to be theirs, people will definitely be more interested in spending and use their money effectively. It also opens up more opportunities for community giving to expand local programs.
- d. it is implemented with community involvement, development programs can be tailored to the specific needs of local residents. These people can take part of the activities involved in decision-making and have a good sense that the actual project implemented will directly benefit them.

In short, community improvement increases ownership sense and therefore build the sense of peaceful coexistence and being responsible for certain government's project. The public thus emanates as stakeholder in bringing success to the said project and security needs. As a result, they devote more resources and time to achieving program goals. This will produce better results than when development plans are dictated by distant government agencies. This peacebuilding is easier and ensures stability even for the beneficiaries who own the scheme. The fact that local residents were involved in the initial planning encouraged them to carefully monitor and maintain the results of their planning activities.

It worth noting that the liberal classical democratic political theorists in the lights of JS Mill form the major source of support for decentralisation, arguing that decentralisation and public participation, particularly at the local level of political activities which formally bring benefits to both the national and local levels.

Local Government, Socio-Economic Development and Peace-building in Rural Areas of Nigeria

It is factual that local government is all over the world conceptualised as a body that is concerned with rural development, ensure lasting peace, and improve standard of living in

rural areas. The rural areas in this regard are the most populated segment of every society or nation, and therefore are most vulnerable to security challenges. The people in the rural area are in dire need of peace and development, in truth, they are very poor. The standard of living is very low and they lack basic social amenities (Akpomuvie, 2010).

In this regard, Ovaga (2012) sees local government as a veritable tool for economic and political development, and peacebuilding particular reference to the rural level in Nigeria. He asserted that it is local government that can best provide some essential services to the local people. He believes that local government is closer to the problems and challenges of the local people, and the fact that these people are best known by the local governments. It is the local government that can pull the resources and knowledge in the locality for the development of the local communities. He went further to conceptualised that local government can provide the needed security to the people because the local people know themselves and their environment (also see Albert, 2001).

Ovaga (2012) regards rural development and peacebuilding as a comprehensive way of planning for rural concerns that considers every sector which are termed important just like security services, agriculture services, education services, housing services, health services and equitable employment into a horizontal, horizontally linked system. The interlinked elements of the business as vertical linkages in terms of operations and space. The importance of rural development and peacebuilding lies not jus in the way it impacts readily on the rural people as well as their environs, but in also the way and manner it improves the country's peacebuilding and developmental milestones as a whole. In Nigeria, where most of the population and land are rural and rural production is low, rural mobilisation and peace offers the fastest, most effective as well as direct socio-economic development and peacebuilding route (Egbe, 2014; Abu-Saba, 1999).

It is obviously crystal that what is considered as peacebuilding and rural socio-economic development's scope is indeed quite wide and needs to be therefore considered comprehensively. These as pointed out earlier which include curbing social vices, remediating

militia activities, creation of new jobs, distributing income equitably, broad improvements in the areas of housing, nutrition and health, making arable land to be accessible easily as well as creating opportunities/incentive. Also, imperative to re-emphasise at this point is the fact that it revolves around the capacity building through educating and sharing the decisions and ideals to ensure sustainable peace and create opportunities that are multi-facet for individuals to realise their full potential which will therefore affect their lives positively.

Concluding Remarks and Policy Suggestions

It is absolutely pivotal to recall that local government all over the world is created to deliver basic services to the people in a particular local area. These can be classified as socio-economic, political and security services such as protection of lives and properties, curbing social vices and militia activities, construction and maintenance of roads, market, primary education, primary health care, maintenance of streets and street lighting, collections of rates, rents, birth registrations, death, voter and other national functions that the local government collaborate with the state as well as federal government to achieve its aim. However, the reverse is the case with the local governments in rural Nigeria in terms of security/peacebuilding and socio-economic development. The paper found that the creation and/or establishment of local governments in Nigeria has made little or no positive impact on socio-economic development and peacebuilding in rural areas of Nigeria. The paper therefore suggested that:

- i. the policies of local government should be directed at ensuring lasting peace and socio-economic development such as remediating social vices and militia activities, pipe-borne water provision, electricity, accessible roads, among others.
- ii. funds generated/allocated to the local government councils should be appropriately directed at socio-economic development and peacebuilding to bring befitting standards of living to the rural populace, as financial misappropriation thwarts its primary reason for local government creation/establishment in Nigeria.

- iii. the local governments in Nigeria should have a compulsory yearly audited accounts to be presented to the joint committee of selected citizens from each local government area in the country

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STATE AND NON-STATE-BASED ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: AN ASSESSMENT OF CAUSES, EFFECTS AND PEACE SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGIES

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ABSTRACT

The triggers of ethnic conflict are inherent in all societies. However, adaptability strategies for sustainable peace differ across communities. While some communities are in perpetual flux, others co-exist in the affluence of peace and mutual understanding. This study is designed to assess the possible causes, effects and peace sustainability strategies of state and non-state-based ethnic conflicts in Africa. Methodologically, the study is based on existing secondary data on contemporary strategies for peace sustainability. The study explores data on state and non-state conflicts collated by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2022). The theories of conflict and relative deprivation were utilized as the theoretical basis for the explanation of ethnic conflicts. Whereas State-based ethnic conflict was found to be fewer but result in large-scale fatalities, the reverse is the case for non-state conflicts. Ethnic conflicts lead to extreme violence, intense suffering, destruction of national assets and deaths. Women and children are found to be most vulnerable in the events of ethnic conflicts in Africa. The study further brings to fore factors such as the quest for political power and authority, struggle for scarce resources, fragile inter-communal histories, cultural discrimination, cultural practices, socio-economic exclusion and land disputes as the major trigger factors of ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the study recommends the engagements of seasoned professionals and academics in the area of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Psychology and Criminology for the resolution of ethnic conflicts; community participation in socio-economic decision-making and planning; enactment of laws to discourage speeches, actions and inactions that promotes ethnic hates; and the utilization of peacemaking and peacebuilding approaches in pre and post-ethnic conflict resolutions.

Keywords: Ethnic conflict, Peace sustainability, State-based conflict, Non-state-based conflicts.

Introduction

The sustainability of peace amongst human groups is crucial for co-existence. Efforts over time in this direction have been hindered intermittently by the triggers of ethnic conflicts such as inter-communal histories, cultural discrimination, cultural practices, socio-economic exclusion and land disputes. Ethnic conflict is considered not only a threat to communal habitation but also a major disturbance to international peace and security. The concept of ethnic conflict has been summarily described as a non-gorilla form of a discrepancy between one or more communities or parties. This implies that the interest or objective(s) of at least one party involved in the conflict is made known. Such interests do often have some ethnic coloration. Therefore, its antecedents and viable remedies are often perceived along ethnic lines. Generally, ethnic conflicts are not specifically hinged on ethnic differences but on political, economic, cultural, territorial and social matters (Kempin, 2023). Membership of an ethnic group is traceable or determined by shared ancestry, common history, residence, language or dialect and cultural heritage.

Within the 20th and 21st centuries, countries like Nigeria, Sudan, Israel, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Rwanda, Darfur, among others have had very disastrous ethnic conflicts. The consequences of ethnic conflicts are usually far-reaching to loss of human and animal lives, destruction of properties and critical infrastructure, human rights violations and other crimes against humanity. To this effect, ethnic conflict has been adjudged to contribute significantly to the retrogressive developmental pace of nations that have suffered consistently from the menace of ethnic conflicts (Megoran, 2007).

Nigeria, Ethiopia and Sudan are considered among the top African countries that have suffered from the menace of violent ethnic conflicts. Historically, Nigeria has witnessed the highest number of communal conflicts, however, it was ranked to have the third-highest number of fatalities in Africa. Whereas, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, relatively few numbers of conflicts had resulted in a high number of fatalities (UCDP, 2022).

Nigeria as an African country with huge diversity in its ethnicity is vulnerable to the menace of ethnic conflicts. A plethora of ethnic conflicts have been recorded in Nigeria. Some of these are the Oro and Hausa women conflict in July, 1999; the Kaduna/Enugu riot in 1999; the Lagos (Idi-Araba/Oko-Oba)/Kanu conflict, the Tivs/Iunkuns conflict in 2001, etc. These conflicts have persisted among other parties even up till the 21st century. For instance, on the 16th of February, 2022, conflict occurred between the Tiv and Jukin communities in Makurdi, Benue State, Nigeria. In Cross River State, Nigeria, the unending conflict between Nko and Onyadama communities over a piece of land has persistently caused havoc on the state and its indigenes. The dangerousness of ethnic conflicts cannot be overemphasized. Therefore, the need to unravel long-lasting measures that will guarantee sustainable inter-community peace is germane for any nation. Peace is a predictor of the quality of life and sustainable development. The absence of it is a threat to life and human existence. Therefore, when peace is sustained, other socio-economic elements of life are likely to be sustained.

Peace-making as an approach to conflict resolution is best suited in conflict situations where peace-building strategies had failed to achieve. When conflicts erupt, all reconciliatory efforts that are made to restore peace are classified within the auspices of peace-making. However, peace-building strategies are pre-existing peace templates that were established to avert communal conflicts. When these templates fail to sustain peace, conflict is bound to erupt. This paper is therefore a rigorous attempt to assess the roles of peace-building and peace-making strategies in inter-community peace sustainability in Nigeria. It takes into consideration past approaches in peace mediation and sustainability.

Literature Review

On the Causes of Ethnic Conflict

Scholarly contributions abound on the causes of ethnic conflict. The causes of ethnic conflict have been attributed to many factors, most of which have been over-subscribed and are considered manageable and even preventable if concerted efforts are made by stakeholders in fostering peace. These causes will be discussed thematically with an exploration of the

proliferated views of scholars on ethnic conflicts. According to Osadola (2012), in his study on a historical analysis of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria, the increasing level of poverty is a precipitating factor of ethnic conflict. Therefore, the degree of poverty in a community of persons determines the rate of joblessness and limited resources. When basic resources that guarantee livelihood are scarce, the available resources become a trigger of conflicts as the struggle for resource control or material possession will cause opposing community members to clash. This explains why most ethnic conflicts had their epicenter in the rural poor communities where there is a lack of the necessities of life; like water, roads, schools, medical facilities, etc. This type of environment is assumed to foster the presence of fear, hatred, distrust, and aggression.

The struggle for limited resources gives rise to inter-community conflicts. This is because the quest to exterminate a community considered a rival in order to possess the available limited resources usually becomes the priority of the conflicting communities. The rate of unemployment and poverty in Nigeria is worrisome and has been attributed to many acts of deviance (Ashibi, Okpiliya and Andrew, 2020). Every community desires to be free from all forms of external danger or threat particularly as it concerns their common wealth and existence. The fear of insecurity and the desire to protect its members from external aggression has driven communities into over-protectiveness and the encroachment of other peoples' rights. This often leads to reprisal attacks and a full-blown ethnic conflict. Areas of protective interest usually involve superiority of culture, religion, and security.

Cultural variations or differences is one of the prominent causes of ethnic conflicts. According to Edward B. Tylor (1871), culture entails that "complex whole which encompasses knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society". No two communities share the same culture. What may be acceptable in one community may not be the case in another. These differences in cultural practices often act as triggers of communal conflicts. Ali and Yahaya (2019) posited that the colonial administration gave room for Nigeria's disunity through the imposition of multiple cultures,

norms, values and traditions. Consequently, the various ethnic groups considered themselves as rivals and competitors rather than people with a common foundation. This competition and rivalry often result in violent conflicts among ethnic groups. Therefore, cultural and ethnic diversity will only produce a state of grave socio-political diversity.

The struggle for land ownership is often at the center of communal conflicts. The significance of land ownership is often attributed to livelihood, where a piece of land is utilized for various economic purposes, particularly for agriculture. For instance, the 21st-century Nigeria has witnessed a high rate of farmer-headers conflicts. These conflicts are land-related conflicts due to encroachment by another party in their quest for greener pastures or new settlements. This type of land-induced conflict between parties is age-long and among the earliest causes of ethnic conflicts (Brosche and Elfversson, 2012).

This accounts for one of the triggers of state-based ethnic conflict. Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) contend that highly diverse societies are not more conflict-prone. Rather, states characterized by certain ethnopolitical configurations of power are more likely to experience violence. The quest to occupy political offices breeds fertile grounds for state-based conflict to occur among different ethnic groups pursuing the same interest. However, other causes of ethnic conflicts include the struggle for scarce resources, fragile inter-communal histories, cultural discrimination, cultural practices, socio-economic exclusion and land disputes

Theoretical Framework

The term “conflict” is usually at the center of ethnic conflicts. Based on this premise, the Marxian theory of conflict was adopted to elucidate the possible causes of ethnic conflicts to proffer viable solutions to mitigate the trend. The theory of conflict was developed by Karl Heinrich Marx in the 19th century during the industrial revolution. The thesis of the theory holds that members of the society are in frequent flux as a result of structural inequality and competing interest in scarce resources. It portrays the fact that different groups in the society compete over limited resources to gain authority and survival advantage over others.


The conflict theory is utilized to further demonstrated that social order is strategically held, maintained and sustained by rival communities in the society through outright domination and control of power; and not by simple conformity and consensus. This is a radical approach that tends to subject the weaker communities entirely to the mesmerism of the powerful community (Hayes, 2022). Therefore, most communal conflicts are a result of the constant struggle for scarce resources by neighbouring communities. A situation mostly triggered by a rival community competing against the other to control territory or possess resources.

This feeling of discontent often triggers aggression and a high tendency of the affected individual or group to embark on violence in order to possess and restore their dignity. Generally, these theoretical underpinnings lucidly convey the fact that communal conflicts are largely triggered by the struggles for scarce resources and the relative feeling or perception of the deprivation of basic needs or socio-economic and political inclusion. Although, from an integrationist perspective, hate speech has also contributed largely to the spike of ethnic or communal conflicts. The vast diversity of ethnic groups and languages in Nigeria has also laid a formidable foundation for ethnic or communal conflict to thrive.

Causes, Effects and Peace Sustainability Strategies in State and Non-State-Based Ethnic Conflicts

Ethnic or communal conflicts are associated with grave consequences, especially with the loss of lives and the wanton destruction of property. The aftermath of ethnic conflicts tends to be severe, protracted and intractable; and at worst it is a stake of survival versus genocide (Robin, 2000). The number of deaths attributed to ethnic conflicts is usually unimaginable. These fatalities may be categorized into state-based, non-state, and one-sided fatalities. Depending on the type of ethnic conflict, the degree of fatalities varies. While state-motivated ethnic conflicts are wider in scope, catastrophic in nature and intense in fatalities; non-state-motivated ethnic conflicts are confined to specific communities with less severe aftermath like state-based ethnic conflicts. However, the one-sided conflict is a less escalated conflict with minimal consequences when compared with state-based and non-state-based conflicts.


Figure 1: Fatalities of ethnic conflicts by type of violence (1989 - 2022)



Source: UCDP report, 2022.

Figure 1 above, is indicative of fatalities arising from ethnic conflicts in Africa as reported by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The figure shows that state-based conflicts are at the extreme with over 200,000 fatalities in 2022. However, non-state and one-sided violence had less than 50,000 deaths in 2022. This reveals that state-based conflicts are the most calamitous of ethnic conflicts and must be avoided at all costs.


Figure 2: Fatalities in Non-state conflicts by region (1989 – 2022)



Source: UCDP Report, 2022.

Figure 2 above is a presentation of fatalities in non-state conflicts by regions between 1989 to 2022. While Asia is seen to have a less frequency of ethnic conflicts, Africa, the Middle East and America are seen to have experienced the worst spikes of ethnic conflicts within the period under review. Before 2007, Africa topped the other regions with the spate of ethnic conflicts. Between 1989 and 1992, the continent had the highest fatalities of non-state conflicts. However, between 2007 and 2019, the regions of America and the Middle East experienced greater spates of fatalities due to non-state ethnic conflicts than Africa. But the figure indicates that fatalities emanating from ethnic conflicts in Africa were trending upward as of 2022. This implies that those constant triggers of ethnic conflicts in Africa must be checked and curtailed to reverse the trend of fatalities arising from non-state conflicts.


Figure 3: Non-State Conflicts by Regions (1989 – 2022)



Source: UCDP report, 2022.

Figure 3 above represents the UCDP report on non-state conflicts by regions from 1989 – 2022. It indicates that non-state conflicts are more prevalent in Africa than in other regions like America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Between 1989 and 2022, Africa recorded over 80,000 conflicts, while other regions are below 60,000 conflicts with Europe having the least occurrence of non-state conflicts.


Figure 4: Non-state conflicts by organizational levels of the warring sides (1989 – 2022)



Source: UCDP report, 2022.

Figure 4 above is indicative of non-state conflicts by organizational levels of the warring sides between 1989 and 2022. The figure reveals that there are fewer non-state conflicts in formally organized groups or communities than the informally organized groups or communities. The figure indicates a mild positive correlation of non-state conflicts between the formally and informally organized groups or societies. This implies that conflicts in informally organized groups or societies tend to trigger a proportionate degree of conflicts in formally organized groups or societies. Therefore, efforts toward mitigating conflicts in informally organized groups or societies will naturally reduce conflicts in formally organized groups or societies.

Figure 5: Fatalities in non-state conflicts by organizational levels of the warring sides (1989 – 2022)



Source: UCDP report, 2022.

Figure 5 above represents the UCDP's report on fatalities in non-state conflicts by organizational levels of the warring sides between 1989 and 2022. The figure revealed that while fatalities are lower in informally organized groups or societies, it is quite high in formally organized groups or societies. While there are few non-state conflicts in the formally organized groups as indicated in Figure 4, the high number of fatalities recorded corroborates the data in Figure 1, which shows that state-based violence carries a high fatality rate. This may not be far from the fact that states have the capacity to empower individuals with weapons of reasonable destruction than non-state actors. Therefore, despite the low frequency of ethnic conflict in formally organized societies, the rate of fatalities is usually high.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Ethnic conflict is a dangerous threat to human existence that must not be ignored. It thrives in the diversity of ethnic groups and languages. Africa is composed of diverse ethnic groups with Nigeria having over 371 ethnic groups and 527 languages. Nigeria is therefore best described as being ethnically diverse and culturally heterogeneous. Consequently, Nigeria by its diverse nature of ethnic groups and languages is negatively disposed to the incidence of conflicts between ethnic groups. The quest to grab political and economic powers has enticed political actors to utilize her ethnic diversity to cause division among opposing faction(s). Although state-based conflicts are fewer in frequency, they however result in high fatality rates. Conversely, non-state violence is higher in frequency but results in low fatality rates. According to Tepfenhart (2013), ethnic conflicts are violent, bringing suffering, death, destruction, and terrorism to the victims.

Several factors have been implicated as triggers of state and non-state violence. While factors such as the struggle for political power and authority are primarily responsible for the trigger of state-based conflicts, the struggle for scarce resources, land ownership, poverty, insecurity and cultural variations are identified as the causes of non-state conflicts. Based on these findings, the following recommendations are proffered, thus:

- i. Seasoned professionals and academics in the area of Peace and Conflict Resolution; Psychology and Criminology should be consciously engaged in proffering viable approaches for the resolution of ethnic conflicts.
- ii. Community participation in socio-economic decision-making and planning, particularly, in project initiation, planning and execution should be encouraged by state actors. When community members are involved in the initiation, planning and execution of government projects, the community will take legal ownership and work and live in harmony with the government and other neighbouring communities.
- iii. Both States and the Federal House of Assembly (HoA) should deliberately enact laws that discourage speeches, actions and inactions that promote hate among ethnic groups.
- iv. To avoid state-based conflicts, the government must exhaust all available options of peace-making and peace-building approaches in pre- and post-ethnic conflict resolutions.

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GLOBALIZATION, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM IN THE NORTH EAST NIGERIA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND OPTIONS

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the influence of globalization on the expansion of transnational crime and terrorism in Nigeria. This report highlights illegal firearms smuggling as the plague of Nigeria's human security concerns, with a special emphasis on the insurgent group Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. The goals of this work are to investigate the influence of globalization on the security environment in North East Nigeria, as well as the role of globalization in transnational crimes and terrorism in the region. Based on a multidisciplinary research strategy, the study used content analysis. To analyze the subject of study, "the Queer Ladder Theory (QLT) and Frustration-Aggression Theory (FAT)" were applied. The paper argues the inability of the Nigerian government to address and curtailed demands from its citizens. This report advises that significant investments be made in new technologies for cross-border control. Some radars are capable of serving as main detection sensors for long-distance remote surveillance systems. "Mobile Surveillance systems and Blighter Radars", which are cost-effective, should be implemented to survey both the land and air zones concurrently while participating in re-orientation activities with impacted populations to instil ethical principles and respect for existence and human rights in them.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Globalisation, Nigeria, Security, Terrorism and Illegal firearms trafficking

Introduction

Threats to international security have included terrorism, militancy, armed robberies, political violence, and trafficking in weapons and illegal substances (Mbagwu & Obileye, 2019; Ozoigbo, 2019). In developing nations, terrorists have grown to be powerful adversaries of the

various tiers of government and its security agencies. Depending on where they carry out their attacks, different terrorist organizations are known by different names, such as “the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Kurdistan Workers Party and Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham in Syria, the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in Pakistan, the Communist Party of India Mao (NPA) and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement in the Philippines (Forbes, 2019). As of 2018, the most terrorized countries were Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria, Pakistan, Somalia, India, Yemen, the Philippines, and DR Congo” Forbes, (2019).

By murdering, kidnapping, and displacing people, terrorism, one of the reasons undermining regional security, has prevented significant development in Africa, particularly in the Sub-Sahara area. This violates human rights and poses a danger to the local, national, and educational systems (Akinyetun, 2021). The lack of education, unemployment, bad leadership, the porousness of national borders, the unauthorized spread of weapons, and political meddling have all been linked to the foundations of terrorism (Ozoigbo, 2019). According to Egunjobi (2021), Nigeria's high levels of poverty and insecurity were fueled by the country's rising jobless rate. According to Ozdeser et al. (2019), one of the risks to Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), income, and economy is terrorism, particularly Boko Haram. Several of the most significant terrorist activities in Nigeria are “the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta's” and Boko Haram's widespread bombings in some of the states in the North (MEND).

The 2011 New Year's Eve bombing, the 29th May bombing during President Goodluck Jonathan's inauguration and several other bombings during the April/May 2011 election period are notable among them. Terrorism-related violence associated with Boko Haram continues to be "the most extreme dimension of insecurity, especially in the northern part of Nigeria and its geographic spread across the West Africa" (Ogbonnaya, Ogujigba and Steigler, 2019). It is impossible to overstate the impact of terrorism, international crime, and

globalization on Nigeria in the twenty-first century. This study therefore examines the issues of globalization to Nigeria's counterterrorism efforts in relation to terrorism, international crime, and globalization.

The Northeast geopolitical zone, comprising of the six states of Bauchi, Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, Yobe and Taraba, will be the principal region covered in this study. About 719,435 sqKm of Nigeria's total 923,769 sqKm (909,890 sqKm land and 13,879 sqKm water) are considered to be the Northern region. Out of Nigeria's overall population of "140,431,790 as of 2006, the Hausa/Fulani ethnic group dominated the region with roughly 53.59% (75,269,722): North West: 35,915,467; North Central: 20,369,956; North East: 18,984,299" (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). According to the World Bank's 2019 estimates, the region's population in 2020 was predicted to be 107,816,036, which represented 2.6% of Nigeria's estimated population of 201,153,912.

Conceptual Analyses

The concept of globalization

Depending on whose side of the North-South split one is sighted it from, the multifaceted idea of globalization is rife with ideological implications. This is seen from the variety of interpretations that have been applied to it. Aremu and Saliu (2013). A practical definition of the term "globalization" cannot be found in the literature that has developed out of the discussion over it over the past ten years, according to Cesare Poppi (quoted in Alan Scott, 1997). The concept's meaning is self-evident in some ways, yet it is also ambiguous and difficult to understand because of how broad and varying its reaches are. The discussion around globalization may be more important than any other idea Charles, O. O (2006).

Largely speaking, the term globalization connotes "the deepening of social, economic, and cultural interactions among countries of the world" (Saliu and Aremu, 2013). It is "the integration of economies and societies through the cross-country flow of information, ideas, technologies, goods, services, capital, finance, and people" (Rangarajan, 2003).

Transnational crimes

Simply said, "the movement of individuals, products, and services across sovereign national jurisdiction in a manner devoid of accepted norms and standards" is what transnational organized crime denotes (Ngor Ngor, cited in Criminal Justice Processes, p.3). A highly organized and skilled criminal activity known as transnational crime transcends the primary focus of a single nation (ibid). "Illicit gun trafficking, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking, money laundering, advance fee fraud, and smuggling" are a few examples of crimes with transnational aspects.

Terrorism

Terrorism is defined as "conducting crimes under both civil and military legal codes" (Ladan, 2012). Terrorism frequently claims that they were to obey the law of the war or accept any limitations on the breadth of their brutality that would put them at a disadvantage in comparison to the establishment. Because the essence of the terrorism mind set is absolutist, their aims are fundamental, and any limitation on terrorist means of combat is unacceptable. We can conclude here that terrorism refers to "all forms of violent action by clandestine and some-clandestine actors aimed at achieving criminal military, religious, political, or other goals, with such action frequently directed at government and non-combatant populations with the deliberate goal of spreading fear, anxiety, and terror".

Without a doubt, the Boko Haram insurgency has continued to jeopardize public safety, security, and peace, stifle economic development, weaken democracy, and constitute crimes against public peace, humankind, as well as terrorism. Especially, "it breaches fundamental human rights to life, dignity, liberty, and religious, conscience, and thinking freedom" (Ladan, 2012).

Finally, the distinction of insurgency from terrorism is determined by aim of the actor. Insurgent movement and guerrilla force can achieve their objectives while adhering to international law of war principles.

Theoretical Framework

The “Queer Ladder Theory (QLT)” and the “Frustration-Aggression Theory” form the hinges of the study. Daniel Bell (1919-2011) created this Theory (QLT) in “an attempt to explain the instrumental character of organized crime as a desperate method of socio-economic empowerment and social rising”. This theoretical approach has now spawned a prominent theoretical framework that is commonly employed in current crime studies. The fundamental assumptions of QLT are as follows: organized crime is an instrumental behaviour, a means to a goal; it is a tool for social climbing and/or socioeconomic progress; and it is a method to gain riches and power (Mallory, 2007; Okoli & Orinya, 2013).

The theory that organized crime thrives in environments where the government's ability to command, penalize, and discourage crime is limited; when public corruption is rampant; and where chances for legitimate economic choices are limited is sometimes attributed to Queer Ladder Theory (Okoli, & Agada (2014). Kidnapping and national security in Nigeria. *Research on humanities and social sciences*, 4(6), 137-146). Under these conditions, the temptation to commit crime is considerable, while the deterrent to illegal behaviour is low. To put it another way, “the benefits of committing a crime outweigh the costs and/or hazards involved. This provides cover for criminal impunity and franchising” (Okoli & Orinya, 2013).

Applying it to the setting of the research, QLT allows us to come to terms with the predominance of organized crime in Nigeria's Northeast area. In this light, it has been recognized that The Boko Haram phenomenon in North-western Nigeria has indeed been inspired by a criminal desire for financial gain in a climate that is hostile to it. This had been exacerbated by the state's existing socioeconomic dissatisfaction and associated livelihood crises, as well as the seeming indolence of key government authorities in halting the dreadful situation. In QLT, the idea of *Ladder* denotes “unfavorable pattern of social mobility”. As a result, people who turn to organized crime, such as Boko Haram, do so in desperate search of

economic gain and socioeconomic empowerment (Mustapha, 2019). As a result, a high crime rate and a sense of fear are unavoidable consequences of this tendency (Okoli & Orinya, 2013).

Relationship among Globalization, Transnational Crimes and Terrorism

Globalization is responsible for technological developments like smart phones, computer, the internet, and satellite network, among others. ICT (Information and Communication Technology) has had a significant influence on many parts of human existence, particularly social connections. Many of the factors have been identified as negative. Omekwu (2006) believed that these hazardous influences include "pornography, money laundering, cultism, international terrorism, and child abuse; which all pose a threat to African cultural legacy". Nudity is still not regarded as a virtue in indigenous African culture. Nudity has grown popular in many African institutions and cities, and Africa's rich and sophisticated clothing patterns are becoming obsolete.

Another argument for the bad impacts of globalization is "weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, ethnic bloodshed, worldwide crime, and trafficking" (Davis, 2003; Williams, 2008). In a similar vein, globalization had enabled "Violent Non-State Actors to build transnational social capital", form alliances, and garner support outside of their local operational region. Globalization, as well as the emergence of the illegal global economy, has created financial options for violent non-state actors and other terrorist organizations in general (Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe, 2013).

Creating a link of terrorist activity with globalization, (Akinterinwa, 2004 citing Agbu) states that, "Globalization, which has enabled the brand of international terrorism as at present, generally implies the integration of countries into the world economy through increased trade, investment, short-term capital flows and international migration of skilled and unskilled labour". Also, Ampatuum (2003) submits that while globalization has brought unprecedented development and progress to people, it has also unleashed negative aspects such as "facilitating international terrorism and other forms of transnational crimes." Transnational terrorism, he claims, is "a worldwide phenomenon that is one of the most

devastating”. The 11th September, 2001 attacks on the USA demonstrated the threat's deadliness (Casale, 2008).

Effect of Firearms and Illegal Trafficking

The proliferation of armaments jeopardizes Nigeria's territorial sovereignty. Widespread weapon smuggling is fuelled by the growing number of violent disputes in various regions of the world. Similarly, ongoing political insecurity and internal power struggles in third-world nations fuel arms trafficking (Onuoha, 2013). Because of the country's open borders, illegal gun trafficking thrives in Nigeria. Nigeria's borders are porous due to the way colonialists split up the African continent as well as the nature of its maintenance by post-colonial governments (Onuoha, 2013). While Nigeria's border problem has a colonial background, its porosity has been compounded by successive administrations' failure to adequately administer these boundaries. In the view of Okumu (2010), “the high level of insecurity on African borders is largely due to the way they are administered and managed, and less to do with how colonialists drew them”.

According to Nigeria's Interior Minister, Abba Moro, “there are about 1,499 illicit and 84 lawful officially recognised entrance ways into the country”. Terrorists and traffickers use this leak to transport “small arms and light weapons” (SALWs) into the country. Resultantly, Nigeria was claimed to have over 70% of the approximately 8m illicit firearms in West African subregion.

Perspective on Boko Haram

The Boko Haram, also called as “Ja mat Ahl as-Sunnah lid-da 'wawLawalihad”, dates back to 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf gained control of the group. Since then, the cult has gone by several names, including Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah, Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram, and anma 'atu Ahlisunnah Lidda' awatiwal Jihad (Ogbonnaya, Ogujigba and Steigler, 2014). In 2004, the gang relocated to Kannamma, Yobe State, near the Niger border. It has subsequently established a base from where to plan its assaults.

The Terrorism Index in African Countries, published by Lars Kamer in 2022, ranks Nigeria third out of 13 African countries. From 2011 to 2022, the states most hit by Boko Haram lethal assaults cases Nigeria with 35,646 cases in Borno, 5,747 cases in Zamfara, 5,462 cases in Kaduna, 3,359 cases in Adamawa, 3774 cases in Benue, 3,359 cases in Plateau and 3,359 cases in Yobe. Similarly, the continuous escalation of the crisis in the area has escalated security concerns and protection for nearly 30.6 million people residing in the six most impacted state. “Women and girls are more vulnerable to kidnapping, sexual assault, and abuse, including rape”. As banditry assaults have persisted, the impacted community has voiced distrust in the army and police, as well as their capacity to prevent a recurrence of this heinous trend. Residents and survivors in afflicted areas have stated that when they are assaulted, the police and soldiers are tardy, if not non-existent (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).

According to all reports, banditry is threatening security, peace, and development in Nigeria's northwest. While the growing problems might be ascribed to a variety of factors, the threat to security in an area still reeling from the impact of Boko Haram's decade-long war in the northwest cannot be overstated. As a result, vulnerable communities came to rely on local vigilantes for protection. In other cases, people arm themselves to fight attacks, and the government's focus on combating the Boko Haram uprising may be hampering its capacity to respond to instability in the northwest.

Government's Efforts at Curbing Boko Haram Activities in Nigeria

The Nigerian government's response to the security crisis has been slow and reactive generally. It was not until 2014 that a concerted effort began to take shape. The Nigerian Police Force, directed by Inspector-General Suleiman Abba, created the "Task Force on Cattle Rustling and Associated Crime" in one such endeavor. "The task force was to be in charge of patrolling and gathering intelligence on anti-rustling and associated crimes, as well as investigating and perhaps prosecuting reported occurrences of such crimes" (Yusuf 2015). This task group, however, has remained mainly inert since its formation.

The most inventive response, nonetheless, comes from the Kaduna government. The methods include embedding security agents among herders to safeguard them from bandits, reinforcing state boundaries to prevent criminals from crossing borders, and, most critically, implanting computer microchips in the animals to track their activities and prevent armed bandits from taking them Bunn, Jimoh, Wilsher, & Hooper (2015). The "El-Rufai Model program in Kaduna is a proactive and preventive strategy via the use of information and communication technology (ICT)" (Leadership, 2015). However, it remained a proposal without implementation.

Numerous official measures, however, have lowered the number of bandit attacks and cattle rustling. Thousands of animals have been collected and returned to respective owners on several instances. For instance, as of 7 March 2016, the Katsina government's combined patrol force had rescued 12,000 livestock after just a few days of operations (Elazeh 2016). A handful of bandits had also been caught and convicted. With the assistance of the armed forces, the security forces were also able to infiltrate several of the rustlers' hideouts (Godwin 2016; Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016).

Conclusion

The objective of this study was to examine the influence of globalization on the emergence of terrorisms and transnational crimes in Nigeria, with an emphasis on the North East. The research examined Boko Haram's risks in relation to international crime. It is clear that the threat of transnational crime is growing in Nigeria as a consequence of poverty, unemployment, weak security, porous borders in Northern Nigeria, arms proliferation, the existence of barely governed places that served as hideaways for the Boko Haram sect, and a greater level of illiteracy.

Recommendations

On the basis of the foregoing, the paper offers the following solutions to assist bring a stop to Boko Haram insurgency and transnational crimes in Nigeria.

- i. The country must spend extensively in innovative cross-border technology. Some radars are capable of serving as main detection sensors for “long-distance remote surveillance systems”.
- ii. Government should develop a strategy to provide expressive work for the youths stuck in the phenomena by developing programmes intended at alleviating chronic poverty in the area in specific and the entire country.
- iii. There should be maintenance of military efforts in fighting the war counter to banditry, in addition to providing security personnel with both contemporary equipment and essential encouragements to empower them to conduct their duties short of interference.
- iv. The country should have a re-orientation that will instil ethical ideals, respect for human life and human rights in individuals, as well as the necessity to co-exist regardless of religious or ethnic tendencies.
- v. The Nigerian government should take the lead in implementing regional security among ECOWAS member nations.
- vi. Nigerian authorities must show political courage in dealing with the Boko Haram menace.

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POLITICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN NIGERIA: CAUSES, NATURE AND IMPACTS ON NIGERIA'S NATIONAL UNITY

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ABSTRACT

The post-Cold War era gave rise to the contemporary political order characterized by 'politics of difference', 'politics of identity', and 'politics of recognition' or 'multiculturalism'. Separatist movements, socio-political disintegration and identity-based movements became emerged developments which are consequential to the development of human society and nations. The heterogeneous nature of Nigeria, the marginalization of some ethnic groups, and the economic and socio-political underdevelopments due to the government apathy perceived by certain groups or organizations representing these interests have exacerbated the agitation of several demands for Self-determination. This has also raised certain questions. Can self-determination guarantee peace and security in a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria? This research interrogates the challenges and consequences of self-determination on the Nigeria national unity. The study finds that these tendencies have critically challenged established sovereignties, territories and the traditional conceptions of the nation-states, while new political authorities and structures are being created. They are particularly evident in several states across Latin America (Bolivia, Columbia), Asia (India, Indonesia) and Africa (Sudan and Nigeria), and these states remain vulnerable to violent political conflicts and insurgence, emanating from movements of excluded minorities or ethnic groups of the nation that clamour for self-determination. The study recommends that self-determination struggles in Nigeria can be managed by true practice of federalism, Power sharing arrangements and Consociationalism.

Keywords: Abuse, Physical, Emotional, Pattern, Impact, Women

Introduction

A recurrent political feature in recent times is the demand of various ethnic nationalities to be politically recognized and accepted as distinct identities in a plural society. As an outcome of

global shift in politics, social and economic context, regionalist identities, are frequently emerging, recreated and re-defined as ethnic groups negotiate their identities and interests in the clamor for self-determination. Although these tendencies create extreme challenges to the security, peace and sovereignty of the nation-states in which they occur, however in some areas they are positively seen as legitimate movements for minority rights and self-determination.

Since the Nigeria independence in 1960 mistrust, discrimination, aggressiveness, disintegration and conflict have characterized the social interactions between various multi-ethnic and multicultural nationalities in Nigeria. As a result of the nature of its ethnic cleavages, complex political identities and a history of recurring ethno-religious conflicts and instability, Nigeria expresses traits of disintegration, secession, civil strife, minority clamor for self-determination and violent conflicts. These have portrayed the nation as one of the most divided states in Africa. Ake (1993: 20) rightly posit “The vast majority of ethnic and national groups in this country are increasingly feeling that far from being a fair deal, their incorporation in Nigeria is grossly oppressive”. This confirms the increasing rate of Nigeria’s disintegration of ethnic nationalities, and their alienation to the project of national unity.

In Nigeria, the movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) from the South East, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and other militant groups from the South-South, the O’odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC) from South-West , whose one its focus is “to ensure maximum self-determination of the people of Oodua” and the Arewa Republic in the North, have contributed nothing more than the divided state of Nigeria. The ethnicised political structure of Nigeria and the continuous ethno-religious conflict in the history of the country have given the option of self-determination becoming an alternative solution towards national stability and unity, but instead of providing solution it has remain a major preponderance of instability and disunity in the nation. Injustices that are ingrained in Nigeria’s political system remain a push factor for self-determination movements.

Concept of Self-Determination

Self-determination is a principle for realizing the freedom to control one's own life. It serves as the prerequisite for achieving positive human conditions for a decent life and fulfillment (Jeong, 2017). Self-determination literally symbolizes the aspiration of individuals to create, fashion and rule themselves and not to be dominated and moulded by others. The concept of self-determination applies to several contexts, ranging from politics, religion, psychology, child care/parenting, culture and international law. It presents a wide-range of possibilities to persons, groups or institutions within these contexts.

The principle of self-determination can be classified into two categories- the internal and external self-determination. Internal self-determination has to do with the agitation of an aggrieved group within an existing state demanding to be granted autonomy and self-governance (Igwe, Bereprebofa & Anthony, 2020). This implies that the dissatisfied constituents will continue to exist within the boundaries of the nation-states based on agreements to freely make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development within their territories and it does not affect the existing territorial integrity of the state (Gudeleviute, 2005). On the other hand, external self-determination has to do with secession or separatist movement by aggrieved groups who deliberately seek to separate themselves from the existing state and set up a new independent state (Bereketeab, 2015). Example of this is the struggle for self-determination by Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) which of course is a continuation of the declaration of Republic of Biafra on the 26 May 1967, by Colonel Odemegwu Ojukwu, which ended up in the Nigeria civil war (1967-1970).

