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The Noun International Journal of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution is a product of the Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria. The vision behind this academic journal is to:

- i. promote sustainable research culture among the academia for the enhancement and development of the intellectual capacity of both the authors and the readers.
- ii. aid the promotion and assimilation of the values of Peace and Conflict Resolution in our societies.
- iii. provide a platform for espousing writers and well researched academic works for reference and teaching purposes.

The journal will also aid the promotion and assimilation of the values of Peace and Conflict Resolution in our societies. The Journal is published twice a year, first publication in March and the second in August and may also feature special editions as may be deemed fit at any material time.

The articles in this journal have been carefully selected, effectively reviewed and edited by the Editors who are tested and proven in their various fields of study and practices as seasoned academician and practitioners and I believe it will be a worthwhile reference material.

The journal has an online presence, thus making it a reference material which is easily accessible at any point in time and has become widely acceptable within the academic world both locally and internationally.

This invaluable work has become a continuous success because of the support and contribution of the Editors, the members of the Department and the management of the National Open University. Special appreciation goes to the harem of our Professors in the Editorial Board who despite their busy schedules have not relented in providing

mentorship opportunity for every member of the Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, NOUN.

I must of necessity appreciate all members of my team who have worked tirelessly to ensure the sustenance of this vision.

On a final note, I do appreciate the Almighty God who has been the source of my inspiration and from whom I draw the energy which mobilizes me for performance.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, featuring a stylized 'S' and 'O' followed by a long horizontal line.

Dr. Samuel Opeyemi Iroye
Editor-in-Chief/ HOD, Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution

NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [NIJPCR]

CALL FOR PAPERS

The **NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [NIJPCR]** is a peer-reviewed journal publication of the **Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution**, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja, which publishes twice a year but may also feature special editions as may be deemed fit at any material time. The Editorial Board of the journal welcomes well-researched original papers, for publication in the Journal which is released in the Months of March and August every year.

Paper submissions are welcome in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution any relative areas and they should adhere to the following guidelines.

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STRATEGIES FOR INTEGRATING PEACE EDUCATION CURRICULUM IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN ABIA STATE

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ABSTRACT

Schools play a cardinal role in society by inculcating the right attitude to students to build a peaceful and progressive society. Peace education is the oxygen needed for managing and preventing conflicts and safeguarding national security. The paper investigates the strategies for integrating peace education curriculum in secondary schools in Abia State as a predictor of sustainable peace in the state. It highlighted the importance of peace education in building a peaceful, safe and stable society. This qualitative study relied on secondary data from books, journal articles, newspapers, and internet sources, while the structural functionalist theory provided the framework for analysis. The paper identified course integration strategy and social integration strategy as the major strategies adopted to integrate peace education curriculum in secondary schools in the state. It therefore posited that if peace education curriculum is properly integrated and the contents well taught, it will instil in learners the right attitudes, knowledge, skills and values for resolving conflicts peacefully. The paper recommended collaboration among secondary schools and policymakers in the state to link local peace education activities to national initiatives. The paper concluded that integrating peace education curriculum in secondary schools is key to reducing conflict, maintaining security, and ensuring sustainable development.

Keywords: Abia State, Curriculum, Human Security, Peace, Peace Education

Introduction

Abia is one of the five states in the southeast geographical zone of Nigeria ravaged by man-made insecurity. The state has been struggling to overcome years of violent conflict

occasioned by the activities of cults, criminal gangs, hooligans, and separatist groups who disturb the peace and security of the state. There is great anxiety, fear, and total confusion among the people as the heinous attacks by these non-state actors have claimed many lives. Chijindu (2023) noted that following the spate of attacks by unknown gunmen, residents of Abia State live in fear. For example, residents in Bende, Ikwuano, Ohafia, and Umunneochi local government areas have lamented that kidnapping has become a daily routine despite the efforts by the government to curb the menace (Steve, 2022). Moreover, the Independent People of Biafra ordered sit-at-home protests and the attendant killings have challenged the survival, livelihood and dignity of people in the state (Chibuike, 2023). This has been particularly devastating in the education sector where Mondays are lost by schools to the sit-at-home order. Consequently, stakeholders in the state are constantly in search of solutions to ensure lasting peace in the face of unending conflicts which have significantly slowed the growth and development of the state.

It is the view of Young (2017) that education and good governance ensure that peace; security and development become more inclusive and promote the rights, prosperity and welfare of all citizens of the nations. Peace education has always played a leading role in terms of student development and human security. Wherever conflicts are resolved amicably, and peace maintained, security is guaranteed. For this reason, peace education is a sine qua non to the development of any society. A culture of peace and non-violence goes to the substances of fundamental human rights which include children's rights, cultural identity and diversity, democracy, equality between men and women, indigenous peoples and minorities rights, international solidarity, literacy, preservation of the natural environment, respect and dignity for all, respect for workers' rights, and social justice.

The ultimate goal of peace education is to transform individual and community relationships characterised by dehumanisation, delegitimisation, and polarisation, towards reconciliation, solidarity, and tolerance. It seeks to equip learners with the capacity to resolve

conflicts without recourse to violence and enable them to become responsible citizens who are open to differences and respectful of other cultures and opinions.

Conceptual Analysis

Peace

The United Nations defines a culture of peace as — a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations (UNESCO, 2010). The UNESCO model is the most universally recognized and incorporates many aspects of a culture of peace. Also, the UN General Assembly (1999) declared action in the following eight key areas necessary to transition to a culture of peace and nonviolence: a culture of peace through education; democratic participation; human rights; sustainable development; equality between men and women; advancing understanding, tolerance and solidarity; supporting participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge and promoting international peace and security. Furthermore, from the lens of Adams (2005), a culture of peace is an integral approach to preventing violence and violent conflicts, and an alternative to the culture of war and violence based on education for peace, the promotion of sustainable economic and social development, respect for human rights, equality between women and men, democratic participation, tolerance, the free flow of information and disarmament.

Education

It was Fafunwa (1974) who opined that education means what each generation gives to its younger ones which makes them develop attitudes, abilities, skills and other behavioural attributes which are germane to the growth of the society in which they live. On his part, Ugwu (2015) defined education as the total development of the child through established acceptable methods and techniques based on his abilities and interests to make up the socio-economic and political needs of the society and to equip the individual to take his rightful place and become a useful citizen and contribute meaningfully to the development of the society.

Curriculum

Sani (2013) defined curriculum as the educational experiences designed purposely for certain students within a specific time to accomplish the set objectives. Curriculum is also understood as planned learning activities for students, run and monitored by schools to achieve its educational goals. Curriculum is fundamental to education because it serves as an instrument for guided instruction.

Curriculum Integration

Curriculum integration is an offshoot of the constructive school of thought in which learners are expected to construct their knowledge, and in the process create meaning to the learning process. To the proponents of integrated curriculum, the inherent defects in the compartmentalization of knowledge characterized by single subject approach call for a paradigm shift. Megham (2008) defined an integrated curriculum as one that brings together content from different disciplines in a meaningful way to focus upon issues and areas relevant to student lives. Meghan's definition further revealed the limitation of the single-subject approach since areas of relevance to learners are multi-related and the robustness of single subjects to address learners' multifaceted needs is in great suspect. This line of thought is in synch with Kathleen and Fowler (2010) who submitted that an integrated curriculum is an intellectual effort aiming at connecting academic, career, and technical domains in the instructional process in such a way that learners are prepared and equipped for further education, employment and career development.

Peace Education

Peace education is education aimed at teaching students, about issues of peace and how they can resolve conflicts in a non-violent manner. Peace education inculcates the spirit of equity, harmony and social justice, by appealing to the worldview of the learner to see social interactions through the lens of peace. Peace education challenges the long-held belief that war cannot be avoided. Often this belief is based on an underlying view that violence is inherent in human nature. At the micro-level, education on non-violent conflict resolution

approaches, such as collaborative problem-solving, anger management and mediation, can improve the quality of human relationships and bring about solutions that are constructive, fair and helpful to all parties (Ahmed and Khan, 2017). Furthermore, UNICEF defined peace education as the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level (UNICEF, 1999). Fundamentally, peace education has five rudimentary principles: equality, nonviolence, respect for differences, tolerance, and social justice. In their compilation, Teachers Without Borders (2011) perceive peace education for positive peace to include education for human rights, multiculturalism, social justice, ecological sustainability, and inner peace.