An example of internal self-determination is the agitation for autonomy and resource control by the Niger Delta militants in the South-South geopolitical zone. The emergence of MOSOP represents the beginning of internal Self-determination movements in the Niger Delta. MOSOP was led mainly by the Ogoni ethnic group, a tribe of about half a million people. The objective and scope of their grievance are couched in the Ogoni Bill of Rights

(1990) presented to the military government of IBB and Royal Dutch Shell (the major oil company in the region at the time). Article (20) of the Ogoni Bill of Rights states that:

The Ogoni people wish to manage their own affairs. NOW, therefore, while reaffirming our wish to remain a part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, we make demand upon the Republic as follows: That the Ogoni people be granted POLITICAL AUTONOMY to participate in the affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit by whatever name called, provided that this Autonomy guarantees the following: (i) Political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people; (ii) The right to the control and use of a fair proportion of OGONI economic resources for Ogoni development (MOSOP, 1991, Bill of Rights: 5-6).

In Northern Nigeria, the most visible evidence of separatist agitation is found in the widely publicized joint communiqué by the Arewa Youth Consultative Forum on 6 June 2017 with several other northern groups including Arewa Citizens Action for Change, Arewa Youth Development Foundation and Arewa Students Forum. This is known as the Kaduna Declaration.

The preservation of cultural identity, the promotion of collective economic and political interests, provide basis for crave for greater autonomy of these ethnic cleavages. People look for identity because they perceive that the existing state does not serve the needs of their protection and integral rights of the community. Class, ethnicity, and nationalism are the competing sources of loyalty for many marginalized and socially excluded ethnic groups in a heterogeneous society. People with culturally distinctive identities, clamor for their rights to self-governance by asserting their nationhood. The deprivation of autonomy instigates the desire of ethnic minorities to seek for their own states.

Origin and History of Self-determination

The concept of self-determination is long associated with the emergence of nationalism in the 18th and 19th century (Hannum, 1990: 27). The French Revolution spread the idea of self-determination throughout the world unifying peoples into nations. Immediately after World War II, there was an interest in movements toward self-determination. Self-determination as a term was first used by the American President, Woodrow Wilson in his famous document - “the Fourteen Points” where emphasized the need for colonial masters to grant their colonies

inalienable rights to self-determination and freedom (Taiwo, 2017). The principle of self-determination entails that nations have the right to freely choose their sovereignty and international political status without external force. Some literatures advocate that some earlier political philosophers and social science theorists made significant inroad in the concept of self-determination.

Self-determination as applied to nations in the 20th century led to the emergence of new forms of identity politics which have complicated and intensified the age-long tensions between the American and French Revolutions; and the contemporary nationalism. Moore (2006, p.94) argues that the post-Cold war gave rise to the contemporary political order characterized by “politics of difference”, “politics of identity”, “politics of recognition or multiculturalism” which in fact have promoted the clamour for self-determination in most nations with Nigeria having the largest share.

Right of Self-determination

The principle of self-determination entails that nations have the right to freely choose their sovereignty and international political status without external force. Article 1(2) of the United Nations (UN) Charter explains that one of the main purposes of the UN is to “develop friendly relations among nation-states based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of the people as well as taking necessary measures to strengthen universal peace” (Dersso, 2012: 8). Self-determination principle transformed into a legal right under Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) stated that the “rights of everyone to have a nationality that cannot be arbitrarily violated.” The common Article 1 in both International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) explained that “All peoples have the right of self-determination whereby they have can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic social and cultural development” (Gudeleciute, 2005: 49). Donnelly (1989) summarized the political effect of the covenant thus:

“In practice, then, the internationally recognized right to self-determination, despite its seeming breadth, has been treated as an extremely narrow right. States’ fear of secession and governments’ fear of revolution have combined to restrict the right to self-determination to little more than the right to sovereignty for those states (and colonies) that currently exist. Given that the right to self-determination emerged as part of the struggle against Western imperialism, this is not surprising”.

Article 8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul) also stated that "all peoples have the right to existence and that they have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination, to determine their political status freely and pursue their economic and social development". The African Charter explains further that colonized and oppressed people have the right to free themselves from alien domination using any means recognized by the international community (Bereketeab, 2015). The principle was also incorporated into the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which evolved into the United Nations Charter. The study undertaken by the Special Rapporteur in the ‘Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (Caportorti, 1977), defines minorities as:

A group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state and in a non-dominant position, whose members possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the population who, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion and language.

The ‘minority’ definition offered above contains a lot of information, and further highlights the issues that are crucial to the discourse of minority rights and the need to maintain their identity. The key issues arising from this definition include: numerical inferiority; minorities are essentially groups; minorities exist within a state; minorities occupy a non-dominant position; ethnic, religious and linguistic differences.

Theoretical Framework

Remedial Rights Only Theory and Primary Rights Theories have been conventionally used as the main theories of secession (Buchanan, 1997); but Remedial Rights Only Theory will be suitably considered for the scope of this article. Remedial Rights Only Theory is defined as a

general right of a group to secede under the condition of suffering a level of injustice to the extent that secession becomes the appropriate remedy of last resort. These injustices could be in different forms, such as economic marginalization, ethnic cleansing, exploitation, the threat of extermination, unjust conquest and under-representation in political power or government threshold (Buchanan, 1997).

This theory has also been associated with the theory of suffering, which argues that if aggrieved people within an independent state keep up guerrilla warfare for a long time, they are entitled to obtain statehood (White, 1981). This means that the severity of violence and suffering a minority group within a state face becomes a matter of international concern regarding cases of remedial secession (Anaya, 1996; Lehnig, 1998). Remedial Rights Only Theory is also associated with the theory of cultural distance, which argues that if there is an existing cultural gap between the subordinate and superordinate sections of the population and this gap is coupled with the theory of suffering and remedy, it can compel moral and political imperative for the movements of secession.

The independence and international recognition of South Sudan in 2011 and Kosovo in 2008 have been considered exemplified cases of remedial secession theory (Radt & Wolff, 2015; Bereketab, 2015). To reduce conflicts and nationalist tensions, Remedial Right Only theory posits that people have the right to have their own state. The Remedial Right Only theory also called “The Just-Cause” theory, allows the right to secede if it is necessary to remedy an injustice such as prior occupation of territory, the violation of people’s and human rights including genocide, and discriminatory injustice or ignoring people or groups on their religion, language, ethnicity or culture (Moore, 1998, p.6). The problem with the theory is it does not take into account the process and type of the existing states and these nations and groups which struggle or demand their right to self-determination.

In summary, Allen Buchanan in his theory said a people or a nation has right to self-determination, if:

1. The physical survival of its members is threatened by actions of the state or it suffers violations of other basics human rights, or
2. Its previously sovereign territory was unjustly taken by the state.

The right to Self-determination has been viewed as harm to the international order and state system. Many have criticized it on the basis that this action increases armed conflicts in the world. This study also joins to asserting that it has caused more harm than good to the project of Nigeria national Unity, invariably the development of the nation. Therefore, every positive effort should be made to end it up in our country.

Causes of Self-determination Agitations in Nigeria

A vast majority of ethnic and national groups in Nigeria are increasingly feeling that far from being a fair deal, their incorporation in Nigeria is grossly oppressive (Ake, 1993, p.20). Historical events and sentiments about politics and war provide social and cultural construct and narratives which have been used to mobilize ethnic and public opinion; and national identity construct in Nigeria. The impact and effects of Nigerian civil war are still fresh in the heart of several ethnic groups; invariably and unconsciously moderate their behavior and actions.

Biafra agitation gained momentum after former President Buhari gave an address at the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) in 2015 and created the impression that he would discriminate against the Igbos for not voting for him in the 2015 presidential election. And this he actually did considering the level of discrimination in his appointments.

Oppressive and undemocratic government which does not respect the rule of law and inclusive governance engender ethnic agitation for autonomy and independence. The endemic corruption which is deep-rooted in Nigerian system triggers agitation. For instance, the Niger Delta militants demand for resource control and a clamour for autonomy and independence to enable them manage the resources within their locality, because of perceived marginalization, environmental degradation and continued neglect on the part of Nigerian government and the oil producing companies in the region.

It is pertinent to note that the heterogeneous nature and complexity of Nigeria and of course the inability of the successive governments to manage the rich diversity of the nation has contributed immensely to the agitation for self-determination by various groups. The preservation of cultural identity, the promotion of collective economic and political interests is a driving force, since people look for identity because they perceive that the existing state of Nigeria does not accommodate their needs of rights of protection, political inclusion and economic development.

Impact of Self-determination agitations on national integration in Nigeria

The impact of Self-determination agitations on national integration in Nigeria are numerous to be contained in this paper, however some impacts will be mentioned within the space available. No nation prospers nor develops where there is war and anarchy. Peace and unity propel stability and development. Violent conflicts, war and insecurity are consequent effects of self-determination agitations in Nigeria. Instead of integrating all the ethnic and national groups into one indivisible entity called Nigeria, the nation has been regarded as the most disintegrated state in Africa.

The ethnic suspicion and mistrust have created ‘enemy-blocs’ in Nigeria, this was visible in the last general elections particularly in Lagos where the Igbos were disenfranchised of voting in the Gubernatorial election. It is arguable to note that the nascent democracy in Nigeria is truncated, whereas ethno-religious interests are magnified above national interests. There is increase in insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria today, because some of the groups that started as a political group have turned out to become insurgent groups, terrorists, bandits and kidnappers-for-ransom, and have turned the nation to the land of horror. How can investment thrive in such a state?

Managing Self-determination Agitations in Nigeria

Managing the clamour of self-determination by various ethnic cleavages in a pluralistic society like Nigeria is a herculean task, yet there lie certain principles with which it can be addressed. These principles include: Regional autonomy and Federalism, Power sharing and

Consociationalism, and distributive policies. Minority groups can demand more autonomy within the existing political space or nation-state instead of insistence on full independence. Such regionally clustered ethnic groups can be granted self-governance, and control over their resources and internal affairs; allowance of the protection of dignity, identity and cultures, thereby given equality among the rest of the national society. Regional autonomy is guaranteed in federalism, because while the centre holds dominant authority, the state devolves power to specific groups of people. This reduces ethnic/tribal agitations and armed violence.

Federalism guarantees greater regional autonomy through the provision of power sharing. Federal systems provide several opportunities for conflict management through reduction of concentration of power among institutions at the centre. When power is scattered by separation of political functions at various levels of the government, the struggle for the control of the centre becomes less intense, as competition at regional levels is encouraged. Horowitz (1985, p.598) posit “Compartmentalization of conflict at a regional level has a dampening effect on ethnic conflict. Inter-ethnic conflict can be compartmentalized within limited political boundaries”. Hence regional autonomy can be a solution the recurring incident of movements of self-determination in Nigeria.

Power Sharing and Consociationalism

Majority or dominant rule by majorities or hegemony over the minorities has a grave and destructive consequence on certain ethnic groups. The age-long perceived marginalization of the minorities by the dominant group can be allayed using consensual democracy. One vital feature of power sharing is the participation of representative of significant groups in the business of governance. Lijphart (1990, p.494) asserts “Joint decision making on all issues of common concern needs to be complimented by a high degree of group autonomy because decisions must be in the hands of each group”. Therefore, Consociational democracy originally propounded by Arend Lijphart is a technical term to describe a model of democracy which seeks to resolve political differences by techniques of consensus decision rather than

majority-dominant rule. Exclusivity of power control by a dominant hegemony deprives the minority share in the system.

On the other hand, self-determination agitations can be managed when less emphasis of social and economic policies are placed on ethnic and class affiliations. There is equal allocation of public funds, equal access to land and other economic resources, reduction of socio-economic inequalities and equal political opportunities among the ethnic groups in the existing nation-state.

Conclusion

Self-determination struggles in the heterogeneous composition and complexity of Nigerian society have contributed immensely to the fragmentation and disunity of the nation. National development, nascent democracy and the project of national unity have been negatively affected, rather than solving the question of marginalization. Ethnic cleavages have promoted 'politics of difference', 'politics of identity', 'politics of recognition' or 'multiculturalism', and have presented Nigeria as the most divided nation in Africa.

The cultural and economic diversities of Nigeria state is harnessed and equal opportunities politically, socio-economically are provided for both the minorities and majorities; and political hegemony is eradicated, functioning institutions and good governance is in place, everyone will have a sense of belonging and the struggle for self-determination will be a history.

Recommendation

This study recommends that Nigerians should focus on what should build cohesion among the ethnic groups, promote understanding, love and unity. Equal rights and opportunities should be given to all irrespective class and ethnic affiliations. There should be devolution of powers at the centre, while regional autonomy is granted to ethnic regions to control their resources and internal affairs. Finally, since the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as Amended does recognize the right to self-determination; the government should on the basis

of political dialogue give hearing ear to all the aggrieved sections or ethnic regions in the state to provide a lasting solution to the imbroglio.

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THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN PROMOTING PEACEFUL GLOBALIZATION: AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

This paper examined the role of regional organizations in promoting peaceful globalization in Africa. The was discovered Regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Accord de Non-Aggression et d' Assistance en Matière de Defence (ANAD) through their various mechanisms, such as peacekeeping missions, economic integration initiatives, and conflict resolution mechanisms, these organizations have played a significant role in promoting peaceful globalization in the continent. Conversely, the findings also showed that the regional organizations in Africa face a number of constraints in their efforts towards promoting peaceful globalization in Africa. Such as structural, limited/financial resources, lack of political will, complex socio-political dynamics and Political divisions, side-taking and lack of consensus among states. The paper concluded that as Africa continues to grapple with the challenges and opportunities of globalization, regional organizations will remain critical in promoting peaceful globalization in the continent. The recommendations highlight the need for sustained efforts and support, adequate resources and capacity-building support, strengthening political will for peace and security, improving coordination and collaboration, and addressing the root causes of conflicts and security challenges in the region through sustainable peace-building initiatives.

Keywords: Africa, African Union, ECOWAS, Globalisation, Regional Organisations

Introduction

In recent years, globalization has become an increasingly important concept in the world economy, shaping the way nations interact with one another. However, globalization has also brought with it several challenges, including the potential for conflict and instability. For example, in African, the continent has a long history of conflict and instability, with many

countries facing economic and political challenges that have hindered their development. Over the last half a century plus, the number of conflicts has increased. They have become more intense and brutal where violation of human rights has become a norm that even the United Nations still feels incapable of addressing this area effectively (Møller, 2005; Wulf, 2009). This led to the United Nations assigning peace and security duties to regional organizations for peace operations - often argued as an application of the principle of “subsidiarity” according to which “Africa are responsible for African conflicts” (Møller, 2005: 3). Regional organizations have emerged as key players in this process, providing a platform for dialogue and collaboration among member states.

The African Union, established in 2002, is the most significant regional organization on the continent. The AU's primary objective is to promote economic integration and development, peace, security, and democracy across the African continent. The AU has been instrumental in mediating conflicts in several African countries, such as Libya, South Sudan, and Mali. The organization has also launched several initiatives to promote intra-African trade and economic integration (African Union, 2021). Similarly, ECOWAS, established in 1975, is a regional organization that comprises 15 West African countries. Its primary objective is to promote economic integration, peace, and stability in the region. ECOWAS has played a crucial role in promoting democracy and good governance in the region. For example, in 2016, ECOWAS mediated the peaceful transfer of power in Gambia after a political crisis.

Equally, SADC, established in 1992, is a regional organization comprising 16 southern African countries. Its primary objective is to promote economic integration, peace, and security in the region. SADC has been instrumental in resolving conflicts in several African countries, such as Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (African Union, 2021).

Some academics and policy practitioners are of the view that regional organizations not only have a role to play but have emerged as a viable framework for the maintenance of regional peace and security. In the process, they have ‘rescued’ the global institution, the

United Nations, in its mandate to maintain international peace and security. The case of the West African peacekeeping and conflict stabilization interventions and regional deployments have been cited as a reflection of this development, despite its many problems and challenges (Francis, 2010). If this is the case, what has been the role and contribution of -regional organizations in promoting peaceful globalization in Africa? To provide answers to these questions, I propose to examine the role of regional organisations in promoting peaceful globalization in Africa.

Conceptual Clarifications

For the purpose of clarity, setting the parameters for what the paper regards as ‘regional organisations’ and ‘peaceful globalization’ is necessary.

Regional organizations,

Regional organizations, also known as regional intergovernmental organizations (RIGOs), are "entities formed by countries within a specific geographic region to promote economic, political, and social cooperation" (Hänggi, 2018). They are typically composed of member states that share common interests, culture, geography, or political systems. Regional organizations vary in their size, scope, and objectives, but they all aim to promote regional integration and cooperation. Similarly, United Nations Development Programme (2017) defined regional organization as a group of countries within a particular geographic area that have agreed to work together to promote economic and social development, regional security, and other common goals. A regional organization according to Kacowicz (2016) is a formal structure created by states within a specific geographic area to facilitate cooperation on issues of common interest, such as trade, security, or environmental concerns. According to Miles, (2014) a regional organization is a set of institutions, rules, and practices that govern the relations among states within a particular geographic region and that aim to promote cooperation, integration, and regional identity.

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Peaceful Globalization

Various scholars have proposed different definitions and frameworks for peaceful globalization, highlighting its diverse dimensions and implications. Peaceful globalization can be defined as a process of global integration that promotes peace and security through mutually beneficial economic, social, and political interactions among nations, while respecting the sovereignty and cultural diversity of each country (Sabbagh, 2019). According to Kivimäki (2020), peaceful globalization is a process that facilitates the diffusion of democratic values and institutions, human rights, and the rule of law, which in turn promotes peace and security by providing a framework for resolving conflicts and promoting stability and development.

The United Nations (2015) defines peaceful globalization as the process of increasing global interconnectedness and interdependence in a way that prioritizes the well-being and security of all peoples, fosters mutual understanding and respect among cultures, and promotes sustainable development. Peaceful globalization according to Kolb, (2017) is a vision for a world in which global interdependence and connectivity are managed in a way that enhances the well-being and security of all individuals, and which helps to prevent conflicts and promote sustainable development. Furthermore, peaceful globalization can be defined as a process of global interdependence that promotes peace and security by fostering a sense of shared responsibility for the well-being of humanity and the planet, and by encouraging the development of international norms, institutions, and mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution (De Lombaerde, 2020).

Theoretical Framework

Realism

Realism theory is a perspective that sees international relations as a struggle for power and security, in which states prioritize their own interests over those of others. However, in recent

years, regional organizations have emerged as important actors in promoting peaceful globalization in Africa. This essay will apply realism theory to explain the role of regional organizations in promoting peaceful globalization in Africa, with a focus on the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Proponents of the realism theory posit that states act in their own self-interest and prioritize security and power above all else. This can be seen in the actions of regional organizations like the AU and ECOWAS, which have prioritized the interests of their member states. For example, the AU has intervened in conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, and Mali to promote regional stability and security (Mwanasali & Khalifa, 2020). Similarly, ECOWAS has intervened in conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire to prevent the spread of violence and instability (Takyi, 2016).

Realism theory can be used to explain the role of regional organizations in promoting peaceful globalization in Africa. While these organizations are primarily motivated by self-interest, they have been successful in promoting stability, economic growth, and conflict resolution in the region. However, there are also challenges to this approach, as some states may seek to dominate others and promote their own interests. As such, regional organizations must balance the interests of their member states to promote peaceful globalization in Africa.

Africa's Regional Organisations and Their Mechanisms for Promoting Peaceful Globalization in Africa

The true number of regional and sub-regional organizations active in promoting peaceful globalization in Africa may never be known, as there are various ad hoc coalitions that play a vital, the role of regional organizations in promoting peaceful globalization in the African subregion, although occasionally unrecognized, is significant. The African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Accord de Non-Aggression et d' Assistance en Matière de Defence (ANAD). Of all these, Only ANAD was especially designed for defense and security objectives. Others were forced to incorporate peace and security calculations into their agendas because of events

in their regions (Wulf, 2009). The goal of this section is to provide a concise overview of the mechanisms used by these organizations in promoting peaceful globalization in African Sub region.

A. African Union (AU)

African Union (AU), formerly (1963–2002) Organization of African Unity, intergovernmental organization, established in 2002, to promote unity and solidarity of African states, to spur economic development, and to promote international cooperation. The African Union (AU) replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The African Union (AU) has had a significant peacemaking impact on the African subregions, in West Africa, particularly in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ivory Coast. The AU's interventions have included deploying peacekeeping forces, mediating peace negotiations, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Okeke, 2015).

In the East African region, the AU has been actively involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives, particularly in Somalia. The AU's African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has been instrumental in helping to stabilize the country and support its political transition process (Adebajo, 2013). The AU has also played a significant role in promoting peace in Central Africa, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The AU has supported mediation efforts and deployed peacekeeping forces to the region to help end the conflict and promote stability (Abiew, 2018). In the Southern African region, the AU has supported efforts to promote peace and stability in countries such as Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Lesotho. The AU has provided mediation and technical support to help resolve political crises and promote democracy in these countries.

Correspondingly, in terms of its mandate for conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. The Union has established a continent-wide peace and security architecture through its Peace and Security Council. The AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2004 and has been instrumental in promoting peace in

conflict-affected regions of Africa. The PSC has helped to mediate conflicts and prevent the escalation of violence in countries such as Sudan, Somalia, and Mali (Adebajo, 2013).

The AU's African Standby Force (ASF) was launched in 2003 and has also played a key role in maintaining peace in Africa (Vanessa & Mark, 2003). The African Standby Force (ASF), to be “composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice”. Such deployment is envisioned to take place both for preventative purposes, in the form of forceful interventions, and for post-conflict peacebuilding. It has been used in several peacekeeping missions, including in Burundi, Somalia, and the Central African Republic (Abiew, 2018; Vanessa & Mark, 2003).

With continued AU engagement with Member States on conflict prevention, management, resolution and post conflict reconstruction and development as well as peacebuilding initiatives, progress is being made in the signing and implementation of peace agreements between countries not at peace, or those emerging from decades of conflict and instability. The Commission has recently published the APSA Roadmap 2016–2020, a strategic document, which builds on the achievements and challenges resulting from the implementation of the previous APSA Roadmaps (2011-2013).

The AU Commission also provides strategic, political, technical, and planning support to operations authorized by the Peace and Security Council and carried out by regional coalitions of Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), or Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs). Such support includes: The Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) and the operation against Boko Haram undertaken by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin- the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Lastly, it is vital to emphasize the critical nature of the partnerships formed by the AU within the framework of APSA. The European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and bilateral partners have all played a key role. There has

been significant innovation and creative problem solving, which has been pivotal in meeting the continent's peace and security challenges (African Union, 2017).

B. Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS)

For its part, the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) was formed in 1975 with the aim of promoting economic integration and cooperation among its 15 member states in West Africa. Although the organization did not include defense elements when it was formed, it quickly recognized the necessity of security in achieving its specified economic goals and, in April 1976, adopted a Protocol on Non-Aggression, which pledges members to: “refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning the acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against other members”. This was expanded in 1978, with the signing of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, which stipulates that an act of aggression against a member state constitutes an act of aggression against the entire community. In-built in these defence arrangements are some mechanisms to be activated in times of crisis, including the appointment of a Deputy Executive Secretary for Military Affairs, whose duty is to manage the operational aspects of the management (Adebajo, 2002; Adibe, 2000; Kwesi-Aning, 1999; Kwesi-Aning, 2000).

Another mechanism that ECOWAS has used is mediation and conflict resolution. ECOWAS has established a Mediation and Security Council to handle conflicts and crises in the sub-region. The Council has been involved in several mediation efforts, including in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire. ECOWAS has also established a network of Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (ECOWARN) to monitor and respond to potential conflicts in the sub-region (Ayambire, 2019; Sampson, 2011).

In addition, ECOWAS has been involved in promoting good governance and democratic practices in its member states. ECOWAS has developed a number of instruments, including the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, to promote democratic governance and respect for human rights in the sub-region. ECOWAS has also established a

court of justice, the ECOWAS Court of Justice, to promote the rule of law and protect human rights in the sub-region (Ayambire, 2019; Sampson, 2011).

C. Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional organization composed of 16 countries in Southern Africa, including Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SADC was established in 1992 (Johnson, 2004), and which superseded the 1980 founded Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) with the primary objective of promoting economic cooperation and regional integration among member states. However, SADC has also played a significant role in addressing political and security challenges in the region.

SADC's mechanisms in promoting peaceful globalization and handling conflict in the African sub-region include Mediation and Conflict Resolution: SADC has played a significant role in mediating conflicts in the African sub-region, such as the peace talks between the Democratic Republic of Congo and rebel groups in 2013 (The Carter Center, 2013) and significant role in mediating the political crisis in Zimbabwe in 2008. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: SADC has deployed peacekeeping missions to conflict-prone areas in the African sub-region, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho, to support peacebuilding efforts. Capacity Building and Institutional Strengthening: SADC has focused on building the capacity of member states to manage conflicts effectively. For example, SADC has established the SADC Standby Force to enhance the capacity of member states to respond to crises (The Southern Times, 2019).

D. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, (IGAD)

The fourth organisation, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, (IGAD), was formed in 1986 is a regional organization composed of eight countries in Eastern Africa, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda; and its primary objectives at its outset was to co-ordinate measures to combat the effect of drought and

desertification in East Africa; promoting economic cooperation and regional integration among member states. Indeed, at its formation, it was known as Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and Disaster (IGADD).

Also, the peace talks between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in 2005 (The Carter Center, 2005). IGAD Peace and Security Division: This division was established in 2006 to provide strategic guidance on peace and security issues in the region. It coordinates IGAD's efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts and provides technical support to member states on peace and security issues (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, 2020), including through its contribution to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). IGAD has also established a regional peacekeeping force, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Mission in South Sudan (IGAD-MS), which has been deployed to South Sudan to support peace and stability in the country. Also, IGAD provides institutional support to its member states to build capacity in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. This includes the establishment of specialized institutions such as the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) and the IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD). And finally, IGAD promotes regional integration as a means of promoting peace and security in the region. The organization has developed several protocols and agreements to facilitate trade, free movement of people and goods, and cooperation in various sectors, including energy, agriculture, and tourism.

E. Accord de Non-Agression et d'Assistance en Matière de Défense, (ANAD)

The Accord de Non-Agression et d'Assistance en Matière de Défense, (ANAD), which is the last organization considered in this study. The Accord de Non-Agression et d'Assistance en Matière de Défense (Treaty of Non-Agression, Assistance and Mutual Defence (known by its French acronym, ANAD) was a regional security agreement signed was signed in June 1977 by seven Francophone West African states (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo. Benin and Guinea Conakry were granted observer status at

the meetings of ANAD. While originally conceived narrowly — as a non-aggression and mutual defence pact aimed at promoting peace and stability in the region (Bereketeab, 2005). ANAD's main objective was to promote security and stability to enhance economic development. It was not a supranational body, and nor did it develop military policy. It was clearly a defensive alliance, and an attack on any member would be interpreted as an attack on the entire alliance (Alao 2000).

Its mode of operation includes dialogue and negotiation to resolve conflicts among members, and, if necessary, the deployment of a peace intervention force. Also, the accord stipulated that an external attack on a member state would entail the following actions: a search for a diplomatic solution, to be followed by an imposition of sanctions short of force, and finally, the use of armed force to counter the aggression. However, today ANAD has transcended its initial mission and includes elements of high-level integration such as common policy formulation and cooperation on broader human security issues. Please note that the ANAD treaty was dissolved in 1996 and replaced by other regional security initiatives.

Challenges Prospects for Peaceful Globalisation

Regional organizations in Africa face a number of constraints in their efforts towards promoting peaceful globalization in Africa. Some of these constraints include structural, limited/financial resources, lack of political will, complex socio-political dynamics and Political divisions, side-taking and lack of consensus among states.

It is worthy to note that many of the regional organisations that took charge of conflict in the post-Cold War era were not specifically designed for the purpose. Most are, indeed, economic organisations, founded for economic purposes (Alao, 2000). Thus, they do not have in place some of the structural facilities needed for conflict management. ECOWAS was without a section akin to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and this inevitably affected its ability to co-ordinate the ECOMOG operations effectively. This problem has now been recognised by the organisation and, in its new treaty, such structural flaws have been given attention. The South African Development Community, too, is trying

to clearly articulate its position, as it tries to strike a balance between the original economic objective and its security concerns (Alao, 2000).

Recently ECOWAS countries were divided over whether the sub-regional body should intervene in conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire. While Nigeria supported intervention, Ghana was openly unwilling to deploy troops. This inability to act in a unified manner was a major impediment to resolving the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. In East Africa, Ethiopia's and Kenya's interventions in Somalia in 2006 and 2011 respectively were deeply problematic and had less to do with stabilization than with promoting their national interests. The AU proposed that neighbouring countries with interests in Somalia should not be part of AMISOM. This wisdom was, however, abandoned when the AU and UN agreed to include the Kenyan troops already in Somalia in the mission (Alao, 2000).

Regional organizations are thus actively involved in promoting peaceful globalization in Africa; specifically in West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa. In West Africa, the ROs have deployed peacekeeping forces, mediated peace negotiations, and supported post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In East Africa, they have been actively involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives, particularly in Somalia. In Central Africa, the regional organizations have supported mediation efforts and deployed peacekeeping forces to help end the conflict and promote stability. In Southern Africa, the regional organizations have provided mediation and technical support to help resolve political crises and promote democracy.

With regard to the constraints faced by regional organizations in their efforts towards promoting peaceful globalization in Africa, the findings revealed there are several challenges hindering their efforts in promoting peaceful globalization in Africa. Some of the major constraints include: One of the main challenges is the lack of funds - regional organizations has limited financial and logistical and relies heavily on external support from international partners to fund its operations, which can be unreliable and unpredictable. AU (2017) corroborated this finding AU is faced with has important unintended consequences.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Though, the role of regional organizations in promoting peaceful globalization in Africa is not without challenges. Through their various mechanisms, such as peacekeeping missions, economic integration initiatives, and conflict resolution mechanisms, these organizations have played a significant role in promoting peaceful globalization in the continent. They have provided critical platforms for dialogue and cooperation among member states. As Africa continues to grapple with the challenges and opportunities of globalization, regional organizations will remain critical in promoting peaceful globalization in the continent.

Addressing these constraints will require sustained efforts and support from the member states, international partners, and other stakeholders. This includes providing adequate resources and capacity-building support to the organization, strengthening political will for peace and security on the continent, and improving coordination and collaboration among all stakeholders involved in peacebuilding efforts. In addition, there is a need for greater coordination and collaboration among regional organizations, to ensure that their efforts are aligned and complementary. This coordination can be improved through the creation of joint committees and partnerships between different regional organizations, facilitating the sharing of information, expertise, and resources. Additionally, regional organizations should address the root causes of conflicts and security challenges in the region through sustainable peace-building initiatives.

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AN APPRAISAL OF THE LIBERAL PEACE MODEL IN CONFLICT-PRONE AFRICA: A STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community spearheaded by the United Nations Organisation (UN) has been involved in conflict zones by ways of helping conflict-torn states to sign ceasefire agreements with rebel groups, monitoring power-sharing transitions and funding general elections. Renowned scholars have decried this one-size-fits-all approach as an attempt to transplant the liberal peace on hostile grounds beyond the Western world. Central to the paper is the question as to why this peace theory that explains the peaceful relationships among Western democracies has become a cure for dysfunctional and violent states in Africa. Using the Democratic Republic of Congo as a typical case study of Western engineering for more than two decades, the paper adopts the literature review approach in gathering secondary data and reopens the debate on the merits of the liberal peace model in conflict zones. The study unveils the misreading of Kant's theory of peace with its attendant divide (in theory) between the West and the rest. It proposes as alternative, the human peace model to advance the common good, irrespective of culture, religion and nationality. Such a bottom-up model is apparent in selfless actions that are in the reach of every individual by virtue of God's given talents.

Keywords: Africa, Conflict, Liberal peace, Intervention, Congo

Introduction

The wave of democratization that began in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s compelled a few dictators on the African continent to quickly organize multiparty elections and gracefully step down after the defeat at the polls. Others held national conferences to delay positive changes and allowed the formation of political parties in a desperate attempt to either buy in opposition candidates or gerrymander a part of the electorate altogether. The unlucky among them led

their respective countries into civil wars (Kaldor, 2006; Meredith, 2006; Collier, 2008). From Bosnia to Kosovo, El Salvador to Haiti, from Angola to Rwanda, Afghanistan to Iraq and from Sierra Leone to Liberia, the same method produced the same result (David, 2012). In other words, policymakers had to devise a one-size-fits-all interventionist strategy that includes aid packages conditioned by power-sharing transition and elections to be monitored by the UN peacekeeping forces.

Even though ending an armed conflict may open the door for the rebuilding of damaged infrastructure and dysfunctional institutions of government, such a laudable project of reconstruction is far from covering the whole agenda of the liberal peace. In the same way, the good conduct of general elections is not convincing enough to claim that liberal peace has been injected into African countries by Western democracies (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007). Using the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a typical case study of a conflict-torn country in Central Africa, this paper reviews the literature on the mainstream theory of liberal peace by taking a cursory look at its intellectual origins and its association with Western (military) intervention in conflict zones. Central to the paper is the question as to why the liberal peace theory that explains the peaceful relationships among liberal states has become a cure for dysfunctional and violent-prone states in sub-Saharan Africa (Campbell, Chandler & Sabaratnaam, 2011). Such an appraisal of the Western model requires a new conceptualization that aligns with the way of life of local populations.

The argument is thus organized around four sections as follows. First, the study opens with the theory of liberal peace as enunciated by Immanuel Kant and expatiated by liberal scholars. Second, the study reopened the discussion on the application of Kant's theory of peace in conflict-torn states in Africa construed as a one-size-fits-all interventionist strategy. Third, Western intervention in the Congo war provides a case study that seems to focus on political and economic liberalization without addressing the root causes of the perennial conflict. Fourth, the paper proposes, as an alternative, a peace model which is apparent in the actions taken by every individual in a given society to advance the common good.

Theoretical framework

Most liberal theorists concur that the liberal peace theory originates in the classic work of Immanuel Kant, *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795), in which German philosopher contrasts what he describes as ‘the lawless state of savagery’ with a project of long-lasting peace among nations. Oneal & Russett (1997) postulate that trade and foreign investments, as well as democratic governance, reduce the probability of armed conflict between two liberal countries. Such a peace model requires the implementation of three principles (articles), namely republican constitutions, a federation of free states, and universal hospitality. Republican constitution is centred on the citizens’ participation in government via their representatives because “Every form of government that is not representative is properly speaking without form because one and the same person can no more be at one and the same time the legislator and executor of his will” (Kant: 8).

The federation of free states (second article) conveys the notion that sovereign states can form an association of like-minded nations based on common aspirations (international laws) to transform the anarchical behaviour of states at the international level into cooperation. Far from implying the formation of a mega-state, the federation of free states implies that each independent state retains its autonomy but together they subscribe to a kind of pact known as a league of peace (*foedus pacificum*). According to Kant, a league of peace is different from a treaty of peace (*pactum pacis*) because “the latter seeks merely to stop one war, while the former seeks to end all wars forever” (Kant 1795: 14). As a result, the citizens' common right to peace would transcend national boundaries (cosmopolitan right as the third article) and in the long run, this cosmopolitan right of citizens facilitates the emergence of "a nation of peoples (*civitas gentium*), that continually growing, will finally include all the people of the earth.” (Ibidem: 16).

How does the vision of a cosmopolitan society put on the mantel of liberal peace theory? US President W. Wilson who sought American intervention in Europe for a post-war settlement attempted to answer this crucial question. Under his initiative, the League of

Nations was launched at the Paris Summit (1919), to end the First World War, thus making him the first statesman to have articulated what is to be known as the democratic peace thesis: democracies do not fight each other (Paris, 2004). However, unlike the Kantian league of peace which was premised on the consent of the people (Republican constitution), the League of Nations sought to achieve collective security in war-prone Europe without regard to the dictatorial regimes of most states then.

By establishing a correlation between peace and liberal values (rule of law, fairness, freedoms and rights) shared by Western democracies, Doyle is credited for being the enunciator of the liberal peace theory. Referring to Kant's three articles of peace and in response to a critique, he contends that none of these constitutional, international or cosmopolitan sources is alone sufficient, but together (and only where together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal politics and economies with sustained liberal peace" (Doyle, 2005). When it comes to the expansion of liberal peace beyond Western nations, he advocates a variety of economic and diplomatic means which he categorizes into three clusters: inspiration, instigation, and intervention (Doyle, 1999).

Liberal Peace Model in Conflict-Prone Zone: A Discuss

It is understood that the liberal peace theory makes sense of an empirical outcome of peaceful relationships among free individuals and between liberal states. A liberal interpretation of internal conflicts suggests that liberal values of individual freedom and fair play are trampled upon by either an autocratic regime or an aggression of foreign forces. The ensuing breakdown of law and order signals the dissolution of the social contract and the revival of the state of nature in which the specialists in legitimate violence (security agents) are overwhelmed by the demand for fairness and equity expressed by a large portion of the population (Bates, 2008). In any case, both the government and rebel troops usually fight each other with heavy weaponry manufactured elsewhere but the involvement of external actors is hardly exposed so as not to compromise the mainstream definition of civil or intrastate wars.

Accordingly, any Western intervention to shore up a failed state in the South has become problematic since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the war against terror in Afghanistan as well as the NATO airstrikes on the oil-rich country that paved the way for the rebels to topple the long-standing dictatorship of Colonel Gaddafi in 2011. Mac Ginty & Richmond (2007: 492) capture this polemic in terms of “Polarization between those who support its liberal goals of a democratic and neoliberal framework for peace, which aspires to human rights, the rule of law and development, and those who see this as liberal hubris, replicating the errors of liberal imperialism in the 19th century.” Focusing on the second category of critics, two filters of interpretation, namely Euro-centrism and Afro-pessimism, can be used to address the question as to why the Kantian peace should not become a cure for violence-ridden states in Africa.

On one hand, Euro-centrism contends that liberal peace is a kind of peace that is apparent only in Western societies where liberal values have evolved and are internalized. Interestingly, any effort to disseminate these Western values is denounced by radical critics as a replay of imperialism or neoliberalism. In other words, this 'Western peace' is therefore non-transferable in the poor countries of the South where different values are operating. Willett (2005: 573) contends that Western-sponsored conflict resolution is nothing more than "liberal peace by proxy, whereby resources from African countries are mobilized to undertake security mandates determined by the powerful vested interests of Western liberal democracies.” As for Mac Ginty, building liberal peace in Africa “represents both liberal naivety and a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the existing and emergent polities in the African context” (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2007: 495). He rather moves on to advocate an accommodated (hybrid) peace model to avert the risk of idealizing 'indigenous' and 'traditional' peace-making (Mac Ginty 2011). Against the current trend of transplanting the Western liberal peace in illiberal countries of sub-Saharan Africa via international intervention (global governance), Richmond advances the idea of an indigenous peace which is emancipatory, self-sustaining, bottom-up, suitable to the everyday life and locally owned but in the closing pages of his book,

the scholar still maintains that the liberal peace offers a form of emancipation even though it is potentially hegemonic, a 'liberal utopia' (Richmond 2008).

In short, Eurocentrism seems to reinforce the dichotomy between liberal and illiberal states which is apologetically held "to explain the lack of policy success and, through this, suggest that democracy or development are somehow not 'appropriate' aspirations or that expectations need to be substantially lowered or changed to account for difference" (Chandler 2011: 181). Afro-pessimism portrays patronage as a lesser evil in conflict-prone African countries and treats the general public as a mass of victims at the mercy of a national elite but this form of stigmatization undermines any form of capacity building. It is important to note however that a one-size-fits-all interventionist strategy was developed at the end of the Cold War to fix failing states in five stages: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. It is called the UN Agenda for Peace initiated by the then Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992) and delivered through aid packages conditioned by power-sharing transition government and elections to be monitored by the UN peacekeeping forces. The Democratic Republic of Congo provides a case study of Western intervention disguised as liberal peace in a conflict-prone country.

Case study: Democratic Republic of Congo

Close to the size of Western Europe and one-fourth of the US, the DRC enjoys a geostrategic position in Central Africa concerning its fauna and flora evolving around the beautiful land, the huge rain forest, and the many rivers. It also possesses a wealth of natural resources: cobalt, copper, cadmium, petroleum, industrial and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, germanium, uranium, radium, bauxite, iron, ore, coal, coltan, hydropower, timber, and many more. Yet such a potentially rich country ranks among the ten poorest nations in the world as far as human development is concerned. One plausible explanation attributes this paradox to the long and painful history of foreign interventions which some analysts trace its origin back to the Fifteen century (Haskin, 2005; Omara-Otunnu, 2007).

Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Tutsi-led government in Kigali launched a manhunt across the border and the Rwandan Patriotic Force (RPF) tracked down the fleeing Hutus accused of genocide in a retaliatory manner and turned the refugee camps in Eastern Congo into slaughterhouses. To disguise the presence of these foreign troops in a sovereign territory, leaders of neighbouring countries met with a long-time Congolese rebel, Laurent Kabila in 1996, and together they formed the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation (AFDL). In February 1998 Kabila sought the cooperation of bigger states within the region by bringing the Congo into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). As soon as the news of the invasion of troops from neighbouring Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda in DRC reached the SADC, an emergency meeting of member states took place in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe on 18 August 1998.

L.D. Kabila had his regime shortened when he failed to meet the expectations of his foreign sponsors who decided to invade his country. The next day the leaders of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe undertook to respond militarily. In an act of collective self-defence guided by Article 51 of the UN Charter, they launched the 'Operation Sovereign Legitimacy' (OSL) to shore up the Kabila government. The ensuing 'African World War' involving many African countries testified to the influence of foreign powers in the DRC between 1996 and 2003 (Snow, 2008; Prunier, 2009; Meredith, 2006). OSL was already one month old when the UN Security Council through UNSC Resolution 1234 (9 April 1999) called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign troops (Coleman, 2007).

Consequently, under the new dispensation, DRC resumed its cooperation with important players including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other UN sister agencies. Through the financial assistance of the donor countries, the inter-Congolese dialogue was back on track at the Sun City resort, in South Africa (February 2002), with the full participation of all sections of the Congolese society. The Kabila government, in partnership with donor countries, produced the Global and All-Inclusive Accord for the transition in DRC (AGI), which was signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002 under the watch of the government

of South Africa. AGI recognized the incumbent as Transition President who would share political power with four vice-presidents assisted by ministers and vice-ministers on April 7, 2003. Under the magic formula of 1+4, the power-sharing government awarded the status of political leaders to warlords who would accept to silence their guns and wait for the ballot contest.

Without prejudice to a strong batch of trained police officers, thanks to EUPOL and expected international election monitors, approximately, 70 percent of the MONUC 17,600-strong military contingent was expected to handle the election-related duties involving public protection, safety, and escorts. Nevertheless, the UNSC still authorized on 25 April 2006 the deployment of the European force (EUFOR) to the DRC for the period encompassing the country's elections (UN, 2006). Speaking from Brussels a few days before the polls, the German commander, Lt Gen K. Viereck made the following statement: "If deterrence does not succeed, we shall fight against any spoiler. We could use force, even lethal" (ISS Today 2006). Arguably, the election of Joseph Kabila in 2006 was a victory in a pre-emptive war between the Congolese electorate and the external forces made of UN and EUFOR.

External engineering through the accompaniment of the transition government by the international community coupled with enforcement of elections during the 2006 elections underscored the UN Peace Agenda which downplayed the causes of the conflict. As Duffield (2001) contends, the liberal discourse confines the causes of conflict to the South and helps provide the legitimization for outside involvement. Since then, the protracted crisis in East DRC has served to divert the attention of the public from claiming their democratic dividends in terms of security, peace, and development (Galtung, 1969). As far as DRC is concerned, peace accords among warlords are constantly breached, giving way to the multiplicity of armed groups coupled with a plethora of intervening forces, particularly in the Kivu Region where the Movement of the 23 March 2009 (M23) supported by Rwanda continues to make headlines (UN, 2010). The challenge put forward in the field of peace research consists of developing an alternative model which is people-driven and sustainable.

The way forward: A search for alternative

It is acknowledged that “there has been little research on the nature of the liberal peace project.” Enforcing façade democracy and opening the economy to foreign investors under the guise of liberal peace is like putting the cart before the horse. Not only does the peace of the battlefield lead to an arms race among powerful nations of the world but it also makes war and violent conflict ubiquitous in the 21st Century. This top-down approach relies exclusively on the know-how of the elite both local and international. It also reduces the rest of the population into passive recipients of peace conceived elsewhere before being transplanted on a conflict-ridden soil.

There is therefore an urgent need for a paradigm shift in the way we conceive of peace which is grounded in the traditional way of life of non-Western societies. Such a peace model implies the agency of the citizens at the grass-root level instead of elite-driven initiative in connivance with external actors. The empowerment of the masses in this regard consists of expanding people’s capabilities by encouraging each member of the society, through peace education, to break the chains of ignorance with its attendant victim mentality and become peace actors as opposed to foot soldiers. Such a human peace model implies a lifestyle based on cardinal values of hospitality, generosity, and altruism, to name but a few. It is a relational peace which is characterized by non-domination, mutual recognition and trust.

In the African context, the give-and-take peace model parallels ‘African solidarity’ whereby altruistic individuals find joy in doing certain things for others without expecting any gratification from above. They live out true humanism which Desmond Tutu described as the African Weltanschauung (world-view), popularly known as ‘Ubuntu.’ As he puts it, A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are (Tutu 1999: 34).

The Yoruba culture in West Nigeria qualifies such a person who lives for others as *omoluabi*, which literally means the ‘one born by God.’ Similar expressions can be found in many other cultures on the continent that buttress the human peace model. This alternative is possible if a local community allows everybody, including the poorest of the poor, to bring out the best he or she possesses in life and put it at the service of humanity with no string attached given that true humanity is more in giving than receiving. In the African worldview, everyone is a potential giver and receiver and there would be no one left behind in the pursuit of the Global Vision 2030 (UN, 2015).

Conclusion

The mainstream peace model discussed above hinges heavily on the politics of war and conflict. It is a tacit way of simply saying that what is known, accepted, and visible is war rather than peace while relegating the latter to the realm of abstraction and piety. Even though the liberal peace model conveys a meaning of accommodation rooted in the liberal tradition, this paper has argued that Western intervention in conflict zones has robbed the Kantian project of the capacity to promote international peace based on the power of consent in the hands of the citizenry. The shift towards the local is a clear rejection of the interventionist approach which developed in the 1990s, based on supply-driven templates conceived by Western technocrats. Using the Democratic Republic of Congo as a typical case of external engineering, the transition government was instrumental in the transformation of warlords into politicians and leaders of political parties, thanks to the support of the international community.

The quick-fix approach in the post-war reconstruction is that it reflects the minds of donor countries and makes a mockery of local initiatives. No proclamation of World Peace can make local communities peaceful unless concrete actions are taken by local people themselves to advance the cause of peace. It is in this context that the study advocates the conceptualization of the human peace model which is premised on the deep-rooted values of African solidarity and apparent in the ability to share God-given talents with others

irrespective of creed, nationality, or race. This bottom-up approach allows local communities and nations to take the driver' seat in providing sustainable solutions to their problems.

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CONTRIBUTIONS OF TERTIARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO PEACEBUILDING IN BORNO STATE, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria has become synonymous with violent conflicts. These conflicts appear intractable because of the defective approaches adopted by governments towards resolving them. The major thrust of this study is to explore the role of tertiary educational institutions in Borno State in peacebuilding. Data collection was done using secondary sources like textbooks, academic journals and newspapers. Functionalism theory provided the explanation of the statutory role of tertiary educational institutions in addressing violent conflicts in the state. The study adopted the qualitative method of research based on the previous studies on educational institutions' role in strengthening peacebuilding initiatives. The findings reveal that tertiary educational institutions in the state play a critical role in the peacebuilding process through teaching, research publication and community development services. The study recommended that the Borno State government should further empower the institutions in deepening their peacebuilding efforts.

Keywords: Education, Nigeria, Peace, Peacebuilding, Tertiary Education

Introduction

Tertiary educational institutions are vital in nation building. Among the many strengths of tertiary education, the ones most frequently mentioned are the roles played by its mission that yield value to society and help create a better future. This is based in the belief that tertiary education is an essential catalyst for generating economic development and for creating a more

peaceful world through access to individual thought and heightened exposure to diversity (OblinGer, 2012). For this reason, the Federal Government of Nigeria maintained that education is a veritable tool for social change, national integration and development (FGN, 2012). As stipulated in the National Policy of Education (2013), the goals of settling up tertiary educational institutions are among others, to contribute to national development through high level manpower training; and to develop the intellectual capacity of individuals to understand and appreciate their local and external environment.

People in Maiduguri face numerous security challenges due to the Boko Haram insurgency. Even though the Nigerian government deployed the military against the insurgents, instability and bloodshed have not only persisted but have risen since then (Felbab-Brown, 2020). Agbor (2015) agreed that education has advantages in reducing the intensity of conflicts and setting the stage for lasting peace. In his research, Yunus (2020) investigated the integration of peace education directly into Islamic religious and citizenship education in Borno State. In another study, Kingsley (2013) demonstrated the efficacy of educational institutions in helping to address situations of conflict. However, there is dearth of study on the roles of tertiary educational institutions in peacebuilding in Borno State. This lack of investigation is the vacuum the current study aims to address.

Conceptual Clarification

The core terms in this study include - conflict, education, peace, peacebuilding, and tertiary educational institutions. These terms are defined below within the context used in this study:

Conflict

Conflict develops when one party's actions are seen to be hindering or blocking the goals, needs, or actions of another. Conflicts can originate within an entity resulting in intra-personal, intra-group or intra- national conflicts; or they could reflect incompatible actions between contrasting groups or persons leading to interpersonal, intergroup or international conflicts. Depending on how they are handled, conflicts can serve a constructive role leading to a re-examination of basic assumptions and practices; or in the alternative, to a disruption of

peoples' life and general wellbeing. However, in this study, conflict refers to a situation of interaction involving two or more parties in which actions in pursuit of incompatible goals result to varying degrees of discord as well as violent clashes within and between communities, groups and state and non-state actors.

Education

Education is a deliberate and purposeful formal and informal activity directed at the achievement of a range of ends that include the development of knowledgeable individuals who are able to think rationally, the formation of a sustainable community and the realisation of economic goals benefiting both individuals and their communities.

Peace

Peace is the absence of physical and structural violence, and the presence of justice. Peace is synonymous with non-violence and harmony. It is understood as the opposite of antagonistic conflict, violence, or war. It is the absence of negative conflict which in general terms regarded as the fundamental basis for social stability and the development of human societies.

Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding denotes the full spectrum of interventions or initiatives by stakeholders in the educational and other sectors to facilitate durable peace and prevent the reoccurrence of violence. It is ultimately concerned with the building of relationships, asserting communal responsibility and solidarity. It involves addressing those issues that trigger conflict. Furthermore, peacebuilding is the logical intervention to prevent the generation of conflict by creating sustainable peace. It aims at changing beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour of the people in order to achieve a more stable and peaceful co-existence.

Tertiary Educational Institutions

Tertiary educational institutions include publicly and privately owned Colleges of Education, Polytechnics, and Universities. These institutions are the highest level of formal education and offer a range of professional, vocational, and general education programmes and courses on

both part-time and full-time at different levels such as certificate, diploma, bachelor, post-graduate diploma, masters, and doctor of philosophy.

Theoretical Framework

Functionalism

The paper is anchored on functionalism theory. The theory provides useful explanation of the function tertiary educational institutions can play in addressing the endemic group violence synonymous with the Nigerian state. Propounded by scholars like Durkheim (1993), the theory addresses the society as an organic whole in which each of its element like institutions work together to maintain the other. Various parts of the society are seeing to be closely related and taken together as a complete system. The educational institutions like universities, polytechnics and colleges of education work to support the government in providing education and training for the people. Therefore, any lapse in the educational system will affect the general security and well begin of the people which will on long run lead to state of insecurity. Hence, the proper functioning of each part of the society ensures the well begin and the survival of the whole society (Bothamley, 2004).

Literature Review

The World Bank (2021) posit that tertiary educational institutions are instrumental in fostering growth, reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity. They benefit not just the individual, but the society as a whole. The key contributions of these institutions to peacebuilding is through the teaching of peacebuilding concepts like ethics, values, human rights, tolerance, early warning and response efforts, violence prevention, conflict resolution, peace advocacy, civilian and military peacekeeping, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, ceasefire agreements, establishment of peace or buffer zones and other themes related to peace. Education at the tertiary level facilitates youth to achieve knowledge, enhance their proficiency in the area of peace and amicable resolution of conflict, and create an attitude about the perception of peace in human life.

Likewise, UNESCO (2008) emphasised that education for non-violence and peace includes training, skills, and information directed towards cultivating a culture of peace based on human rights principles. This education not only provides knowledge about a culture of peace, but also imparts the skills and attitudes necessary to defuse and recognise potential conflicts, and those needed to actively promote and establish a culture of peace and non-violence.

The National Policy on Education enumerated the aim of tertiary education in Nigeria to include:

- a) To contribute to national development through high-level relevant manpower training.
- b) To develop and inculcate proper values for the survival of the individual and society.
- c) To acquire both physical and intellectual skills which will enable individuals to be self-reliant and useful members of the society.
- d) To promote and encourage scholarship and community services.
- e) To forge and cement national unity; and
- f) To promote national and international understanding and interaction (NPE, 2013).

The concept of peacebuilding is the identification and support of measures needed for transformation toward more sustainable, peaceful relationship and structures of governance, to avoid a relapse into conflict (UN, 2007). According to Jah (2022) peacebuilding is a complex and dynamic process of changing relationships, perceptions, attitudes, behaviors, interests, and underlying structures that encourage and perpetuate violent conflicts. Engaging multiple levels of society (i.e. high, mid, and grassroots), peacebuilding involves addressing the root causes of the conflict through long term economic and social justice provisions, the reform of political structures of governance, strengthening the rule of law, and healing through reconciliation. It also refers to mechanisms and structures that can prevent a conflict, terminate it, transform it, or resolve it.

Enaigbe and Igbinoghene (2016) posit that peacebuilding has not taken strong root in Nigerian education sector because of the lack of understanding of the concept of

peacebuilding, as well as its aims and objectives, among policymakers, the general public, and government. Hence, (Akande, 2021) advocated for the inclusion of peacebuilding and conflict resolution in teacher education curricula in Nigeria.

Tertiary Educational Institutions in Borno State

The Nigerian National Policy on Education (2013) defined tertiary education to include universities, colleges of education, polytechnics, and monotechnics. Borno State has many tertiary educational institutions that include four universities (University of Maiduguri; Bornu State University, Maiduguri; Nigerian Army University, Biu; and the National Open University of Nigeria Study Centre, Maiduguri). The state also has the Ramat Polytechnic. Other tertiary educational institutions are Kashim Ibrahim College of Education, Mohammed Lawan College of Agriculture, and the College of Education, Waka-Biu.

The Approaches of Tertiary Educational Institutions to Peacebuilding in Borno State

As spelt out in the National Policy on Education (2013), tertiary educational institutions are established purposely to provide teaching, research, and community services. Education has been shown to reinforce or drive economic and social exclusion, inequality and social fragmentation along ethnic or religious lines (UNICEF, 2014). Management and governance of education can contribute to conflict, especially if corruption is present or wider political processes that are weak and ineffective. Therefore, reducing inequalities in educational provision and resources, as well as fighting corruption may reduce grievances that underpin conflict.

The case of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria is evidence of conflict emanating owing to lack of education in the side of the group and directionless policy in the side of Nigeria (Okoro, 2018). It is also not far from the recent herdsmen terrorism that has killed many Nigerians and depleted the national economy as the herdsmen lack quality education and thus get frustrated when conversing with the residents of their host communities (Okoro, 2020). Effective education management is critical to the role of education in responding to conflicts

and emergencies if they were to arise again (UNICEF, 2014). Furthermore, proper investment in higher education systems is critical for building peace.

The key approaches to peacebuilding used by tertiary educational institutions in Borno State are through teaching, research, community service, and research publications.

1. Promotion of Peacebuilding through Teaching

Functionalism sees the state as an organic whole in which each of its elements like the educational institutions work together to maintain the wellbeing of the other. Various parts of the society are seen to be closely related and taken together as a complete system. Therefore, human capacity development is one of the major activities of universities in Nigeria. The values, skills, and knowledge imparted by tertiary institutions largely influence the attitudes of students. One of the several ways of promoting the culture of peace among students at the tertiary level include teaching peace studies and conflict resolution. Considering the state of affairs in Borno State, it is worthy of note that all the four universities in Borno State (University of Maiduguri; Bornu State University, Maiduguri; the Nigerian Army University, Biu and the National Open University of Nigeria, Maiduguri Study Centre) have departments of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution. Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution courses have also been included as fundamental GST courses and are compulsory for all students in the universities regardless of their course of study. Through the teaching of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution in the institutions, students have the opportunity to learn the causes and prevention of war, the nature of violence, social oppression, discrimination, marginalisation and other concepts in peacebuilding and conflict management. Moreover, through peace studies, students, staff and the public imbibe peacebuilding strategies necessary for a just and peaceful society.

2. Promotion of Peacebuilding through Research

Nigeria as a nation has been riddled with so many conflicts and Borno State is not exempted from conflicts. A rich field of research on conflict management and origins of conflicts are open to academicians and policymakers in tertiary educational institutions. This is in

consonance with the expected role of tertiary educational institutions to promote research and contribute to the development of the host communities. Experience has shown that so many conflicts resolutions methods have been practised for decades, but they have not been properly researched and documented. By this reason, the Nigerian Army University, Biu, regularly carries out research in key areas like peace, insurgency and national security as a way of building sustainable peace in the state and beyond. Such research is vital for management of future conflicts. In a similar manner, the University of Maiduguri established the Centre for Peace, Diplomacy and Development Studies to deepen research in areas related to peace and human development.

The Centre collaborated with the MacArthur Foundation to conduct researches in several areas of peace and human development (PRNigeria, 2022). Another area of research under investigation by the institutions is the problem of internally displaced persons. The institutions have also carried out researches in several areas like the causes and consequences of population displacements, the management of refugee camps, the role of women, the education of internally displaced persons and the resettlement of internally displaced persons in their towns or cities at the end of the conflict. Findings assist policymakers in taking necessary steps to promote a culture of peace. In essence, research is necessary to enhance institutional image and reputation as well as contribute to the knowledge base.

3. Promotion of Peacebuilding through Community Services

Community service is the third cardinal duty of tertiary institutions. Community service refers to programme that touches the lives of the host communities. Community service programmes are designed to bring positive development to the host communities. Through the continuous organisation of conferences, peace fora, peace walk, workshops, seminars, and public lectures, the institutions in the state integrate the culture of peace to the people. Imparting information and sensitising the public on various issues related to peace will help in promoting peace and harmony in the state. For example, the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) partnered with the University of Maiduguri to engage 200 graduates of the university to

provide afternoon education services in Borno communities and Q'uranic centres (Premium Times, 2020). On its part, the National Open University of Nigeria organised its first international conference on peace. The conference provided a forum for frank discussion on several profound issues regarding peace in Nigeria. Furthermore, the Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, National Open University of Nigeria joined the world in celebrating the United Nations' International Day of Peace to remind people of the need to commit to peace above all differences (NOUN News, 2021).

4. Promotion of Peacebuilding through Publications

Publications play a strategic role in life of every institution and the tertiary institutions in Borno State have made visible contributions through their publications. As a way of contributing to peacebuilding in Borno State, the University of Maiduguri Centre for Peace, Diplomatic and Development Studies (CPDDS) has published books and journals dealing on peace and national security issues. The different thoughts in the books and journals can help in building national security and promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts in the country. The research publications contribute greatly to understanding the challenges that security operatives face in the field, and human rights abuses encountered while tackling insecurity in the country, among others. To this effect, PRNigeria (2022) stated that the publications by CPDDS cover the activities of Boko Haram terrorists in the Northeast, herder/farmer clashes, and ethno religious crisis in Plateau and Kaduna States. Policy dialogues with the police, civil defense, and vigilantes such as the Civilian Joint Task Force, and civil society organisations have been enhanced by the university through the publication of books and journals that deal on peace.

In a similar manner and to further strengthen peacebuilding in Borno State, the National Open University of Nigeria has also contributed through its publication - NOUN International Journal of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution (NIJPCR). The NIJPCR is a refereed journal providing a forum for scholars for the sharing of critical thinking and constructive action at the intersections of conflict, development, human rights, and peace in

Nigeria. The journal thus serves as a professional and respected tool for promoting dialogue and expanding networks on critical peacebuilding discussions towards coherent, and constructive action for national development. The journal is a credible resource that helps government, policymakers and the academia solve security issues and build positive peace within Nigeria and internationally.

Challenges faced by Tertiary Educational Institutions in carrying out Peacebuilding activities in Borno State

There are several challenges these educational institutions encounter in carrying out peacebuilding activities in the state. They include:

1. Shortage of trained manpower is a major challenge. Well trained, experienced and qualified manpower are not in adequate number in some of the institutions.
2. Inadequacy of infrastructure is a major problem that hinders the implementation of peacebuilding programmes in the tertiary institutions.
3. Lack of funds to carry out short term courses that will enhance the culture of peaceful resolution of conflicts to the public. Funding is an importance resource in carrying out peacebuilding activities.
4. The various attacks and threats by Boko Haram insurgents in the institutions have resulted to school closure leading to unstable academic calendar. Many tertiary institutions located in Borno State have been victims of continuous attacks. Staff of these institutions have often been threatened, harassed, kidnapped and killed by insurgents, thereby demoralising them. No any meaningful programme of the institutions can be effectively implemented in the midst of insecurity.
5. Most of the peacebuilding activities are concentrated in the urban areas where most of the institutions are located due to insecurity.

Conclusion

Peace is a necessary condition for the sustainable development of any nation. Peacebuilding is the logical intervention carried out to prevent the generation of conflict. Happenings in Nigeria presuppose that peacebuilding activities be given exceptional attention in all tertiary educational institutions. This study investigated the extent to which tertiary educational institutions in Borno State are championing peacebuilding and conflict management programmes. This implies that all the tertiary institutions (universities) are offering peace and conflict resolution courses to students. The Ramat Polytechnic and the colleges of education in the state also offer peace studies as General Studies (GST) course compulsory for all newly admitted students. Supporting peacebuilding programmes in tertiary educational institutions in Nigeria will help to manage, mitigate, resolve, and transform conflicts in the society.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this paper, the following recommendations are made:

- i. Tertiary educational institutions in the study area should regularly organise enlightenment campaigns and educate the public on the importance of peace to the individual and the society;
- ii. Government and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) should collaborate in funding peacebuilding activities in the institutions to ensure that necessary facilities are not lacking;
- iii. Departments of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution in the institutions should introduce short-term courses to the public where citizens will be taught concepts related to peace and conflict resolution;
- iv. Conflict management and peacebuilding education should be incorporated into all teacher training education programmes at the Kashim Ibrahim College of Education; Mohammed Lawan College of Agriculture; and the College of Education, Waka-Biu.

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EXAMINING ART THERAPY FOR PREVENTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR IN CHILDREN AFFECTED BY CONFLICT AND TRAUMA

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ABSTRACT

Conflict and trauma have been known to affect children in many different ways. This study explores how art therapy can be used to mitigate violent behaviours in such children. This study used the qualitative research design, desk research, content analysis and interviews with artists who have used art therapy and some visitors to the National Gallery of Art Lafia to ascertain the impact of art on emotions in order to use it as therapy on children to averting violent extremist behaviours. Both primary and secondary data collection was used. The Research analysed Theories for Developmental Art therapy and Person-centred Theory as the theoretical framework. However, the researcher came up with some findings which showed that Art therapy, although still experimental, has a great impact in helping rehabilitate traumatized children and adults using Art processes, and nonverbal technics, which start by encouraging children to express their suppressed traumatic emotions through art. The Research also made some recommendations, including developing more art therapy centres in prisons, juvenile correctional facilities, refugee camps, hospitals, etc. Regular use on children to reveal their suppressed emotions, to reveal abuse early, was also recommended.

Keywords: Terrorism, Insurgency, Terror-attacks, Fatality

Introduction

Children in armed conflict are often deprived of basic needs, psychologically supportive environments, educational and career opportunities, and other resources that promote positive psychosocial development and mental health (Frounfelker *et al.*, 2019). Children continue to be disproportionately affected by armed conflict, and supporting them should be a priority for the international community. Experiences of conflict, ranging from denial of access to

psychologically supportive environments and resources to forced engagement in armed forces or armed groups, violate children's rights as set out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. (Frounfelker, et al 2019)

Over the past few decades, art therapy has emerged as a promising technique for changing the minds of young people who are about to join extremist groups. (Vaishnavi, 2021). Art therapy helps people express themselves without having to verbalize their emotions. With guidance from a psychotherapist, individuals often create expressive art depicting their thoughts and feelings. For many, this creative outlet is an essential part of trauma healing. (Durling, 2020)

Children in conflict-affected areas are generally highly vulnerable to violent extremist behaviour and recruitment into terrorist groups, which has increased over the years, necessitating alternative methods to address this issue. On the other hand, art therapy is still considered an experimental therapy method in some countries, which this Research will try to show its effectiveness and encourage its use to promote healing. Usage in Nigeria is shallow, and Research on it is very sparse. This Research will attempt to bridge the research gap around art therapy in Nigeria

Conceptual Analysis

Art Therapy

According to the American Art Therapy Association (1996). Art therapy is based on the idea that the creative process of creating art heals and enhances life and is a form of non-verbal communication of thoughts and feelings. Art therapy is also believed to be a type of experiential therapy that is a model of treatment involving a series of exercises and activities. These activities encourage people to express themselves, get in touch with their creative side, become more social, thoughtful, spend time outdoors, be active and cooperate with others. Art therapy, in particular, is an exceptionally beneficial experiential therapy. It can involve virtually any form of art or craft project. (Durling 2020). Cherry (2021) stated that 'the use of artistic methods to treat psychological disorders and improve mental health is known as art

therapy. According to Cherry, Art therapy is a technique rooted in the idea that creative expression can promote healing and mental well-being.

Trauma

Trauma is a mental disorder that develops after an individual has experienced a traumatic event or a series of traumatic events. Examples include violence, sexual abuse, childhood neglect, car accidents, natural disasters, the death of a loved one, and war or fighting. Trauma is often all-consuming and impacts all facets of a person's life, including career, self-esteem, relationships, physical health, sleep patterns, and the ability to function in society. (Durling, 2020). Durling (2016) stated that trauma could cause post-traumatic stress disorder or acute distress disorder. In many cases, this could lead to other mental health issues, such as panic attacks, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, depression, codependency, eating disorders, or survivor's guilt. Often the trauma also coincides with alcoholism and drug addiction.

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

PTSD is a psychiatric disorder resulting from a traumatic event. Frightening or terrifying experiences such as war, abuse or neglect leave traces that remain imprinted in our memories, emotions and bodily experiences. When triggered, PTSD causes symptoms such as reliving the trauma, panic or anxiety, tenderness or reactivity, memory lapses, and numbness or dissociation (Fabian 2017). Originally thought to be the aftermath of war on some military veterans, we now know that post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a mental health condition that can affect anyone. PTSD is caused by exposure to a traumatic event or frightening experiences such as an accident, sexual assault, war, natural disaster, or threat of death to yourself or a loved one. PTSD is a long-lasting consequence of incredibly traumatic events that overwhelm a person's coping ability (Inoue *et al*, 2022).

Theoretical Framework

Person Centered Theory

This paper is anchored on the Person-centered Theory; Carl Rogers developed person-centered therapy in the 1940s. His basic idea was that people are essentially trustworthy, have the

potential to understand themselves and can resolve their problems without the therapist's intervention. Person-Centered Theory employs skills such as congruence, unconditional positive regard and empathy. Carl Rogers developed person-centered therapy as a reaction against psychoanalytic therapy. Person-centered therapy emphasizes the client's/patient's resources for gaining self-awareness. It also contested the idea which believes the counsellor knows best. Furthermore, it is hoped that the clients/patients realize their potential for growth, wholeness, spontaneity, and inter-directedness. In addition, it is not the therapist who primarily brings on the change. That responsibility falls with the client/patient (Corey, 2009).

Corey (2009) went further by stating the role of a counsellor in person-centered theory, which is to focus on the client's strengths. A positive search for assets can be done, and the counsellor must create an environment allowing the client to explore their emotions, thoughts, etc. The setting is an essential piece of this therapy. These are all techniques of art therapy where the client is allowed to heal and grow by himself under the observation and guidance of the Art therapist.

Literature Review

The Effects of War on Children

According to the United Nations Report on the effects of armed conflict on children, in ongoing conflicts worldwide, war has increasingly and seriously affected civilians. Among them, more than half are children and adolescents younger than 18 (Machel 2001). In 1996, UNICEF stated that during the period 1985-1996, approximately 2 million children had been killed in war, 4 to 5 million had become disabled or seriously injured, 12 million children had been displaced or left homeless, and 1 million had lost their parents. Or were separated from them (Machel 1996). Experiencing armed conflict during childhood and adolescence poses severe mental health risks and threatens child development. Exposure to different types of violence, the duration of the conflict, and the nature of traumatic events experienced and observed are all associated with the onset and severity of mental disorders in conflict-affected children. (Frounfelker, et al 2019).

Overall, the most commonly reported mental disorders in conflict-exposed children are depression and PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder). Other disorders reported include acute stress reactions, panic disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), childhood-specific anxiety disorders, and sleep disorders. Later in childhood, children exposed to conflict-related trauma are predisposed to externalizing symptoms, including behavioral problems and defiant conduct/oppositional disorder. (Frounfelker, et al 2019).

The effects of armed conflict ripple through the social and developmental ecology of the child. Psychosocial manifestations of war trauma in children include proximal and distal effects on family interactions, academic achievement, peer relationships, and general life satisfaction. (Frounfelker, et al 2019).

Art Therapy and Treating Trauma

Art therapy is a unique type of psychotherapy that uses creating and visualizing art in the context of a helping relationship to increase the well-being of clients of all ages (Malchiodi, 2011). Art therapy harnesses the benefits of artistic creation, a holistic human activity which has evolved for personal and societal well-being (Davies, 2005).

Throughout history, artistic creation has been an essential vector of knowledge about oneself and others (Gerber et al., 2012). Artworks bring emotions into consciousness and encapsulate complex human experiences through an expressive form (Barone & Eisner, 2012). Like other forms of psychotherapy and counselling, Art therapy is used to increase self-understanding, encourage personal growth, and aid in emotional repair and has been used in a wide variety of forms and settings with children, adults, families and groups. (Malchiodi, 2012).

Complex trauma greatly influences people's lives through significant symptoms and brain changes. However, the nature of complex trauma and the plasticity of the brain allows art and art therapy to address the fundamental issues of complex trauma. Art therapy helps improve brain function and regulate neurotransmitters. The implementation of flow when practising art, the expressive nature of art therapy, the development of existing skills, and the

building of therapeutic relationships within art therapy sessions demonstrate the application effective use of art therapy as an alternative method of treatment to improve and recover brain function, as well as improve symptoms of complex trauma (Li, 2015).

As Miller (2018) noted;

Art expression is a powerful way to safely contain and create separation from the terrifying experience of trauma," writes Gretchen Miller, board-certified art therapist for the National Institute for Trauma and Loss in Children. "Art safely gives voice to and makes a survivor's experience of emotions, thoughts, and memories visible when words are insufficient (Miller 2018: 14).

Vaishnavi (2021) stated that art therapy is generally experiential in nature. The typical treatment model, which has emerged globally, involves a range of exercises and activities. These activities encourage people to look deep within, to go to that memory and event, to express themselves creatively, to express dark thoughts, and to make peace with them once they are at big day. They then feel less victimized and more in control. They become more caring in nature. They are able to socialize more and cooperate with others.

Vaishnavi went further to list art therapy forms like painting, colouring, drawing, photography, jewellery making, pottery, acting, filmmaking. Anything that has a visual connotation Vaishnavi also explained that trauma is registered in the left side of the brain and that is where our visual or artistic brain is. The right side of the brain is analytical, and phonetics and voice are housed there. So, when we use art for therapy, we delve deep into the brain's creative side, and it helps us say more without actually speaking.

Art Therapy for Children

Artistic expression has been used extensively in therapy with children for several reasons. It is a natural language for most children and can be a valuable modality for enhancing the expression of trauma, distress, or loss (Malchiodi, 2001). Additionally, children lack the verbal capacity to express a crisis, and for those who have been raped or abused, art is a way to communicate feelings and experiences without words. Gross and Haynes (1998) explain why art therapy is helpful for children as;

- They may reduce anxiety and help children feel more comfortable with the therapist.

- They may increase memory retrieval.
- They may help children organize their narratives.
- They may prompt children to tell more than they would during a solely verbal interview.

Malchiodi, (2001) went further in stating that it is important to avoid imposing adult standards on children's creative work and making assumptions about content and meaning when working with children and their artistic expressions in art therapy. Since it is difficult to make conclusive interpretations about content and meaning, it is helpful to use a phenomenological approach to understanding children and their art. Here Malchiodi has sought to encourage giving children the freedom to express themselves and to look at their artistic expressions with an openness to a variety of meanings, to the way the child sees the world and to the context in which the expressions were created. One of the main ways to achieve this is to encourage the child to develop their own artistic expressions and storytelling and see them as experts on their own experiences. When therapists influence or direct therapy in children, it is likely that the meaning of the child is not fully represented or sometimes misunderstood.

Artistic Emotional Relieving Experiences

Images can create feelings of pleasure, fear, calm or anxiety and have been shown to alter mood and even induce feelings of well-being (Benson, 1975). There is strong evidence that images have a significant impact on our bodies. Simple experiments have proven that even exposure to images of nature from a hospital room window can reduce the length of stay and increase patients' sense of well-being (Ulrich, 1984).

In the course of this Research, some Artists and visitors to the National Gallery of Art Lafia were interviewed to understand the emotionally relieving experiences they got producing and viewing art. The artists interviewed all agreed that making art always brought joy and happiness to them, reducing all negative emotions they felt, such as sadness, anger, depressed feelings and sorrow. One of the artists interviewed said he used art to nurse himself

out of depression after so many visits to psychiatric hospitals failed. He recovered by simply painting constantly. Another artist narrated how she helped her 8-year-old niece recover from a violent attack that led to her mother's death, which she witnessed. According to her, she constantly provided her with drawing and painting materials, which the child used to express her deep emotional feelings of a sad and violent loss which she couldn't talk about; this helped create an understanding of what the child was feeling and how to help her.

Another artist explained her feelings while painting: "I am often overcome with waves of emotion while I paint. These moments are unpredictable and run the spectrum from overwhelming rushes of nostalgia, or feelings of amazing calmness, all the way to what I describe as a full-body tingle. That rush of excitement that sweeps from head to toe, vibrating my whole body with excitement". Visitors to the Gallery interviewed stated that they always feel calm and relaxed when in a gallery around artworks. One of the visitors interviewed gave an instance of her feelings when left alone in a gallery; she said the feelings were very calm and delightful, like being taken to another world or travelling back in time.

Trauma in Children as a Precursor to Violent Behavior

In 2015 a study was conducted at the University of Maryland by a team led by Simi, P. (2015). They examined how different factors related to childhood trauma-related conduct problems precede the process of entering violent extremism. This study identified a pathway by which non-ideological risk factors accumulate over time from childhood, including trauma, and serve to drive the person toward a variety of violent behaviours, including violent extremism. Many violent extremists they studied shared individual background factors such as child abuse, trauma, and other risk factors with mainstream street gang members and "ordinary" violent offenders.

The study suggested solutions to avoid extremism, i.e. early interventions designed for at-risk youth and gang members should inform how we think about and apply initiatives against violent extremism. Becoming part of an extremist group provides a sense of social cohesion that may otherwise be lacking in the life of someone whose family background is

characterized by dysfunction and instability. There are numerous individual, family and community approaches that can be taken to help counter violent extremism, but it is only through systematic empirical evaluations that we will know how well these interventions translate into different populations of violent extremists. However, existing interventions offer an important starting point, and the substantial similarities we find in the stories of violent former white supremacists and more general violent offenders suggest that mainstream programming can play an important role in addressing violence and extremism.

Using Art Therapy to Prevent Violent Behavior

Besides trauma, art therapy can be an effective complementary treatment technique for many mental health disorders. It is commonly used to treat people with panic disorder, depression, anxiety, OCD, grief, borderline personality disorder, eating disorders, and anger issues. There has been some remarkable art therapy work with victims of terrorism who suffer from the resulting mental and physical problems (Lev-Wiesel & Slater, 2007), Art therapy with inmates has been successful and has shown varied benefits, ranging from learning self-expression to overcoming depressive symptoms; it also improves social reintegration (Bennett & Gussak, 2009). In addition, studies show that art therapy can help reduce the rate of recidivism (Bruna, 2007), which is an important element in measuring the effectiveness of art therapy in correctional settings. Art therapy in recent times has been introduced in prisons as a form of prisoner rehabilitation.

On 18 July 2020 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in collaboration with the Kazakhstan Ministry of Internal Affairs' Prison Committee, commemorated Nelson Mandela International Day by hosting several activities designed to draw attention to issues and challenges faced by the corrections system and the applicability of Nelson Mandela Rules. The week-long event started with the delivery of an online master class by Artist Beibit Asemkul on the basics of painting for prisoners in eight correctional facilities. During the master class, prisoners learned about the basics of painting using acrylic paint. By providing art therapy, UNODC and the Prison Committee hope to facilitate the

construction of art stimuli, improve mental stimulation, reduce stress, boost prisoner self-esteem, provide employable vocational skills, and reduce violent behaviours among prisoners.

A 2019 United Nations prison guidebook highlights that creative, cultural and recreational activities should be offered in all prisons to benefit prisoners' mental and physical health. Any prisoner not employed in outdoor work shall have at least one hour of appropriate outdoor exercise daily, weather permitting. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), Rules 105 and Rule 23(1) It is generally recognized that participation in arts and sports-based interventions are unlikely to result in it alone making a criminal abandon criminal activity, but it can make a significant contribution to a criminal to desist in indirect forms of crime. (Vaishnavi 2021) Practicing art for inmates can also help develop positive communication that helps violent extremist inmates disengage from violence. Engaging in arts-based therapy can also provide violent extremist prisoners with opportunities to better understand themselves. Introducing violent extremist prisoners to reflexivity through the arts ensures that they can engage in opportunities to try to make sense of their lives in terms of achieving a kind of coherence that is both sensitive and meaningful for them.

Conclusion

When children go through traumatic experiences, they often relive it through recurring flashbacks and disturbing thoughts, sometimes diagnosed as PTSD. These frightening thoughts and memories are complex for some children to express in talk therapy, which is why art therapy for trauma is recommended by this study for children in conflict-stricken areas to avert extremely violent behaviours.

The art therapy approach to treatment offers creative modalities through which individuals can express thoughts and feelings, communicate nonverbally, achieve insight, and experience the curative potential of the creative process. Every artist knows there is much to be gained emotionally from the process of making an Artwork as well as from standing back and viewing the finished art product. The tapestry that is art therapy is not a dusty relic hung in a museum

but a living work in progress. There is pleasure in admiring an Artwork that has already been produced and excitement in the production that improves emotional feelings.