John Dewey (1923) defined peace education as a curriculum which will make it more difficult for the flames of hatred and suspicion to sweep over this country in the future, which indeed will make this impossible because when children's minds are in the formative period, we shall have fixed in them through the medium of the schools, feelings of respect and friendliness for the other nations and peoples of the world. On her part, Maria Montessori (1949) posited that establishing lasting peace is the work of education. She explored the significant connection between peace education and early childhood education and defined peace education as educating for a culture of peace, and not war. This study perceives peace as everyone's right, and peace education as the primary solution to all social conflicts in society.

Theoretical Framework

The sociological perspective of structural functionalist theory as propounded by Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons forms the main framework for this study. The structural functionalist theory is concerned with the utilitarian functions of education in the maintenance of peace and social order. Functionalists see a society which is sustained by its constituent

elements such as the family, school, religion, traditional institutions, etc. through their cohesive roles. Azikiwe (2008) and Chizoba, Dienye, and Kalu (2022) maintain that schools and their host communities should complement the functional roles of the family by transmitting core values and social control or the regulation of deviant behaviour.

The Need for Peace Education and a Culture of Peace in Abia State

Abia State is confronted with security challenges in all the seventeen local governments of the state. Residents of the state need peace education as a tool for conflict resolution and peaceful co-existence. The state government should ensure that the state is built on peace by introducing peace education in all schools. Osaat (2015) posited that peace education is the process of acquiring the values, the knowledge and developing the attitudes, skills and behaviours to live in harmony with oneself, with others and in the natural environment. Thus, peace education is understood as a series of teaching encounters that stimulate in people the desire for peace and non-violent alternatives for managing and resolving conflicts. In this dispensation, violence and various forms of conflicts are everywhere and peace education is the best global option for resolving global violence and other forms of crises.

Several definitions and conceptions of peace education have also been put forward by other leading scholars and institutions, who share the common idea that peace education aims to counter a culture of war by promoting a culture of peace. A culture of peace has been defined by the United Nations (UN Resolutions A/RES/52/13) as a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations. Consequently, peace education challenges the notion that violence is innate to human beings; and aims to transform the content, pedagogy and structures of education to deal with various forms of violence in the society.

In the face of unending conflicts, Abia State is constantly in search of solutions to ensure lasting peace pervades the planet. Education remains an important tool for promoting peace in a world filled with turmoil and innumerable socioeconomic challenges that daily put

peaceful coexistence at jeopardy. Equipping the younger generation with the requisite knowledge and skills for adopting a positive attitude to conflict resolution is of paramount importance to the search for peace. It is therefore fundamental to infuse or integrate peace education in all teaching and learning processes at all levels of an education system (Zarif, Urooj and Munir, 2019). This is what mainstreaming peace education entails.

The African Union Agenda 2063 recognizes the fundamental role of peace education as a vehicle to usher in peaceful coexistence in the African Continent. For this reason, the AU developed the Continental Education Strategy for Africa 2016-2025 (CESA 16-25) to guide and shape policies in the education sector in Africa. The strategy document has embedded peace education, and one of its key pillars is to ensure a peaceful and secure environment. The continental education policy document has 12 strategic objectives to be achieved by 2025. These results areas are aimed at wholly reorienting the African education and training systems to achieve the AU's vision and Agenda 2063. In the result area (Strategic Objective 10), CESA 16-25 seeks to "promote peace education and conflict prevention and resolution at all levels of education and for all age groups."

Abia State has demonstrated concerted efforts towards building and realization of sustainable peace through education. Class textbooks consisting of stories and poems on peace themes have been developed targeting students and adult literacy classes. This is in addition to sports being used as a vehicle to nurture skills and attitudes for peace. When integrated properly, peace education will inculcate in individuals the spirit of patriotism that enhances peace and national security as highlighted in one of the goals of education in the National Policy on Education (NPE, 2004).

Strategies for Integrating Peace Education Curriculum in Secondary Schools in Abia State

Abia State is experiencing an increased or heightened state of insecurity. Secondary schools in the state are sometimes sites of violence, but they also provide an enabling environment in which the aims of peace education can take root. As posited by Brock-Utne, peace education plays a significant role in promoting the concept of peace among students (Brock-Utne, 1989).

Atieno, Kiplagat, and Yego (2016) stressed that conflicts are inevitable in educational institutions because there will always be disagreements among school administration, teachers, and students. Furthermore, they stressed that conflicts may present through the following: students not obeying school rules, students not doing manual work, students not respecting teachers, students engaging in vices like theft, fights, bullying or not attending lessons; teachers not respecting the principal, among others. Thus, there is a need to plan and integrate peace education well in the state secondary schools to ensure sustainable peace and development. The following are the major strategies adopted to integrate peace education curriculum in secondary schools in Abia State:

(i) Course Integration Strategy

Whether private or public secondary school, the government is the only authorized agent that produces the curriculum for schools through the Ministry of Education. A sound curriculum is fundamental in ensuring peace prevails in any society. Educators and curriculum developers consider peace education as a tactical plan to eliminate conflict. Integrating peace education curriculum in Abia State adopts the course integration approach. Relevant peace education content is selected from the traditional social science-based subjects like geography, economics, government, and arts-based subjects such as history and literature.

Thus, the peace education curriculum includes topics such as respect for elders, human rights, negotiation, cultural similarities, democracy, human rights, global challenges, value systems, inter-tribal marriages, and tolerance. Teachers teach and emphasize these peace concepts. These peace education concepts are integrated into traditional subjects such as history, geography, government, and social studies which constitute the core aspects of the secondary school curriculum. Also, this strategy ensures that instructional materials for implementing peace education curricula do not present any biased information or message that may be derogatory to any person or group.

Moreover, secondary schools in the state incorporate co-curricular activities to promote holistic child development and sportsmanship by providing facilities for sports and

peace clubs. Secondary schools in all the 17 local government areas of the state also implement recreation programmes that focus on peace education concepts like cooperation, decision-making, sportsmanship, and teamwork, which is one of the approaches used in Abia State to mainstream peace education in schools. Thus, peace clubs exist in all the secondary schools in the state. For example, school-based peace clubs exist in Government College, Umuahia; Girls High School, Aba; Mary Slessor Secondary Technical School, Arochukwu and other schools to dialogue about peace and conflict issues in the communities. The peace clubs focus on training students on non-violent dispute resolution techniques, and how to participate in community outreach events. During such training sessions, teachers/facilitators use experiential learning approaches to instil values such as problem-solving skills in learners.

(ii) Social Integration Strategy

The social integration strategy highlights the interaction between the schools and the host communities. This functionalist strategy sees society which is sustained by its constituent elements such as the family, school, religion, traditional institutions, etc. through their cohesive roles. There is support for participatory communication and free information among students themselves, between students and management and between school and community. Peace education is all about developing the knowledge, skills attitudes and behaviours on methods of resolving conflict and enabling people to acquire positive and appropriate sensitivities to these problems. Peace education in the activities of schools is centred on democratic and conflict resolution principles. Through the efforts of the schools, members of the community are taught not to resolve conflict through violence and war but rather through dialogue.

This kind of peace education strategy fosters a positive conflict orientation in the community by training students and community members to view conflict as a platform for creativity, understanding and growth. Peace education programmes of this kind include training participants in skills of coalition building, compromise and conscientious objective, critical thinking, debate, human rights, individuality, promoting the values of freedom of

speech, and tolerance of diversity. It aims to produce responsible citizens who could hold the government accountable to the standard of peace. Peace education activities are structured to have students and citizens make decisions and respect the opinions of others. Building freedom of interaction, sharing of information, and democratic principles decrease the likelihood of violence and wars and are indispensable for a culture of peace.

Benefits of Integrating Peace Education Curriculum in Secondary Schools in Abia State

Nwadiokwu (2019) posited that peace education inculcates in learners the skills, attitudes and knowledge that will enable them to communicate effectively with people; and creates in learners the consciousness for self-awareness and alertness towards national security and protection. It also enables students to acquire the right values for underlying peace for respect for human life and national development. Furthermore, it motivates learners towards collective living of togetherness and respect for human rights/dignity and prepares learners to work towards promoting national unity, and sustainable economic and social development.

As seen from the above, peace education is essential in secondary schools in Abia State because the state is facing threats of violence by non-state actors and groups. Serving as surrogate parents, teachers promote peaceful coexistence among students by resolving conflicts justly and promptly in the school. Mutual respect, tolerance and observance of student's rights help to create love, happiness and a conducive atmosphere for teaching and learning and also create democratic leadership in the class, order, gender equality and healthy interactions. Peace education and peace culture are global targets capable of achieving quality economic output, and good technological and social development. Therefore, imbining peace culture in students is the root of quality human resources, civilization and peaceful coexistence. In affirmation of the above view, Dimkpa (2014) outlined some benefits of peace education including improved security conditions, improved quality of life, the dignity of labour, higher life expectancy, improved working conditions, increased employment opportunities, higher savings, better decision-making and inner peace.