Art therapy is a valuable approach to the rehabilitation of children in conflict-stricken areas. Art therapy has emerged as a promising technique to help in the mental development of children with trauma-related challenges providing an effective non-verbal way of changing the minds of young people who are on the verge of joining extremist groups, thereby preventing extremist violent behaviour and terrorism.

Recommendations

In light of the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made:

- i. The government needs to introduce art therapy in all prisons especially juvenile correctional facilities;
- ii. More art therapy centres need to be established nationwide to attend to the growing number of children with trauma issues, focusing on places with high-level trauma-affected children and teenagers such as refugee camps, internally displaced centres, hospitals etc; and
- iii. Children should be encouraged to express themselves occasionally using art processes; this has proven to reveal children's emotions that cannot be expressed verbally. This can give parents or caregivers early signals of abuse in children.

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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER FRAMING: EXPLORING THE DICHOTOMY OF WAR AND PEACE JOURNALISM IN THE HERDERS-FARMERS CRISIS IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Before the present perilous height of the crisis, the relationship between herders and farmers in Nigeria was peaceful and symbiotic. Unfortunately, the last decade has seen high tensions with increasingly violent flare-ups, resulting in the deaths of people, the destruction of property and, on occasion, reprisal attacks. This is happening at a time when media scholars and other interested parties blamed the crises on media framing. Using framing theory, this study examined the dichotomy of War and Peace Journalism framing in the Herders-Farmers Crisis in Nigeria. A total of 60 editions of The Punch and Daily Trust newspapers served as the sample size that was content analyzed. Findings revealed that war journalism dominated the coverage of the crisis by The Punch newspapers. In contrast, Daily Trust newspapers utilized more of peace journalism indicators. While war indicator visual effect was most salient in The Punch, victory-oriented peace journalism frame was the most salient indicator used in the Daily Trust. Therefore, it was recommended that the media should always frame crises in a way that will offer solutions and not lead to reprisal or escalation of the crisis.

Keywords: Newspaper, Peace journalism, War, Herder/Farmer Crisis

Introduction

The relationship between the herders and farmers has been mutual and peaceful where the herders' cattle would fertilize the farmers' land in exchange for grazing rights (International Crisis Group, 2017). Unfortunately, the once pleasant and symbiotic relationship involving

the sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists has become a destructive and violent conflict since the beginning of 21st century (Egbuta, 2018). Samuel, Onyenachira and Ogechukwu (2018) said most evidence regarding the crisis comes from newspaper reports of various incidents involving the herdsmen and farmers in settled communities.

Confirming this, Shehu (2017) cited in Usigbe and Ilo (2019) disclosed that the framing of herders-farmers conflict in most Nigerian Newspapers, is biased with regional coloration. In another submission, Ahmadu and Ayuba (2018) also cited Usigbe and Ilo (2019) concluded that the deployment of group solidarity by both farmers and pastoralists contributed to exacerbating the conflict into a broader dimension beyond individual pastoralist-farmer conflict to a communal conflict. These scholars observed that actors in this conflict mostly came from diverse tribal, regional and religious divides and that shape the frames of the media, as the people that work in the media are by no means absolved from partisanship in the reportage of ethnic and religious-driven conflicts.

Peace Versus War Journalism Frame

Media scholars have made frantic efforts to catalogue conflict reporting into war and peace journalism. This is influenced by the frames and agenda the media set when reporting conflicts (Odi & Ngene, 2017). Seow and Maslog (2005) founded that the framing concept theoretically supported war/peace journalism.

War Journalism

Media typically promote a xenophobic view of the world which becomes particularly obvious in times of conflict (Siraj, 2016). Therefore, reports of the press are influenced by nationalistic and ideological tendencies (Wolfsfeld, 2004). Wolfsfeld stated further that the customary modus operandi of the media is to report tension, conflict and violence. According to Galtung (2002), cited in Gavilan (2011), war journalism has four main features it is violence and war oriented, highly by propaganda, pays attention to the opinion of the elites and it is zero-sum game, which means one party wins all and the other part loses all. In another submission,

Shinar (2004) expressed in a comparative study that the media have a preference for war frames even while covering peace negotiations.

On their part, Odiegwu-Enwerem, Oso, Amodu, Chuks-Enwerem and Okorie (2021) mentioned that the press when reporting conflict situations focuses on the hateful attack, retaliation attacks, public protests as well as government intervention efforts, among others. While war journalism is the brand of journalism that escalates conflicts, peace journalism is the brand of conflict journalism that is presumed to de-escalate conflicts (Odii & Ngene, 2017).

Peace Journalism

Peace journalism and development journalism have related characteristics. While the former centers on saving society from destruction, the latter saves the society from the miseries of poverty (Siraj, 2016). Lynch (2014) sees war journalism as a profession that fails to report all the factors that historically may have been responsible for conflict formation. It also fails to report on all sides that might be affected by the conflict (De Michelis, 2018). On the contrary, Hanitzsch (2004) contended that peace journalism report cause, provide possible solutions on all sides and give voice to the views of all parties involved. Hanitzsch said peace journalism reporters investigate the background of a conflict formation to make conflicts appear transparent to the audience. Hällgren (2012) asserted that peace journalism does not mean reporting that does not possess the features of war journalism. Rather, it adopts the concepts from the field of conflict studies to be able to examine a conflict and journalism practice encourages peace (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005).

Theoretical Focus

Framing means media reporting an event from an angle with the view that audience or readers would understand the message from the same perspective the media reported it (Oduah, 2014). On his part, Gitlin (1980) viewed frames as “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse...” (p. 7). This position was supported by Entman (1993: p. 52) who stated

that: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”.

News messages, therefore, “are textual and visual structures built around a central axis of thought, from a certain perspective, and by information professionals who will provide an interpretive framework for the audiences exposed to the news messages” (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015, pp 424). Stated differently, Gerth and Siegert (2012) opined that media frames are the words, images, sounds, or arguments that media professionals use when presenting a message about an issue to their audience. This explanation is in consonant with view of Lamidi and Olisa (2016) who stated that the concept refers to the manners in which the media employ some basic tools in reporting events to their audience. These tools were identified by these scholars as “frames”.

Scholars and social pundits have blamed press of worsening ethno-religious crises through biased, unfair, sensational and irresponsible coverage and reporting (Soola, 2011; Auwal, 2015). The reason is that media cannot be separated from conflict, because the nature of crisis and the journalism profession will always attract media report (Bello, 2018). This scholar said further that, traditionally, the press the world over is presumed to perform the function of societal surveillance, by reporting the reality. Unfortunately, Kur, Agudusy and Orhewere (2015) observed how different newspaper publishers in Nigeria, colored the contents of their news stories synonymous to instigating unsound rivalry and create discord between diverse racial groups in the country.

Research Methodology

The study adopted a quantitative content analysis method. The content analysis is essential to understand how the selected newspapers frame the herders-farmers crisis. The population of this study was all the editions of *The Punch and Daily Trust Newspapers* from November 1st, 2020 to April 31st, 2021. The researcher selected the papers because they are capable of representing the major ethnic group in Nigeria. This belief was confirmed by Aliagan (2016)

who stated that *Daily Trust* is from the Northern region while *The Punch newspaper* is from the South West geo-political zone of Nigeria.

Therefore, news contents from *The Punch and Daily Trust newspapers* were used while the sampling frame was between November 1st, 2020 to 31st April, 2021. This study used the systematic random sampling which is an aspect of probability sampling to derive a sample. By systematic random sampling it means the selection of every *nth* unit after a random start is selected (Taherdoost, 2016). However, there are 181 editions for *The Punch newspapers and 181 for Daily Trust newspapers*, which stretched from November 1st, 2020, to April 31st, 2021, both daily and weekend editions. The researcher chooses 30 as the representative of each 181 editions.

To obtain the interval of the sample selection, the 181 samples was divided by 30 to obtain 6th as the interval. Hence, the application was; $\frac{N}{n} = nth$. The N means the populations, n as sample size and the nth is sample for the study. The interpretation was; $\frac{N-181}{n-30} = nth-6$ (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011, p. 111). Therefore, 30 editions of *The Punch* and 30 editions of *Daily Trust newspapers*, totaling 60 editions, served as the sample size that was content analyzed. The unit of analysis for this study was every straight news story on the herders-farmers as contained in *The Punch and Daily Trust newspapers* and major instrument used was the coding sheet. However, the researcher adapted Lee and Maslog's (2005) approach-based war and peace journalism indicators as the coding categories as they met the specific needs of the study. Statistical package for social science research (SPSS 20) was used to present the quantitative data in tables and figures. Descriptive statistics such as frequencies and percentages were used to summarize the data collected.

Table 1: Approach-based war and peace journalism indicators developed by Lee and Maslog

	Coding category	War Indicators	Peace Indicators
1	Visible effects	Casualties, damage to the property, death tolls	Arrest killers, Emotional trauma, damage to society and culture, how it affects long-standing diversity of the country.
2	Elite orientation	Over reliance upon elite military, government officials, interest groups as actors and sources of information	A focus on civilians and common people as primary actors and sources of information
3	Dichotomising	Do they blame one side?	Avoids dichotomization of good guys versus bad guys.
4	Victory	Zero sum game	Solution- oriented or peace initiatives
5	Two party	Talks about farmers versus herders, Muslims versus Christian, Hausa versus Yoruba, North versus West etc.	Multiparty orientation (Nigerians, Government, third party, negotiators-alternative viewpoints
6	Victimising	Stateless, defenseless, pathetic, racism, etc. with a focus on their violence and our suffering/ focused mostly on what has been done to the people	Avoids the use of victimizing language and report on how people are coping.
7	Demonising	Terrorist, extremist, fundamentalist, brutal, gunmen, kidnap	Avoids the use of demonizing language by using more precise term.
8	Emotive	Massacre, lynching, ethnic cleansing, killing, murdering, terrorist attack, etc. whether used to describe the farmers or the herders	Avoids the use of emotive words and not exaggerating the gravity of situations

Data Presentation

In providing a descriptive analysis of the study, statistical data was collected and analyzed to establish the objectives set out for this study. The news contents of 30 editions for The Punch

and 30 editions for Daily Trust making 60 editions from the two newspapers were sampled, and the sampling frame was between November 1st, 2020, and April 31st, 2021. All the data gathered was analyzed using simple percentages and frequencies. And the analysis was guided by the coding sheet.

Prominence accorded the herders-farmers crisis

Table 2: Prominence Given to the Herders-Farmers Crisis by *The Punch* Newspapers

Prominence	Frequency	Percent (%)
Front Page Major Headlines	4	2.43
Front Page Minor Headline	8	4.87
Major Headline	24	14.63
Minor Headline	52	31.70
Dept of story (Less than 200 words)	20	12.19
Dept of story (200-400 words)	36	21.95
Dept of story (400 words and above)	20	12.19
Total	164	100

Table 2 shows that, out of the 164 items identified in *The Punch*, 4(2.43%) of the herders-farmers crisis stories made front page major headlines while 8(4.87%) of the stories made front page minor headlines. The crisis, however, made 24(14.63%) major headlines and 52(31.70%) minor headlines. This is followed by depth of story (less than 200 words) which appeared 20(12.19%), depth of story (200-400 words) 36(21.95%), while depth of story (400 words and above) recorded 20(12.19%). As a result, it is safe to say that *The Punch* newspaper gave the herders-farmers crisis significant prominence by featuring it on the front page 12 times. This is because the front page is considered the most important page of a newspaper publication. The topic also appeared in the major headlines of the inside pages, despite the mirage of other events that call for attention.

Table 3: Prominence Given to the Herders-Farmers Crisis by *Daily Trust* Newspapers

Prominence	Frequency	Percent (%)
Front Page Major Headlines	4	3.63
Front Page Minor Headline	10	9.09
Major Headline	21	19.09
Minor Headline	27	24.54
Dept of story (less than 200 words)	11	10
Dept of story (200-400 words)	20	18.18
Dept of story (400 words and above)	17	15.45
Total	110	100

Table 3 above shows that stories on the herders-farmers crisis reported by the *Daily Trust* in the period under review appeared 4(3.63%) as front-page major headlines, 10(9.09%) as front page minor headlines, 10(19.09%) as major headlines, and 27(24.54%) as minor headlines. Also, the depth of story (less than 200 words) was 11(10%), the depth of story (200-400 words) was 20(18.18%), and the depth of story (400 words and above) was 17(15.5%).

According to the summary, in terms of the prominence given to the herders-farmers crisis, the *Daily Trust* gave credence to the crisis, with news on the subject appearing 14 times on the front page, as well as significant major headlines and depth of the story.

Dominant journalism frames of the herders-farmers crisis

Table 4: Dominants Frame in *The Punch*

Dominant frame	Frequency	Percent
War Journalism Frame	403	61.3
Peace Journalism Frame	254	38.7
Total	657	100

In answering this research question, Table 4 revealed that out of the total 657 war journalism and peace journalism frames used in *The Punch newspapers* in the period under study, the war journalism frame appeared 403(61.3%) as opposed to the peace journalism frame 254(38.7%). In general, *The Punch* had more indicators of war journalism than peace journalism.

Table 5: Dominates Frame in *Daily Trust*

Dominant frame	Frequency	Percent
War Journalism Frame	152	37.7
Peace Journalism Frame	251	62.3
Total	403	100

In answering this research question, Table 5 revealed that out of the total 403 war and peace journalism frames used in *Daily Trust newspapers*, war journalism frames appeared 152(37.7%) as opposed to peace journalism frames 251(62.3%). This could imply in the literature that northern newspapers report the herders-farmers crisis in a softer tone, which is consistent with the peace journalism tenant.

Most Salient Indicators in the Coverage of the Herders-Farmers Crisis in Nigeria

Table 6: Most Salient Indicators in *The Punch*

War	Freq.	%	Peace	Freq.	%
War indicator visual effect	64	15.9	Peace indicator visual effect	21	8.3
War indicator of elite orientation	46	11.4	Peace indicator of elite orientation	33	13
Dichotomizing of war journalism	56	13.9	Dichotomizing of peace journalism	28	11.0
Victory oriented war journalism frame	52	12.9	Victory oriented peace journalism frame	31	12.2
War indicator of two-party categorization	41	10.2	Peace indicator of two-party categorization	38	15
Victimizing war journalism indicator	48	11.9	Victimizing peace journalism indicator	34	13.4

Demonizing war categorization	48	11.9	Demonizing peace categorization	35	13.8
Emotive war categorization	48	11.9	Emotive peace categorization	34	13.4
TOTAL	403			254	

The data presented in Table 6 shows the dominant indicators between the war journalism and peace journalism frames used in the newspaper under study in their coverage of the herders-farmers crisis in Nigeria. For *The Punch newspaper*, the findings show that the war journalism frame recorded 403 indicators as against peace journalism's indicators, which were 254. Meanwhile, the war indicator visual effect had 64(15.9%), while the peace indicator visual effect appeared 21 times (8.3%). With the war indicator of elite orientation appearing 46(11.4%), the peace indicator of elite orientation had 33(13%).

As dichotomizing war journalism garnered 56(13.9%), dichotomizing peace journalism recorded 28 appearances, representing (11.0%). Furthermore, the victory-oriented war journalism indicator appeared 52(12.9%), whereas the victory-oriented peace journalism indicator appeared 31(12.2%). Also, the war indicator of two-party categorization appeared 41 times (10.2%) more than the peace indicator, which appeared 38 times (15%). The victimizing war journalism indicator also appeared at 48(11.9%), while the victimizing peace journalism indicator got 34(13.4%). On its part, the demonizing war categorization indicator had 48(11.9%) when compared to demonizing peace categorization, which was 35(13.8%). And finally, the emotive language had 9(8.4%) compared to the avoidance of the use of emotive war categorization, which had 48(11.9%), unlike emotive peace categorization, which had 34(13.4%). Thus, the implication is that *The Punch newspaper* used more indicators of war journalism during the period under review than peace indicators.

Table 7: Most Salient Indicators in *Daily Trust*

War	Freq.	%	Peace	Freq.	%
War indicator visual effect	17	11.2	Peace indicator visual effect	35	13.9
War indicator of elite orientation	32	21.1	Peace indicator of elite orientation	19	7.6
Dichotomizing of war journalism	24	15.8	Dichotomizing of peace journalism	27	10.8
Victory oriented war journalism frame	7	4.6	Victory oriented peace journalism frame	44	17.5
War indicator of two-party categorization	15	9.9	Peace indicator of two-party categorization	35	13.9
Victimizing war journalism indicator	18	11.8	Victimizing peace journalism indicator	31	12.4
Demonizing war categorization	18	11.8	Demonizing peace categorization	31	12.4
Emotive war categorization	21	13.8	Emotive peace categorization	29	11.6
TOTAL	152			251	

The data shows that war journalism indicators appeared 152 times and were less prevalent in the *Daily Trust newspaper* during the period of study as opposed to peace journalism indicators, which appeared 251 times. From the above table, it can be seen that the war indicator visual effect had 17(11.2%) indicators compared to the peace indicator visual effect, which has 35(13.9%). While the war indicator of elite orientation had 32(21.1%) indicators, the peace indicator of elite orientation had 19(7.6%). Meanwhile, while there were 24(15.8%) dichotomizing of war journalism, there were only 27(10.8%) for dichotomizing of peace journalism. This is followed by a victory-oriented war journalism frame, which appeared seven times, accounting for (4.6%) of the total, and a victory-oriented peace journalism frame, 44(17.5%).

The War indicator of two-party categorization was used 15(9.9%), while the Peace indicator of two-party categorization was used 35(13.9%). When it comes to the language-based categorizations for peace and war journalism, there were 18(11.8%) recorded

victimizing war journalism indicator in the period under study as opposed to 31(12.4%) recorded victimizing peace journalism indicators. Whereas, demonizing war categorization had 18(11.8%) when compared to demonizing peace categorization, which was 31(12.4%), and emotive war categorization had 21(13.8%) compared to emotive peace categorization, which was 29(11.6%). Hence, the implication of this finding is that *Daily Trust* promotes an amicable resolution of the herders-farmers crisis through the medium reportage of the issue. This can be supported by the frequency of the indicators of peace journalism used, which are more frequent than the war journalism indicators.

Discussion of Findings

The primary objective of this study is to examine whether the newspaper framing of herders-farmers tilted toward war or peace journalism. According to Boukes, Jones, and Vliegthart (2022), the length of a story and front-page placement are the two indicators to understand the prominence of news items. Hence, the allocation of the front page to the herders-farmers crisis by the two newspapers said a lot about the level of importance attached to the matter. Judging by the data analyzed, it is evident that both papers gave considerable distinction to the crisis. Furthermore, this study sought to determine whether war journalism or a peace journalism frame dominates coverage of the herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria.

With regards to the research question seeking to investigate the most salient indicator of war and peace framing in the coverage of the herders-farmers crisis, it could be inferred from tables 6 and 7 that both papers differed on their approach to reporting the herders-farmers crisis. While *The Punch newspaper* had more war journalism frame indicators, *Daily Trust*, on the other hand, had more peace journalism frame indicators. Specifically, *The Punch* frequently used the "war indicator" visual effect followed by a "dichotomizing indicator" of war journalism. While the war indicator visual effect focused on casualties, damage to property, and death tolls, among other awful things, the dichotomizing indicator of war journalism centers on blaming a party involved in the conflict. This publication also used victory-oriented war journalism frame indicators, which center on the zero-sum game instead

of peace initiatives, followed by victimizing war journalism indicators that portray the crisis in words such as "stateless," "defenseless," "pathetic," "racism," etc., with a focus on their violence and our suffering.

Consequently, it could be said that *The Punch newspaper*, which is from the Lagos axis of Nigeria, reported the crisis from a war journalism perspective while its counterpart from the northern axis promoted peace journalism. This can, however, be linked to the position of Bigman, Cappella, and Hornik (2010), who explained that when the media highlighted positive aspects of an event, people tended to rate the framed object or story favorably and show more favorable attitudes compared to when the undesirable equivalent was highlighted.

Conclusion

From the findings of this study, it can be concluded that the Nigerian media gave some level of prominence to the coverage of the herders-farmers crisis. Judging by the data analyzed, it is evident that both papers gave considerable prominence to the crisis. Aside from that, the newspaper from the southern part of Nigeria, namely, *The Punch*, had more war journalism frame indicators, while the *Daily Trust*, on the other hand, had more peace journalism frame indicators. Therefore, Nigeria newspapers must understand the power of news framing and news placement. This is because framing restrict listeners or media audience to the understanding of reality to only that that was reported by the media. Hence, the media must always frame crisis in such a way not to lead to reprisal or escalation of the crisis.

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POWERING PEACEBUILDING FROM BELOW WITH LOCAL PEACE INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture. This study focuses on exploring the concept of local peace infrastructures (LPI) with attention on local peace committees. This qualitative study is anchored on the theory of change, and adopts participatory action research design. It uses purposive sampling techniques to select samples for the study. It sourced primary data from individual interviews, focus group discussions, observation and diarizing. The study reveals that local peace infrastructure like local peace committees (LPC) are effective in grassroots peacebuilding, and in addressing multiple threats occasioned by violent conflicts and problems associated with low/absence of social cohesion. It points that LPC can be mainly sustainable if established through collaborative efforts by the grassroots with shared sense of local ownership, inclusiveness and legitimacy. LPC resourcefulness in intimate partners or domestic violence intervention reveals this could be done with local peace infrastructures.

Keywords: Peacebuilding, Below, Local Peace Infrastructure, Local Peace Committees.

Introduction

Many conflicts are rooted in local contexts and individual level, be it conflicts at societal, state or global scale. To address conflicts without given adequate attention to grassroots and individual level concerns can pose a big challenge to conflict resolution. Embracing cultural and grassroots mechanisms are important steps in building peace from below. This is why it is important for conflict managers and parties to pay attention to cultural and grassroots dynamics. Nganje (2014) corroborates this when he argued that, parties strive to understand the cultural dimension of conflict, and identify the mechanisms for handling conflict that exist

within cultural setting. Building on cultural resources and utilizing local mechanisms for handling disputes can be quite effective in resolving conflicts and transforming relationships.

Local Peace Committee

Local peace committees are effective peacebuilding mechanisms. Peacebuilding is an activity designed to change the cultural and structural conditions that lead to deadly or destructive conflict and to resolve injustice in a nonviolent manner. The evolution and emergence of local peace committees as mechanisms for grassroots peacebuilding in the 21st century could be traced to the early 1980 with John Paul Lederach playing a key role in the entire idea of infrastructures for peace. The concept gained prominence in the 1990s following momentum built up for argument that local communities affected by violent conflict be recognized as resources, and not just recipients of peacebuilding efforts that are largely driven from the outside (Lederach 1997). It was further argued by the proponents of the concept that communities affected by violent conflict have greater incentives than any external actor to resolve such conflict, and better placed to build and sustain peace through their intimate knowledge of the local culture as well as community relations and dynamics (Lederach 1997).

Local peace committees have been defined by different scholars. Adan & Pkalya (2006) conceive local peace committee (LPC) as conflict intervention structure that integrates both traditional and modern conflict intervention mechanisms to prevent and manage or transform intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic conflicts. They defined it as a conflict mitigation and peacebuilding structure which integrates traditional and modern conflict interventions to address intra-and-intertribal tensions and conflicts or/and a community-based structure and initiative to prevent, manage and transform intra and inter-community conflicts. A working definition from a workshop put together in June 2005, by NSC and Oxfam GB in Nanyuki defined a peace committee as a group of people whose broad job is to define parameters for peace.

The inherent ability of LPC to build trust and confidence at community levels makes it essential in personal transformation and in the transformation of potential actors. According

to Hopp-Nishanka (2012), LPC brings stakeholders and their constituencies together, change agents and creates space for joint problem-solving as well as creates, consolidate and maintain a network of transformative actors. LPC is inclusive and presents a superior structure that values and recognises the role and contributions of various groups within the community (Irene, 2014). Whereas successive structured steps and criteria such as age system, kinship/clan, often define the membership of traditional structures, peace committee is through a selection process of representatives from different groups in the community. Adan & Pkalya (2006) posits that this approach helps to widen the composition of peace committees with a cumulative effect being the emergence of all-inclusive peacebuilding structure/approach/process.

Theory of Change

Peacebuilding professionals often reference theory of change (Jantzi & Jantzi 2009). This theory agrees that an intervention activity is the real causes of change or result gotten. This theory also asserts that an activity always goes with assumption that are expected of a given result, in other word, intervention contribute to intended result (Mayne, 2015). Cartwright & Hardie (2012) as well described these assumptions support factors: events and conditions needed to bring about contribution to the expected cause.

This postulate views violent act as behavior that can change through proper intervention of peace infrastructure, as the school of thought agrees that change occur as a result of intervention, therefore, intervention of peace infrastructures in local community is regarded to as activity which will definitely reduce and if possible, eliminate the presence of violence (Cartwright & Hardie 2012) in the target community. The theory is useful in analyzing this study because, as the theory explains, the intervention that LPC brings to the local community for this study can help bring the required change in terms of reducing violence.

Method

The study is a qualitative research and adopts participatory action research (PAR) approach. Participatory action research (PAR) resonates with peacebuilding. It is believed to be very appropriate because of its relationship with peacebuilding. As opined by Chivasa (2017), PAR and peacebuilding bring individuals together with a view to addressing a common social problem, and are relationship oriented. He further argued that peacebuilding acknowledges that peace is not an accidental experience. It requires planning as clearly pointed out by Hopp-Nishanka (2012). It also requires commitment and participation of relevant stakeholders and cooperative relationship. And all of these are critical components of participatory action research.

The study adopts purposive sampling technique in selecting members of the PAR team in the study location in Ojoo community, Oyo State, Nigeria. The population of study include males and females within youth and adult age brackets. The period of study is April 2022 to May 2023. Seven volunteer members who are members of the local community for the study and the researcher constituted the PAR team during the first cycle of the participatory action research. For this study, the process went through the PAR cyclical processes twice. Before starting the second participatory action research cycle, seven more volunteers joined the PAR team. This increased the PAR team to 14 volunteers (self-selected) members. The need to increase the number was pointed out during the observation stage of the first PAR cycle. In the second cyclical process of the PAR, the PAR team (14 members) co-diagnosed the problem, co-planned, co-implemented, co-observed, co-reflected and co-re-planned in line with PAR approach. Intimate partner violence/domestic violence was among the major problems identified at the diagnoses stage of the PAR. Besides other community-based conflicts the study intervened, six non PAR members representing six families with domestic violence cases were purposively selected to go through the PAR process with a view to using the LPC to tackle the conflicts.

A brief outline of each participant is described in the table below. Pseudonyms were used to protect their identities

Table: Demographic Information of Participants (14 PAR team & six non PAR members/domestic conflict parties)

Name	Sex	Age	Educational level	Marital status	Job
1. Mo	Female	31yrs	Diploma	Not married	Self-employed – Marketer
2. Dan	Female	25yrs	B.Sc	Not married	Administrationist
3. Ades	Male	70yrs	High School Certificate	Married	Retired
4. Olu	Male	45yrs	M.Sc	Married	Self-employed
5. Ama	Male	57yrs	M.Sc	Married	Self-employed
6. Iwe	Female	48yrs	M.Sc	Separated	Administrator
7. Oluse	Male	47yrs	ACCA	Not married	Accountant
8. Fide	Male	50yrs	B.Sc	Married	Estate Agent
9. Okos	Male	65yrs	Diploma	Married	Self-employed – publisher
10. Sade	Female	35yrs	Nil	Married	Housewife with small business
11. Iwale	Female	20yrs	Student	Not married	Student & Self-employed beautician (Make-up Artist)
12. Aden	Male	58yrs	M.Sc.	Married	NILST
13. Joy	Female	60yrs	B.Sc	Married	Self-employed – small business
14. Austi	Male	52	B.Sc	Divorced	Teacher
15. Fati	Female	36	Diploma	Married	Self-employed – small business
16. Abdu	Male	44	B.Sc	Married	Clergy-Imam
17. Kem	Female	19	Student	Not married	Nil
18. Sol	Female	27	NCE	Married	Teacher
19. Akan	Male	65	B.Sc	Married	Retired- Chief
20. Emma	Male	55	B.Sc	Married	Clergy- Pastor

Source: Fieldwork 2023

Individual interviews, focus group discussions, diarizing, observation were adopted by the PAR team for data collection. The research questions for the study is guided by the research problem leading to the specific objectives, which are: to establish informal LPC in the local community for the study; to assess the effectiveness of LPC in addressing conflicts and building peace in local community; to explore how LPC can be promoted in local community; and to examine how LPC sustainability can be achieved in local community. They were co-prepared by the PAR team in line with PAR approach. The respondents were asked the questions during data collection stage of the study.

For validity and reliability, the interview guide was prepared by the PAR team with the research objectives in mind and presented to two experts and senior researchers in the relevant field for review and criticism. Their criticism and modifications were implemented while producing the final draft of the interview guide that was used by the researcher. Other validity strategies deployed include: triangulation, use of participants checking, preliminary activities that served as a pilot programme, and prolonged presence in the site of research. For data validation purpose from participants, the researcher checked on members for clarification on issues that seemed inconclusive, unclear and requires emphasis. One of the ways of finding out whether for example, an observation is ‘valid’ is to ask other people – especially the research participants and checking whether the participants agree with the researcher’s data (Creswell 2014), and this was one of the strategies adopted in this study. The giving of clear instructions to participants and respondents as well as not asking questions that require long explanations contributed to the reduction of fatigue and attention deficit for those interviewed. Participants agreed with researcher’s data, which establishes the reliability of the study.

The research was carried out in accordance with ethical guidelines. Ethical consideration was a priority in this study. There was voluntary participation of individuals in the interview sessions. Individuals who participated in this research work were not forced into it. Privacy and anonymity of participants were also given paramount importance in this study.

The consents of the informants were sought to have their responses taped for easy analysis. Participants were assured that the purpose of the data collection exercise is strictly academic. Furthermore, works of authors used for the research were duly acknowledged.

Result and discussion

The method used in analyzing the primary data collected for the study is thematic content analysis. Thematic content analysis was adopted to analyse the collected data because it is well-suited for the analysis of primary data for qualitative study. Thematic content analysis is used to analyse classifications and present themes (patterns) that relate to the data. A collaborative approach was also deployed in selecting the themes following the interview responses and focus group discussion data. The identification of themes for discussion was effected via a coding technique developed in line with Bless and Higson-Smith (1995) advising that letters or symbols could be used to represent data in the form of codes. The themes that came out are; LPC establishment, LPC effectiveness, LPC promotion, and LPC sustainability. Themes that occurred more frequently were considered as major themes.

Key themes

No	Themes
1	Local Peace Committee (LPC) establishment
2	Local Peace Committee (LPC) effectiveness
3	Local Peace Committee (LPC) promotion
4	Local Peace Committee (LPC) sustainability

LPC establishment

Many respondents in the FGD and personal interviews activities mentioned that the creation of LPC require collaboration among stakeholders. They said LPC creation can be done through research, done through community outsider(s) and/or insiders' motivated actions. In all of these, respondents said the best is insiders' motivated actions. If it is something the insiders (local community members) think they want, the insiders would be motivated by the spirit of

local ownership, and this would contribute in making the creation and running of the LPC more effective. In this study, this was taken into consideration. Local people took ownership of it. They saw it as what they think would work in addressing the problem of conflicts and violence, and in build peace in their local community. A respondent comments corroborates the aforesaid point when he said;

We are really now happy to be part of this project of creating LPC in this our community because we are convinced that it is the right approach to deal with conflicts and violence that are prevalent in this community and in building sustainable peace (Seg, Male, 47 years, Friday, 21st April, 2023).

Another respondent added that following his experience in this project, he believed that:

Self-initiated LPCs are less expensive. This is due to the fact that they make use of community resources which often include free manpower, free venue, and easier mobilization of volunteers or people to select into it including flexible time arrangement and local fundraising (no matter how small) even if it's for refreshment of LPC members when addressing conflict cases during meetings. (Iwe, Female, 48 years, Friday, 21st April, 2023)

The above comment by respondent reminded me of Odeendal (2010) argument on legitimacy as critical consideration in setting up a local peace committee. LPC must enjoy local legitimacy, and legitimacy often flows from ownership. When it is available, it makes the local community members double or multiply their commitment to the LPC. The acceptability of the LPC become very high among local community members.

Community members that volunteered or selected into the LPC membership must be those whose honesty, integrity, credibility and attitudes are not questionable. In addition, they must be knowledgeable on what they are expected to do. The establishment of LPC often involves the selection of capable individuals representing different sectors and social divides of the community. The representation of all social groups or constituencies found in the community including vulnerable groups such as youth and women, offers local peace committees a platform that is conducive for creating co-existence and cohesion (Chivasa, 2017) in local communities. The LPC members often undergo relevant trainings with a view

to building their capacity and to empower them to carry out the LPC activities effectively and efficiently.

LPC Effectiveness

During interviews design primary data from respondents, many respondents argued that local peace committees are very effective in peacebuilding, preventing violence and in conflict intervention. Their creation can be for preventative measure, response to specific conflict cases or in peacebuilding at grassroots level. The root causes of conflicts can be effectively addressed by LPC. Many conflicts and violence that manifests at national level are also actually entwined with local factors. Many respondents describe LPC as more effective in addressing the root causes of conflicts and in building peace than some other approaches like litigation, and even the traditional approach. Well, given that LPC is often a blend of traditional and contemporary approach, one may not want to argue the position of the respondents on LPC effectiveness. The successful intervention by the LPC in different conflicts in the community including six domestic violence cases brought to it by six non PAR community members, attest to the effectiveness of the LPC. The view expressed by many respondents appeared to have been summarily captured by a respondent who said:

We are glad for all we have put in to this project of setting up LPC. We can see by ourselves that LPC is truly effective in addressing conflicts and violence as seen in the different conflicts including domestic violence cases brought to it for intervention. We can see that LPC build peace on a solid foundation that can endure the test of time. Whether as a reaction to a specific conflict or as a preventative structure, LPC is indeed effective, and its capacity to build peace from below is not in doubt. (Ama, Male, 57 years, Friday, 21st April, 2023)

The comment of the respondent may very well contribute to the quest to further hone LPC capacity build peace in today's world. This is important amidst the increasing rate of violence and states fragility, and the urgent need to stem the tides. Van Togeran (2012) purely connects with this when he contends that when state fragility occurs, the creation of informal LPCs help communities to address peace challenges affecting their well-being. And the addressing of their well-being brings balance to such communities, and by so doing

advance their interests. Also, Odendaal (2010) and Sangqu (2014) alluded to it, when they said that communities create peace committees to advance their interests. Building peace is a paramount interest of communities and LPC is strategic to the whole engagement. LPCs build peace in local communities through creating dialogue spaces where people engage each other in search of solutions to their challenges. They also facilitate peacebuilding sessions. In some situations, they mediate conflict and act as early warning systems and work towards addressing human insecurity concerns in their areas.

All respondents from among those who brought their cases to the LPC intervention in the course of this study, agreed that their conflicts were amicably resolved by the LPC created by the study. They added that what was achieved can be rightly described as positive peace among the conflict parties. They said they were satisfied with the resolution, and that the root causes of their conflicts were fully addressed. One advantage of blending traditional approach and contemporary approach that LPC bring to fore is synergy. And this truly makes LPC strong, effective and holistic in its approach in dealing with conflicts and building peace. The comment of an informant as seen below attempt to bring clarity as regards impact when he said;

“We are happy LPC has been created and that the committee can resolve our conflicts. So we decided to come to the LPC to see how it would resolve our conflicts. We are happy we came and brought our cases here. All we could say at this point is that, the LPC really did well when we brought our cases before it. What we saw was different from our experiences in previous cases we were involved in and took to other community groups for resolution. The LPC facilitated resolution processes that also allowed us to play major role in resolving our conflicts. What I mean is that the LPC help us to resolve the conflicts by facilitating and mediating the process”. (Fide, Male, 50 years, Friday, 21st April, 2023)

The above comment from a respondent did reveal that conflict stakeholders were satisfied with the outcome of the resolution of their conflicts. Respondents also pointed out that LPC helped to facilitate the process that led to the resolution of the conflicts. There was a strong collaboration between the conflict party and the members of the LPC as they work

together towards the resolution of the conflicts. This is actually in line with LPC approach that is concern with facilitating dialogue, mediating conflicts and building consensus. These functions of LPC allow the conflict stakeholders to play key role in resolving their conflicts. In short, LPC help the conflict parties to address the root causes of the conflicts.

LPC Promotion

Promoting LPC in local communities can flow from LPC legitimacy. When respondents were asked if LPC is something they are willing to promote in their community, all the respondents said yes. They added that they were happy to share the idea with neighboring communities and support in promoting LPC even in those areas. They continued, saying that they have seen that LPC would be useful in dealing with conflicts and violence and in build peace in their community. The willingness to promote the LPC is an important step in the realization of my desire for the establishment of more LPC in the community. This would help reduce pressure on a single one, given the prevalence of conflicts in the community, and the need build peace as soon as possible. The extent of members' willingness to promote LPC can be seen from their actions and commitment to the project. A participant's voice summed it up by saying;

I would like to say on behalf of my colleagues that we are glad to commit ourselves to the promotion of LPC in our domain, and even try to influence neighboring communities to establish LPC. Personally, I love the idea, and would be very much available and support the LPC in my community with my resources. I am sure the same goes for my colleagues, and from what we hear around, the community is happy to promote LPC in the community". (Olu, Male, 45 years, Saturday, 22nd April, 2023).

When asked how they might promote the concept of LPC in their community? Many of them said it is possible, especially if the community leader is in support of the project. They added that community leaders have a system in place for supporting and promoting what they support and approve. They continued by saying that, they will continue to volunteer their time and resources for the LPC they created. And that they are sure that a combination of individuals and collective resources of the community deployed into it would go a long way

in promoting the LPC. They will promote LPC with their resources and continuously ensuring that leaders support and approval is obtained at all times.

LPC Sustainability

Of course, generally, LPC are faced with the problem of inadequate funding from external sources or outsiders. This has contributed in stifling some LPC, and eventually led to folding up of such LPC. So, when the respondents were asked about the challenges militating against the sustainability of LPC, given their experiences in this project, many of them pointed out that poor funding can actually be a major challenge for LPCs sustainability. However, for many of them, even though donor support from outsiders or external sources can add value to LPCs in their local community, they argued that with their local resources support, they believe their LPC can continue to survive. The clarity of this point is seen in a respondent remark that:

We know as local people, we may not have adequate financial resources to support our LPC, but we believe as we put forward the little we have and make our non-financial resources available, such as our time, commitment, free venue for meetings, our local foods and palm wine to drink during meetings especially when addressing or resolving conflict cases brought to LPC, we shall have no problem keeping our LPC on the sustainable path and continue to survive". (Dam, Female, 25 years, Saturday, 22nd April, 2023).

What was observed from the respondents relates to the benefits with factors such as local ownership, inclusivity and legitimacy of LPC. Local ownership and inclusivity are key factors for achieving legitimacy of LPC. When a community take ownership of LPC, it raises the LPC stake for its legitimacy. The community also work to mobilize local resources and ensure the sustainability of the LPC. For LPC to be sustainable, most respondents said that such LPC should be set up by members of the community. They all agreed that outsiders cannot simply set up LPC without the leaders of the community and the insiders support. And if outsiders are interested in setting up an LPC in any community, they should first obtain the approval of the community members, and also involve community members in the set up process. The respondents in this study, added that sustainability is not a problem when

community members see the LPC as part of their everyday life. The informant remarks summed it up by saying that:

When LPC is organically developed by community members, it will run just like many other associations in the community, such as Elders' Forum, Youth Groups, Woman Groups, traditional Leaders' Councils, and so on. And they will survive as the community members see it as part of their everyday life. This is also true if the traditional system in place do not see it as a group competing against the Elders traditional Council that use traditional mechanisms to resolve communal conflicts. Elders will definitely don't want to give up that, as they believe in the existing African traditional approach to resolving conflicts. When the LPC is presented as a complementary structure to the existing system, and the elders see it as partner in progress in dealing with communal conflicts and in peacebuilding, as well as having a healthy relationship with the traditional system, it would then be seen as part of the community and part of everyday life of the community members and the community as a whole". (Iwale, Female, 20 years, Saturday, 22nd April, 2023).