Challenges to the Integration of Peace Education Curriculum

Some of the most noticeable challenges in integrating peace education in secondary schools in Abia State include:

Inadequate knowledge

Inadequate knowledge about the concept of peace education as well as its aims and objectives by the policymakers, members of the general public and government. In other words, there is limited expertise and capacity for peace education available in parts of the state. Baldo and Fumiss (1998) posited that peace education is most effective when the skills and knowledge of peace and conflict resolution are learned and known by the planners as well as the implementers. This implies that the peace education curriculum planners should give a clear outline of how the programme will be conducted and how it will be implemented by individual schools. School managers and teachers are the key actors in the implementation of these and so, they need further training to be able to deliver. It was Ehiemere (2022) who opined that if the Abia State government would properly institutionalise peace education in schools, the rate of insecurity would be reduced to its barest minimum.

Inadequate funding

Inadequate funds especially funding dedicated to peace education is a major problem in the state. Ehiemere (2022) posited that: money is an absolute crucial input of any educational system. It provides the essential purchasing power with which education acquires its human and material inputs. With too little money, education can be helpless. With an ample supply, its problems become more manageable even though they do not vanish. Inadequate funding is consequent upon a lack of political will to fund education programmes despite the increasing appreciation of its positive impact on the psychosocial behaviour of children who have already benefited from such programmes.

Lack of comprehensive peace education curriculum

Another challenge facing the integration of peace education in secondary schools in Abia State is the lack of a comprehensive peace education curriculum that can be used to suit the needs

of the people. Mkpa and Ekon-Nweke (2019) stated that to achieve the objectives of peace education, a school system must be prepared for drastic changes including setting new educational objectives, preparing new curricula; (re)writing school textbooks, developing instructional materials, and training teachers to create a school climate that is conducive to peace education. Peace education curriculum usually consists of activities such as communication, cooperation, and problem solving, etc. without which the objectives of peace education would not be achieved. The methodologies currently used in formal learning in some schools, contrast with the peace education approach and tools which place more emphasis on learning, critical inquiry and discovery methods than the competition learning approach. Ede and Nwaogazie (2022) also opined that it is the responsibility of every teacher to introduce experience-based learning, group work, and discussion methods in classroom lessons.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Education plays a structural functionalist role and integrating peace education curriculum in secondary schools remains a key antidote to the prevailing violence-related turmoil facing State. The formative years of children present an opportunity to instil knowledge on the dangers of the absence of peace, causes and the means to ensure peace and tranquillity prevail. Education that integrates peace be a greater weapon to fight the enemies of peace than the kinetic ones – bullets, guns, machetes and other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the paper recommends that the State government should integrate peace education curriculum in all secondary schools. The mode of delivery for peace education should also be reinforced to ensure that transformative pedagogy is employed to enable the inculcation of knowledge, skills and attitudes needed by students to become agents of peace. Co-curricular activities such as peace clubs, music and drama societies provide an opportunity for students to gain experiential learning that they will carry along for many years in their lives. Lastly, the state Ministry of Education should mandate all secondary schools to review their school mottos,

songs, vision and mission statements to portray peace messages, students should not just recite or memorize the themes; they should internalize and practice the values

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THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSHUMANCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD SECURITY IN THE SOUTH-SOUTH GEOPOLITICAL ZONE

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ABSTRACT

The research examined the nature of transhumance and the level of humanitarian damage coupled with their impact on food security in the South-South geopolitical zone. Relying on the Structural-Functionalism theory, the study utilized the survey research design as well as the qualitative and quantitative research strategies as the methodological tool. To this end, the multistage/stratified sampling technique was used to derived the population of the study which constitutes some states in the South-South zone while the Taro Yamane formula was used to scientifically derive the sample size from the population. The study revealed that farming activities have reduced in the South-South region of Nigeria due to the crisis of transhumance which has metamorphosed into food insecurity in the region with 0.712 (71% correlation) @ (p>0.001) significance level. Also, the study found that the internal security challenge posed by farmers-herders conflict discourages people from embarking on agriculture which has led to constant hike in the prices of crop and livestock production in the South-South with 72% relationship @ p < .001. It concluded that transhumance has created food insecurity and humanitarian crisis in the South-South zone of Nigeria. The study thus recommended that: an effective mechanism through mapping of a holistic security architecture should be put in place, the government should adopt alternative dispute resolution through dialoguing with the herders and the farmers in the communities, there should be a strict adherence to policy implementation.

Keywords: Terrorism, Insurgency, Terror-attacks, Fatality

Introduction

Transhumance has induced a varying degree of internal conflict and insecurity in the Northern part of Nigeria and has consequently moved to the Southern part through the North-Central region. Across the country today, newspapers and media houses are awash with diverse stories of arson, kidnapping, indiscriminate shooting at unarmed farmers, and killings of different magnitudes. These dastardly acts are perpetrated primarily by unscrupulous herdsmen or herdsmen militias who go about with guns and other sophisticated weapons (Aigbe & Akenzua, 2020). Although cattle rustling and theft have not accentuated the process of reaching a truce between the clashing parties, The herdsmen, who are major aggressors in the conflict, have resorted to using gruesome means to unleash terror on civilian farmers. The implication of this is that scores of casualties in terms of deaths are being recorded.

Violent and gruesome attacks by criminal herders on farming communities have prevented crop farmers from accessing their farm lands for cultivation, thereby increasing poverty and hunger, which results in food insecurity. In an age where agriculture is seen as a veritable alternative to economic diversification, issues like this can only serve as a clog in the wheel of progress, despite numerous agricultural policies being formulated. According to Nwozor, Olanrewaju, and Ake (2019, p. 10) “the key thrust of Nigeria’s agricultural renaissance is to diversify its economy by making agriculture the hub of economic growth while also achieving a hunger-free country (a hunger-free country is one that is food secure)”. Food security has been prioritised as an imminent national policy framework in the country, considering the fact that a huge part of its 200 million population is food insecure (FMARD, 2021). Despite its favourable agro-ecological endowments, food insecurity is still of great concern to the government due to its prevalence in the country.

Until 2018, the conflict between farmers and pastoralists was primarily confined to the North-Western, North-Eastern, and Middle Belt zones of the country. However, from late 2017 to early 2018, the conflict had expanded to the South-West, South-East, and South-South of Nigeria (EASO, 2021). To date, it keeps spreading like wildfire and has therefore become

a national menace. Farmers are scared of going to their farmlands due to the high level of insecurity being perpetrated by transhumant elements. Numerous scholarly attempts to provide insight into this menace have revolved around land tenure, ethnicity, resource scarcity, climate change, and other causes. Those who have made attempts to relate the issue to food security were particularly interested in the North-East and North-Central sub-regions of Nigeria. It is against this backdrop that this study focuses on the implications of insecurity occasioned by transhumance on food security by beaming its search light on the South-South Geopolitical zone.

Objectives of the Study

This study examined transhumance and the challenges of internal security in Nigeria. Within this context, the following are the study's specific objectives.

1. To examine the nature of transhumance induced conflict between farmers and herders and its impact on food security in the South-South zone of Nigeria.
2. To assess the level of humanitarian damage caused by farmers-herders crisis and its impacts on farming activities in South-South Nigeria.
3. To examine the nature of stakeholders' response to quelling the feuds between farmers and herders towards ensuring food availability in Nigeria.

Research Hypotheses

The following research hypotheses were formulated to facilitate empirical generalization of this work:

1. H_0^1 : there is no relationship between transhumance and food insecurity in the South-South.
 H_R^1 : there is a relationship between transhumance and food security in the South-South.
2. H_0^2 : there is no relationship between insecurity and farming activities in the South-South

H_R²: there is a relationship between insecurity and farming activities in the South-South

Transhumance and Internal Security: A Conceptual Nexus

Transhumance and internal security are omnibus concepts that are not amenable to a singular definition. This is due to the fact that the concepts independently possess wider coverage while providing linkages in various aspects. For instance, Ibrahim (2019, p. 53) argued that “*there are varied conceptual issues (mobility, modernization and stimulus paradigm) that catch our intellectual curiosity which can be used to describe transhumance*”. To this extent, transhumance is defined as the practice or action of moving livestock from one grazing location to another in a seasonal cycle typically to low lands in the winter and high lands in the summer (FAO, 2017). According to Ayantunde, et al (2014), transhumance can be seen as a livestock production system characterized by seasonal and cyclical movement of varying degrees between complementary ecological areas. This movement is majorly inspired by unfavourable climate change that exposes nature’s parsimony in terms of rainfall distribution. That is why Akpen (2019, p. 45) argued that “*transhumance is a response to ecological, agricultural, health and socio-cultural challenges*”.

Thus, concerns for the common man now drive the concept of security. By implication, Adams (2019, p. 221) contends that “*internal security must be related to the ability of the state to perform the function of protecting the well-being of its people*”. To Prakash (2016), internal security can be defined as the act of keeping peace within the borders of a sovereign state or other self-governing territories generally by upholding the national law and defending against internal security threats. Nwolise (2008) corroborated this view when he asserted that internal security entails the security agencies of a nation being able to combat armed robbery, religious and ethnic riots, communal and community clashes, armed insurrection, rebellion, insurgency, terrorism, natural disaster, etc.

Rather, the new ones constitute strange elements with despicable characters such as: wielding AK47 ammunition, lawlessness (Ikelegbe, 2019, p. 10) leading herds into major

streets and public places like schools and markets and using herds to block highways for brigandage (Eke, 2018; Aghedo, 2017). The horrendous grazing activities of transhumant elements that result in wanton destruction of crops and farmlands have led to violent confrontation between the warring parties. Also, the herders are hardened by harsh conditions of their occupations and lifestyles and the relative deprivation; isolation and the lack of basic amenities that they endure. Furthermore, there is a wide contention that the perceived oppression and marginalization by the herders is further accentuated by the continuous depletions of their cattle stock through cattle rustling, insecurity and declining grazing routes. The resultant effect of this accusation and counter accusation is the ravaging farmers-herders conflict that has resulted in the loss of lives and properties.

Theoretical Framework

Structural-functionalism

Several theoretical frameworks have been used to explain the conflict of transhumance. A lot of them have focused on and revolved around the intellectual tradition of neo-Malthusianism which places emphasis on resource use, environmental scarcity and population growth factors (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Moritz, 2010). This reductionist tradition has posed a critical theoretical and methodological issue in a situation where the phenomenon is contagious regionally (Nwangwu Mbah & Ezugworie, 2020). Against this backdrop, this research adopted the theory of Structural-Functionalism.

Structural-functionalism is a theory that tends to explain the society based on the existence of structures and the roles they perform. Historically, it can be traced to the work of Talcott Parson in the 18th century and was later developed by other scholars including Bronislaw Malinowski and Radcliffe Brown. It was Parson who argued that society consists of four structures with each of them performing a specific role. The structures according to Parson include: economy; polity; law and social control; lastly, cultural and motivational commitment. Each of these structures is destined to perform specific functions viz: adaptation,

goal attainment, integration and pattern maintenance (Varma, 1975 p. 200). These functions include: adaptation, goal attainment, integration and pattern maintenance.

Since Parson's analysis of structures and the roles they perform in the sustenance of the system, other scholars have provided their own perspectives about the functionality of the social system. Beyond Gabriel Almond and David Easton who introduced the functional analysis into the domain of political science through the systems theory, Radcliffe-Brown also gave insight into the explanation of structural-functionalism.

According to Turner (2012), in Radcliffe-Brown's explanation of function, the idea of structure is included. This structure comprises numerous entities which maintain the continuous existence of social order. To this extent, he made three basic summaries of his own approach to the functional theory. The assumptions are:

1. Minimal integration and coordination of a society's parts represent the only criteria for its existence.
2. The term function encompasses those interactions that facilitate the maintenance of this required integration.
3. In each society, structural features can be said to contribute immensely to the maintenance of necessary integration.

When this is brought to the domain of transhumance, it creates a web of three units of analysis which in this context are the structure. They are: the herders' institutions, the farmers' institutions and the government. These various structures exist to perform varied roles and functions. While the herders are known for harnessing livestock and animal husbandry for the provision of skin and herds, the farmers function to provide cash and food crop for commercial or subsistence purposes of the good of the society. Also, the government as a structure exists to provide social amenities to ensure the smooth running and performance of the other two structures. There is a continuous trespassing of the functions of each structure that tend to heat up the nadir part of the social structure. This explains the incessant clashes between farmers and herders.

Methodology

This study utilized the cross-sectional/survey research design with a combination of both quantitative and qualitative research strategies. The population of the study was 1,780,579 while the sample size was about 1200 using the multistage sampling technique. This sample, derived from Taro Yamane formular, was spread across nine local government areas (three each) in three South-South states of Edo, Delta and Rivers states. While the questionnaire constituted the major instrument for data collection, the in-depth interview was also used to elicit information from farmers, security officials (Police and vigilantes), herders and others who are privy to the menace of transhumance.

The information gathered from both the questionnaires and the in-depth interview were complemented with data from secondary sources which include: journal articles, online sources, books, monographs, annual reports, etc. Furthermore, the hypotheses were tested using the Pearson's correlation coefficient with the aid of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The research is focused on the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The region is given attention because it is closest to the North-Central and thus constitutes a pathway through which transhuman elements migrate southward. Also, the South-South zone possesses favourable weather conditions, with the highest annual rainfall. According to Adewole and Serifat (2018:100), the region boasts an average annual rainfall of 737.84 millimetres, compared to the second-placed South-East at 442.36 millimeters.

These statistics render the South-South a fertile ground for herdsmen to graze their cattle due to its abundant rainfall for grass production. Within the South-South Geopolitical zone, Edo, Delta, and Rivers states represent the domain of case study analysis and spring board. This is because, according to Egbeluje (2020), Edo and Delta states are the worst hit by the onslaught of herdsmen activities and brigandage, while Rivers State was selected based on its arable and fertile agricultural land. This could be partly due to the fact that Edo State is the first point of call from North Central and therefore serves as a migratory route.

Testing of Hypotheses

Hypotheses 1

H₀¹- There is no significant relationship between transhumance activities and food insecurity in the South-South.

H_r¹- There is a significant relationship between transhumance activities and food insecurity in the South-South.

Table 4.53		Correlations	
		Transhumance Activities	Food insecurity
Transhumance Activities	Pearson Correlation	1	.751**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	1039	1039
Food insecurity	Pearson Correlation	.751**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	1039	1039
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

There is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p < .001$). The direction of the relationship is positive. There exists a strong positive relationship between transhumance activities and food insecurity, meaning that these variables tend to increase together. Thus, the positive increase in transhumance activities leads to a corresponding increase in food insecurity in the South-South. Hence, the study rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternate hypothesis that states that there is a significant relationship between transhumance activities and food insecurity in the South-South region.

Hypotheses 2

H₀²- There is no significant relationship between insecurity and less farming activities in the South-South.

H_r²- There is a significant relationship between insecurity and less farming activities in the South-South.

Table 4.54		Correlations	
		Insecurity	Less farming activities
Insecurity	Pearson Correlation	1	.723**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	1039	1039
Farming activities	Pearson Correlation	.723**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	1039	1039
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

There is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p < .001$). The direction of the relationship is positive. There exists a strong positive relationship between insecurity and farming activities, meaning that these variables tend to increase together. It therefore means that an increase in insecurity leads to a corresponding increase in less farming activities. Thus, the study rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternate hypothesis that states that there is a significant relationship between insecurity and less farming activities in the South-South.

Discussion of Findings

On the nature of transhumance induced conflict between farmers and herders and its impacts on food security in the South-South region of Nigeria, the study revealed that farming activities have reduced in the South-South zone of Nigeria due to the crisis of transhumance which has metamorphosed into food insecurity in the region. Thus, the study established that there is a strong positive relationship between transhumance activities and food insecurity in the South-South region with 0.712 (71% correlation) @ ($p > 0.001$) significance level. To affirm the position of this study, Erunke and Aku (2022:23) observed “that the low level of agricultural production, due to attacks from herdsmen, for example, coupled with a rising population growth rate in Nigeria, is likely to lead to a food crisis and a higher unemployment level”. Their study examined the implications of Farmers-Herders Conflict on Food Security

in Benue State, North Central Nigeria. Aso, Udosen (2021:17), asserted “that the Nigerian herder-farmer crisis can be interpreted as an issue of obtaining land for economic survival”.

The implication of this is that there are endemic political, economic, and environmental tensions in the nation and severe food insecurity, particularly in the Middle Belt and Southern parts of Nigeria since the return of democracy in 1999. Also, Gordon (2000) claims that the conflicts are brought on by the herdsmen's cattle destructively destroying farmlands. Herdsmen, of course, are nomads who travel from their customary homes in quest of more fertile pasture for their herds of cattle.