One of the important points raised by an informant in the above comment is the adaptability of LPC to local system since many local people often strongly uphold and cherish their tradition or local systems. Change is difficult, so whatever is going into local communities to change existing system often encounter resistance. So LPC must be introduced to complement the existing tradition or local system that supports peacemaking in such local community. This help to increase local people acceptability of the LPC. This is very important for the sustainability of LPC in local communities.

Informal LPC often readily resonate with local community commitment to connect the LPC to the local resources base of such community. For formal LPC, external resource support is often required for their survival. In general, whether LPCs are externally or internally motivated, formal or informal, it cannot be argued that adequate resources are required to make such LPC to function well and be sustainable.

Concluding Remarks

Reflecting on the power from below in peacebuilding, the study focuses on informal LPC created through collaborative efforts by 14 PAR members in Ojoo local community. The study

demonstrates the power of LPC in building peace from below using local resources, principles and philosophies of local agencies and initiatives. As local peace infrastructure that are embedded in local environment, LPCs showed that, it truly serves as catalysts for building sustainable peace.

All participants in the study emphasized their trust in local peace infrastructures as local mechanisms for effective peacebuilding in local communities. The study showed that grassroots peacebuilding initiatives such as LPC are effective in addressing multiple threats to local peace and social cohesion, and in building durable peace.

Finally, it underscored that a collaborative peacebuilding framework that links elites structures (national or state peace infrastructures e.g. ministries of peace) and grassroots peace structures (e.g. local peace committees) which represents a holistic approach is required for rural-urban peacebuilding. Given that such peacebuilding framework links local, national, regional and global initiatives and resources required to deal with complex and multi-level nature of contemporary violent conflicts, and also against the backdrop that some local conflicts and insecurity are intertwined with national, regional, and even global dynamics.

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THE NEXUS BETWEEN POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTALISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE ECOWAS SUB-REGION: AN OVERVIEW OF MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF Ogoni PEOPLE

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ABSTRACT

Public awareness about the ills of environmental degradation in Nigeria became more prominent with the emergence of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in the 1990s. This later led to the rise of environmentalism and environmental concerns in Nigeria with the emergence of various environmental movements like the Oil Watch, Nigeria. Since then, environmentalism in Nigeria has been experiencing challenges which are political in nature. This paper analysed the nexus among politics of environmentalism and national security in Nigeria with the case of MOSOP. It was discovered that there is politics involved in environmentalism in Nigeria, because environmental movements in their struggle for environmental rights and protection and in a bid to influence the activities of multinational companies and the political process in Nigeria are caught in the web of politics as environmental movements often makes political demands on government and multinational companies. Also, it was discovered that MOSOP even as it advocates for environmental justice also made political demands on government as reflected in the Ogoni Bill of Rights presented to the Government and people of Nigeria on 26 August, 1990. The paper recommends that environmental movements in the process of seeking to influence the political process and in their political demands/ activities should ensure that there is high level of commitment to the struggle for environmental rights and that environmental movements should focus more on environmental issues than politics.

Keywords: Niger-Delta, Environmentalism, National security, Politics

Introduction

Nigeria is again the cynosure of the global eye following the years of crises in the Niger-Delta region. The crises spanning from struggles driven by the quest for equal access to critical oil resources and power, self-determination, ethnic autonomy, revenue allocation politics and the decentralization of a hegemonic federal power in the context of shrinking oil reserves (Obi, 2006). The region known to be one of the most blessed in human and material resources and fetched Nigeria over 90% of its revenue is however, left in its trail poverty, frustration and underdevelopment. The Niger Delta, which derives its name from River Niger, is one of the world largest wetlands covering some 70,000km² formed by the accumulation of sedimentary deposits transported by the Niger and Benue Rivers (Azaiki, 2007, World Bank Report; 1993).

The Niger Delta Communities have settled in the area for many millennia with the Ijaws being the oldest group, having lived there for over 7,000 years. Geographically, the Niger Delta consist of areas identified with deltaic characteristics in the southern part of Nigeria which include Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta State) and parts of Akwa Ibom, cross River, Edo and Ondo states. This means, the idea of categorizing all oil producing states as Niger Delta is wrong. Over 7 million Nigerians inhabit the area with over 20 ethnic groups and about 800 communities (Okoko and Ibaba 1997).

The Niger Delta is the hub of oil and gas production in Nigeria, accounting for about 80% of total government revenue, 95% of foreign exchange earnings, 95% of National Budget and over 80% of National wealth (Tell, 2008). The oil Industry in the Niger Delta is dominated by multinational corporations such as chevron Texaco, Exxon-Mobil, Total, Agip, SPDC, ELF and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The arrest, trial and sentencing to death of Isaac Boro and his colleagues for their protest against the suppression of the Izon in particular and the Niger Delta in general in 1966, the inspired murder of the Ogoni four as a preface to the judicial murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues in 1995; the murderous sack of Kaiama in 1998 on the first anniversary of the “Kaiama Declaration”; the massacre of Odi in 1999 are simply a dimension of that violent intolerance of protest. Thus, these acts of

violence could have been targeted at oil corporations and the federal government whom are the primary beneficiaries of the oil region at the expense of the local people, the truth of the matter is that, the crises which had taking a different shape are intended to be heard around the world, and has drawn not only national recognition, but had captured international attention as well.

Conceptual Postulation

National Security: "National Security" refers to the measures taken by a nation-state to protect itself from threats and ensure the safety and well-being of its citizens, territory, and interests. It encompasses a range of areas, including defense, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy, and economic policies. The concept of national security is multifaceted and can vary across countries based on their unique circumstances, geopolitical position, and perceived threats.

Environmentalism: Environmentalism refers to a broad social and political movement focused on addressing and mitigating environmental issues. It encompasses various ideologies, practices, and policies aimed at protecting and preserving the natural world and promoting sustainable development.

Environmentalists advocate for the conservation of natural resources, the protection of ecosystems and biodiversity, and the reduction of pollution and waste. They recognize the interconnectedness of the environment and human well-being, emphasizing the need for a balance between human activities and the Earth's natural systems.

Environmentalism and national security are interconnected issues in Nigeria, as they are in many countries around the world. Nigeria faces significant environmental challenges that have implications for its national security. Here are some key points to consider:

- **Resource Conflict:** Nigeria is rich in natural resources, including oil, which has been a major driver of its economy. However, the extraction and distribution of these resources have led to conflicts between various groups, such as local communities, oil companies, and the government. These conflicts often have ethnic, religious, and

economic dimensions, and they can escalate into violence, posing a threat to national security.

- **Resource Degradation and Criminal Activities:** Environmental degradation, such as deforestation, pollution, and illegal mining, undermines the livelihoods of local communities and contributes to poverty. In some cases, these degraded areas become hotspots for criminal activities, including illegal mining, smuggling, and poaching. These activities can erode governance, weaken the rule of law, and provide a breeding ground for insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of organized crime, threatening national security.
- **Water Scarcity and Conflict:** Nigeria faces water scarcity issues due to pollution, poor water management, and population growth. The competition for limited water resources can exacerbate existing tensions between communities, particularly in arid and semi-arid regions. Disputes over water access and control can lead to conflicts that have the potential to escalate and disrupt social stability.
- **Cross-border Environmental Challenges:** Nigeria shares borders with several countries, and environmental issues do not adhere to political boundaries. Transboundary challenges, such as deforestation, wildlife trafficking, and illegal fishing, can have regional security implications. Cooperation with neighboring countries is crucial to effectively address these challenges and maintain regional stability.
- To address the nexus between environmentalism and national security in Nigeria, it is important for the government, civil society, and international partners to work together on the following:
 - Developing and implementing sustainable environmental policies and regulations.
 - Strengthening environmental governance and law enforcement to combat illegal activities.
 - Promoting renewable energy and clean technologies to mitigate climate change impacts and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.

By addressing environmental challenges and incorporating environmental considerations into national security strategies, Nigeria can work towards a more sustainable and secure future.

History and Development of National Security

The basic notion of national security emphasizes the overall security of a nation and a nation state in the context of the protection or the safety of a country's secrets and its citizens. Over time and resulting from a variety of definitions, it became obvious that national security had become an attractive euphemism for a range of diverting political, social and economic agendas. The concept initially emphasized the freedom from military threat and political coercion to later increase in sophistication and include other forms of non-military security as suited the circumstances of the time (Prabhakaran, 2008).

As early as 1943 for instance, Lippmann defined a nation as having security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war. By the 1960, Wolfers admitted that the concept is an ambiguous symbol meaning different things to different people, but saw it objectively as the absence of threats to acquired values and subjectively as the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. By 1996, national security was seen as an appropriate and aggressive blend of political resilience and maturity, human resources, economic structure and capacity, technological competence, industrial base and availability of natural resources and finally the military might. It was further viewed as the capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes is necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and wellbeing (Paleri, 2008).

The early origin of the concept of national security as a philosophy of maintaining a stable nation state can be traced to the Peace of Westphalia, wherein the concept of a sovereign state, ruled by a sovereign, became the basis of a new international order of nation states. Its narrow conception in the context of military security on the other hand has been traced to realist thought on international relations which has its emphasis on states as primary actors competing in a situation of anarchy for survival and power (Prabhakaran, 2008). The earliest

mention of the term was made in Yale University in 1790, where reference was made to its relation with domestic industries. Its manifestations thereafter can be said to be intricately bound initially to developments in the United States, and then to the immediate post-Cold War period.

By the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, there has been a conscious shift from a limited, largely military sense of security to one that encompass all manner of threats, with the result that new issues were continually being classified as security issues or threats to national security. Reasons for this development are not far-fetched. It has been suggested that this may not be unconnected with the fact that the 1947 Act did not define national security. This conceivably was advantageous in that the ambiguity created made it possible for the phrase to be invoked wherever issues threatened by other interests of the state came up for discussion. A second reason is that over the years, there has been the realization that national security encompasses more than just military security. It will entail any measure put in place by a nation to secure its citizens and resources from danger and the risk of infiltration, sabotage and subversion.

Premised on this, it has been contended that the national security goal of Nigeria has the state and military power as its primary focus. The above position, however, becomes incongruous when considered together with section 14(2)(b) of Chapter II of the Constitution which declares that “*the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government*”. Chapter II of the Constitution sets out the Directive Principles which are structured in the form of directives given to the government to guide the establishment of a just country. The Principles commit the state to promote the welfare of the people by affirming social, economic and political justice. They constitute fundamental obligations of the government in the governance of the nation (Saurin, 1996). If the provisions of sections 5(5) and 14(2) (b) of the Constitution are considered in this context, it would be seen that national security will encompass not just physical security, but, also economic and social security.

Indeed, anything that would create a distortion within the system and thereby promote instability and insecurity will come under the focal lenses of national security.

Environment as an Element of National Security

Following the shift in thinking on what constitutes national security, one of the non-military elements of national security has been identified as environmental security. Environmental security deals with environmental issues which threaten the national security of a nation in any matter. However, while it is not the case that all environmental events can be said to be capable of threatening national security, such issues as climate change, deforestation and loss of biodiversity have been found as capable of threatening a nation's security. In similar vein, resource problems and environmentally threatening outcomes of warfare are issues that can seriously undermine the security of a nation. The United Nations has identified environmental degradation as one of six clustered threats with which the world must be concerned now and, in the decades, ahead (Aja and Emeribe, 2000).

Environmental degradation is the deterioration in environmental quality from ambient concentrations of pollutants and other activities and processes such as improper land use and natural disasters. It is the erosion of the quality of the natural environment caused, directly or indirectly, by human activities. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction defines environmental degradation as the reduction of the capacity of the environment to meet social and ecological objectives and needs (Romm, 2019).

Environmental degradation is of two broad types: when natural habitats are destroyed or rendered unusable through pollution or contamination; or natural resources are misused, over-used, made scarce and eventually depleted. Either of the two situations can result in deprivation of the populace of such critical essentials like food, water, quality air and basic survival resources. Where the situation degenerates into one of desperation by the people for any source of relief, it may result in civil strife, instability and anarchy, and thus a threat to the security of the region and anyone who may interact with the region.

In Nigeria, following incessant rains between June and August, 2010, hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced while properties running into billions of naira were destroyed. The worst affected are communities in Sokoto, Kebbi and Jigawa States in the northern part of Nigeria where the Goronyo dam in Sokoto State overflowed its banks, and in Lagos and Ogun States in the western part of Nigeria as a result of release of water from the Oyan dam by the Ogun-Oshun River Basin Development.

The second is by weakening states by providing revenue for insurgents and criminal groups, depressing economic productivity, or undermining the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the citizens. The summary of Kubis position is that environment degradation can cause people to lose faith in and become discontent with their leadership's ability to govern them, promote development, provide basic goods and services, and create a prosperous national economy. The moment government and leaders lose their credibility; it could result in a loss of legitimacy by the state, and invariably in internal conflict and regional instability. It is thus, of fundamental importance that policymakers have a clear view of the environment and security relationship, not only in the context of environmental issues that present immediate hazard to human security,²¹ but, also those that are likely to affect the health of the planet and its inhabitants, particularly humans in the future (Kubis, 2017).

One of the first countries to make the clear connection between environment and national security was the United States when in 1990 Mr. Al Gore, then a Senator, placed environmental degradation on the national security agenda with his statement that environmental neglect threatens not only the quality of life but life itself. In that same year, he initiated the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program together with Senator Sam Nunn with the aim of redirecting military resources toward developing and analyzing the data needed for alerting the US public to possible security threats (Azaiki, 2007). In this regard, environmental degradation did not come unto the front burner as a major issue in Nigeria until 1988 following the dumping of toxic waste on a site in Koko, a small port town in the southern part of Nigeria.³¹ This led to the setting-up of the Federal Environmental

Protection Agency in 1988. By the time the Report of the Vision 2010 Committee was published in 1997, it was acknowledged that Nigeria's and breadth of the country. These include: Kubis,(2017).

- Population pressure and the continuous exploitation of marginal lands, aggravating the process of drought and desertification in the north;
- Severe gully erosion in Eastern and Northern states;
- Coastal and marine erosion, and land subsidence in coastal and riverine states;
- Flooding in low-lying belt of mangrove and fresh swamps along the coast, the plains of large rivers and short-lived flash floods in the inland river;
- Uncontrolled logging with inherent problems of the destruction of bio-diversity;

Some of the above issues, particularly that relating to devastation and neglect of the environment in the Niger Delta has in recent times degenerated, giving rise to massive violent protests by the citizens and inhabitants of the Niger Delta, kidnaps (of expatriates of oil companies, government officials and their relatives), uncountable killings and destruction of entire communities. What is of significance in the above is that while Nigeria may not have formally identified its environmental challenges as an issue of national security, a country like the United States is already looking at these issues via its own national security strategy document to conceptualize its relationship with Nigeria³³ in furtherance of its foreign aid, diplomatic and national security policies.

This clearly underscores the urgent need for Nigeria to properly identify environmental security issues as triggers of national, regional and global instability, and consequently, formally address them as part of its national security strategy.

The Case of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP)

This section presents a historical analysis of the case of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) to examine the politics of environmentalism and environmental degradation in Nigeria. This section focuses on three (3) subsections to analyze the case of MOSOP, namely:

- (a) An Overview of MOSOP and the Genesis of the Conflict between Shell/SPDC and Ogoni Community;
- (b) The Political Activities and Demands of MOSOP;
- (c) Lessons from the Emergence and Struggles of MOSOP.

a) An Overview of MOSOP and the Genesis of the Conflict between Shell/SPDC and Ogoni Community

The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) is a social movement that advocates for the environmental rights especially with regards to Ogoni Land. It can be stated that “the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP was founded in 1990, as a mass- based democratic social movement to represent the Ogoni community with the launching of the Ogoni Bill of Right (OBR)” (UNPO Representation Publication, 2009).

It can be noted that “the origins of the conflict between the Ogoni and Shell/ SPDC date back to the company’s discovery of oil in this part of the Niger Delta in 1958”.

To further trace the origin of the conflict between the Ogoni and Shell/ SPDC, it is believed that “as early as 1970, seven Ogoni chiefs sent a memorandum to SPDC and the military governor of Rivers State complaining of environmental degradation from the company’s operations”. Consequently, “the year 1993 proved decisive in Ogoni SPDC relations”. This is because on 4 January, 1993, about 300, 000 Ogoni staged a peaceful mass protest against the company and the environmental degradation of their land (International Crisis Group, 2008).

b) The Political Activities and Demands of MOSOP

The activities of MOSOP especially in the 1990s were political in nature as their struggles for environmental justice also witnessed some form of political demands by MOSOP from Nigerian government and oil companies. It is believed that “the Ogoni confrontation with SPDC over its environmental and community relations practices was only part of a much wider range of demands and grievances that led to the crisis of the mid- 1990s” (International Crisis

Group, 2008). Thus, historically, politics in Nigeria has been dominated by three large ethnic groups namely Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo respectively.

Also, the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) even as it contained environmental demands of Ogoni people also have political demands contained in it. As the Ogoni Bill of Rights presented to the Government and people of Nigeria on 26 August, 1990 frowned “that today, the Ogoni people have: No representation whatsoever in ALL institutions of Federal Government of Nigeria”. And, the Ogoni Bill of Rights as some of its political demands, however, demanded political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people as well as adequate and direct representation as of right in all Nigerian national institutions.

The above political demands were reflected in the Ogoni Bill of Rights and are championed by MOSOP even as it carries out its activities in advocating for environmental rights for Ogoni people. MOSOP is championing its political as well as environmental demands have used protests as a tool for achieving its demands. Thus, protest can be seen as a political tool used by most environmental movements to press their demands. MOSOP have used this political tool to effectively attract attention and concerns especially from the international community in respect of environmental degradation being experienced in Ogoni land due to oil extraction and exploration in the area (Tamuno, 2011).

c) Lessons learned from the emergence and Struggles of MOSOP

The lessons to be learnt by other environmental movements from the emergence and struggles for environmental rights of MOSOP is that MOSOP despite its political demands was very committed in the struggle for environmental rights of Ogoni people. As MOSOP never allowed its political demands to distract the group from its struggles for environmental rights which was very key and paramount at that time to the Ogoni people and this became an eye opener as it led to the emergence of other environmental movements like Oil Watch, Nigeria. And also garner international attention as the eye of the globe was now focused on the environmental degradation in Ogoni land. However, other environmental movements should

learn from MOSOP experience and be more committed in the struggles for environmental rights and not to be distracted by the politics of environmentalism.

This study is very critical and crucial with regards to its major findings. Firstly, in this study, it is discovered that there is politics involved in environmentalism in Nigeria. This is because environmental movements in their struggle for environmental rights and protection and in a bid to influence political process in Nigeria are caught in the web of politics as environmental movements often makes political demands on government.

Lastly, it is discovered that MOSOP even as it advocates for environmental justice also made political demands on government as reflected in the Ogoni Bill of Rights presented to the Government and people of Nigeria on 26 August, 1990.

Conclusion

It is now glaring that whereas oil should have been a blessing to the Niger Delta, the fundamental character of the Nigerian State and the exploitative activities of the Oil multinationals have translated basically to negative effects. This comes in form of dislocation of the local economics, environmental degradation, inter- and intra- communal crisis, corruption, development crisis, looting and squandering of oil resources etc. The resource agitations and militant insurgency in the region is thus facilitated by the information of what is obtainable in other oil producing western states, hence the call for redress. But since the militants are feeding on their global bunkering networks to sustain the struggle, much need to be done (locally, nationally and internationally) urgently to curtail the crisis.

Recommendations

- i. There is need to articulate national security strategy to formally include environmental degradation in line with issues that may subsequently arise such as Assess Environmental Risks, Integrate Environmental Factors, collaborate with Stakeholders, Enhance Resilience, Enhance Resilience, and Capacity Building.

- ii. There is a need to identify the parameters that will be used to set clear measurable threshold beyond which an environmental problem will constitute a threat to national security and warrant intervention.
- iii. Also, environmental movements should focus more on environmental issues than politics.
- iv. The multi-national corporations should also abide by global environmental standards and better the lots of their host communities.
- v. Nigeria should improve security especially in the high sea to delinks the bunkering networks.

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BOKO HARAM (BH): FROM A DOMESTIC INSURGENT GROUP TO AN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST

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ABSTRACT

Boko Haram started off as a religious movement in 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno State of Nigeria with avowed opposition to “Western education” but subsequently adopted violent insurgency methods to pursue its objectives leading to its proscription by the Federal Government of Nigeria in 2011. Using the theories of ungoverned spaces and victory, this research paper analysed data from secondary sources and established among other findings that some factors including ideological affiliation with other terrorist groups were responsible for the transformation of BH from a domestic intra-state insurgent group to an international terrorist organisation straddling the entire Lake Chad Basin Commission member countries. The study recommends criminalising terrorism as an atrocity crime requiring concerted priority action by the international community as one of the key measures to address the worsening humanitarian crises brought about by this non-international armed conflict.

Keywords: Conflict, Crime, Insurgency, Terrorism, Violence.

Introduction

In its early beginning in 2002, BH which literally translates to “Western education is forbidden” according to Ibrahim and Bala (2018) was founded by Mohammad Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State of Northeast Nigeria. As an Islamic sectarian movement with intent

to uproot the corruption and structural injustice that has contributed to a widening of gap between the few rich and the many poor which it blamed on western influences and for which it sought to impose Sharia or Islamic law as solution.

From its relatively benign beginning as a fragmented so-called religious movement, Boko Haram has metamorphosed into one of the worst terrorist groups in the history of sub-Saharan Africa. Based on impact of terrorism, the Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorist Index (IEP-GTI) for March 2022 stated that the Sahel has become increasingly the most violent part of the globe in the past 15 years. The Islamic State, West Africa Province (ISWAP) with its BH affiliate has become the most lethal in the sub-region, maintaining its unenviable record as the third most vicious terrorist organisation after the Taliban, Islamic State, and ahead of Al Shabab with whom it shares doctrinal and logistics support. The group's activities were initially localised and isolated, but eventually escalated to regional and international dimension, with tragic consequences. In time, governments around the Lake Chad basin mobilised a regional military action to collectively confront and address the monumental security challenges. While some successes have been recorded so far in restoring peace, some daunting challenges remain- perhaps associated with the disproportionate focus on military action.

The abduction of about 275 girls from a boarding school in Chibok, Borno state in April 2014 generated worldwide condemnation and offers of international support and assistance including the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions on BH individuals. Many regional bodies including the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), ECOWAS, and countries like the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia imposed varying degrees of intervention. The BH subsequently in August 2014 declared areas under its control including territories in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon to be an Islamic Caliphate, an action that prompted the establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJT) by the four Lake Chad Basin Commission members. Studies on Boko Haram insurgency onset has largely emphasized economic poverty, religious ideology, and the historical north-south

identity fractionalization (Iyekekpolo, 2020). Some other studies have focused on the political corruption which has occasioned economic poverty and inequality as the key drivers of the expansion of the BH insurgency.

Omenma (2020) advance the economic dimension of the expanded armed conflict to the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the areas while Omenma et al. (2020) and Okoli (2019) submit that the quest for a territorial caliphate by the group is a factor. While these studies have made contributions to the literature, this study specifically examines the transformation of the BH non-international armed conflict which began as a fragmented so-called religious movement into one of the worst terrorist groups in the continent of Africa as evidenced by the Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorist Index (IEP-GTI) for March 2022 which found that the Sahel has become increasingly the most violent part of the globe in the past 15 years with Islamic State, West Africa Province (ISWAP) as the most lethal. One of the key challenges resulting directly from the BH conflict is the forced displacement of persons internally and as refugees, humanitarian crises, and atrocity crimes committed by the terrorists. This is the social problem component of the study while the research component aims to contribute in the understanding, explanation, and possible measures to address the continued security threat of the armed conflict and its wider implication for stability of the country and the region.

Conceptual Underpinnings

This work adopts some conceptual definitions of the terms insurgency and terrorism as they apply to our work. Insurgency is defined as a political movement aimed at realising a specific political goal such as the overthrow of a government or a territory thereof (Unal, 2016). It is an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government using subversion and armed conflict (Badire et al. 2016). It also refers to refers to the systematic use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region (Okoli, 2019). At its early age, BH clearly qualified for this description before its transformation to an international terrorist group.

Terrorism on the other hand is defined as the systematic use of violence and intimidation to coerce a government or community into acceding to specific political demands (Badire et al., 2016). It is also a method of pursuing a political goal (Unal, 2016) which in this case is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate within the sovereign boundaries of the four countries. Akanji (2019) maintains that the primary goal of BH was the disintegration of the Nigerian state guided by radical Islam which considers Western education, democracy, and Western values as corrupt and evil and should be uprooted and replaced with Sharia.

Theoretical framework

Some theoretical perspectives explain the transformation of BH terrorism into what it has become today. The theory of ungoverned space refers to physical areas which are social, political, and economic zones where states do not have effective control and which violent non-state actors can exploit to avoid surveillance and undermine state sovereignty (Burchill, et al., 2005; de Londras, 2010; Faleti, 2006; Moore, 2018). It also refers to a territorial sphere where firm governmental control is lacking and which may be ‘a physical or non-physical area where there is an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control’(Okoli, 2019).

This theory assists us explain why the vast Sambisa Forest of Borno State, the Lake Chad and its several islands and islets have provided and continued to provide BH with the territorial control, maintained as sanctuary, and used to dominate the population (Okolie-Osemene, 2019). This theory of ungoverned space is further reinforced by the theory of victory which according to Bartholomees (2010) is all about the belief by the insurgents that they have the capability of defeating the government on the battlefield, spark popular revolt to meet urgent demands, provoke international intervention on their behalf or prolong the conflict long enough for the government to seek a negotiated settlement. Both theoretical perspectives which we adopt for our work are not incongruent with social conflict theories that underpin research studies of this nature.

Factors that Engendered the Evolution of Boko Haram

Social conflict researchers have identified a key driver of the present armed conflict as the impact of globalisation on African societies with the wholesale adoption of liberal democracy and free market economy that produce contradictory effects on political stability and social harmony (Alli, 2006; Eyesan, 2020). The BH avowed ideological objective has evolved from simple advocacy for Islamic puritanism in northern Nigeria to the creation of the Islamic State in West Africa and Lake Chad region in particular (Onuoha & Oyewole, 2018). This situation is also amenable to structural conflict theoretical analysis and explanation (Faleti, 2006).

The second factor is the impact of climate change which has been established to have affected the Lake Chad water resources through desertification and drought, resulting in a consequent shrinking the lake and loss of economic activities like fishing, farming, herding, trading, unemployment, and induced migration which made the area a fertile ground for insurgents who took advantage of the gaps in the socio-ecological structure to inhabit the ungoverned space (Iheoma-Hart, 2021). Omenma (2020) explains that there is a nexus between water resources and the terrorism of BH in the Lake Chad region and conclude that the economic dimension is predicated on two interrelated escalatory indicators of the attack on the Nigerian oil exploration team in the region and the continuous exploitation of oil and gas resources by Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in the same region. Omenma (2020) state that economic rather than religious interests have provided the impetus for increased terrorist activities of the BH and have significant implications for both the security and counterterrorism efforts in the region. Omenma et al. (2020) argue that BH insurgency is motivated by the need for a territorial caliphate focusing ungoverned space expressed in the group's declaration of Gwoza in Borno State as the Caliphate Headquarters and the use of Sambisa Forest and Lake Chad areas for sanctuaries, planning and executions of its operations. This analytical submission accords well with our theoretical framework of ungoverned spaces as a geographical driver for the expansion of the BH insurgency.

As a terrorist group, BH is now subject to the UN Convention of International Terrorism and the application of some international instruments related to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism. For instance, while the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 of 2004 was directed to all forms of terrorism while its Resolution 2349 of 2017 specifically condemned terrorist attacks and other violations in the Lake Chad region by Al Qaida, Islamic State, Boko Haram (retrieved March 30, 2022, from <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12773.doc.htm>). The BH terrorist group has also violated International Humanitarian law consequent upon its continued acts of killings, kidnapping, human trafficking, extortion, and forced displacement of persons as either internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees fleeing to other countries thereby creating humanitarian crisis. According to UN International Office of Migration-IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (2018), there are: Nigeria: 1,918,508 million IDPs as of June 2018. Of these, 78 per cent are living in Borno; Chad: 144,166 as of March 2018; Cameroon: 238,099. The operational methods of the group has become more advanced and now include deployment of some military technology of drones, anti-aircraft guns, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack both military and civilian locations (Faluyi et al., 2019).

These include Al Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, Al Shabab in Somalia, and Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), and to its declaration of itself as the Islamic State, West Africa Province (ISWAP). According to Onuoha and Oyewole (2018) Boko Haram members were known to have received training from Al Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operates across the Sahel and North Africa, and from Al Shabaab in East Africa. Heintz (2020) analysed the multidimensional nature of the BH conflict and submitted that the conflict may not just be animated by local material conditions but may be a part of a broader anti-West jihad. The sharing of radical religious ideological affinities and affiliations with other global terrorist groups has been a key factor in the escalation of the BH conflict and its consequent internationalisation.

The flow of illegal/illicit funds funnelled to sponsor BH operations and activities have been traced to certain individuals lately in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for which six individuals were convicted for financing terrorism and further sanctioned by the United States in its List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Boko Haram (Retrieved March 30, 2022, from <https://www.state.gov/designation-of-six-individuals-for-their-support-to-boko-haram/>). Onuoha and Oyewole (2018) state that the militant group the militant group has diversified its funding sources from foreign terrorist groups, bank robbery, cattle rustling, drug trafficking, extortion, engagement in 'front' businesses, collection of levies, and kidnapping for ransom.

The expensive and sophisticated lethal weaponry deployed by BH has reportedly been traced to countries in conflict including Libya, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan among others. These interconnections have made BH terrorism one of the biggest security challenges facing Nigeria since a decade ago and now extended to Lake Chad Basin Countries and threatening the entire West Africa subregion with Burkina Faso, Mali, Benin experiencing increased insurgent attacks lately. The ISWAP faction of BH has lately been responsible for aggravated terrorist related security challenges in Abuja and environs. The group according to the Federal Government of Nigeria was responsible for the bombing, killing and kidnapping of some passengers on an Abuja-Kaduna train in March 2022.

The group also claimed responsibility through a video it released of the operation for the bombing of the Abuja medium correctional facility in Kuje in which several inmates belonging to the group were forcibly freed and monies carted away in the over an hour midnight operation (retrieved August 1, 2022, from <https://punchng.com/breaking-iswap-claims-responsibility-for-kuje-attack-releases-video/>). According to Samuel (2022) the Kuje prison break suggests a collaboration between and among the terrorist groups and their various cells already embedded in the Abuja. The same terrorist group reportedly claimed

responsibility for the recent separate escalated attacks on the seat of power when it attacked the advance Presidential Convoy in Dutsinma, Katsina State, the Presidential Guards Brigade along Bwari-Kubwa road in Abuja, and the 7 Guards Battalion in Dakwa-Madalla near Zuma Rock boundary between the FCT and Niger-State in which several army officers were killed (ThisDay, 2022)

The successful attacks on the seat of power have emboldened the terrorist groups to escalate the armed conflict both in Nigeria and beyond. Weeraratne (2017) submit that the dramatic expansion of BH insurgency in terms of frequency and severity of attacks, geographic scope, target selection, and strategies used are explained by factors that include the growing fragmentation of the group, development of strategic ties with other terrorist groups, strongarmed counter-terrorism operations that appeared to have further radicalized the members, and the exploitation of the porous borders along the north-east of Nigeria.

Akanji (2019) identified lack of political will and commitment by the international community to implement and enforce decisions on counter-terrorism measures as a key challenge to effectively combating the terror group. The United Nations Draft Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism which is a major instrument for concerted global action and for countering terrorism and the use of force by non-state actors is yet to be operationalised (Akanji, 2019). The UN Security Council Resolution 2083 approved the inclusion of BH commanders and members to the list of individuals and entities subject to financial sanctions and arms embargo. The Communique of the 973rd meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) to consider report of the MNJTF against BH on 10th January 2021 not only renewed the mandate of the Force but further mobilised additional global support for it to fill the identified capacity gaps in its area of operations.

We argue in this paper that military operations alone by sovereign states and international agencies may not sufficiently defeat terrorism. We submit that policies that bring about conditions for positive peace and structural justice may play a huge part in turning away the terrorists from the path of negative peace. This may include concerted international

ecological intervention to recharge the Lake Chad for increased water inflow and stem the shrinkage. As submitted by Hogedoorn (2018), to help defeat BH, the EU and other international bodies should do more and push for good governance and accountability. There is a need for a coordinated and comprehensive plan to contain the continuous expansion and recruitment into BH. International law and International Instruments are required to effectively deal with BH including enforcement by UNSC. This position accords with the analytical submissions of Adam et al. (2018); Adedire et al. (2016); Adesoji (2019) on the way forward with BH terrorism. The concurrent insurgent actions in other areas of Africa such as Somalia, South-Sudan, Libya, Uganda, DR Congo, Cameroon among others may have created a disincentive for collective continental response to the BH terrorism.

Conclusion

This qualitative-descriptive documentary research paper using the theoretical framework of ungoverned space supported by that of victory undertakes and analysis and explanation of the transformation of BH from a hitherto domestic insurgency group in Nigeria to an international terrorist organisation so designated by many countries and institutions and having cross border ideological affiliations and operations in multiple countries. Many factors were identified in the study as both contributory and escalatory in the development. The study established that the impact of climate change resulting in the shrinking of the Lake Chad as a major source of income for the inhabitants of the area, the existence of porous borders in the region, the conflict in neighbouring countries of Libya, Sudan, DRC, CAR, and the resultant proliferation of illicit arms, and existence of other similar ideologically oriented terrorist organisations in the continent of Africa and beyond were factors in the transformation and internationalisation of the BH armed conflict.

The work concludes that in addition to generating the needed political will for combating the terrorism among the directly affected LCBC countries, the international community needs to do more to address the ongoing humanitarian crises occasioned by the armed conflict. Criminalising terrorism through the adoption of the work of the International

Law Commission (ILC) as atrocity crime thereby making it triable by the International Criminal Court (ICC) is of urgent priority global action.

Recommendations

1. There is need for sovereign states and international agencies to give priority to the ecological state of Lake Chad with the view to recharging it for increased water inflow and enhance lost economic activity in the region.
2. There is a need to encourage the International Law Commission to develop a distinct international crime of terrorism.

Sovereign states and international agencies should show more commitment and political will to implement and enforce decisions on counter terrorism measures with sincerity of purpose.

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GRASSROOTS PEACE-BUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

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ABSTRACT

This study analyses the concept of grassroots peace-building in post-conflict societies. It examines the functions of peace-building in the prevention of conflict by engaging local communities in the peace-building process. Peace-building as a concept was developed to addresses the economic, social, and political root causes of violence, it fosters reconciliation to prevent the return of structural and direct violence in societies around the world. Over the years, despite the robust implementation of peace-building measures in conflict ridden societies, there still exist the problem of relapse into conflict of such societies. This prompted the concept of the grassroots peace-building, which aims to entrench peace-building at the local level that is directly affected by the problems of conflict. This is in contrast to peace measures originating from national, international, or regional peace-building stakeholders. The study made use of secondary data sourced from journals, internet resources, textbooks and newspaper reports for analysis. Findings from the research shows that the over-reliant on the Western approach to peace-building, has not translated to the prevention of post-conflict societies' relapse into conflict. Grassroots peace-building is very effective in the enhancement of communal relationships, which in the long run, fosters reconciliation and the prevention of relapse into conflict in a post-conflict society. The study recommends that peace-building organizations should ensure that grassroots ownership of the peace-building process is made a prerequisite in the planning and implementation of peace-building programs.

Keywords: Conflict, Grassroots, Peace-building, Post-conflict, Resurgence

Introduction

On 17 June 1992, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted a report to the 47th Session of the UN entitled "An Agenda for Peace" in which the UN Secretary-General gave prominence to the concept of peace-building. From 1992 onwards to the end of the twentieth century, the international community experienced a wave of violent conflict which tested the efficacy of peace-building as a developing concept. The national government's

interest in peace-building also increased due to fears that failed States serve as breeding grounds for conflict and extremism and thus threaten international security. While some States began to view peace-building as a way to demonstrate their relevance (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell & Sitea, 2007). However, peace-building activities in the period accounted for small percentages of the State's budgets. Then, as the reality of destructive conflicts continued to impact negatively on global peace, peace-building came to symbolize the promise of a new strategy for responding to the twin imperatives of security and development in the international system. Yet, despite the bogusness of the implementation of peace-building programs, many post-conflict societies easily relapsed into violent conflicts (Tschirgi, 2017).

The community-based peace-building approach according to Lange (2004), is a growing concept and has through the years, aided the post-conflict recovery in communities that have experienced violent conflict. The concept is being adopted for post-conflict reconciliation and societal reconstruction. Peace-building framework primarily focuses on addressing conflict's core causes, establishing fairness, justice, inclusivity, and economic and political empowerment (Lange, 2004). In it, individuals, groups, and communities are capacitated to take charge of their developmental sustainability in a peaceful environment. This is often feasible when the framework is properly implemented and owned by local institutions and organizations, instead of becoming only receivers of humanitarian intervention (NEEDS, 2004).

From the foregoing, it could be seen that participation of local communities in development programs, potentially gives post-conflict communities more opportunities to discover and evaluate their abilities, especially in the area of devising solutions to disputes. Local engagement in development activities contributes to social stability, unity, and peace in the community.

Conceptual Framework

Conflict

According to Faleti (2006), conflict is a manifestation of the incompatibility of behaviors and interest in human society. This is coupled with the selfish, individualistic and expansionist desires of human beings. Conflict exists in all facets of social living, which may be exhibited at any time or place. While Levy (2001) sees conflict as an event that can occur internationally, nationally, and locally. At the worldwide level, conflicts break out due to the efforts of one or a few nations to impose their very own political or ideology on others.

In the Nigerian context, conflict continues to destroy the development process of communities, and there is a rising necessity for peace-building efforts to turn the tides for the better (Chigozie & Ituma, 2015). Already, there is a dynamism of poverty and underdevelopment accentuating the exacerbation of conflict in the country, creating a systemic cycle of poverty, underdevelopment, and violent conflict (Osaretim & Akov, 2013). The proliferation and escalation of conflicts in Nigeria have created a web of economic incentives for the actors. Indigenes of communities suffering from protracted conflicts now create these economic ventures among other incentives for the sustenance of the conflicts (Remi, 2007).

Peace-building

Elizabeth & Charles (2007) stated that peace-building is a highly contested concept, with definitions ranging from negative peace, or absence of war, to expansive positive peace. Coning (2013) sees peace-building as the process needed to redress root causes of conflict and to deliver social, political, justice, equity, and reconciliation. It is those actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict.

According to Brahimi (2000) peace-building involves approaches with a set of interrelated efforts that support peace activities undertaken in a conflict situation. It aims to build the foundations for peace and provide the necessities for societal rebuilding. In the same vein, Falade, Harbor & Osofisan (2004) stated that the peace-building process involves

stakeholders such as the government, individuals and organizations who continuously design development programs that adhere to the preservation of life philosophy. Peace-building addresses the economic, social and political root causes of violence and fosters reconciliation to prevent the return of structural and direct violence. Its efforts aim to change beliefs and attitudes that transforms the short and long-term dynamics between individuals and groups toward a more stable, peaceful coexistence.