This view was corroborated by an interviewee who lamented:

those people are wicked o. They just enter our farm in this community and use their cow to destroy our crops. If u talk, they will say they are the ones that own Nigeria and they cannot do them anything. There was a day they killed one man here and cut another person's hand with machet on another occasion because the person argued and fought with them. We don't even know what to do now. Me for example, I am scared to go to the farm because of fear. My children are not here, nobody will fight for me (IDI 2, 2023).

Interrogating further on the nature of the conflict between farmers and herders that has contributed to food insecurity in the region,

A 58 years old man supported the earlier view when he stated that:

My son, my production has really gone down. In fact, we are suffering in this village. All these Fulani people are very harmful to us. Last year, I planted vegetables, corn and melon. as they were growing, they brought their cow and destroyed everything. That period, I didn't get one harvest. We used to take some to the market to sell but that year, not even one was harvested (IDI 2, 2023).

To investigate on how the conflict has affected their crop production whether for sale or personal consumption, the first interviewee posited that:

Before, I used to harvest cassava and yam for sale because that's what I farm. But now, to even get the yam to eat is hard. My income has reduced because of it and things are now very expensive (IDI 1, 2023).

Exploring the level of humanitarian damage caused by farmers-herders crisis and its impacts on farming activities in South-South Nigeria, the study established that the internal

security challenge posed by farmers-herders conflict discourages people from embarking on agriculture which has led to constant hike in the prices of crop and livestock production in the South-South. With the correlation co-efficient of 0.723 @ ($p < .001$), the study revealed that there is a strong positive relationship between insecurity and less farming activities in the South-South region.

The spate of insecurity occasioned by herdsmen is alarming in Nigeria to the extent that a day hardly passes by without news of attacks. In June 2018, the country woke up to the news that rampaging Criminal Herdsmen had attacked eleven (11) communities in Barkin Ladi local government area of Benue State. This particular attack left Eighty-six (86) toll with Fifty (50) houses burnt in the process (Ezemenaka & Ekumaoko, 2018).

Due to this unprecedented level of security challenge, food prices have risen beyond measure as a result of the country's obvious insecurity challenges and the significant decline in food output. Many individuals are at risk of famine as a result of the 253% and 123% price increases in key staples food like beans and tomatoes since July 2020. In addition, Nigeria's food import cost has increased by 140% since the country's rising food demand cannot be met by current production levels (Fadare et al, 2019). This is why Udosen (2021) argued that given the numerous constraints on food production, investors and entrepreneurs are advised against entering the agricultural sector, particularly in regions plagued by insecurity problems. This resulted in property destruction, crop damage, attacks on cattle, livestock rustling, and live cattle killings in Benue State. According to reports, some of the main causes of conflict and violence between farmers and herders are population expansion, climatic change, environmental degradation, government policies, and insurgency activities (Ukamaka et al, 2017).

Concluding Remarks

The study concluded that transhumance and farmers violent conflicts have created food insecurity and humanitarian crisis across many communities in Nigeria. Many have died, many displaced and properties in form of crops, animals, houses, vehicles etc. destroyed in

large number. Farmers, though, have occasionally been involved in carrying attacks or reprisal attacks against the Fulani herdsman, have been seen to be mostly at the receiving end of the conflicts. They count more losses than the herdsman. Thus, the research established that there is significant relationship between transhumance and food insecurity in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The herder-farmer conflict has become more significant in the last two decades in Nigeria. Although the government had in the past taken some measures to address this phenomenon, the increasing desertification and the effects of climate change have further increased the drive for the herdsman to move further south in search of grazing land and pasture for their livestock.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations were made:

1. The government should put in place an effective mechanism through mapping of a holistic security architecture to curtail the negative operations of the transhumance and the influx of herder into communities in Nigeria.
2. The government should adopt alternative dispute resolution through dialoguing with the herders and the farmers in the communities. As the study revealed and echoed by one of the IDIs, not all transhumant are criminally minded and as such, a lot of criminally bent herders have infiltrated the good ones.
3. There should intelligently investigate the sponsors of the criminal herders in the country and bring them to justice.
4. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons should be nip in the bud for peace and tranquility in the communities.
5. Another major issue that this study addressed is the fact that there is an existing negative perception of herders by the indigenous communities. There is therefore the need for mindsets restructuring so as to eradicate this ill perception. the research found that there has been a persisting mindset by those in the South-South, which created a perception of the criminality of the herders.

6. States within South-South zone should Create grazing routes for herd and establish cattle ranches. This will facilitate the process of effective implementation of the Asaba declaration, which necessitated the ban on open grazing. The implication is that there will be no room for the invasion of farmlands and crops belonging to farmers.

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RURAL BANDITRY AND PEACEBUILDING: A REVIEW OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE VILLAGE CHILDREN'S EDUCATION IN NIGERIA (2017-2022)

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ABSTRACT

The study set out to examine factors for the persistence of rural banditry and its effects on building future; the effectiveness of protective measures and the challenges confronting these measures. Qualitative approaches with secondary data analysis were employed for the study. Social contract theory was adopted for the explanation of factors for and effects of banditry for the future. The study discovered that weakness of the security architecture continues to be responsible for banditry sustainability; illiteracy resulted from education insecurity due to dearth of law and order; in order to contain banditry, security forces had been deployed, legal framework enacted but the still persist due to weak security system. The study suggested huge investment in the security sector; recruitment, adequate training and remuneration for young Nigerians; the need for political will in the implementation of education policies.

Keywords: Fatality, Banditry, Peacebuilding, Protective-Measures, and Children, Education

Introduction

Physical and structural violence cumulatively, had threatened the safety of humanity and therefore, its existence. The notion of national security interest geared towards protecting citizens of nations against security threats, takes coercive measures from doctrinal, strategic and tactical perspectives to give physical and psychological sense of safety. Conceptualizing

protection implied probable vulnerabilities to persons, institutions and nations that are open to attack. With this hindsight, national security encapsulates direct and indirect violence that affects citizens within its scope (Roberts & Everton, 2018).

Imminent danger to national security often generates conflict which could degenerate to various dimensions of direct or indirect violence. Transformation of adversarial relations destructively had led to two deathly global armed conflicts, besides the civil wars within nations popularly referred to as intrastate wars. International community takes a strategic response to obviate the atrocities that humanity threw itself into, leading to two global conflicts (United Charter, 1945). UN Charter (1945) pointed out its desire to prevent the future generations from the scourge of war, the body was formed. However, these future global actors had been made key participants in most theatres of wars. Warlords in Africa had recruited and utilized children to prosecute their agenda.

Banditry, especially in the rural communities had brought untold hardship due to violence against the people. Villages in Kaduna, Niger, Katsina, Zamfara, Kebbi, and Sokoto states respectively, suffered sporadic attacks. Military operations had been conducted for the purpose of restoring order. Acts of violence by non-state actors had threatened political, social, and economic orders of the rural populace. Government response aimed at reestablishing security and therefore, citizens' wellbeing had mostly been reactive in nature. In the aftermath of communal violence, security forces are often deployed to protect people but the persistence of the armed violence. These deployments are within the realm of actions to protect people (Abdulsalam, Olayiwola, and Akinniyi-Duyile, 2022).

Persistent attacks by armed bandits now proscribed as terrorists consists kidnapping, cattle rustling otherwise known as animal stealing, acts of rape, razing down of communities and massive killings resulting to deaths of 1,100 persons massacred in six states in 2018, 2,200 lives terminated in 2019, and the destruction of 1,600 lives in 2020 (Abdulsalam et al, 2022; Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). Goodluck Jonathan Foundation (2021) pointed out that

banditry gravely endangers public safety and security... Among the victims of these violent banditry acts are the school age children in these rural communities.

Various policies had been conceived and executed to protect children's education. The attainment of the objective of preventing future generations from facing war atrocities of the past generations entails the construction of a solid foundation whereby, peace is built and conflict is transformed (United Nations' Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization) (UNESCO Constitution, 1945). However, rural school age children are growing up with consistent physical and psychological danger of direct and indirect violence. Physical violence from acts of terrorism perpetrated by bandits established structural violence. The UN and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) pointed out that UNESCO existed to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among nations through education. Bandit's violence denied a substantial number of rural children from accessing education that enabled their understanding of freedom and justice.

The state had taken preventive measures towards shielding the future generations from the scourge of violence, without much success. These comprise military deployment, education policy interventions and enactment of laws to protect the child's educational access that shield them from indoctrination. All military strategies, tactics, theories alongside government spending on counter-banditry operations, only witnessed the transformation of the conflict into a catastrophic humanitarian tragedy (Elijah, 2021)

Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN, 2019) conceptualization of education as central to deradicalization, and Federal Ministry of Education (FME, 2021) National Policy on Safety, Security and Violent-Free Schools had only witnessed increased radicalization and recruitment of children, and attacks on schools. Also, Millennium Development Goals (MDG-2) aim of achieving universal primary education, and Sustainable Development Goals' (SDG-4) aim of inclusive and equitable quality education for all (Sustainable Development Goals Funds) (SDGF, n.d) had left millions of children without education.

The Universal Basic Education Act (UBEA, 2004) and Child Right Act (CRA, 2003) aim to make education enforceable had constitutional conflict with S.6 (6)(C), and therefore a nullity by reason of S.3 of the 1999 Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN). These protective measures had neither prevented lack of access to millions of vulnerable children in the rural areas due to school's closures, nor protected them from exposure to manipulation into radicalization.

Objectives for the Study

The study is aimed at critiquing protective measures designed to safeguard rural children banditry and how it affected peacebuilding; and to specifically examined:

- i. Factors for persistence of rural banditry
- ii. Implication of rural banditry in building peaceful future society
- iii. Effectiveness of protective measures for the vulnerable children
- iv. Challenges militating against these measures

Literature Review

The study looked into the reasons for the persistence of insecurity in rural communities from the viewpoint of banditry, and its consequences on future peacebuilding in an information age. The result of the actions to safeguard future generations from the dangers of exposure to acts of violence occasioned by banditry and the militating factors confronting these measures.

Banditry Sustaining Factors

The advantages of globalization are the free movement of humans, goods and services across borders. However, its disadvantage comprises borders porosity that enhances illegal goods movements by criminal networks exploiting the ungoverned spaces (Usman & Singh, 2021). Lack of security presence in the porous and vast forests belt undermined human and national security with arms proliferation. Both traditional and modern conceptualization of security implied taking danger away, which is indicative of the social contract between the state and its citizens, using the government to achieve it (Sall, 2005; Oluwatomisin, 2020).

Bernard and Daful (2021) defined ungoverned areas as physical or nonphysical areas where there is absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control. This provides geographic advantage for effective execution of terrorists' strategies and tactics. Campbell (2018) pointed out that, terrorism experts expressed concerns that parts of the Sahel beyond government control, could become nurseries for radical Islamic terrorism that target western interests and security on the continent of Africa (Ojo, 2020). These areas had not only become a training ground but an operational command and control centers for bandits and BH. The focus of attacks transcends the western interests to include abduction of vulnerable community's residents. Children growing up in a violent environment, may not have the foundation for peace.

Destroying the structures that built peace entails paving way for violence sustainability. Factors of illiteracy, ineffective monitoring of ungoverned spaces, and the consequent flow of illicit weapons and drugs, fuelled the continuous perpetration of physical violence against the civil populace in villages (Whelan, 2006). Government protective measures from policies, to the establishment of laws, and the consequent enforcement through both programs and legal interventions present a weakness that compromise the protective measures aimed at providing safety for the child.

The ineffectiveness of the conflict resolution (CR) phase, undermined the whole peacebuilding process. CR is conceived to mean disputants engaging in agreement that solves their central incompatibilities of interests, acceptance of conflicting parties' need for continued existence, and cessation of all violent conduct in their interrelationship (Wallenstein, 2008). Uprooting the basic central factors behind differences of opinions is a precondition to resolving disputes which in the process changes the whole picture (Albert, 2001). When the reasons behind a conflict are addressed, and the probable cause for violence halted, conflict recurrence becomes neutralized, and therefore the causes become meaningless to adversaries. Disruption of education through banditry precludes future leaders' foundation for constructive peace.

Banditry and Societal Future Peacebuilding

Global society aims to build a tranquil and glorious future, devoid of war and violence by seeking to start from the human mind through education. The emergence of violent conflict is a function of the mind. Building a peaceful and prosperous future result from the constructive knowledge, skills and expertise the mind had accumulated over years, which built structures for peace in the hearts of men (UNESCO Constitution, 1945).

Duchi, Shaibu, Odike and Adams (2022) pointed out that illiteracy worsened individuals' lack of capacity development due to the fact that, at childhood, kids have blank slate; and what they turn out to be is a product of information they received from the environment. Constructive information lays the foundation for positivity in the individual's carrying capacity. For a sustainable future peace, children's environmental interaction had to be free from toxicity and violence. Homes, schools and the general society had to de-emphasize violent confrontation but positive collaboration amongst members of the human family.

Eliminating structural violence such as denial of access to education is the catalyst for constructive societal changes. Globally, Continentally, and nationally; legal and policy efforts had been made to build the foundation for peace through education. These were aimed at resolving the problem of conflict through obviating the tendency for its emergence (UDHR art.26; UNCRC art.28; ACHPR art.17; AUCWC art.11; 1999 CFRN S.18 (1, 2,) 3(a-d); CRA, 2003 S.15 (1-7); UBE Act, 2004). These legal provisions constituted the protective measures geared toward giving validity to educational rights but the provisions of S.6 (6) (C) of 1999 CFRN. This had prevented legal enforcement of S.18 (1)(2)3(a-d) the fountain of Nigeria's national laws; for this reason, exposed these vulnerable children to systemic violence.

UNESCO (2021) stated that, education is key to achieving acceptance and respect for all people irrespective of their race, gender, nationality, or ethno-religious affiliation, being especially important to reach out to children and young people during their formative years through their formal education. Respecting individual and groups diverse perspectives from

ethno-religious, nationalities and cultures, is a prerequisite for halting conflict emergence. UN (2018) Develop regional and sub-regional action plans to prevent violations against children; Improve the protection of schools and hospitals through advocacy and the pursuit of accountability for perpetrators; Support efforts to end and prevent violence against children, of which Israel-Hamas confrontations in Gaza and Bandits attacks on rural communities, had undermined these noble ideas. Loss of parents left the children without guidance of what is right and wrong. Nations depend on parents for the growth of their children.

Protective Measures Effectiveness and the Vulnerable Children

Prominent military response had been the deployment of soldiers and armament in counter-banditry, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism operations to contain, curtailed and if possible, eliminate existential dangers posed to rural communities from bandits. The military measures had witnessed the killings of violent groups members, and civilian population becoming collateral damage. The Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect (GCRP, 2023) stated that over 100 civilians' lives were terminated during military airstrikes between December, 2022 to January, 2023 in Benue, Nasarawa, and Zamfara states. It added that, UN Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention call on the government to execute counter-terrorism operations with full respect to International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

Despite the military response, attacks on rural communities affecting children and other vulnerable groups persist. Establishing checkpoints has the objectives of curtailing arms proliferation, these deviants still access arms by reason that they kept attacking different communities, through exploitation of geographic vulnerabilities, and unemployment amongst others (Olaopeju & Peter, 2021). Bello, Agunyai and Amusan (2022) stated that banditry in Nigeria could have been history, if President Muhammadu Buhari effectively enforced his political will. They believed that political actors give policy direction and expectations to military authorities on security situations.

However, the disconnection between intelligence services and the enforcement agencies resulted in a reactive response instead of proactive action to curtailed threats. Bello

et al (2022) pointed out that, the reactive nature of government forces to threatening security situations like the Kuje Correctional Centre attack despite intelligence reports, emboldened bandits to perpetrate evil unchecked in areas without effective security presence. The essence of armed forces and its intelligence component is to provide security, which enhances the wellbeing of the citizens (S.14, 1999 CFRN). Illegal spread of instruments of violence accompanied by distance of security agencies from interior villages, made them susceptible to widespread killings without effective resistance to curtail attacks on communities which endangers education. Oyinloye (2020) pointed out that:

Sahara Reporters (September 9th, 2021) voiced out the concerns of the UN which warned the government that bandits' continuing attacks on schools threatens future generations. The danger posed to the future decision makers is a function of their preclusion from the inception, education being the tool for enlightening the mind that established the foundation for building a peaceful society. Banditry as a form of insecurity needs a proportionate response to establish the conducive atmosphere for social, economic and political development to advance educational progress of the future greats (Birmati, Aide, Mohammed, & Goje, 2023; Sanchi, Alhassan, Ajibade, & Sabo, 2022).

The 1999 CFRN recognized a child's right to education. S.18 subsections 1 provided that, government shall direct its policy towards ensuring equal and adequate educational opportunities, subsections 3 (a) provide for free, compulsory and universal primary education. To achieve this, UNCRC, ACHPR were domesticated in line with section 12 of the above constitution; CRA 2003 S.15 (1-7) and UBEA 2004 were enacted into law. CRA 2003 had suffered domestication in various states of the federation due to its conflict with cultures and tradition of the local population.