Grassroots Peace-building

According to Abdullahi & Neelam (2019), grassroots peace-building is a term used to represent peace-building measures in the local community, which is directly affected by the problems of conflict. This is in contrast to peace measures originating from national, international, or regional stakeholders. Grassroots peace-building involves a local level of non-State actors, local government, local community actors and leaders, civil society organizations, and other local people who are stakeholders in the conflict. Arandel, Brinkerhoff and Bell (2015) also noted that building peace at the local level requires inclusivity from all leadership facets of society: that is from ground-level authorities (Community) to the top-level authorities (State).

Grassroots-level Peace-building is significantly getting more attention and is recognized as a central part of the peace-building process. This is despite the most peace process in post-conflict environment commonly targets the top level and neglects the bottom level (Abdullahi & Neelam, 2019). The grassroots initiative plays a very important role in the peace-building process, as it helps parties to build trust with the platforms with which community members discuss their differences. This is also because conflict spirals emerge when a community experiences intense pressure on development measures that should have enhanced the socio-economic status of its inhabitants. Therefore, a grassroots level of communal initiative for peace is needed for close-knit relationships.

Post Conflict Society

According to Brown, Langer & Stewart (2011), post-conflict is not an easy concept to define without highlighting some thematic areas for analysis. In large-scale wars, an official surrender, the negotiation for the end of violence, and peace talks or peace treaties mark the end of conflicts. But in intra-State conflicts, hostilities do not normally end abruptly after which there is complete peace. There may be an agreed peace, but fighting often continues at a low level or sporadically, and frequently resumes after a short period.

Brown, Langer & Stewart (2011) noted that peace-building milestones include:

- a. Cessation of hostilities and violence; b. The signing of political/peace agreements; c. Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration; d. Refugee repatriation; e. Establishing a functioning State; f. Achieving reconciliation and societal integration; g. Economic recovery

Stewart & Fitzgerald (2001) however averred that when there is an ongoing conflict, it is more difficult to implement recovery policies, and this also may affect the policy design. While the achievement of some of these milestones may to some degree be contingent upon the prior achievement of other milestones, there is the necessity to follow a sequential order in realizing its achievement. For example, the repatriation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) or refugees, often begins after the cessation of violence and hostilities, even when there are no formal political agreements or when conflict parties are still in the process of in dialogue for a settlement. Most of these milestones are self-evident and require little further explanation. Moreover, they represent the ideal progression, even when about half the cases of “post-conflict” countries revert to conflict within a decade (Collier, 2003).

Post-conflict Peace-building

The post-conflict peace-building process includes a wide range of activities such as reconstruction, rehabilitation, institution building and other developmental activities. NGOs, international financial institutions and development agencies as well as local and national actors cover a whole range of programs in ensuring the recovery of war devastated societies.

Disarmament of combatants, procurement of political and economic concessions to stabilize the society, development of infrastructure, and consolidation of the legal, financial, and political systems are just part of the focal points that change in the years after the peace agreements. The main mission is to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.

According to Filipov (2006) post-conflict peace-building has been on the agenda of the United Nations and major scholars in the years following the end of the Cold War, when the number of intrastate conflicts increased rapidly. While some of the conflicts had been carried out for years before international actors and NGOs directed their attention to them, new conflicts appeared in politically fluctuating zones that suddenly were not dependent on the major powers anymore. Sadly, even the presence of international peacekeeping missions containing peace-building components, the inflow of foreign aid, and the heightened number of NGOs failed to address the post-conflict environment appropriately to accomplish a full-scale recovery of war-torn States. Relapse to the conflict had equal chances to appear after the manifested end of hostilities, reaching the rate of 50 percent of conflict reoccurrence in the past 20 years, when previous conflict areas returned to violence within five years after the signing of a peace agreement (Filipov, 2006).

Conflict Prevention

According to Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency {SWIDA} (2017), conflict prevention is about making societies resilient to violent conflict by strengthening the local capacities for peace. The early prevention of conflict initiatives seeks to improve the relationship of parties before the outbreak of violent conflict, while late prevention pertains to resolving or preventing the recurrence of violent conflict. SWIDA (2017) noted that the methods, approaches and mechanisms for engagement are often categorized as direct prevention and structural prevention, although the methods often overlap and so do the phases of the conflict cycle. Direct prevention refers to shorter-term initiatives that are put into place in a critical moment to have a direct de-escalating effect on tensions or violence. Such

initiatives include dialogue, mediation and other confidence-building measures, preventive international deployment and the establishment of peace zones.

Violent conflict which is the result of multifarious factors, requires timely and orchestrated approaches in context. The combination of good knowledge of the actual circumstances on the ground and a good overview of available conflict prevention tools and mechanisms can help strengthen conflict prevention measures. This means that in any given context, conflict prevention activities and strategies must be based on conflict analysis that draws on a variety of sources and perspectives, and at least the knowledge, experience and perspectives of local actors. The conflict analysis should always include a gender perspective, to get the full picture of patterns of violence, grievances, risks and opportunities as experienced by women and men, girls and boys. The required depth of this analysis varies between contexts, and between various types of interventions. It is very useful in viewing conflict analysis as an ongoing and progressive process involving multiple actors and opinions.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Theory of Change

Theory of Change is a proposition explaining the processes involved in the change phenomenon. It presents the causal linkages existing in an initiative, in terms of shorter-term, intermediate, and longer-term outcomes (Brest, 2010). The changes are tracked and presented as the trajectory of the outcome, showing the relationships between each successful outcome, and also showing how an outcome is a prerequisite for the next one (Clark & Taplin, 2012).

Critically evaluate the assumptions of the Theory of Change, it could be seen that it specifies the way to describe both the mini-steps that lead to the long-term goal of interest and the connections between program activities and outcomes that occur at each step of the way. An important first step in the process is identifying a workable long-term goal and long-term outcomes. The long-term goal is presumed to be the achievable activities that all initiates understand. A trained external facilitator is best to lead the group to consensus and specificity in this process, and once a long-term goal is identified, the group considers the conditions that

must be in place for reaching the set goal. Such conditions are shown as outcomes on the theory of change pathway, and the outcomes also act as preconditions to long-term outcomes. Therefore, the theory of change is not only based on the generation of knowledge about the effectiveness of a program, but also on outlining the methods used in achieving it.

In applying the Change Theory as the basis for this study, it could be seen that grassroots peace-building is an initiative that provides conditions for a peaceful society, which is the outcome. Community leaders are therefore required in the planning, implementation and monitoring of peace-building initiatives, which will reflect their aspirations. The desire for positive peace necessitates post-conflict peace-building programs, and for these programs to have successful outcomes, the community where the conflict occurs is needed in the process.

Peace-building in a Post-Conflict Society

Muggah (2014) presented a research conducted by the International Expert Forum (IEF) with the theme “Peace-building and Post-conflict Recovery: What Works and What Does Not?” The forum was focused squarely on the challenges of rebuilding peace in countries and societies emerging from conflict and the role of external actors in supporting these processes. Participants considered the track record of peace-building, political and economic transition processes, as well as the rule of law and transitional justice. The goal was to distill insights and identify policy implications. Previous forums had considered conflict prevention, the mitigation of consequences of conflict, and peace-keeping. The IEF serves as an informal platform for exchange and dialogue among researchers, practitioners, and decision-makers on issues related to conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peace-building (Muggah, 2014).

Participants found that peace-building is a long-term process and involves many actors, making it difficult to assess the effects of certain tools and instruments. Nonetheless, they agreed that the outcomes of peace-building measures should include economic recovery and political transition to democracy. Accordingly, the participants affirmed that peace-building is widely understood to consist of several dimensions beginning with the first phase

which might include disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration; extending into the second phase which includes efforts to establish the rule of law and build critical services and democratic institutions; and to the third phase dealing with transitional justice, community dialogue, and economic development. In practice, peace-building not only takes into account external actors but also considers local actors and the demands and expectations of the local communities. Peace-building therefore, means different things to those who have suffered from conflict and who are struggling with its aftermath.

Building Peace from the Grassroots in Post-conflict Environments

Abdullahi and Neelam (2019) conducted a study towards understanding the concept of the grassroots peace-building process. The study found that grassroots peace-building consist of formal and informal networks which use the bottom-up approach to peace-building by linking grassroots peace initiative with national and international peace-building actors. The study also found that peace networks existing at the grassroots, provide multi-level mechanisms which help to inform and influence national and international peace-building efforts, thus, helping the peace-building agency to adapt the peace-building strategies which reflect the grassroots contexts.

Darren (2021) carried out a study in Nigeria, which examines peace-building institutions, their early success and continuing challenges in three Nigerian middle-belt States of Plateau, Kaduna, and Adamawa. The study found that local governments in the selected States have created peace agencies or commissions, which has helped in reducing ethnic conflicts in the zone for over five years before the study. The study also found that these peace-building institutions are tasked with addressing long-standing ethno-religious and other divisions in their host States through direct mediation and other peace interventions; building early warning and early response systems for local conflicts; and, in conjunction with local governments and traditional institutions, developing grassroots conflict resolution infrastructure such as mediation and restorative justice units and processes. However, budgetary constraints have limited their effectiveness, and there are perceptions of a lack of

independence from the governors of the State, which sometimes led to the reduction of their credibility. Overall, the study concludes that grassroots peace-building measures are very effective in the prevention of conflicts in Nigeria's middle belt States. It recommends the spread of grassroots peace-building initiatives to other States and regions, to help resolve protracted conflicts ravaging parts of the country.

Conclusion

In sum, there has been impressive growth in data-driven research on peace-building in the past decade. This complements a very large body of case study work. However, there are comparatively few actual evaluations of what works and what does not. There is a clear need to apply multiple methods to start testing impacts. Academics and policymakers agree that in all cases an evidence-based approach is required. The Sudan conflict situation is a striking litmus test for evaluating what can be described as the success or failure of post-conflict building strategies in recent times. Finally, grassroots peace-building is a very effective tool for the enhancement of communal relationships, which in the long run, fosters reconciliation and the prevention of conflict, or the relapse into conflict in a post-conflict society.

Recommendations

Based on the finding made in the study above, the following recommendations appear necessary:

- i. The involvement of grassroots peace-building organizations in the peace-building process should be encouraged as it helps to prevent the recourse into conflict.
- ii. The United Nations (UN) general assembly should review its peace-building policy, to ensure that the grassroots peace-building approach is a stand-alone strategy.
- iii. The international community should ensure that they train and capacitate local communities, local governments and grassroots civil societies towards the implementation of peace-building program.
- iv. The Nigerian government should establish peace-building agencies in every State and local government of the country, to promote grassroots peace-building.

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STAGES OF CONFLICT ESCALATION AND STRATEGIES FOR DE- ESCALATION

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ABSTRACT

This study analysed the stages of conflict escalation and critically evaluates the various strategies for de-escalation. The study identified the problem of volatility in mismanaged conflict interventions, specifically due to wrong timings and approaches. The objective is focused on identifying the various opportunities for de-escalation as contained in each of the nine stages of the Fredreich Glasl's conflict escalation model. The methodology applied includes the analysis of data obtained from secondary sources such as journals, textbooks and internet resources. Findings in the study show that conflict does not emerge and get calcified at the same time, it passes through stages of escalation. Each of these escalation stages of conflict has de-escalation opportunities that can be exploited by third-party interveners. The findings also show that misapplication of the de-escalation approach in a particular stage will lead to further escalation of the conflict situation. The study however, recommends that conflict intervention programs especially originating from the United Nations (UN), should be designed in cognizance with the Fredreich Glasl conflict escalation model. This will enable third parties to plan intervention measures that could directly deal with the conflict issues based on the identified conflict escalation level.

Keywords: Conflict, Escalation, De-escalation, Resolution, Stages

Introduction

Conflicts have been the main contributor to loss of millions of lives world worldwide, while nations faced with civil conflicts have experienced high levels of fatalities from violence. The losses have drastically reduced human resources, and contributed to the reduction in living standards (Alberto & Ferrara, 2005). Conflict is seen to be an inevitable phenomenon that

occurs globally and daily in human existence. There is no human association or relationship in the world, which is free from the threshold of conflict (Edet, Benson & Williams, 2017).

According to Pruitt, Kim, and Rubin (2003), given the dynamics and autonomous nature of conflict, it tends to escalate and evolves through processes. Without an effective management mechanism, conflict transcends into violence and large-scale destruction of lives and properties. That is why Muhammed (2009) opines that resolving conflicts requires the removal of enemy imagery, reduction of violence, and settlement of issues are very crucial components of conflict management. This is because, when enemy pictures are developed in the consciousness of parties, it becomes deep-rooted and resists modification. The antagonistic postures of parties to each other further perpetuate and escalate conflicts. Therefore, it is within this context that this study is focused, to determine the stages of conflict escalation, and the strategies required for conflict de-escalation in each of the stages.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Conflict

According to Afzalur (2010) there is no universally accepted meaning of conflict, but all the proposed definitions have common connections: incompatible goals. Afzalur (2011) further described the conflict as a disagreement that occurs between individuals (the interpersonal conflict), and between groups (group conflict). Group interaction is first disrupted by an initial conflict within the group, often caused by internal differences of opinion, disagreements between its members, or scarcity of resources available to the group. At this point, the group is no longer united, and may split into coalitions. This period of conflict escalation in some cases gives way to a conflict resolution stage, after which the group can eventually return to routine group interaction or split (Afzalur, 2011).

Fischer and Ferlie (2013) see conflict as an activity that occurs when individuals or groups carry out acts that are incompatible with their wants, needs or obligations. This incompatibility can escalate and characterized by the existence of conflict behaviour, which brings damage to the actors. While scholar like MacDonald (2009) sees conflict as a struggle

and a clash of interest, opinion, or even principles. Conflict will always be found in society; as the basis of conflict may vary to be personal, racial, class, caste, political, and international. Disputes between people happen every day, but as different as the causes of disputes are, so are the solutions. Whether a conflict is quickly resolved or escalates depends on the situation, behaviour of the parties involved and the causes of the problem.

Conflict Escalation

Conflict escalation refers to an upward drive in the intensity of a conflict situation and in the level of the strategies applied in implementing it. Conflict intensity is driven by dynamism within each of the actors, evolving patterns of communication between them, and the entrant of new parties in the contention (Kriesberg, 2012). Some conflict escalation is pivoted by difference in goals. Destructive social conflicts always start with the emergence of incompatible goals of between two opposing sides. When the parties cannot find away in reaching mutually accepted solution to their issue, they conceive the idea that they can change the expectations of the other party by conflict. In this, they may try to coerce the other side into surrendering (Pruitt, Kim & Rubin, 2003).

Conflict exists wherever people reside, work or interact. Most issues can be easily solved, but only becomes calcified when the situation spiral of control. The term conflict escalation is aims to describe the trajectory of a conflict process. This is because, conflict situations originate from a mere dispute or differing of ideas, such as everyday issues of who handles house chores (Bosch, 2017). Conflict escalation is actually seen as a spiral event, in which the cause are reciprocally subjected, with self-increasing tools that automatically put down the out-group and lift up the in-group. The resultant violence against the other party ultimately gets fixed into a norm. Conflict dynamism represent vicious arena of insecurity, panicking, lack of communication, stereotypes, broken relationships, and an endless continuum of mutual struggle (Pruitt, Kim & Rubin, 2003).

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is seen as the methods and processes involved in reaching a peaceful ending of a conflict situation. It involves committed parties attempting to resolve their misunderstanding by actively engaging in communication with each other (Forsyth 2009). Conflict resolution is a social process where the conflicting parties enter into agreement to end hostilities with each other. They decided to live peacefully and cease to use arms against each other (Wallensteen, 2015). The "conflicting parties" in this definition are formally or informally organized groups engaged in national or international conflict. The incompatibility here refers to protracted disagreement between the conflicting parties, where their demands cannot be met by the same resources at the same (Wallensteen, 2015).

Mayer (2012) regard conflict resolution as a process by which people who are in disagreement, dispute or war reach agreement to resolving their differences. It involves approaches that depends on the kind of social and cultural context it occurs. Lundgren (2016) noted that many major international non-governmental organizations have seen a growing need to engage practitioners trained in conflict analysis and resolution, just as different scholars are equipped with different approaches in handling conflicts. This is further analyzed below:

Collaboration approach: Bayazit and Mannix (2003) stated that this involves an attempt to work with the other part involved in the conflict to find a win-win solution to the problem in hand, or at least to find a solution that most satisfies the concerns of both parties. The win-win approach sees conflict resolution as an opportunity to come to a mutually beneficial result; and it includes identifying the underlying concerns of the opponents and finding an alternative which meets each party's concerns (Bayazit and Mannix, 2003).

Compromising Approach: According to Baldoni (2012), this is a situation where conflict parties find a mutually acceptable solution which partially satisfies both parties. This can occur as both parties converse with one another and seek to understand the other's point of view. Baldoni (2012) also noted that compromising may be an optimal solution when the goals

are moderately important and not worth the use of more assertive or more involving approaches. It may be useful when reaching temporary settlement on complex issues and as a first step when the involved parties without level of trust amongst them.

Withdrawal Approach: This approach consists of not attempting be involved in the conflict, by postpone it or simply withdrawing. It is also known as “Avoiding”. This approach is however suitable when the issue perceived to not worth the effort or when more important issues are pressing on the parties, and they do not have the time for it (Bayazit and Mannix, 2003).

Accommodating Approach: According to Morrison (2008), accommodating approach to conflict resolution involves accepting or recognizing the concerns of others, rather than one's own concerns. This kind of strategy is also be applied when the issue of the conflict is much more important for the counterparts whereas for the other is not particularly relevant.

Competitive Approach: Forsyth (2009) stated that this approach involves fighting or forcing the opponent through assertiveness and minimizing empathy or concern for others. Competition in conflict resolution is a "win or lose" approach. Actors tend to force others to accept their personal views by employing competitive power tactics (arguments, insults, accusations or even violence) that foster intimidation (Forsyth, 2009).

From the foregoing, conflict resolution is seen to be an expanding field of professional practice around the world. The escalating costs of conflict have increased use of third parties who may serve as conflict specialists to resolve conflicts. In fact, relief and development organizations have added peace-building specialists to their teams.

Theoretical Framework

Complexity Theory

This study adopts the complexity theory as its theoretical basis. The major proponent of the theory is Kauffman (1992) who attempted to explain the rationalized behaviour of large and complex systems that operates at the edge of chaos. Other scholars like Burnes (2005) states that the complexity theory proposes the idea of systems are in unpredictable mode, as they are

also constrained by order-generating rules. It uses complex systems to emphasize interactions and the accompanying feedback loops that constantly change systems (Eisenhardt and McKelvey, 2011). Complexity theory has been used in the fields of strategic management and organizational studies. Its application areas also include understanding of how groups adapt to their environments, and how they cope with conditions of uncertainty. According to Grobman (2005), groups have complex structures in that they consist of dynamic individuals with networks of interactions, and their relationships are not aggregations of the individual static entities. They are adaptive because, the individual and collective behavior mutate and self-organize corresponding to a change-initiating collection of events.

Using the complexity theory as the basis for this study, it seeks to understand the nature of system constraints and agent interactions in conflict management. It helps to explain the uncertainty faced in a conflict situation, thereby presenting the situational dilemma for conflict resolution practitioners on which steps to take in other not to escalate a conflict situation. Also, in the part of the disputants, it presents an environment where miscalculated steps by the parties could trigger escalatory actions and continue the progression in the stages of conflict escalation. Hence, complexity theory is used to better understand new ways of carrying out conflict management, as it has been difficult for traditional models in observing and explaining the collective behavior that promotes conflict escalation as a result of the complex dynamic networks of interactions.

Fredreich Glasl Nine Stages of Conflict Escalation

Conflict escalation according to Glasl (1999) is a model that helps to analyze a conflict, to understand its course and to work out the right solution depending on the level of escalation. The conflict stages according to Glasl (2009), are divided into nine (9) escalation stages. The first three (3) stages is described as stages with opportunities for "win-win" resolutions. In this stage it is decided whether a dispute can be ended amicably or whether the situation escalates. The third to sixth stage of the escalation stage model is about which party wins and who loses. This is described by Glasl as "win-lose". Without outside help (mediation), the already

escalated conflict can hardly be resolved. The last three (3) escalation stages is described as a "lose-lose" threshold from which no party emerges as the winner.

The Friedrich Glasl model of escalation is outline by Jordan (2000) as follows:

Stage One (1): Hardening of Position; **Stage Two (2):** Multiplicity of Issues; **Stage Three (3):** Committed to Actions, not Words; **Stage Four (4):** Formation of Images and Coalitions; **Stage Five (5):** Loss of Face; **Stage Six (6):** Outstanding Threats; **Stage Seven (7):** Limited Destructive Actions; **Stage Eight (8):** Total Destruction of the Enemy; **Stage Nine (9):** Mutual Descent into the Abyss; and **Stage One (1): Hardening of Position**

According to Jordan (2000) the first stage of Glasl conflict escalation model begins when there is incompatibility of goals between individuals or group. This is normally accompanied by frustration and the disagreement leads to calcification of issues and positions of parties. Although, there may be repeated efforts to amend the differences, but the party's interests and opinions crystallize into standpoints. These standpoints become mutually incompatible in the relationship of the conflict parties. The differences lead to development of behavioral patterns representing strained relationships. When no progress is made, the parties become increasingly aware of the mutual dis-agreement they cannot evade. Interactions are then perceived as a waste of time and communication between the parties is still based on basic status of communication whenever there is need to interact.

Strategies for De-escalation in Stage One (1): In this stage, strategies for de-escalation according to Frädrieh (2023), includes the encouragement of parties to engage in straight forward argumentation that focuses on the main issue. They are guided to part away from tactical and manipulative argumentative tricks, and to focus on constructive dialogue. This can include building of main points surrounding the issues and then mutually addressing them holistically with counterparts.

Stage Two (2): Multiplicity of Issues

In this stage, Jordan (2000), noted that the parties turn the manipulative and tactical argument into verbal confrontations. They seek more assertive ways in establishing their standpoints or

positions, and in order to get more stands, they switched in new parameters in the argument and become locked on inflexible standpoints. The Irish Traveler Movement (2019) stipulates that at this stage, the dispute no longer remains in one perspective as the parties start to feel that their general position is at stake. This means that they divert more attention to newer positions shadowing their main standpoints.

Strategies for De-escalation in Stage Two (2): Frädrich (2023) stated that to de-escalate the conflict at this level, parties are encouraged listen to each other point of view. They are guided to interrogate each point presented, and measured in relevance to the main issues presented. If found unconnected, parties are then encouraged to shelve them and stick to main standpoints of the issues. With this strategy, parties will keep communicating remain in dialogue. On the long run, after all exaggerative positions are whittled out, the main issues are left for proper considerations.

Stage Three (3): Committed to Actions, not Words

At this stage, the parties no longer want to continue talking with each other, as they do not believe that further talk will lead to achievement of goals. They resort using actions and activities in buttressing their points. The parties now see each other as competitors in a struggle, hence they try to dominate their counterpart. The most important goal at this stage is to block the counterpart from reaching their goal. Action and non-verbal communication dominate the course of events, and this tends to speed up the escalation process (Jordan, 2000).

Strategies for De-escalation in Stage Three (3): This stage offers a good chance for de-escalation, as parties are encouraged to channel strength and attention to alternate ventures for a while. This will allow for tension to go down as they take their mind or focus off the issue in a short while. Parties are encouraged to go for brief holidays, leave, or other trivial issues, different from the issue at hand are introduced for deliberations. Frädrich (2023). This will enable parties to conflict take of anger, negative feelings and strong antagonism before the can resume discussions.

Stage Four (4): Formation of Images and Coalitions

This stage entails parties in the conflict progressing from ordinary expression of actions to seeking victory or defeat of opponents. Originating positions and evolved positions are now consolidated towards full-blown antagonism against opponents. In this stage, an objective image is juxtaposed on counterparts. These images are hard to change in perception as they are highly fixed, and immune to change by new information. Such images play the role of reinforcing the party sense of orientation. The enemy images occupy the field of vision wherever the parties meet. These image perceptions prevent them from seeing the true complexity and individuality of each side. However, each side rejects the image ascribed to them by the other party, but tries to convince the other side to recognize the projected image of self (Jordan, 2000).

Strategies for De-escalation in Four (4): Frädrieh (2023) contends that in this stage, it is best to identify the allies of parties in order to sought help from them in convincing their ally towards de-escalation. The focus of the third party is no longer on resolving the issues or positions of the conflicting parties, but on fostering an environment for the creation of new images between parties. This includes bring parties back to situations found in stage two, where the central issues are focused on rather than the creation of new positions.

Stage Five (5): Loss of Face

Irish Traveler Movement (2019) Noted that Loss of face portends situations in which the conflict parties can no longer trust the other party. It is translated as that they have found the true, and very different nature of the other party. The whole conflict history is now seen as calculated attempt on annihilating the opponent right from the onset. The dialogues were only deceptive covers for the other party real intentions. There is no longer ambiguity, but everything appears clear, hence the disputes become more antagonistic (Jordan, 2000).

Strategies for De-escalation in Stage Five (5): In order to prove a sincere constructive de-escalation in this stage, Frädrieh (2023) stated that one party might be asked to make a public apology or clarification of presumed offensive statements against opponents. However, the

parties often worry that such concessions would be seen as weakness or culpability, Incidents leading to loss of face are usually followed by dedicated attempts by the parties to amend their public reputation of integrity and social credibility. Such efforts may be leveraged on by third parties to encourage parties to re-establish their image for acceptability.

Stage Six (6): Outstanding Threats

According to Jordan (2000), parties in this stage look for ways to show the other party or parties that they are very committed to their chosen course. In this, they make astounding threats that they feel may sway their counterparts to yield to their demands. Although parties may have been made threats of actions in earlier stages, but the threat in this is of damaging actions. Parties will try to show that they will not retreat and the conflict becomes increasingly complex, difficult to grasp, and impossible to control. By their actions, the parties introduce time pressure on each other's actions, and thereby curtail their possibilities to weigh the consequences of alternative courses of action in a turbulent and chaotic environment.

Strategies for De-escalation in Stage Six (6): Frädrieh (2023) pointed out that to be able to prevent parties from activating aggressive actions, is the focus strategy in this stage. This can be done by the use of alternative dispute resolution measures such as third-party mediation and negotiation in preventing the actors from accessing destructive machineries. Also, third parties can identify sources of support of volatility to parties and dialogue for restrictions, or delay in response. This will help buy time for the continuation of efforts to entrench alternative measures for de-escalation of the conflict. For wider societal conflict, this is where peace keeping can prove effective to monitor situations.

Stage Seven (7): Limited Destructive Actions

At this stage, parties tend to put the actual cause of the conflict in the background and focus on defeating their opponents. They do this by carrying out some limited destructive acts that gets the conflict out of control. The main thing here is to inflict as much damage as possible on the opponent. In social settings, this escalation level is rarely reached, but in political tussle, violence get escalated more quickly. Now parties expect their counterpart to be of destructive

tendencies, thus, securing own mission is achievable by eliminating or by targeted attacks against their counterparts. The counterpart is now an enemy that must be eliminated at all cost. Attacks lead to counter attacks, and even more destructive. In this situation, successful attacks may create the feelings of being powerful, thus giving room for further escalation.

Strategies for De-escalation in Stage Seven (7): Frädrich (2023) avers that this stage needs highly professional third parties support to de-escalate the conflict and keep it from going further. Also, in the wider societal context, peace-building strategies such as peace-keeping and peace enforcement can be implemented to checkmate the violence and destructive tendencies of the parties. Peace-making can further help to de-escalate the situation.

Stage Eight (8): Total Destruction of the Enemy

At this stage the attacks move from limited acts of annihilation of counterparts, to intensified destructive actions. Every aspect that gives the counterpart some power and leverages are targeted for destruction. The system that keeps the counterpart coherent is attacked, hoping that the very foundation of the opposition is crushed. When a party is attacked in a way that threatens to shatter it, it is forced to make strong efforts stay afloat. This leads to an even stronger pressure to undertake further attacks on the other side, and the main task is to destroy the existence and basis of the enemy at all cost (Jordan, 2000).

Strategies for De-escalation in Stage Eight (8): according to Frädrich (2023), a good conflict management strategy is required to de-escalate the situation. This may be done in consecutive manner to prevent the conflict from going further. In the wider societal context, peace-building strategies such as peace-keeping and peace enforcement are also needed to separate the parties and seek other peace-building strategies for de-escalation.

Stage Nine (9): Mutual Descent into the Abyss

This is the last stage of conflict escalation where the move to destroy the enemy is the sole goal of parties in conflict. Jordan (2000) noted that is a stage where even if the cost of destroying the enemy is at the price of destruction of own existence do not matter anymore. It

is now a total war of extermination. The only goal and concern to go together into the abyss and ensure that the enemy is defeated.

Strategies for De-escalation in Stage Nine (9): this stage requires a well-planned third party intervention to constructively bring parties to the negotiation table again. In the context of wider societal conflict, peace enforcement strategy is needed to forcefully separate the parties, and instill peace-building activities that will lead to reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. It also requires the intervention of professional conflict resolution practitioners who does have the capacity to militarily force parties to dialogue and ceasefire (Frädrich, 2023).

Conclusion

This study analyzed the stages of conflict escalation, identifying the various opportunities for de-escalation present in each of the stages. The research found that conflict situations do not suddenly turn into crisis situations but escalates through stages. Each stage has inherent openings for attempts in resolving the conflict, and the resolution could be initiated either by the parties themselves, or through a third party. The findings also shows that misapplication of de-escalation approach in a particular stage will lead to further escalation of the conflict situation. The Fredreich Glasl's escalation model is a very useful diagnostic tool for a conflict facilitator. The model provides a situational stress factors faced in conflict situations. Rather than seeking to identify the types and causes of conflict, the Glasl's conflict escalation model specifies the internal dynamics sustaining conflict relationships. It attempts to unveil the impediments obstructing the development of mutual resolutions agreements, and exposing the contradictory interests and standpoints.

Recommendations

Based on the findings made in this study, the following recommendations appears necessary:

- i. The Fredreich Glasl's nine stages of conflict escalation, should be adapted by the United Nations (UN) as the standard tool accessing the stages of conflict and planning for conflict intervention programs;

- ii. Since it was found that conflict escalates in series of stages, the Nigerian government should use the conflict escalation model in analyzing various conflicts in the country, and ensure that the required resolution methods are applied in resolving them; and
- vii. research institutes and scholars should devote more time and resources in analyzing the Fredreich Glasl's nine stages of conflict escalation. This will help to expand its scope of propositions.

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VIGILANTE AND CRIME CONTROL IN EDO STATE NIGERIA (2015-2022)

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ABSTRACT

Residents of Edo State are very conscious of their environments so much that they have evolved voluntary security groups to supplement government role in securing life and property. The study examines the role of vigilante in crime reduction in Edo State with reference to Esan North East and Esan South East LGAs. Quantitative method was utilized and data obtained was analysed descriptively via frequency tables. Findings showed that vigilante formation has been effective in crime control/reduction in the study area as against previous records. Vigilantism is an aspect of community policing is an effective strategy in crime prevention where by the security agencies work in an accountable and proactive partnership with the community so that the community participates in its own policing. The study concludes that there is need to streamline the establishment of the vigilante groups by legalizing and regulating their activities for effective community policing because the Nigeria Police system has failed to live up to its expectations in curbing criminality. The study recommends amongst others that; to enhance the relationship between the police and vigilante groups, there should be adequate legislative framework for the operation of vigilante groups. Vigilante group members should be trained in aspects of crime detection and knowledge of the law.

Keywords: Vigilante, Policing, Social Security, Sustainability

Introduction

Insecurity means being vulnerable to danger or harm (Obi, 2017a). Providing enough security to make crime less of a problem is a social requirement for any society to stay together. Every society does what it needs to do to protect the lives and property of the people who live in it. Without enough security, business and social activities may not be able to go on as they should. Since the beginning of time, people have worked to keep their neighbourhoods safe so that they do not become victims of crime. The most important thing about the 20th century is that it was shaped by the effects of terrible global wars, colonial struggles, and ideological conflicts, as well as efforts to set up international systems that would promote peace and prosperity around the world. Yet, there a lot of insecurity and corruption. In fact, they have become the biggest problems for many developed and developing countries in the 21st century. In particular, new threats like organized crime, trafficking, civil unrest, and terrorism have added to the continued focus on traditional war between and within countries.

Vigilante is not a recent development. Before 1900, many vigilante groups were formed in frontier areas of the United States. In 1851 and 1856, concerned citizens in San Francisco organized vigilante committees the forcibly restored peace and order. In South Africa, vigilante activity is frequently justified, as ‘filling’ a policing gap’ due to police inefficiency, corruption and conspiracy with criminals, practical failing in the criminal justice system (Qadri, 2005). In Sierra Leone, vigilante activities have been explained in terms of police ineffectiveness in combating crimes (Bronwyn, 2001).

In Nigeria, vigilantism existed in the precolonial era. Human Rights Watch and Centre for Law Enforcement and Education Report, (2002: 23) noted that “vigilante and other self-defence groups currently operating in Nigeria have roots that reach deep into the country’s history”. In the colonial era, some local communities in the south east maintained their own standing army to defend their territory against the threat of invasion from neighbouring communities, (Uche and Obi, 2016) Although there was no equivalent modern-day structure

at that time, some parallels can be drawn between these groups which were created by local communities for their own protection, and the more recently formed self-defence groups.

The emergence of the vigilante groups, it is argued, indicates that the State security apparatus have failed to adequately protect the lives and properties of the Nigerian citizenry. Though, there has not been any time in the history of Nigeria that government was not faced with security challenges, the exit of the military and the institutionalization of a liberal democratic government witnessed dramatic increase in security problems and the proliferation of the vigilante groups could be regarded as an outcome of the situation. Pratten (2008) admits that during this time, the number of vigilante groups and militias rose steadily. This position is also shared by U.S.A National Institute of Justice (2007) when they observed that the creation of vigilante groups is in response to the security vacuum created as a result of lapses in the protection of life and property by government. The failure necessitates the provision of security from outside the formal security structures of the State.

People no longer feel safe to relate with their fellow men and women because it breeds a feeling of distrusts and skeptics among people, Ogbuke and Obi (2016). The multiplier implication of insecurity is that, it has resulted in the retarded growth and development of these communities and Edo state at large. Insecurity is an ill wind of social phenomenon which blows no one any good. Ubiaja, Ewato, Eohimi in Essan South East LGA, Uromi, Uzea close to Anthony Enahoro train station in Essan North-East LGA and between Benin and Ehor road of Edo State since 2015 to date has now been characterized and manifest in acrimony, incessant case of armed robbery, maiming, assassination, intimidation, kidnapping, homicide, rape, poverty and gang violence (including cultism) that are increasingly becoming wide spread and promoting a climate of fear, impunity and insecurity in the communities and as a result of banditry, kidnapping and farmers-herder crisis. For example, according to Vanguard news of April 29 2021 a 19 year-old boy was short dead when kidnappers raided Benin Ehor Road. Travelers were held hostage until ransom are paid for their release, this further buttress the point to delve into the phenomenon of insecurity in the study area. Given the fact that there

is the need to control this kind of negative activities in the society, coupled with the hydra-headed nature of the problem; there is the necessity to carry out detailed study of the problem, so that the issue can be appropriately articulated.

The central issue of this paper is to examine the role of the vigilante groups in the provision of security or otherwise in their communities of existence over time. In doing this, research examines the role of vigilante in crime reduction in Esan North, East and Esan South East LGAs of Edo State of the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria between 2015-2022. It also examines emerging arguments about their role in providing social security and concludes with several suggestions on how to streamline the vigilante groups as supplementary community policing organization in Nigeria.

Research hypotheses

1. The formation of vigilante groups in Esan Northeast and Esan Southeast L.G.A is significantly related to people's perception of the role of police in crime control in the area.
2. The police have not failed in their roles to residents of Esan North, East and Esan South East LGAs of Edo State.

Conceptual Review

Community Policing

Community policing is a collaborative activity of monitoring society with the aim of instilling law and order. According to the US Committee on Law and Justice (2007), community policing is a philosophy based on the notion that community interaction and support can help control crime and reduce fear, with members of the community helping to identify criminals/problems and bringing them to attention of the police. Community policing consists of three key components: collaborative partnership, organizational transformation and problem solving.

Collaborative partnership between the police and members of the community will lead to trust in the police and create avenues for identifying criminals/problems and providing solutions. Organizational transformation has to do with the alignment of the police

organizational management practices, structure, personnel and information system to support community partnerships and proactive problem solving.

Arising from the definition of community policing as a collaborative activity and the mixed roles of some of the vigilante groups in Nigeria in the present time, the inclination is that only the Vigilantee Group of Nigeria whose members work in collaboration with the police are actually engaged in community policing in Nigeria.

Vigilantism

The word vigilantism is of Spanish origin and means: “watchman” or “guard” but its Latin root is vigil, which means “awake” or “observe” (Johnston, 1996). According to Johnston, six elements of vigilante activity are:

- i. Minimal planning, preparation or premeditation.
- ii. Private agents acting in a voluntary capacity.
- iii. Activity undertaken without the states’ authority or support.
- iv. A reaction to the real or perceived transgression of institutionalized norms.
- v. Aims to offer people the assurance that established order will prevail.

However, the meaning of this concept, which has an old social history depended on the peculiarities of the situation where it existed. Between the 1830s and 1850s, vigilance committees were formed to help fugitive black slaves and ensure their obedience and of the abolitionists to the pro-slavery majority in America. In the 19th century, vigilante groups were set up in frontier towns and rural communities of United States to keep order and put down illegal activities by criminals. In such places, they supplemented the duties of legal authorities by holding formal trials before administering usually capital punishment. Generally, vigilante groups in the US operated in protecting the breakdown of law and order; however, in some cases their actions were dishonourable as they merely dispensed their own version of the law.

The initiative of citizens of respective societies the world over, towards maintaining order outside the formal way persists up to the present day, but it incorporates perspectives inconsistent with those of the 19th century such as, attacking political opponents of their

financiers and punishing real and perceived wrongdoings. Yet these actions of vigilante groups are commended especially by people who feel dissatisfied with government. The intricate situation in discussing vigilantism in Nigeria and elsewhere in the world is that vigilante groups try to justify their existence by accusing the law and its agents of being too slow in dispensing justice but reversely, the law accuses the vigilante groups of its violation (U.S.A National Institute of Justice (2007)

In more developed societies like America and Europe, vigilante groups are not so common and serious compared to what is obtainable in Nigeria because the formal institution of Police are effective. In most cases, Vigilantism is just about a handful of civilians around the cities in costumes who take to the streets to fight crime. These vigilantes include “superheroes,” militia-style organizations, and even religious protection groups. They are the latest iteration of a long-held western fascination with vigilante justice (Davis, Henderson, and Merrick, 2013). Also, Vigilantism materializes as a reaction to institutional racism or collaboration of the Police with criminal elements and the corruption in the Police department in padding of Police report. In communities which were under-policed, often because of racist and discriminatory reasons, private citizens would take it upon themselves to protect themselves because they knew the police would not.

In contrast, most Africa Vigilante members are usually recruited from local communities. Their members are likely to share the same ethnic or political identities, collective interests and threat perceptions. This raises the likelihood of them acting as local militias – potentially more powerful than state authorities – and pursuing narrow ethnic agendas. Although, they are often formed initially to protect their communities, have had some success when hired by weak African states to tackle insurgencies just like in Sierra Leone, Uganda’s Teso region, South Sudan’s former Western Equatorial State, and Nigeria’s north east.