Challenges Facing Preventive Measures

The various hurdles confronting security, policy and legal response measures are multi-dimensional. Emelife (2020) stated that responses to the educational needs of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) conceptualized in Humanitarian Response Strategy, aim to provide

immediate access to learning opportunities for out of school children and support their retention in schools. Nigerian government committed 200 billion from World Bank for Better Education Service Delivery for All (BESDA), introduced Open School Program (OSP), Alternative School Program, enacted laws and formulated policies, deploying security forces to create a conducive environment for socio-economic and political development of communities, for the purpose of providing access to education for the vulnerable groups. In all these, millions of children still roam the streets but the school.

Lack of political will to allocate a substantial percentage of national estimates to education, had stalled policy implementation. Lack of successful implementation of education policies in Nigeria, results from dearth of adequate funding, widespread corruption, challenges of accountability, poor governance, educational policies inconsistency, which retarded efforts to meet desirable educational standards goals/objectives needed for a globalized age (Enyiaz, 2022). Most educational policies faced the problem of defective planning, over-estimation, cost under-estimation, dearth of reliable data, insufficient skilled teachers, dearth of school infrastructural facilities, insufficient funding amongst other challenges were considered militating factors for unrealistic nature of education policies, and inability to achieved its objectives (Okoroma, 2006).

Further Discourse

The study disclosed that vast land areas without security presence, porous nature of national borders, arms proliferation, economic insecurity resulting from violence perpetrated by the social structures that are responsible for the sustainability of rural banditry, had not been addressed. Weak security systems allow criminal control of ungoverned spaces, which betrayed State existence, with the government having standing armed forces. Failure to prevent unauthorized weapons possession at checkpoints, reinforces the claims of weakness in the nations' security architecture, economically inclusive. Poverty is a function of lack of job opportunities, which is also a key hindrance to educational access. This established a vicious cycle of unemployment-poverty-illiteracy (Shingh, 2023). Illiteracy results from

educational insecurity due to forced migration occasion by banditry. Though education is central to peacebuilding, lack of it constitutes a setback.

Deployment of security forces, rolled out of government policies, and the establishment of legal frameworks to protect the education of children had been made. However, persistent invasion of communities by bandits is indicative of a structural failure of the state security architecture. Exploitation of porous borders, vast forests belt, influx of foreign immigrants and the challenges of illegal arms trades reinforces the claims of weak security systems (Sanchi et al, 2022). Despite the presence of uniform men on the highways, continuous attacks of villages by bandits indicated weapons accessibility and the inability to curtailed illegal spread of arms to non-state actors on the roads reflected inability to checkmate bandits (Ogbu, Ereke, James and Yusufu, 2017).

Nigeria's security system had been adjudged weak, its near absence in vulnerable areas to checkmate rampaging non-state actors had left the citizens at the mercy of these criminals, and the government surrendering its key functions of security and welfare of the governed. Dearth of adequate budgetary allocation to the sector, over/under- estimation of policies and dearth of data for effective implementation of educational policies in Nigeria, continue to undermine educational advancement for a greater future peacebuilding. Legal scam of providing education in S.18 (1)(2)(3) (a-d) of 1999 CFRN, complemented with S.15 (1-7) of CRA 2003, but denied its enforceability by S.6 (6)(6) of the same Constitution. This creates a constitutional conflict which is a nullity by reason of S.3 of 1999 CFRN.

Conclusion/Recommendations

The study concluded that security has been the precondition for a conducive environment that ushers in peace pivotal to preventing displacement that sabotage the educational development of the child. The security of communities had to be strengthened, to checkmate unnecessary killings and forced migration that affects children's education. Lack of access to education creates a structural violence that establishes susceptibility. This comprises lack of ability to appreciate imminent dangers, and proneness to recruitment as violent aggressors by non-state

actors. When a substantial number of persons lack access to education, knowledge of peace becomes a challenge, and for this reason, peacebuilding becomes a compromise.

Various response options taken to address the vulnerabilities faced by children from military, policy and legal, seemed ineffective in the face of increased attacks on communities, therefore throwing more into the streets. More illiterates compounded the problem of comprehensive data for effective cost estimation and implementation to provide education access to children. Accompanying this is the factor of legal double standard. All provisions that sought to prevent violation of the education right of children conflicted with the 1999 CFRN, and therefore became null and void. The government cannot be held accountable for educational violations.

Therefore, huge investment in the security sector is very critical in strengthening the weak system that can patrol the ungoverned spaces, control movement of people into the country due to porous borders and curb arms proliferation exacerbating the banditry problem. Recruitment and adequate training and remuneration of intelligent and brilliant young Nigerians will enhance security coverage, reduce the problem of unemployment and provide safety to the rural population. Sincerity of purpose and political will in the formulation and implementation of policies will help achieve education objectives. Amending the conflicting aspects between the Constitution and the CRA is key to children's education right enforcement

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THE RESURGENCE OF MILITARY COUPS IN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR NIGERIA'S ECONOMY

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ABSTRACT

Military coups have been a recurring feature in Africa's political milieu since the mid-20th century. While the frequency of coups has decreased over the years, they have now resurfaced, thereby constituting a major threat to democratic movements in various countries on the continent, including Nigeria. This study investigates the historical context, causes, and consequences of military coups in Africa, focusing on the specific impact on Nigeria's economy. The study employed primary and secondary sources were utilized for data gathering and analysis. The resurgence of military coups in Africa over the past few years has sent a shock wave to Nigeria, for example in April 2021, the military in Chad seized power upon the death of its President Idriss Deby. By the end of 2021, soldiers had toppled elected governments in Mali, Guinea Conakry, and Sudan. In 2023, the military forcefully changed the democratic leaders of Niger and Guinea. These coups often disrupt the fragile democratic processes and stability achieved in various African countries, and Nigeria has not been immune to this trend. The research discovers that the root causes of these coups include corruption, weak governance, ethnic tensions, and the desire for power among military leaders; similarly, foreign influence and the desire for end to neo-colonial ties with the French and the presence of Russian Wagner group combined to induce the resurgence of coup in Africa. The impact of coups on Nigeria shows that it could cause instability and uncertainty, a decline in foreign direct investment (FDI), reduced economic growth, and fiscal imbalances. Additionally, the diversion of resources toward military expenditures can strain government budgets and hinder development projects. The study recommends that democratic leaders should avoid ambiguity that can lead to coup such as corruption, embezzlement, and external influence by former colonial masters. Policymakers and stakeholders can better formulate strategies to prevent coup attempts by promoting democratic governance, and mitigate the economic fallout when coups occur.

Keywords: Governance and Political Stability, Economy, Military Coup, Regional Stability,

Introduction

In recent years, African continent has witnessed unimaginable resurgence of military coups. These abrupt changes in leadership, often facilitated by the military, have had significant repercussions not only on the countries directly affected but also on the rest of Africa in particular, and the global community in general. (Habiba Ben Barka & Mthuli Ncube, 2012). The resurgence of military coups in Africa has rekindled concerns about political instability and governance crisis on the continent. For decades, Africa has strived for democratic progress, with many countries on the continent making strides toward civilian rule. However, recent developments have undermined the wave of democratization given the resurgence of military intervention in politics by seizing power through forceful means.

The juntas have often cited issues of corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of accountability as justifications for their actions. Jackman (1978) attributed the coups d'état that took place in the new states of Africa from 1960 to 1975 to three broad reasons, namely social mobilization or “modernization”; cultural pluralism; and political factors (i.e. political party systems and mass participation). Johnson, Slater, and McGowan (1984) found that “states with relatively dynamic economies whose societies were not very socially mobilized before independence and which have maintained or restored some degree of political participation and political pluralism have experienced fewer military coups, attempted coups, and coup plots than have states with the opposite set of characteristics.”

Military coups in Africa can lead to economic instability in any region. Investors may become hesitant to commit capital to countries facing political uncertainties; this can potentially impact national economies, trade relationships, and foreign direct investments. (Wells Alan, 1974). Nigeria has extensive trade relationships with several African nations. A military coup in a neighboring country can disrupt cross-border trade and commerce, affecting the flow of goods and services and potentially leading to economic losses for businesses, especially in Nigeria. Political turmoil caused by military coups can trigger migration and

refugee crises, with displaced individuals seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, including Nigeria. Hosting refugees can strain Nigeria's resources and social services, impacting the nation's economy.

One nation that closely monitors these developments is Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa. As a regional powerhouse with a burgeoning economy, Nigeria finds itself at the crossroads of geopolitical stability when military coups occur in neighbouring countries. When the military made dramatic entries onto the political stage, Nigeria, with its vast population and economic significance, stands as a key player in Africa's political landscape. (Adekeye Adebajo, 2002). Also, Nigeria is a major oil producer in Africa. Political instability in neighboring countries can disrupt the flow of oil and gas resources, potentially affecting Nigeria's energy security and revenue from the oil sector. These enormous challenges confronting Nigeria as the hub of Africa and one of the hegemons in Africa's political economy provide justification for this study.