Contemporary Nigerian vigilantism concerns a range of local and global dynamics or informal justice and crime control. In the Yoruba-speaking south-west crime fighting has been

led by the O'odua People's Congress (OPC) (Obi, 2017c); in the eastern states by the Bakassi Boys and across the north by Sharia implementation committees or Hisba. Beyond fighting crime, these groups represent divergent aspirations for Nigeria's future like the pro-secession movement in the south east such as IPOB.

However, there are also accusations of vigilante groups over-reaching their remit and being implicated in human rights abuses. See studies on OPC, Bakassi Boys, and the Civilian JTF in the north east Nigeria, for example, CRC reports that in May 2020, some men of the OSPAC vigilante group in Rivers State of Nigeria invaded Isiokpo in Ikwerre LGA and arrested innocent youths and Ogoja labourers who were returning from the farm. Those arrested were subjected to inhumane treatments, including physical torture and starvation. Furthermore, the vigilantes in some cases have assaulted people they ought to be protecting. For example, report by Faruk (2021) indicates that 200 (10.8%) of people arrested in North east by vigilante personnel has be assaulted sexually, physically beaten and intimidated not to speak. Notwithstanding, it may not be surprising that Vigilante Groups have been seen as better alternatives to formal policing structures like the police. Smith (2007) averred that public yearning for vigilantism could be considered as a response to wide spread negative perception that the police, the courts and other institutions of the state are too corrupt and ineffective to curtail the level of crime. In fact, the growth of vigilantism and the fact that various States of the federation are giving approval and solid support to the role of vigilante groups indicates that their operations are valued.

Therefore, it should be noted that the effectiveness of such groups, and the key to controlling them, depends on objectives and oversight. The clearer vigilantes' objectives and mandates are set in advance, and the greater the oversight by national and local leaders, and especially local communities, the more effective the group can be and the less likely it will veer away from community defence and crime control.

Research Methodology

The study was carried out in Esan South and Esan North-East L.G.A in Edo State, Nigeria. In carrying out this research, the multi stage sampling technique was more appropriate for the purpose of obtaining information for the generalization about the larger population. A multi-stage sampling procedure was carried out in phases. The study will follow three stages of random sampling. Stage one: involve the random sampling/selection of two Local Districts from the two Local government namely; Uromi (Esan Northeast) and Ubiaja (Esan Southeast LGAs) of Edo State. Stage two: involve the random selection of few settlements from each of the two-district making a total of four settlements. Stage three: involve the selection of 100 residents from each of the selected settlements making a total of 400 residents for the study. The study made use of descriptive statistics to analyse the data obtained from field survey. This includes frequency counts. Non-parametric statistics (Chi-square test) was used to analyse the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables. However, out of the 400 questionnaires administered, 365 was validly used for analysis.

Test of Hypothesis I

H₀: The formation of vigilante groups in Esan Northeast and Esan Southeast L.G.A is not significantly related to people's perception of the role of police in crime control in the area.

H_i: The formation of vigilante groups in Esan Northeast and Esan Southeast L.G.A is significantly related to people's perception of the role of police in crime control in the area

Significant level chosen: 0.5%

Test Statistics: Chai-square

Decision Rule: Reject H₀ if the Chi-Square value is greater than the critical value.

Chi-square test showing cross tabulation of the relationship between Police performance and Residents satisfaction.

Chi-square test showing cross tabulation of the relationship between Police performance and Residents satisfaction.

Count					
		Community Satisfaction			Total
		Very satisfied	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Police Performance					
	Very effective	0	1	2	3
	Effective	0	0	33	33
	Ineffective	0	45	137	182
	Very ineffective	0	0	147	147
Total		0	46	319	365

Chi-square (χ^2) analysis of the relationship between police performance and Community satisfaction

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	443.790 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	249.288	8	.000
N of Valid Cases	365		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19.

Result of Chi-Square test showing the Relationship between Police performance and Community satisfaction.

Chi square	443.7
Df	8
Assumption. Sig	0.000
Critical χ^2 value	15.1

Decision-Rule

Result of the Chi-Square value is greater than the critical value i.e. $443.7 > 15.1$. The researcher rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternative hypothesis. In other words, the formation of vigilante groups in Esan Northeast and Esan Southeast L.G.A is significantly related to people's perception of the role of police in crime control in the area. This is in agreement with the submission by Obi, Obi (2017);" The apparent failure of the Nigerian Police to control the

increasing wave of crime has led to unilateral public action against crime and criminals in some major cities in Nigeria”.

Hypotheses II

H₀: The police has not failed in their roles to residents of Esan North, East and Esan South East LGAs of Edo State.

H_i: The police have failed in their roles to residents of Esan North, East and Esan South East LGAs of Edo State.

Significant level chosen: 0.5%

Test Statistics: Chi-square

Decision Rule: Reject **H₀** if the Chi-Square value is greater than the critical value.

Chi-square test showing cross tabulation of the relationship between Police Role and Duty Proportion

Chi-square test showing cross tabulation of the relationship between Police Role and Duty Proportion

Count					
		Duty Proportion			Total
		Often	Very often	Not often	
Police Role					
	Maintain Peace, Save Lives and Property in the Community	42	3	92	137
	Crime Control and Settlement of dispute	8	4	57	69
	To Save Life and Property	32	8	51	91
	To investigate Crime related issues and make arrest	10	17	41	68
Total		92	32	241	365

Chi-square (χ^2) analysis of the relationship between police role and duty proportion

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	437.755 ^a	12	.000
Likelihood Ratio	223.271	12	.000
N of Valid Cases	365		

a. 4 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.48.

Result of Chi-Square test showing the Relationship between Police Role and Duty Proportion

Chi square	443.8
Df	12
Assumption. Sig	0.000
Critical X ² value	21.02

Decision-Rule:

Since the Chi-Square value is greater than the critical value i.e. $443.8.6 > 21.02$. The researcher rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternative hypothesis. In other words, the police have failed in their roles to residents in the study areas which led to choice of alternative means of security of life and property, hence vigilantism.

Key Findings

The study has vividly revealed that community policing as a strategy towards crime prevention has three essential elements namely: partnership, problem solving and organizational transformation. The results further show that the majority of vigilante officers regardless of their rank are familiar with the philosophy of community policing with its core elements. It can, therefore, be concluded that vigilante as an aspect of community policing is effective strategy in crime prevention where by the security agencies work in an accountable and proactive partnership with the community so that the community participates in its own policing and the two work together in mobilizing resources to promote long term community safety and support security initiatives, rather than the security agencies alone reacting on ad hoc and short term basis to incidents as they occur. The specific findings of this study is aligned with past experience which authenticated that for the police to be effective and

successful in crime prevention, there must be an active partnership between them (police) and the community members and structures.

The police need to mobilize the community to participate in safety and security issues. The issues that result to crisis in Nigeria, which these groups under discussion emerge to execute include among others; political, economic and religious interests, so there is need for representatives of the multi-ethnic groups to meet in a conference to discuss the future of the Nigeria Federal State. Such a conference will provide opportunity for the share of the divergent opinions of members. Perhaps, this explains why Douglas and Ola (2003) point that the solution to the problem of Nigeria in this regard can only emerge when government begins to accept the fact that Nigeria is a federation of diverse ethnic nationalities and act in recognition of that.

Once the problem is recognized, the militias that exist as opposition to the Federal System would naturally metamorphose into security purposeful vigilantes to work in partnership with the police. As this suggestion is being made, it is also realized that any time the issue of national conference is mentioned, the opinion expressed by some Nigerians is that the National Assembly is enough representation of the Nigerian peoples. However, it should be noted that these issues relate to ethnic grievances and cannot be effectively resolved on the floor of the National Assembly where contributions and decisions are subject to extreme party regimentation.

Conclusion

The existence of government is a product of social contract; to protect the citizenry from all forms of social abuses, and by means of the constitution government oversees the military and the paramilitary. Thus, government has the capacity to mainstream the vigilante groups by settling problems that give birth to the emergence of militia groups such as political, economic and religious interests. Equally, government should harmonize operations of the vigilante groups by establishing a national body that will register and regulate their operations. There is need for a national law to be enacted to unify the structure and functions of vigilante groups

throughout the country to ensure uniformity. Between the Nigerian communities, there is disagreement as to who is qualified to engage in community policing as a member vigilante group. For instance, in Southern Nigeria, the acceptable opinion is that community policing is the exclusive prerogative of the indigenes (Agenda, 2005). Though members of vigilante groups are volunteers, the issue of incentive has to be taken very seriously. The incentive should be in form of monetary reward, which will stimulate greater positive results.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made

- i. Vigilante activities should be carried out by well-trained, able-bodied persons recruited from the community. State government should encourage vigilante activities.
- ii. Incentives and adequate logistics should be made available to vigilante groups. This is to ensure effectiveness in their operation.
- iii. To enhance the relationship between the police and vigilante groups, there should be adequate legislative frame work for the operation of vigilante groups.
- iv. Vigilante group members should be trained in aspects of crime detection and knowledge of the law. This is to enable them to operate within the provision of the law.
- v. Security committees should be set up at the Local Government level and should also be headed by the Divisional Police Officer (D.P.O.). The committees should organize periodic meetings to discuss security issues.
- vi. Finally, further research be carried out on vigilante group, joint Police/Army Patrol and Law Enforcement in Nigeria.

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**AN ASSESSMENT OF HAMLAND TRADITIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS AND PEACEBUILDING, JABA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA,
KADUNA STATE**

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ABSTRACT

Historically, Hamland had a well-organised conflict management, resolution and transformation system emplaced before its bastardization by Europeans. Ku and Shetiri institutions who resolved disputes, and peacebuilding for peace among autochthonous Ham communities generationally, were replaced. The study aimed to assess the efficiency of western models in resolving traditional conflict, the causes of conflict in Hamland, the political structures and institutions for conflict management in precolonial times. Historiography and secondary analysis were adopted for the study. The study discovered that, Western models had not effectively resolved value-based conflict in Hamland. Therefore, its application, could not help in mitigating the consequences of incest. Foreign methods watered down traditional methods utilised to resolve infractions of traditional norms and values. More funding of research, teaching and practice of traditional peacebuilding to complement western system. Resuscitation of traditional conflict management to address causes of value-based conflicts. Cultural reawakening that promotes traditional political structures and institutions.

Keywords: Conflict Management, Resolution, And Transformation

Introduction

Tradition implied those practices peculiar to a group of people that had been passed down from the ancestors across generations. A process of handing down a practice to the heirs. In traditional Ham society, human interactions were guided by certain norms and values. When breached, certain sacrifices must be carried out by the traditional political rulers to appease the ancestors, to avert its destructive implications (Graburn, 2001). Ku (Masquerade), a traditional political institution, handled conflicts before European advent in Hamland, Jaba Local Government Area (LGA), Kaduna State. Arrival of European missionaries in Hamland around 1910, met traditional peacebuilding systems in place. Kpop Ku (King of the Masquerade), administered the autochthonous political system (B.-P. Kure, personal communication, December 30th, 2021).

Martin (2012) posited that, highly advanced and sophisticated African civilizations, cultures, societies, and states like ancient Egypt, Kush/Nubia, Axum, Ghana, Mali, and Asante evolved throughout the continent: Hamland inclusive. Traditional alternative dispute resolution (ADR) was not alien but integral part of Ham society (Bharti, 2021). Quick justice delivery devoid of litigation delays and huge costs, maintained peace and stability. Dennen (2005) stated that conflict on all levels of organic existence is pervasive, persistent, ubiquitous. Conflict is the universal experience of all life forms. Organisms are bound in multiple conflict-configurations, dynamics and logic; with its varying sources according to societies.

Hamland had a well-organised mediation, negotiation, and arbitration system emplaced, before its bastardization by European missionaries. Conflict transformation too was not alien, as the dictate of time determined the way cultural adherences were enforced. For instance, a case of two families considered one, whose marriage among them constituted an incestuous relationship among the couples could be transformed over time through a process known as har yari (I. Duchi, personal communication, November 29th, 2021). Absence of har yari, any marriage between them is considered violation of cultural rules guiding marriage, with accompanying consequences. European cultural intrusion subjugated the traditional

system. This led to societal dislocation whereby management of value-based conflict became challenging (Duchi, 2021).

Colonial adventure in Hamland disrupted traditional peacebuilding resulting from its perception as unchristian and barbaric. Missionaries entry supplanted Ham traditions and customs, resulting to a clash of practice. Huntington (1993) stated that culture is symbolic and counts, and its identity makes more meaning to people. Ku (Masquerade), Shetiri (Women Cult), and Yeer (Shrine) made significant meaning to Ham societies in terms peacebuilding. Euro-Christian proselytization presented autochthonous cultures as uncivilised which must give way to Christian traditions.

Christianization of autochthones replaced peacebuilding practices with Westernization. This created a disconnection with ancient practices that brought peace to Ham people, but today. Ku and Shetiri institutions adopt ancestral practices to settle extra-marital issues abhorred by society (Dauda, 2023). Conflict-generating factors are traditionally contextual to a given society. Galtung (1975) pointed out conflict complexity to mean two people scrambling for one thing which implies dispute. Lipton (2016) stated that no two people see things from the same angle. Impliedly, people see things differently based on their peculiarity, environment, and plethora of available information. European poor perception of traditional peacebuilding brought to clash between these civilizations.

Trado-peacebuilding perception as evil sets Christian converts and African traditional religious worshippers at conflict. The adversarial relationship originates from the clash of norms, values, customs, and traditions of the two. Ku and Shetiri subjugation undermine the indigenous dispute resolution. The court system recognized facts that work for the white people. The Ham system investigates the truth of an issue in contention. Gacaca court's success in Rwanda was premised on the nobility of admitting ones wrong and truth-telling. The traditional system does not establish facts, but the truth. Rwanda had put behind its genocidal history, thanks to this traditional but informal court sanction by statutes. The

international tribunal for Rwanda failed due to incompatibility between the tribunal's principles and the people's belief (Le Mon, 2007).

Conceptual Analysis

The following concepts Political Structures, Conflict, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Management, and Peacebuilding were analysed.

Political Structures

Hamland political structures began from the family with the oldest as the clan head. Kpop Ku wielding political and religious powers heads the community. Goldstein (1991) conceptualised political structures from the principles of order either by hierarchy or by anarchy, the specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and the distribution of capabilities across those units. Political structures such as Zhu (family), Haar (clan), and Khyep (community) in Hamland, were responsible for dispute settlement.

Conflict

Conflict implied the clash of interests between and among individuals in society. Western and Ham societies had different norms, values, mores, and customs that clashed. Hamland conflict-generating factors were cultural and contextual to the environment. Coser (1956) defined social conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals. The application of these two cherished value system in the maintenance of harmonious relationship among people in interaction within the society resulted to value-based conflict that could easily gravitate to violence (McEnery, 1985; (Dennen, 1990).

Conflict Management

Conflict management entails controlling destructive consequences of conflict, bringing disputants to the table to appreciate and to forestall future re-emergence. De Wit (2018) defined conflict management as the process of dealing with incompatibilities arising from diverging opinions, objectives, and needs. Effective conflict management techniques limit or

prevent the negative effects of conflict without necessarily solving the conflict. Managing diversity among the people, enhances peacebuilding and prevent violence in Hamland.

Conflict Resolution

It seeks to eliminate the reasons for the emergence of dispute among parties in adversarial relationships, for a constructive harmonious living. Harvard Law School (2022) perceived conflict resolution theory to include the use of mediator's assistance. Zhu heads were mediators, who resolved family conflicts. Irreconcilable disputes from Zhu (Family) were referred to the clan head. When the situation escalates, the case is referred to Kpop Ku in Yeer (shrine). Yeer functions as a traditional court and place for ordeals, fain, and oath-taking.

Khaaku (Oath taking)

Oath taking, mostly conducted at the shrine, seeks to ascertain the truth of the matter under dispute. Kpop Ku and community elders perform the ritual act of Khaaku. Nana (2020) cited Nwankwo (2017) asserted that oath-taking is a statement or assertion made under penalty of divine retribution for intentional falsity. If the gravity of an offence committed is high and defies possible human solution, the accused is presented before the divinized spiritual forces for exoneration or punishment. Khaaku is centred on truth, while falsehood is abhorred due to the consequence of sanctions by the ancestors (Dauda, 2023). Western oath-taking using religious books by politicians seems to have no effect individual's oath-takers. They swore to uphold the constitution, but in reality do the opposite (Odumakin, 2009).

Fain (Fine)

Community members who infringed on societal customs and traditions, gets punished to deter others. Fain entails punishment undertaken as cleansing rites in the shrine. This requires the presentation of acceptable traditional and cultural items. Goats, Kam (local beer), chicken, and other items are used to purge violators of guilt. This frees them from any consequence that could trigger family nemesis. Sowe et al (2019) posited that punishment is always against the conduct of the offender, but his person. They added that fine, imprisonment, death penalty, or compensation, deprived the individual of his liberty, which serves its purpose.

Har Yari

This entails transformation of Hamland norms and values to align with the dictate of time. New norms, values, cultures and traditions are introduced, to repeal former rules. This occurs when a community is growing and the norms of the society had created restrictions that seemed to have affected the community's progress. For instance, a given clan by reasons of societal norms and values, could not intermarry. The families within a clan will be separated into different clans. Ritual sacrifices would be conducted to allow for intermarriages among new clans without negative consequences.

Literature Review

Western vs Hamland Conflict Management

Conflicts are more environmental than people could imagine. American society accepts looking straight into a person/policeman's eyes to imply innocence. Hamland abhors the chastisement of the elderly by the younger ones no matter the erstwhile level of irresponsibility. Dauda (2023) stated that Ham society forbids a younger person to call an elderly O' hai. That is just for age grade or an elderly person and not for the younger ones. Traditional Yoruba values abhor sitting to talk and looking straight into an elders' eyes. However, the latter is considered normal in American society. A clash of values exacerbates conflicts: its resolution is functional upon cultural imperatives. Administration of ordeal and litigation advanced peacebuilding from factual and truthful perspectives (Muoneke, September 28th, 2017).

Ajayi and Buhari (2014) posited that; pre-colonial times were replete with principles guiding conflict resolution in traditional African societies. Those who want their conflicts resolved must have confidence in the tribunal headed by elders, chiefs, priests, priestesses, secret cults, etc that would resolve the dispute. The tribunal for the resolution, management and transformation of the Hamland dispute was the shrine. The judge in this traditional judicial process was the Kpop Ku. The disputants for fear of retribution submit themselves to the

process of unravelling the truth. The process sought for truth in the traditional system. The Western system sought the presentation of facts, not truth.

Causes of Conflict in Pre-Colonial Hamland

Ajayi and Buhari (2014) cited Otite and Albert (2001) posited that, conflict is a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals. Disputes among Ham people revolved around societal values, norms, and customs. Claims over resources in the form of properties like inherited land sharing majorly caused a lot of conflicts. Another cause for conflict then was seen in the aspect of the desecration of religious sites.

Cultural issues

Culturally, Hamland forbade consummation of marriage relationships between the same family. Blood relationship was considered sacred and a taboo for conjugal relations among members. Marriages among brothers and sisters, cousins, nephews and nieces from paternal and maternal homes, were considered incompatible with societal values. Also, the society forbade inheriting the late younger brother's wife by the elder but the reverse. The last child of a family irrespective of age is an uncle to his/her elder one's children. Non-adherence constitutes non-conformity to societal rules.

Desecration of Sacred Places

Hamland respected shrines, forests, and other sacred places. These were forbidden from unauthorised entry or cultivation. Till today, Ghikyaar community has places called Tser Ku (Masquerade forest) and Dzwak Ku (Masquerade river), where people are restricted from illegal trespass. Infringement of this is seen as an affront to Fu Ghikyaar (People of Kurmin Jatau) values. Oral history had it that, defaulters suffered various forms of ailment, which deter violation, and sustained the ecological beauty. Desecration of shrines ignites masquerade cries, but public visibility. This drew the attention of Kpop Ku and his council to find out what happened. The defaulters would be fished out, and punishment meted to them (Duchi, 2021).

Political Organization of Ham Societies

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940) stated that studying political systems required having to deal with the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organised exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use of physical force. Kpop Ku, wields legitimate power drawing from his subjects. Societal rules enforcement by Kpop Ku had no resistance due to the enjoyment of legitimacy by the autochthones. He performs his duties with the assistance of Kpop Ggiyengy, Kpop Kunghees, Kpop Ku Jang drawn from all clans.

At the foundational level of every Ham community, there is Zhu which means family. The aggregation of various Zhu (families) constitutes what is known as Haar (Clan). Ham societies were organised into communities of distinct villages called Khyep, which is the culmination of Haar. Each clan is represented at the village assembly by their clan head. Each Haar was in possession of a seat at the village shrine where decisions with respect to dispute resolutions are made (Dauda, 2023).

Political Structures

Before the advent of Europeans in the twentieth century, Hamland particularly and African societies in general, had their structures for managing conflict. Martin (2012) posited that African political systems and institutions were traditionally based on kinship and lineage, with common ancestry, sanctioned by myth. Utin (2018) stated that, before European Conquest, Africa had developed a well-organised system and institutions of governance, which enhanced stability and cohesion. Oral history pointed out that, Hamland institutions such as Clan heads governed the family unit of the society, while Kpop Ku heads the community level.

Zhu (Family)

The fundamental structure of Ham pre-colonial society comprises individual houses organised into a lineage system. The elderly who presides over the affairs of Zhu settle disputes within. However, when it goes beyond his ability, the clan head intervenes. Mondal (n.d) defined family as an intimate domestic group consisting of people related through blood, sexual mating

or legal ties. Zhu, the basic social unit of Hamland, is the most important primary unit in society. The centrality of Zhu to conflict resolution is that Zhu is the first point of call. Failure for dispute settlement at this level would be transferred to Haar (I.-T. Bawa, personal communication, May 22nd, 2023).

Clan Head (Shekpoo Haar)

Pre-colonial Hamland respected the institutions of elders with the most senior elder as clan head, who represented each family at the community level. Martin (2012) stated that lineage was a powerful and effective force for unity and stability in ancient Africa. Hamland operated the communal unity principle, gbyab khi ki su tset da (unity is our strength). They unite to fight hunger by working for the weaker members of the families; through Shaa, Zhees, and Gbyee. Shaa was organised farming among friends and like minds, Zhees within families, while Gbyee was at the clan level. This farming system resolved the probable resort to stealing that could have aggravated conflict (Bawa, 2023).

Kpop Ku

This was the community head who was later replaced with Kpop Kpaar (Hausa Chief) during the indirect rule system. Kpop Ku wielding political and spiritual powers enforced ancestral cultural norms and traditions for the community alongside council of elders and other sub-masquerades (Bawa, 2023). African Chiefs and Elders constituted the true representation of the peoples politically, the custodian of cultures and traditions of the people; the enforcers of norms, values and mores for constructive human interactions devoid of infractions of societal rules as passed down generationally (Danso, 2020).

Ancestrally, Kpop Ku embodies legislative, executive, judicial and religious powers as community head. Sub-masquerades who assisted the Kpop Ku were, Kpop Ggiyengy, Kpop Kunghees, Kpop Ku Jang (Martin, 2012). Kpop Ku lieutenants were drawn from among various Clans. These structures were in place before its subjugation under Kpyop Kpaar (Hausa traditional chieftaincy) political system by Europeans. Ham society perceived Kpop Kpaar as alien system, imposed on the people through the indirect rule system (Bawa, 2023)

Kpop Ku, while discharging judicial functions in Yeer, adopts spiritual powers in conducting arbitration for the people in line with ancestral practices. In cases of land disputes, disputants are brought before Kpop Ku in Yeer, to swear an oath to unravel the truth of the issue in conflict. After all deliberations, Kpop Ku would speak to the spirits of the ancestors for possible restitution. Breach of cultural values like incest, incur fain, which would be paid for ritual cleansing. This would appease ancestor's spirits and deter future offenders (Bawa, 2023)

Traditional Conflict Management

Ajayi & Buhari (2014) stated that, truth is a covenant logo that disputants must not miss. Facts based Westernised court system, had supplanted truth in contemporary Africa. Truth-telling was central to peacebuilding precolonial Hamland. Conflict management stood on the foundation of truth. Rwandan Gacaca commission in the aftermath of their inglorious genocide, testify to this. Perpetrators confessed the truth while the victims forgave them for admitting it in public. This transformed their genocidal past, burying its worst memories. Conflict management was key in Hamland's attainment of peaceful and tranquil order. Mediation was adopted for land disputes, whereby all disputants presented before Kpop Ku in Yeer by their clan heads. Resolving this conflict goes beyond Zhu and Haar and Khyeb. Adversarial parties would be made to take an oath to attest to their truth. Before oath-taking, disputants will be made to understand that, the culprit would be made to understand that, culprits will be convicted by Ku (Ku di ghi ngu) (Nana, 2020).

Ham societies forbade deaths by unnatural causes. In the event of any such, the Khwis (Defender of the land) would assert that "Anyone responsible for this death should reconsider his or her action now or else, whatever happened to him/her, they should cry and look unto themselves". The evils perpetrator, based on Khwis assertion is expected to reversal of the evil, or stands cursed. The curse could be instant death or family generational nemesis, the befalling of evil upon the family from generation to generation. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940) posited that, in the Kamba, Kikuyu, and other tribes, there are various kinds of rituals or supernatural sanctions. Most direct of these, is the unquestioned belief that, certain actions

bring misfortune upon the person who is guilty of them. The consequences of death deterred the offender from committing the offence.

Traditional Conflict Transformation

Dynamics of time requires adaptation to it dictates. Forbidden rules that became repugnant to natural justice undergo review. Hamland abhorred incestuous relationships, but adjust customs and norms for population growth through har yari. Without this, the repercussion for obduracy is sporadic deaths among innocent family members. When this happen, culprits are led into Yeer by the head of Zhu for ritual purification, to appease the gods. The consequences of recalcitrance had been intermittent deaths among culprit relations, indicative of supernatural sanctions (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Akinwale, 2010).

Dauda (2023) stated that one single family migrated from Njwon (Gyani) to meet Haar Dodo in present-day Ghikyaar. Population increase led to the transformation of various houses into families to form clans for intermarriages. This resulted to the emergence of Haar Yok, Haar Yuwari, Haar Dwashi, Haar Boshiengy. However, a ritual purification had to be done. This transformation har yari established the consummation of the marriage between these hyaar (two or more haar). They include har yari. Haar Yuwari/Dwashi and Haar Boshiengy/Yok were considered one and could not marry between them. Consummation of marriage was only between Boshiengy/Yok getting married with Yuwari/Dwashi. As time went by, the four houses were allowed to marry from among themselves, the second har yari.

Conclusion

The study thus concludes that the western models of conflict resolution cannot address cultural conflicts in Hamland. It was the causes of conflict in traditional Ham society were the breach of customs and traditions for which Western models are unsuitable in an application. Thus The political structures and institutions such as Ku, Shetiri, Zhu, Haar, that manage conflict, had been supplanted by the court systems.

Recommendations

Based on the foregoing, the study suggested:

- i. More funding of research, teaching and practice of traditional conflict management, resolution, and transformation to complement the Western system.
- i. Resuscitation of traditional conflict management to address causes of value-based conflicts; and
- iii. Cultural reawakening that promotes traditional political structures and institutions in conflict resolution, management, and transformation

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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ITS INTEGRATION IN NIGERIA AND THE CHALLENGES OF LITIGATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION

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ABSTRACT

Litigation made social in-roads in the society with promising ability to provide objective and reliable system of justice that will not only equitably resolve disputes but enforce decisions through state machinery. This attracts to it huge prominence that subdued prior non-judicial strategies explored by pre-colonial societies in amicable resolution of disputes in Nigeria. Finding show that the judiciary becomes plagued with numerous challenges that made the wheel of justice to move very slow, causing inordinate delay, congestion of court cases and high cost of obtaining justice. This generated frustration and dissatisfaction with litigation. Eventually, alternative dispute resolution relegated by litigation has become transformed, and brought back to address the challenges demonizing the effective and efficient functioning of court. Despite the proven efficacy attributed to ADR, not much has been done by the Federal Government to promote massive patronage of this strategy. In sum, high number of cases pending in courts that would be speedily resolved through the ADR process. It is the recommendation of the study that awareness on alternative dispute resolution be intensified, an imperative formulation of a harmonized national policy on ADR be made, National Assembly should enact laws to backup ADR operation in Nigeria.

Keywords: Litigation, Dispute Settlement, Alternative Dispute Resolution

Introduction

Litigation and amicable settlement of disputes are the popular mechanisms mostly used in the society to resolve dispute. Dispute is an inevitable social occurrence informed by human interaction. Disputes can arise in all shades and context anytime humans pour themselves into one another (Aina, 2012). It is a recurrent event that is tantamount to sacrificing human

existence, if due attention is not given to its regulation and resolution. In some societies, when rules are broken and the breach is not the subject matter of feud, social order is often maintained by series of sanctions such as ostracism, ridicule, avoidance and denial of favours (Akeredolu, 2013). Formally, litigation has assumed superiority over other means of dispute resolution as authorized by various state laws to suit their purpose. Accordingly, Abegunde (2020) asserts that it is in Nigeria a demand of constitution, as it is in other democracies where the constitution clothed the judiciary with the power of finality of decisions.

Before the Roscoe Pound's Conference of 1906 which its commensuration led to the conceptual birth of ADR, Abraham Lincoln in 1850s as quote in the New York Times (1991) states that, "discourage litigation, persuade your neighbours to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser in fees, expenses and waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There will be business enough. The advice was to young lawyers to embrace honesty in litigation process to improve on its efficiency to curb delay that is a principal factor of creating other challenges for the judicial system. According to Lakai (2017) delay is a major challenge in justice delivery. In the Nigeria context where litigation operates as the major and sole formal dispute resolution mechanism, numerous challenges have plagued the system and are known to be the direct cause of delay in the administration of justice.

However, with the continuing intensity and long-standing frustration and dissatisfaction with the litigation system, the Lagos State judiciary established the first court connected alternative dispute resolution centre in Africa, on Thursday June 11, 2002 (Afolabi, 2020, Etomi, 2014, Rhodes-vivour, 2017; Efevwerhan, 2013). In the view of Leign and Anoba (2017), the concept ADR as a means of resolving disputes has been in practice long before litigation which is now the conventional means of resolving disputes in Nigeria. (Chukwurah, 2008 cited in Akeredolu, (2015) observed that ADR remains the modern version of an ancient practice. It is a transformation in the traditional style of conflict resolution and not alien to Africans; the only difference is the improved and modernised mode of its implementation.

Growth of ADR Mechanisms becomes imperative because of vast economic inequalities present in the country (Okeke, 2019); Nigeria's Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1988 is not only outdated but unsuitable and relevant for a developing country as Nigeria (Bamgbose, 2016). These are studies conducted in respect of ADR but none emphasized huge pendency of cases despite the integration of ADR which is the interest of this study.

Conceptual Clarification

Litigation

Litigation is a judicial process of carrying on a law suit (Olaosebikan, 2023). It involves recourse to a structured court system, which allows for adversarial discourse and analysis of the dispute followed by a judgment which traditionally takes the form of a win-lose situation (Nwakasi and Lamidi, 2019). Litigation is the dominant method of dispute resolution that utilizes state legal machinery as functional instrument to regulate its entire process. Unlike ADR processes that are based on parties' cooperation to commence and conclusively resolve a dispute, litigation involves compulsory jurisdiction and forceful enforcement of its decision when there is noncompliance from the unfavourable parties after delivery of final judgment. The litigation court which serves as the forum for dispute resolution is under the judicial arm of Government. According to Abegunde (2020) the function of the judiciary is tripartite. Settling disputes between people in their private affairs, between people and authorities and between the various arms and level of government.

The inability of litigation to live up to its constitutional responsibility has resulted to frustration and dissatisfaction. This has paved the way for the conceptual birth of ADR that is waxing strong in popularity. The growing popularity of ADR world-wide attest to the wide acceptance that litigation is no longer the exclusive process of decision making in our civil Justice System (Monye, Obiagbaoso and Obidegwu, 2020; Yahaya, 2021). However, in Nigeria, huge number of cases are still pending in court and much numbers are being filed. The inability of the Federal Government to harmonize an ADR policy have contributed to the less interest of parties to submit disputes to ADR. Several associations are constantly emerging

under the umbrella of ADR but without a common name across the Federation like the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA), with its branches across the country.

Dispute Resolution

The University of Lincoln (2022) defines dispute resolution as the process of resolving disagreements or conflict between different parties. Imm (2023) asserts that in general, the term dispute resolution refers to all official settlements of conflict-up to and including going to court. Furthermore, he submits that in practice, most people use the term to mean alternative dispute resolution. Dispute resolution is an essential pathway which disputes must undertake to arrive at settlement. Without dispute resolution, the mechanisms for resolving disputes will be impotent and of no value.

In consequent, the society will be exposed to unimaginable level of unrest. It is important that varieties of dispute resolution procedures are available to parties so that disputes are resolved in a just, timely and cost effective (ITU – MCMC International Training Program, 2015). This is because a single resolution procedure be it litigation or ADR, once any of them takes the responsibility to resolve all kinds of disputes the consequence will not only be expensiveness, chronic delay, congestion of the system with cases but lack of expected level of fairness in its decisions will be evident. At this stage, the gateway to access justice will be narrowed and becomes the preserve of the fittest.

Alternative Dispute Resolution

ADR is a dispute resolution mechanism that possesses verifiable capabilities to relieve courts from the congested and huge volume of newly filed cases that continue to worsen the situation of delay and extremely high rise in cost of litigation. Agarwal and Khandelwal (2023) refer to ADR as a variety of streamline resolution techniques formulated to resolve disputes in controversy in a more organised manner when the normal litigation fails. Alternative dispute resolution is described as a spectrum of informal procedures for resolving disputes ranging from negotiation, to non-binding third party intervention (such as mediation) to binding third party intervention (such as arbitration) outside the formal circuit of the courtroom

(Ajetunmobi, 2017). All the arrays of dispute resolution strategies explored apart from court litigation are what constitute ADR processes.

ADR is not a new concept but its use in adjudication in the modern times has increased predominantly (Amadi, 2019). Scholars are unanimous on this fact that ADR was used lavishly in pre-colonial period to maintain peace and social harmony. In *Okpuruwu vs. Okpokam* (1985) 4NWLR (Pt.90) 554 at 586-587, Oguntade, JCA as he then was held that “In the pre-colonial time and before the advent of the regular courts our people certainly had a simple and inexpensive way of adjudicating over disputes between them. They referred them to elders or a body set up for that purpose. The right to choose an arbitrator to adjudicate with binding effect is not beyond our native community. The new version of the ADR concept is a response from Professor Frank E.A. Sander to the popular dissatisfaction and frustration expressed with the inefficiency in the justice system. Most particularly the dissatisfaction and frustration were heightened in the United States of America.

The Lagos State Judiciary established the Lagos Multi-Door Courthouse (LMDC) as the first court-connected ADR Centre in Africa (Animashaun and Olagunju, 2015; Aina, 2012). According to Onyema and Odibo (2017), fourteen Nigeria States and Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) have replicated the Model Showcasing the efficacy of dispute resolution mechanisms that resonate with local culture and practice. Some Federal Courts such as National Industrial Court, Federal High Court etc have adopted the concept but very huge numbers of cases are still pending in courts. In UK, about 95% of cases which enter the Civil Justice Court System are settled before trial and the number of cases processed by adjudicative decisions are dwindling (Ajetunmobi, 2017).

Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

Animashaun and Olagunju (2015) categorised ADR processes into basic ADR processes which are; Negotiation, Conciliation, Mediation and arbitration; and hybrid processes such as Med-arb. However, Ayinla and Ahmad (2013) categorised ADR on their part as primary ADR processes (negotiation, mediation/conciliation and arbitration) secondary processes (private

judging and mini-trial) and hybrid processes (expert determination, Med-arb, Ombudsman and summary Jury trial). They further assert that an enquiry with the commonly used ADR processes in Nigeria reveals the primary of ADR processes. This study will based its conceptual clarification on the primary ADR processes said to be mostly used in Nigeria.

Negotiation

Negotiation is the most common and first process of ADR, disputants knowingly or unknowingly engaged in it whenever there is dispute. It is the basic form of ADR which have at its core simple talk about a problem with an attempt to reach a resolution (Ayinla and Ahmed, 2013). Professor Frank E. A. Sander quoted in Aina (2012) defines negotiation as 'communication for the purpose of persuasion'. Parties in negotiation are usually involved in a communication to creatively and jointly search for solutions that can provide both sides with possible satisfactory options to reach an agreement concerning the substance of their dispute. Therefore, unlike in Arbitration and Mediation, the parties in negotiation are in full control of both the process and the outcome either in person or by proxy (Yahaya, 2021). However, Aina (2012) asserts that direct negotiation between parties is the heart of all participatory alternatives.

Mediation

Whenever parties fail to negotiate or to reach a successful outcome during negotiation that invariably has created an opportunity for a third-party intervention to assist them focus more attention on their interests or needs than emphasising on their rights. That is, the fundamental role of the mediator is to assist the parties to resolve their dispute but without the authority to impose a decision on the disputants. The golden rule of the process is for the parties to be allowed to reach an amicable resolution based on their mutual consent, after being well facilitated in understanding the dispute and their interests. Bulkachuwa (2015) describes mediation as a non-binding dispute resolution mechanism involving a neutral and impartial third party who tries to keep the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution.

It is an informal process in which disputing parties discuss their situation with the goal of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement or gaining new perceptions about a situation, with the help of a neutral third party who serves as an intermediary to assist the disputing parties to reach their own agreement or resolution (Anyanwu, 2017). Mediation and conciliation are used interchangeably but they are different. A mediator will not formulate a solution for the parties to adopt unlike a conciliator. Negotiators and arbitrators are usually experts in the field of dispute and may likely lost neutrality to favour a certain party. However, a mediator whose concern is to guide the parties, maintains neutrality throughout the resolution process and mediators may not necessarily be experts in mediating field the dispute emanated from. Famous personality figures in government or retired, such as former presidents Olusegun Obasanjo, Goodluck Jonathan etc are mediators.

Conciliation

Conciliation is one of the two known processes recognized by the Arbitration and conciliation Act. The Act did not defined conciliation. However, section 37 of the Act stipulates that “Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Act, the parties to any agreement may seek amicable settlement of any dispute in relation to the agreement by conciliation under the provision of this part of this Act. The conciliation process involves a neutral and disinterested third party meeting with the parties both separately and together and exploring how the dispute can be resolved.

It involves an appointed conciliator who does not interfere directly in the dispute, rather he does it indirectly by exploring the available possible avenues for settlement thereby allowing the parties do the settlement themselves (Kabir, 2011 cited in Nwazi, 2017; Yahaya, 2021). Unlike the mediator who is so concerned in establishing communication than seeking solution to a dispute, the conciliator has a socially imposed obligation to formulate a result yielding solution which its adoption is guided by voluntary acceptance of the parties.

Arbitration

Block (2017) defines arbitration as the submission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for a final and binding decision on a dispute. Arbitration is the reference of a dispute between not less than two parties for determination after hearing both sides in a judicial manner by persons other than a court of competent jurisdiction (Halsbury's Laws of England cited in Leigh and Anoba, 2017). Arbitration is a binding procedure where the dispute is submitted for adjudication by an arbitral tribunal consisting of a sole or an odd number of arbitrators, which gives its decision in the form of an award that finally settled the dispute and is binding on the parties (Chandra, 2006).

It is a dispute resolution process which is based on parties' agreement to submit before an arbitrator or arbitral panel, the area of dispute to render an award that is binding on the parties. Unlike other ADR processes such as mediation and conciliation, an arbitrator or arbitral panel in an arbitration process has the authority to make a binding and final award drawing strength from the parties agreement to submit to the process. Section 2 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act states that unless a contrary intention is expressed therein, an arbitration agreement shall be irrevocable except by the agreement of parties or by the leave of court or judge. This implies that once parties on their own volition agree to submit and seek settlement by arbitration process, it becomes obligatorily for none of the parties to willingly withdrawn or jettison such undertaking but rather be bound by the outcome of the process, except where contrary intention is expressed collectively by the parties or the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal did exceed their scope in arriving at the final award or as may be ordered otherwise by court. Arbitration is becoming the most preferred means of settlement of disputes (Olatoregun, 2019).

Multi-Door Courthouse

ADR could be conducted in private and in a court-connected form. The private ADR could be best known as non-court connected which involves the settlement of dispute by parties and enforcing the decision of their resolution without resort to court in any form. However, this

attracts high possibility of making a calculative refusal of enforcement. On the other hand, there is a court-connected format which incorporates ADR processes and court litigation to compensate for the single and narrow door court system.

Chukwuemerie (2012) views it as conceived in 1976 as a Courthouse that, figuratively speaking, has not just one 'door' that leads to a Courtroom for adversarial litigation but also has other 'doors' that lead to other 'rooms' where other dispute resolution mechanisms i.e arbitration and the ADRs may be explored. Instead of just one 'door' leading to the courtroom, such a comprehensive justice centre would have many doors through which individuals might pass to get the most appropriate process (Sander, 2006). Trained Neutrals in specific areas are duly assigned to resolve disputes in a particular field in the MDCH processes under the supervision of the court, unlike private ADR settlement, and the decisions are entered as judgment of court with the force of enforcement.

Effectiveness of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Addressing Challenges of Litigation

ADR mechanism has been structured to screen and match disputes appropriately to resolution processes for settlement. It equally discourages the mismatch of experts to field of disputes. Parties are at liberty to choose experts to resolve their disputes but it must not be sacrificed on the altar of arbitrariness without recourse to matching disputes to the correct resolution procedure and expert in the area of the dispute.

Unlike litigation where parties to a dispute are made to pay filing fees, professional fee to perfect brief, appearance fee etc, ADR is not for charity and neither is it only for the poor, but its cost is very minimal and affordable. In litigation, the filing fees payable by parties have been increased in all the courts in Nigeria and this is a form of obstacle on the way of administration of justice as the timid and poor now suffer in silence because of increased of filing fees and cost of litigation (Nwakoby and Anyogu, 2004). For instance, a litigant claiming above N1, 000,000.00 in Federal High Court is to pay N 50,000.00 for such claim and other sundry filling fees.

In ADR, parties can represent themselves or delegate other representatives apart from lawyers who are being mobilized heavily to take up a case. There are several cases in court that are still pending simply because the money to perfect the lawyers brief has not been raised. The mere mentioning to the court by a lawyer that his/her brief has not been perfected is enough reason to take an adjournment in the matter to a further date pending the perfection of the brief, if the lawyer is not ready to prosecute the case on pro bono (for free). The parties in an ADR process are always in control and the deciding factor to commence the process and the achievement of consensus in resolving the dispute in issue. In arbitration where the arbitrator or arbitral panel has authority on issuing a binding award, yet the arbiter or arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction to so act is based on parties' agreement. These benefits that will reduce and subsequently eradicate the challenges of litigation to create an efficient functioning justice system are not exhaustive.

Conclusion

This study discussed some disturbing fundamental challenges of litigation in Nigeria, even though with the integration of ADR a decade ago. ADR has been adjudged by its influence in other climes such as US, Britain, Canada among others to be efficacious in reducing and subsequently subduing the daunting challenges of the court. However, that is yet to be visibly practicable in Nigeria, based on certain factors. The government has not positioned herself as a stumbling block to the integration of ADR and equally has not made pronounced legal step that will attract huge patronage for the novel concept like the court system.

Recommendations

- i. An imperative formulation of ADR policy for the country is highly desirable so that it can stimulate its rapid expansion to cover the states that are yet to integrate the concept and the judicial divisions of integrated jurisdictions.
- ii. The judiciary should impress on the Federal Government to expedite action on this. They are putting on the shoes and know where it pinches most.

- iii. National Assembly should initiate amendment of existing laws to accommodate ADR or enact a Federal law for regulation of ADR in Nigeria. Law is the foundation of all social elements be they humans or institutions because their tomorrow is not socially secure without it.
- iv. There should be intensification of awareness mostly for lawyers who are in the best position to easily convince their clients to submit disputes to ADR processes

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UPSURGE IN NIGER DELTA OIL THEFT UNDER THE BUHARI ADMINISTRATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NIGERIAN'S ECONOMY

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ABSTRACT

This study is anchored on the need to find a lasting solution to the continuous rise in incidents of oil theft in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This study thereafter examines the approach of the Buhari administration in resolving the Niger Delta crisis, thereby curbing the incidents of oil theft in the troubled region as a way of saving the economy and fast-tracking development in the country. In view of the dominance of the oil sector in the economy of the country, it is pertinent that urgent and concrete measures be taken to stem the tide of the menace and eventually put a stop to it. The study finds that though there has been a sustained discourse on the issue over the years, the continuous rise in the menace makes it imperative for further interrogation of the matter. Significantly, since the coming to power of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, the menace of oil theft has taken on an astronomical increase. This no doubt brought about profound negative effects on the economy. It was concluded that the reasons for the continuous rise of oil theft, particularly under the Buhari administration, and how the menace has seriously undermined the national economy. In conclusion, the subject of crude oil theft is cogent and critical since being on the continuous rise even in the Buhari's administration. Its importance is one that borders on the very survival of the national economy of the nation, it is understandable that a lot must have been suggested and written on how best to arrest the ugly trend of the scourge. Recommendations also include that the international community should commence oil finger printing to curtail stolen crude from the demand side. There should also be socio-economic development of the Niger Delta be fast-tracked as one sure way to curtail criminality in the oil sector. Finally, and equally important, crude oil theft is a crime against the State and must be treated as such.

Keywords: Oil Theft, Niger Delta, Buhari's Administration, Economy, Nigeria.

Introduction

Industry experts generally agree that oil theft poses a critical threat to Nigeria's economy and by extension the stability of the country. Nigeria is currently battling to stabilise its ailing

currency, curb surging inflation and boost growth after the economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. It is against this background that the rampant theft of crude must be curbed to save the national economy. Odalonu (2015) *posits that* the phenomenon of oil theft is unarguably a spin-off of the instability in the Petroleum industry. The industry itself came to be as a result of the availability of the precious hydrocarbon resource called Petroleum, which has been a critical feature of the Nigerian economy since it was discovered in the country in commercial quantity in 1956.

According to Usim et al. (2015), Petroleum has a long history of being in use since ancient times, and is now an indispensable factor of societal development. The rise in importance was mostly due to the invention of the internal combustion engine, the rise in commercial aviation and the increasing use of plastic. Data from the international oil cartel – Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) – has it that total world production of oil in 2021 averaged 77,043,680 barrels per day. Approximately 71% of this is from the top ten oil producing countries, and an overlapping 37% came from the thirteen current members of the cartel. In recent time, the top three producers have been the United States, Russia and Saudi Arabia (OPEC, 2022). Oil theft has been a recurring phenomenon hampering the Nigerian petroleum industry. Azaiki (2006) describes it as the criminal aspect of oil exploration and production. While oil bunkering is the industry term for the lifting of oil officially permitted by the authority, illegal oil bunkering is doing the same without any official authorization, which makes it an illegal and criminal activity. Buttressing the above point, *Odalonu (2015) submits thus:*

In terms of an orthodox definition and in the context of Nigeria, ‘oil theft’ is constituted as the illegal appropriation of refined oil or crude oil from the various multinational oil companies that are positioned in the country through the process of illegal oil bunkering. This includes the theft, diversion, and smuggling of petroleum products (*Odalonu, 2015: 32*). Enumerating the menace further, Azaiki (2006) avers that oil theft became most pronounced in Nigeria in the thick of the Niger Delta crisis and it was rampant across the region,

particularly in places like Port Harcourt, Warri, Bonny, Akassa, Okrika and Soku, all of which are major loading points for the international oil market. While asserting that illegal oil bunkering is probably the most significant accelerator of conflicts in the Niger Delta, Azaiki (2006) further submits that the proliferation of small and light weapons is closely tied to illegal oil bunkering activities in the region. To this end, illegal weapons and illegal bunkering thrive on each other: illegal oil bunkering makes cash available for the purchase of sophisticated weapons, while access to firearms facilitates brazen illegal oil bunkering activities. In short, small and light arms proliferation and illegal oil bunkering activities are mutually reinforcing.

The Niger Delta Area

The Niger Delta region hosts the bulk of Nigeria's hydrocarbon resources. Sources from the history of the Niger Delta describe the region as the largest wetland in Africa, and the third in the world following after the Amazon basin in Latin America. The region covers an area of 70,000 square kilometers and consists of 5,000 communities divided into 50 ethnic groups and speaking 250 dialects. According to Omotoso (2019: 47), the Niger Delta region cuts across the six states of the south-south geo-political zone of the country, viz – Delta, Rivers, Edo, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom and Cross River. Three other neighbouring states – Abia and Imo in the south-east geopolitical zone, and Ondo, in the south-west, are also oil-producing states. Nevertheless, in the Nigerian parlance, the appellation, Niger Delta, refers principally to the states of the south-south geo-political zone as the six states in the zone also share one distinctive feature, aside of oil that differentiates them from the other three neighbouring oil producing states – they are constituted by minorities.

The region is made up of several ecological zones, which include sandy coastal ridge barrier, brackish or saline mangroves, freshwater, permanent and seasonal swamp forests and lowland rain forests. The whole area is traversed and criss-crossed by a large number of rivers, streams, rivulets, creeks and twenty estuaries, namely Forcados, Escravos, Benue and Ramos in the Western flank and Dodo, Pennington Digotoru, Middleton, Koluama, Fishtown, Sangana, Nun, Brass, St. Nicholas, San Babara, San Bartholomew, New Kalabari, Andoni and

Opobo. Azaiki (2006) further describes the Niger Delta as an intricate and delicate landscape of wetlands and dry lands. Of its 70,000 square kilometres, 20,000 are seasonally flooded zones, tidal and swamp areas. The cartographic Niger Delta covers the area supplied with water from the Rivers Niger and Benue as they flow together after Lokoja (the confluence) to empty themselves into the sea. These rivers, (now joined) break up at Abutor into Rivers Nun and Forcados. The landmass and water body traversed by these rivers is the core Niger Delta, which, excluding the continental shelf, is approximately 29,100 square kilometres representing about 3.8% of Nigeria's total land mass.

The ethnic diversity of the Niger Delta region makes it very rich in culture and traditions. This diversity is anchored on the presence of about 5,000 communities divided into 50 ethnic groups and speaking 250 languages and dialects. The numerous ethnic groups include Ijaws, Ogonis, Ikwerres, Etches, Ekpeyes, Ogbas, Engennes, Obolos, Isoko, Nembes, Okrikans, Kalabaris, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Igbos, Ika-Igbos, Ndoni, Oron, Ibeno, and Yorubas, Ibibios, Annangs and Efiks. Other groups include Ibibios, Anang, Efiks, Bekwarras, Binis, etc. Stakeholders in the Nigeria project generally agree that the Niger Delta has a peculiarly difficult terrain that requires serious developmental attention. Simbine (2006) submits that in spite of the enormous wealth, in oil and gas resources, derived from the Niger Delta, the region remains largely under-developed and neglected. Oil exploration generates a lot of wealth, but it also creates ecological degradation, environmental and health hazard as well as inhumane exploitation and political subjugation. All these problems manifested themselves in the Niger Delta. Thus, by the mid-1980s, when the bubble finally burst and the oil boom began to turn to doom, the Niger Delta became the worst affected region.

By the end of the 1990s, according to Omotoso (2019: 135), a number of strong-willed youth leaders have emerged on the scene to take the struggle on a more violent path. Most of these young leaders believed in the revolution of Adaka Boro, which was cut short in its infancy. They also believed in the goals of Ken Saro Wiwa. So, for them the primary objective was not just to continue from where Boro and Saro Wiwa were stopped, but to intensify the

struggle and carry it to such a height as to challenge the very authority of the Federal Republic of Nigeria over the land and people of the Niger Delta region. Omotoso (2019: 135) explains further that given the nature of the new phase of the struggle, most of the leaders that emerged were men with violent background. The struggle, it was affirmed, was not for the chicken-hearted. As such, to survive and triumph those involved must combine the peoples' interests, which they all claimed they were fighting for, with elements of violence and ruthlessness economic exploitation. Two of the young leaders that emerged under this climate were Tom Ateke and Asari Dokubo.

Corroborating the above, Ikporukpo (2007) submits that with funds from various sources, which included patronage from the elite, proceeds of illegal oil bunkering activities and armed raids on banks, many youths in the region were able to acquire sophisticated weapons. Then they organised themselves into more fearsome groups for a more coordinated 'liberation war' against the state and the multinational oil companies. Though there were then many armed groups in the Niger Delta, the biggest and the most ferocious was the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). As noted by Azaiki (2006), the group's military insurgency drew upon ethnic minority Ijaw identity, and a deep sense of grievance, and was buoyed by support from various sources and the "righteousness of the cause".

Omotoso (2019: 140) states further that with the increasing militancy of the Niger Delta youths, the Nigerian government equally raised the level of its military operation in the region. Though the Federal Government still claimed that it was not at war with the Niger Delta region, Adedeji (2009) avers that everything was then being done to militarily counter the militants. For this purpose, a special inter-service force was organized tagged "Joint Task Force" (JTF) and involving Army, Naval and Air Force personnel. They were armed with some of the best weapons in the Nigerian military arsenal and their brief, under what was called "Operation Restore Hope", was to protect the oil facilities, neutralize the militants and make the Niger Delta safe and secure.

Adebayo et al. (2009) note that the subsequent “oil war” was really tough and raged for several weeks. A lot of collateral damages were incurred both on the part of the militants, the oil companies and the Nigerian military. Justifying the military action, President Umaru Yar’Adua claimed that Government has a responsibility to protect national oil assets in the Niger Delta, which were under the attack of the militants (Chiedozie and Adedeji 2009). By the time the amnesty window closed on October 4, over 30,000 youths had renounced violence and signed on to the amnesty deal. Thousands of arms had been surrendered, and the ‘big boys’: Tompolo, Ateke Tom, Boyloaf, Farah Dagogo and others had all pledged to work for the peaceful resolution of the crisis (Adebayo et al. 2009; Odiogwu 2009).

Upsurge of Crude Oil Theft in the Niger Delta During the Buhari’s Government

Scholars generally agreed that oil theft in the Niger Delta of Nigeria has become a major strategic economic problem bordering on the very survival of the nation. Though already confronted with waging wars against terrorism and other violent crimes across the country, Omotoso (2019: 378) laments that Nigeria has in recent years been forced to launch another war, this time around against economic sabotage, which is symbolised by the menace of oil theft. Ibrahim (2022) also bemoans thus: “Oil theft and pipeline vandalism have taken a turn for the worse in recent years, with oil thieves running rings around government officials. International vessels enter Nigerian waters and in connivance with state oil firms and security officials reportedly steal large volumes of crude.”

Stemming from the above, analysts have attributed the decline in production to insecurity, hostile regulatory environment and poor fiscal policies. In the light of this, local producers and the international oil companies have been experiencing setbacks in their output with even some of them abandoning their oil fields in the Niger Delta. Incidentally, oil theft is not a recent phenomenon in Nigeria. Usman (2013) alludes that data from some authoritative sources reveal that the country lost oil estimated at \$10.9 billion or about 136 million barrels to crude oil thieves in the first quarter of 2013. Also 10 billion barrels of oil valued at \$894

million have been lost to pipeline vandalism in the downstream sector. This represents the loss of 7.7 per cent of total revenue that accrued to the country within the period to crude oil thieves.

In explaining the intricate interwoven business of oil theft in the Niger Delta region Oghenerhaboxe (2014) postulates that the racket is nothing short of an organised crime involving oil workers, oil companies, officials of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), highly placed Nigerians, foreign businessmen, and serving and retired military personnel. The oil theft racket is no doubt a big business, sometime running into billions of dollars. This much was ascertained by Naanen and Tolani (2013) who claim that “the illegal bunkering economy has an annual value of \$9 billion with about 50,000 people receiving incomes directly or indirectly from the business. There is no doubt that those who export 80 per cent of the stolen crude oil are not poor people. They are connected to the political and military establishments, as well as the oil bureaucracy.” A critical look at the oil theft racket also reveals the thriving industry known as artisanal refinery, which is largely run by community people. In fact, Wilson (2014) *opines that* the general population that surrounds the variety of oil pipelines throughout Nigeria often facilitates the local creation and sale of illegally refined oil products as means of alleviating their impoverished condition. This effort has given rise to artisanal refining.

Authoring a report on the menace, which was anchored by the United Kingdom-based policy think-tank, Chatham House, *Katsouris and Sayne (2013) assert that* Nigeria lost at least 100,000 barrels of oil per day (b/d), about five per cent of her total output in the first quarter of 2013. Industry analysts readily agreed with her position given that the links between oil thieves, pirates and global criminal networks - including arms and drug traffickers - could feed broader insecurity in West Africa. The problem, however, is how to track it in the vast international market. To do this, it is posited that the country must first device a means to identify its crude to make it trackable. Then whoever buys it, Nigeria can make a case against that person or the country. Upon taking office, the Buhari administration embarked on some measures to curb illegal bunkering and oil theft. However, the efforts seem to have yielded no

concrete results. In fact, industry experts are of the view that concerted international action to check the Nigerian crude oil theft is not feasible, because the stolen crude oil represents a minor fraction of international crude oil traffic and thus does not present any credible threat to the world's economy and international security.

It was against the background of the imminent total collapse of the country's oil industry that President Muhammadu Buhari gave orders to the military to launch a full-scale counter-attack on the militants. Levinus (2016) posits that the president took a stand that the unity of the country is not negotiable and it thus becomes imperative for him to give the counter-attack order so as to halt the national wastage taking place in the area, especially pipeline vandalism, kidnapping of people for ransom and wanton theft of crude oil. By the end of June, the Nigerian military had been able to subdue the NDA militants and in July President Buhari declared that he would now shift his attention to the issue of oil theft in the Niger Delta.

Laba (2016) quoted Buhari as saying: "The amount of crude being stolen, the sabotage and the vandalism of our pipelines have cost the country a lot. If people know the cost of the crude we lose through the activities of theft and vandals, they would be amazed. So, we are going to sanitize that sector and ensure that we plug all the leakages. We are trying to get the technocrats in the private sector to help us so that we can also help ourselves." Interestingly, six years down the line, the menace of oil theft remains a thorn in the flesh of the Buhari administration. In fact, instead of being curbed, there has been a worrisome rise in the incidents of oil theft with its far-reaching implications for the national economy.

Implications for the Nigerian Economy

Having been over dependent on oil, the Nigerian economy went into recession with the oil glut and burst in market price during the 1980s and 1990s. By then the largely subsistence agricultural sector was unable to match the demand of the ever-increasing population. The industrial sector, which largely depends on the importation of foreign raw materials and spare parts, was hit by scarce foreign exchange as the country's export earnings from oil dwindled.

All of these resulted in mass unemployment, food scarcity and the non-availability of basic essential commodities.

As the oil business across the world becomes more sophisticated, the need arose for Nigeria to reposition its own industry for it to be in tandem with international standards. This is important for the country to derive maximum benefits from the hydrocarbon resources. To this end, the country embarked on a process of reforming its oil & gas industry. The first pragmatic move to re-configure the Nigerian petroleum industry actually took place with the 1991 Indigenisation Policy of the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. That policy opened up the industry for the participation of local business people. Even at that, fundamental reforms remained a challenge. The process was eventually kick-started in Year 2000 by the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo. As pointed out by Omotoso (2019: 353), Obasanjo could not complete the process before he exited power in 2007. It was thus his successor, President Umaru Yar'Adua, that first codified the reform agenda into what became known as the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB).

Okungbowa (2022) submits that Nigeria loses about 600,000 barrels of crude oil per day to oil thieves. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) however admits losses of 470,000 barrels per day. While this discrepancy exists, what is, however certain is that much of our crude oil is stolen on a daily basis. Quoting NNPC estimates, Okungbowa (2022) explains that about 700million dollar worth of crude oil is lost to oil theft monthly. Between January and July 2022, Nigeria lost 10 billion dollars to this crime, which is equivalent to 4.3trillion Naira (at N430 official exchange rate to the dollar) which is more than fifty percent of Nigeria's Foreign Reserves. The figure is also more than double Nigeria's total revenue between January and April 2022. It is on record that during this period, Nigeria's total revenue was unable to service its debt and the country had to borrow for everything, including payment of salaries. As expected, this development has occasioned severe damage to the economy and its devastating effects include reduced exports, and the shutdown of production by some companies, factors which have virtually crippled the country's fiscal stability

According a Premium Times Editorial, the Minister of Finance and National Planning, Zainab Ahmed, in September, 2022, painted a more disturbing picture for 2023, when she revealed a projected N11.30 trillion deficit budget, if the downward trend in revenue continued. She made this revelation while defending the 2023-2025 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and Fiscal Strategy document at the National Assembly. The scale of the criminal activities in our oil sector is so devastating that the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) called for the declaration of a state of emergency in the sector. Emphasising the grim situation, Douglas (2022) quotes the Speaker of Nigeria's House of Representatives, Femi Gbajabiamila, lamenting that "Nigerians no longer want to hear about crude oil theft. The question has now become what are we doing about it? Therefore, we are urging a swift and systemic overhaul of the systems in place to protect the country's oil and gas resources." Also highlighting the extent of the losses, Wumi Iledare, a Petroleum Economist, submits that the menace of crude oil has grown in proportion impacting the availability of foreign exchange (**Douglas** 2022).

The extent of the theft was confirmed recently by Mele Kyri, the Group Chief Executive Officer of Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL), with the discovery of pipeline illegally connected to one of Nigeria's major oil export terminals. The illegal pipeline, which technically exports around 250,000 barrels of oil per day, stretches for kilometres and it has been operating undetected for nine years. Many industry watchers indeed regard the massive theft of crude as an attack on the sovereignty and continued survival of the Nigerian state. The menace has resulted in several cases of environmental pollution, pipeline vandalism, production shortfall and drop in electricity supply among others. It therefore goes without saying that if the menace is not curbed in good time, the nation may be facing a serious economic implosion.

President Buhari himself agreed to the poor performance of his administration in this area when he said, as quoted by Onuah (2022): "We will not allow a few criminals to have unfettered access to the nation's oil supply." To this end, the President instructed security

agencies to speedily clamp down on those involved in oil theft in the Niger Delta, adding that Nigeria was also strengthening cooperation with its neighbours to stop criminals syphoning away stolen crude by sea.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the subject of crude oil theft is cogent and critical since being on the continuous rise even in the Buhari's administration. Its importance is one that borders on the very survival of the national economy of the nation, it is understandable that a lot must have been suggested and written on how best to arrest the ugly trend of the scourge. Even at that, the continuous rise in the incidents of the menace calls for new strategies and tactics hence the need for a further interrogation of the way out of the jam. This section thus highlights a number of recommendations from experts and stakeholders.

Stemming from the above, the underlisted are recommended.

- i. There should therefore be increased collaboration between the international community and the federal government as a necessary way in combating oil theft and illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea.
- ii. The international community should commence oil finger printing to curtail stolen crude from the demand side. Participants also resolved that defeating oil theft and illegal bunkering would require enhanced intelligence gathering system with advance electronic and community input.
- iii. socio-economic development of the Niger Delta be fast-tracked as one sure way to curtail criminality in the oil sector.
- iv. crude oil theft is a crime against the State and must be treated as such. The Government must go after the perpetrators of this dastardly act and punish them as a deterrent to others. Economic sabotage is a severe crime against the State and is very reprehensible.

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THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICT ON EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN PLATEAU STATE: 2001-2021

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ABSTRACT

The importance of education in Plateau State and Nigeria in general cannot be overemphasized; however, the series of conflicts in Plateau State has become a multi-hydra headed monster which security agents appear incapable of handling. Due to these security challenges, numerous students at the primary and secondary schools and tertiary institutions have suffered wanton harm, fear, despair and death in areas around Jos North and South, Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Yelwan Shendam, Wase and Kanam. This paper examines the impact of insecurity on educational development in Plateau State since 2001. In doing this, the paper adopted a qualitative research design and descriptive survey. Primary and Secondary data were collected from informant through oral interviews, textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers and the internet. There are several security challenges that affect educational development in Plateau State, among which includes the Jos conflicts, Boko Haram bombings, political violence banditry and kidnapping. These dangers have caused the death of hundreds of students in Jos and its environs, withdrawal of students from the state, dropping out of school by pupils from primary and secondary schools, destruction of schools and students' property, and majorly the drastic reduction in the standard of education in the state at all levels. The paper, therefore, recommended among other things that Plateau people (both indigenes and settlers) should work towards a peaceful society by forgiving each other and accepting one another as brothers and sisters; religious tolerance is paramount for peaceful coexistence. Also, schools should teach peace and harmony to students before the age of tertiary education.

Keywords: Development, Education, Impact, Insecurity and Peace

Introduction

The growing conflicts experienced in the world today have affected the educational system in different dimensions. For instance, UNESCO (2010) noted that over the years, about 31 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America had suffered from one form of attack or the other on its educational system. Similarly, Buckland in Jacob (2005) reported that the genocide that took place in Rwanda resulted to the death of teachers and students thereby affecting education. Indeed, more than two-third of the teachers in the primary and secondary schools were killed or displaced.

The period between 2001 and 2021, Plateau State faced several violent conflicts that bedeviled its progress at different perspectives including educational development. The conflicts were caused by different factors; perhaps, religious and political reasons accompanied by fear of domination and perceived injustice in policy formulation and implementation. Prior to 2001 there was relative peace in the state except for the minor clashes over grazing areas between farmers and pastoralists, and land ownership tussles. But between 17th March and 7th September, 2001 dormant conflicts turn violent and became the lid for subsequent crises in Plateau State. Armed conflicts were experienced and many lives and properties were lost (Kaigama, 2012).

Nigeria is a signatory to various international agreements among which are the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Education for All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNICEF, 2012), now Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). To fulfill these international agreements, Nigeria has set up structures toward the achievement of the rights of the Nigerian children, especially as they relate to EFA and MDGs. The major thrust of Education sector reforms in Nigeria has been to widen access and improve the quality of education delivery in a manner that is equitable. Since 1999 when Universal Basic Education was launched, a good deal of attention and resources have been devoted to achieving EFA and MDGs educational goals ahead of the deadline of 2015 (UNICEF, 2012). This has proved unrealizable in post MDGs and is carried into SDGs.

Over the past twenty years have shown that there are high incidences of insecurity created by religious cum ethnic conflict in some local government areas in Plateau State such as Jos North and South, Riyom Barkin Ladi, Basssa, Bokkos, Wase, Langtang North, Shendam and Qua'an Pan majorly suffered from these conflicts. The prevalent situation tends to be reflected in the culture of violence, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts that have claimed so many lives. During the crises many schools were destroyed and some became refugee camps as many people were displaced from their homes. The study seeks to examine how security challenges impact on educational development in Plateau State in the past two decades.

The paper seeks to examine the impact of insecurity on educational development of Plateau State. The organizational structure of the paper is made up of the background, statement of the research problem, significance of the study, methodology adopted and an examination of the insecurity in Plateau State, which has affected educational development and most especially, the University of Jos, the study concluded with a peace education and recommendations.

Insecurity and Education in Plateau State

Forced displacement

The National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Nigeria outlined the causes of IDPs thus:

In Nigeria, most of the incidences of internal displacement occur because of violent conflicts with ethnic, religious and/or political undertones. Some incidences also occur because of clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers and between government forces and armed groups. (National Policy on IDPs, 2008: 10)

A surge in violent conflict in Plateau State since 2001 has led to historically high levels of forced displacement across the state. (National Policy on IDPs, 2008). Field interview with teachers in Jos revealed that when crisis occurs in Plateau State religion tends to stand as a social factor that divides Christians and Muslims; the Jos and other conflicts in Plateau State has displaced over 200, 000 people to different places and mostly to areas dominated by either Christians or Muslims, this has led to the emergence of segregated

settlements in the state. For instance, a teacher from Science Day Private Secondary School Bauchi Ring Road said, “because of the crises in Jos metropolis, the Christians and Muslims live in separated settlements, so we now have Muslim schools and Christian schools both in the public and private schools, this is because of the emergence of Christian and Muslim settlements in places like Dogon Dutse, Angwan Rogo, Rikkos, Angwan Rukuba, Rukuba road, Tudun Wada, and so many others,” (Oral Interview with Tishak Luka Goma, 2021). The implication of this is that school locations become distant to some students who were forced to move by conflict, (Oral Interview with Atah Gabriel, 2022). Gabriel maintained that the aftermath of every crisis in Jos North and South, Bassa, Riyom, and Barkin Ladi LGAs saw families displaced to new settlements whereby students/pupils find it difficult to go back to their former schools and most parents deliberately stopped their children from attending their former schools due to security reasons (Oral Interview with Atah Gabriel, 2022).

Economic Impact

Every violent conflict is accompanied by economic downturn on the belligerents. Education in conflict and post-conflict contexts does not merely remain the same or worsen for all groups, and that cycles of inequality may deepen, thereby creating the conditions for increased conflict risk, and potentially setting off a vicious cycle, (Omoeva, Hatch, and Moussa, 2015). The economic impact of conflicts in Plateau State on education reflects on financial capacity of parents/guardians to send their children/wards to school. For example, a teacher said, “In fact, most families are poor prior to the 2001 conflict in Jos, meanwhile post 2001 led to the loss of jobs and means of livelihood by parents and guardians, loss their ones and properties to the extent that they can hardly eat once a day” according to a social worker/activist (Oral Interview with Adamu, 2022). Another teacher said “most parents affected by conflicts became traumatized and had to rely on humanitarian aid and NGOs to survive, hence education became a minor problem for them” (Interview with Musa, 2022).

Hence, the aftermath of the conflicts in Plateau state comes with financial impact on families, this directly impact education, as parents could not afford school fee, books, transport

and other educational demands for their children to attend their regular schools, this resulted in school drop outs and transfers from standard private schools to public schools with low standards (Idegu, 2015). Another teacher reiterates that pupils normally drop out from primary school due to unfavourable environment, sickness and lack of seriousness from parents, but the conflict brought economic hardship on parents and guardians, which in turn affects educational development in Plateau State (Oral Interview with Manasseh, 2022). More so, primary and secondary school student's drop-out rate increases when crisis occurs; major reasons were fear of terror attack from 2013 to 2016 by Boko Haram cell in Jos metropolis, chaotic environment that could lead to killings and banditry in Wase LGA. The death of some parents/guardians also led to the withdrawal of pupils from school.

Impact of Conflict on Enrolment and Closure of Schools

Abama & Gyang (2018) confirmed that the impact of crises in Plateau State affects the UBE policy in various ways. They reveal that the major challenges of conflicts in primary schools in Northern Senatorial district of Plateau State are forced closure of school and dropout rate increase; that pupils normally drop out from primary school due to unfavourable environment and drop out could be due to parents/guardian withdrawal of pupils from school. However, major reasons were fear of terrorism, chaotic environment that could lead to killings. Educational administrators in Plateau State confirmed that enrolment pattern into schools after every violent conflict in Jos and other parts of the state is highly categorized base on religion and ethnicity. In Christian dominated areas, students/pupils' enrolment is basically dominated by Christians and Muslim areas are dominated by Muslim students/pupils and Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups (Oral Interview with Dalong, 2021).

As a result of this, public schools are over populated while others are not. For example, settlements in Barkin Ladi, Jos North and South today are segregated based on religion and ethnicity, which affects school enrolment. This has deprived students/pupils from socializing with and tolerating one another" (Oral Interview with Aliyu, 2022). Also, in the rural areas today the indigenes are separated from the Fulani settlers especially Riyom and Barkin Ladi.

According to Anas Aliyu, the simple reason is to avoid conflict”. In addition, the study confirmed that in Muslim dominated areas most of the teachers posted to teach were Christians and so going to work becomes difficult due to fear of attack, (Oral Interview, 2022).

These crises affected secondary and primary schools and the tertiary institutions in Plateau State in various ways. The study reveals that a major challenge during violent conflict was forced closure of schools, especially the University of Jos, Jos ECWA Theological Seminary, Plateau State Polytechnic, Theological Seminary of Northern Nigeria (TCNN), College of Education Gindiri, Federal College of Education Pankshin among several others have suffered threats from hoodlums and conflict merchants during crisis (Oral Interview with Makama, 2022).

Also, dropout rate increased for the primary and secondary schools, this is accompanied by poor teaching quality, inadequate instructional materials, destruction of school buildings, killings of personnel, primary and secondary schools turned to refugee camps during the 2001, 2004 and 2008 crisis (Oral Interview, Zahra Abdulsalam 2022), posting to schools base on religion, teacher turnover, transfers in and out of schools, and engagement of unqualified teachers to teach in some schools are some of the bad effects of conflict in Plateau state, these in turn dwindled the standard of education in the state. The findings are consistent with the works of Jacob (2015) who discovered that Jos crises resulted to long period of forced closure of schools, destruction of school buildings, movement of students from one school to another even at the middle of the term among others (Olajide, 2009).

Findings also revealed that crises can impact on pupils’ access to school in terms of physical access which reflects on geographical distance of schools and households, economic access which reflects on poverty and financial capacity of parents/guardians to send their children to school. Brenden (2010) revealed that conflicts normally impact on education through long-term disruption of attendance of teachers and students, lowering teacher quality, dwindling recruitment of staff, leading to teacher shortages and persistent distraction of

teachers and students by fear of trauma thereby reducing the quality of education provision and students' ability to learn. Brendon submission is link to the findings of this study, because when students/pupils socialize, they learn to cooperate with one another and learn from their different cultures. When children are denied opportunity to learn, play and interact together based on religious differences, the effects are bad and can only manifest in the future, they can cause more conflict in the society and hinder peaceful co-existence.

In a situation where children are denied access to school by violence, the implication is that dropout rate in schools will increase and quality education cannot be obtained by all school age children (Oral Interview with Bashir Mohammed, 2022). The child is exposed to ignorance and cannot face the global challenges. The promotion of basic education necessitates access to school by all school age children (UNESCO, 2010). The growing challenges inflicted by conflicts on students between 2001 and 2021 in Plateau State have caused challenges to the success of basic education in the primary level and secondary education; this in turn affects the tertiary institution enrollment and the quality of students. Children and adults found in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps and those squatting with relations could not attend school (Ibrahim, 2021).

The University of Jos Experience

Higher institutions and places of learning are often explicit targets during periods of crises in most parts of the world, including Nigeria. In line with this submission, UNESCO (2010) again reports that education has been attacked in at least 31 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America over the past years (UNESCO, 2010). The learners will not be totally focused on their studies as they will not have peace of mind. They will always be in fears in schools with the menace. Evidence shows that deviant behavioural traits are on the increase in the country generally, and in the higher education system specifically (Fyenis, 2010). For example, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the Nation's civilian president from 1979-1983 expressed concern over the growing incidence of criminality and corruption in Nigeria. He lamented that

the country was steadily yielding to the pressures of crime and its hidden perpetrator; (The Standard Newspapers, 2009).

For two decades, the University of Jos has faced several challenges because of the outbreak of violent conflict; examples of crisis/challenges of University of Jos are as follows: Like other universities in the world University of Jos has faced some crisis that militated against the achievement of its goals/objectives (Idegu, 2015). Shortage of accommodation in the University of Jos has made the institution to be affected during the 2001, 2005, 2008, 2014 bomb blast, 2015, 2021 crisis in the city of Jos. For example, 7th September, 2001, the first violent conflict that broke out was between Christians/Hausa-Fulani over a woman who had disagreement with Muslim worshippers observing Friday prayers along Congo Russia area in Jos with about 100 casualties, which some were students of University of Jos (Idegu, 2015). The students were found all over the streets; they became victims of circumstances as they were going to the school or returning back to their respective places of accommodation in the city Idegu, (2015). In January 2011, students of the University of Jos became victims of commercial motor riders (*okada*) who stabbed their passengers with knives and other sharp objects to death. Most of these victims were female students; the Student Union Government in a swift response organized an *aluta* protest/demonstration across the Naraguta campus and village hostel; this led to a lot of casualties as the military shot at the demonstrators with life ammunitions, many sustained gunshot injuries including the SUG officials.

In August 2021, at least eight (8) students of the University of Jos were killed and many missing following the escalation of attacks on commuters at Rukuba road in Jos, Plateau state (Dati, 2021). The governor of the state, Simon Bako Lalong on August 15, declared a 24-hour curfew in Jos North Local Government Area of the state following the massacre of about 22 travelers by hoodlums. The 24- hour curfew came on the heels of the earlier dusk-to-dawn curfew imposed on three local government areas in the state, Bassa, Jos South, and Jos North, due to the security threats and tension witnessed by residents in some parts of the state. (Dati, 2021) The University of Jos is situated at a danger zone where students are always

killed when crisis erupts. The university management had to suspend its examination due to the crises. According to the ASSU chairman “We have suffered untold damages in relation to loss of lives and property, in addition to the regular suspension of academic activities each time there is a security breach in Jos and as a union, we have tried to understand how the university community is always at the receiving end of each crisis in Jos” (Dati, 2021). The danger of violent conflict has indeed led to the death of innocent students, teachers/lecturers, destruction of property, school facilities, and trauma to parents and students alike. No society can develop above its educational standards, and without peace, development cannot take place; peace education is quite relevant and important in Plateau State, which the next section is on peace education.

Conclusion

The study examined the negative effects of conflict on educational development in Plateau State. The conflicts in Plateau State from 2001 to 2021 have endemically shattered the growth of educational standards in the state due to the conflicts in Jos North and South, Riyom, Bassa, Barkin Ladi, Wase, Yelwa Shendam, Namu and Kanam conflicts, the 2008 LGA election conflict, 2014 terminus and University of Jos bombings, the 2021 Rukuba road attack and counter attacks around the University of Jos among several others has caused security challenges to the educational development of the state, as numerous students at the primary and secondary schools and tertiary institutions suffered wanton harm, fear, despair and death in different parts of the state. The paper has assessed the effects of forced displacement on education, the impact of conflict on economy of parents and guardians, the impact of school closure and drop-out of pupils due to segregated settlements and poverty. The University of Jos is also a major causality of violent conflict with several students killed and closure of the citadel of learning for safety of lives and property.

The following recommendations were made based on the findings of the study:

- i. Massive community enlightenment campaigns are necessary on the importance of peace in Plateau State for educational and economic development;

- ii. The security units of institutions should be well equipped and funded to make them more effective in the future;
- iii. Government should re-strategize measures on how to curb with crisis effect on the educational sector. It can develop and design formal education in an informal setting for school going age children in IDPs camps;
- iv. Government should provide necessary infrastructure in schools, particularly access road and fences. This will minimize the effect of insecurity threats as student's movement can easily be controlled;
- v. Both the government and community members should as a matter of necessity seek ways to rebuild destroyed schools in urban and rural areas to re-emphasized to create awareness to the general public on the need to contribute to the development of schools instead of destroying them;
- vi. Enrolment in schools in line with religious affiliation should be discouraged and
- vii. The State government, community members and Parents Teachers Association (PTA) should organize massive mobilization and sensitization campaign on effects of drop-out from school, especially in crises affected areas, this is to discourage school-drop outs in the state.

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