This article examines the intricate web of economic implications that these coups present for Nigeria. From trade disruptions and refugee crises to the shifting dynamics of regional alliances, it will explore how the resurgence of military coups in Africa affects Nigeria's economic stability, foreign policy, and its role as a regional leader. Another critical factor to examine is the role of international actors in shaping the political landscape of Africa. Foreign powers' interests and interventions can either exacerbate or mitigate political crises, which in turn can impact the economic stability of countries like Nigeria.

The objectives of this study are to examine the historical context and factors contributing to the resurgence of military coups in Africa. To analyze the implications of the resurgence of military coups in Africa for Nigeria's economic stability, growth, and development. To propose policy recommendations aimed at enhancing Nigeria's resilience to the economic consequences of military coups in the region.

Theoretical Framework

Economic dependency theory, also known as dependency theory, is a perspective in economics and development studies that emerged in the mid-20th century. Raúl Prebisch was the major founder of the economic theory. Other scholars like Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1972), Samir Amin (1976) and Andre Gunder Frank (Frank, 1966, 1979) also made significant contributions to the development of this theory. It primarily focuses on the relationships between developed and underdeveloped countries, seeking to explain the disparities in economic development and wealth distribution between them. Theotonio Dos Santos emphasizes the historical dimension of the dependency relationships in his definition when he wrote:

...an historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected (Dos Santos, 1971).

Dependency theory posits that the global economic system is divided into a core of developed countries and a periphery of underdeveloped countries. The core countries are economically advanced, while the periphery countries are economically dependent on the core. Prebisch started using the terminology of “core” and “periphery” already in 1929. In his report for the ECLA titled “The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems” - often referred to simply as Prebisch’s Manifesto - he describes these notions as two broad and contrasting regional categories, that is, the economically developed center and the undeveloped periphery. (Prebisch 1950). He highlighted that unequal exchange is causing the flow of surplus value from periphery regions to core regions.

Prebisch also noted that this issue has been unnoticed for a long time, at least in the social sciences, due to previously used terms and all other variants of the rich-poor dichotomy. According to Friedmann the development potential of a given region or country is determined

by the stimulating effect of regional growth centres, the construction of infrastructure, and the provision of support from central areas to less developed regions. (Friedmann, 1966).

Recent coups in Africa

Gabon

Military officers in Gabon said they were seizing power Wednesday 30th August, 2023, just minutes after President Ali Bongo was declared the winner of a controversial election marred by violence and allegations of vote rigging. (TVC, News, 2023). The officers who appeared on state television Wednesday announced the closure of borders and dissolved state institutions including the Senate, National Assembly and Constitutional Court. They said in a later statement that Bongo was under house arrest. (Arise News, September, 2023).

Bongo, who was seeking a third term in office, came to power following the death of his father, Omar Bongo, in 2009, after more than four decades in power. Both men were key allies of the oil-rich country's former colonial power, France, and the family is believed to have amassed significant wealth — which is the subject of a judicial investigation in France. (Arise News, September, 2023). Gabon is generally considered more stable than other countries that have experienced unrest in recent years, but it now appears set to join a growing list of junta-led states — including Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan — that create a geographical belt of turmoil across sub-Saharan Africa.

Niger

Rebel soldiers in Niger deposed the country's Western-allied president, Mohamed Bazoum, on July 26, 2023 amid political upheaval, a rise in Islamist extremism and growing Russian influence across the region. (Arise News, September, 2023). This forceful change in administration by the military led to a fervent reaction by the international community such as Britain, France, Germany and the European Union, all announcing the end of aid to Niger after the ouster, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the United States could follow suit. So far, President Biden has not labelled the situation a coup. (Arise News, September, 2023). A key regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), said in

August that it was prepared for military intervention and had decided on a “D-Day” for intervention — though it did not give a date and said diplomacy was still possible. (ThisDay Newspaper, August, 2023)

Coup supporters in Niger’s capital, Niamey, as well as in neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali, have been spotted waving Russian flags, and experts say uncertainty around the coup leaders’ motivation may hamper Western attempts to restore Bazoum through diplomacy. The coup has also thrust the fate of Niger’s uranium to center stage as experts say European countries may have to grapple with the effects on the nuclear industry — especially in France, which evacuated European nationals from the country but has resisted an ultimatum from the coup leaders for its ambassador to leave. (TVC, News, 2023).

Burkina Faso

Two coups occurred in the country within the space of eight months in 2022, beginning with Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba’s overthrow of President Roch Kaboré in January. Damiba promised to restore the country’s security after a rise in attacks by Islamist extremists. In a counter coup, the current leader, Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, ousted Damiba in September 30, 2022 after a mutinous group of military leaders saw no improvement in quelling the violence, which led to the second coup, (BBC News, September, 2022). Captain Ibrahim Traore led the coup to become Burkina Faso’s new leader, deposing Paul Henri-Damiba, who had only come to power in January through his own coup. (Al Jazeera, October, 2022).

The Pentagon has stationed U.S. Green Berets in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso’s capital, and the State Department pays contractors to train the country’s forces, the Wall Street Journal reported, in the hope of countering a growing Islamist militant threat and the Russian mercenary Wagner Group’s influence in the region. (Wall Street Journal, September, 2022). The relationship between Burkina Faso and France is complicated, steeped in colonialism. Anti-French sentiment has been very visible in recent years. Something French President Emmanuel Macron has tried to tackle since his election in 2017. (Nicolas Haque, 2022).

Mali

The sudden overthrow of a democratically elected government in Mali in the spring of 2012 by a small group of military insurgents is symptomatic of the re-emerging pattern of coups d'état which have hit Africa in recent years. So it happened that in March 2012, after enjoying twenty years of constitutional democracy, Mali briefly fell under the control of a group of middle-ranking soldiers. The coup in Mali was immediately met by international condemnation, sanctions imposed by its neighbours, and the loss of northern Mali to Tuareg forces. The coup proved short-lived: on April 6, the junta agreed with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) negotiators to step down in exchange for an end to sanctions, and handed back power to the transitional government led by Dioncounda Traoré.

Led by Assimi Goïta, a group of Malian military leaders overthrew President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta on Aug. 18, 2020, after anti-government protests over corruption, pandemic management, the country's poor economy and ongoing security threats. International leaders and the U.N. Security Council condemned the coup, and the United States ended military assistance to Mali three days later. In early January 2021, the junta backed out of a September 2020 agreement to transition the country back to civilian elections after Bah N'daw was installed as interim president. In May 2021, Goïta staged another coup and remains in power today. (Maclean, 2022).

Guinea

Col. Mamady Doumbouya, the U.S.-trained commander of Guinea's special forces, ousted the country's first democratically elected president, Alpha Condé, in September 2021 after years of protests against Condé for altering the constitution to allow himself a third term and imprisoning opposition candidates. (Africanews, September, 2021). The United States condemned the coup and terminated military assistance, which had included sending small teams of U.S. Special Forces to train Guinean Special Forces. Amid criticism and ongoing

violent protests, Doumbouya agreed to return the country to civilian rule with a 24-month transition beginning in early 2023. (US-Institute of Peace, 2022)


Chad

After President Idriss Déby, who seized control in his own 1990 coup, was killed in a military operation against rebels on Chad's northern border in April 2021, the speaker of parliament should have ascended to the presidency. Instead, a military council took control and installed Déby's son, Gen. Mahamat Idriss Déby as president, leading to deadly protests in the capital. The elder Déby had been a Western ally against the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram, and the United States did not formally impose sanctions on the country after the unconstitutional transition of power.

Sudan

Sudanese Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized control of the country in 2021, ending a precarious power-sharing agreement between Sudan's government and military forces enacted after the military deposed President Omar Hassan al-Bashir in 2019 amid pro-democracy protests. In April, the Pentagon sent two warships to the Port of Sudan, and the United States evacuated hundreds of citizens from the devolving chaos that has resulted in hundreds of deaths and an impending human-rights crisis. (Arise News, 2021)

Military coups in Africa over the decades



Source: Research by Central Florida and Kentucky Universities

BBC

Finally, in West Africa most of the former French colonies are fallen apart from their erstwhile colonial pact and relations through coup, despite the presence of the French military in some of these countries, these coups kept on occurring, rightly or wrongly, showing they are either ending the French involvement or meddling into their country's affair. Russia has been masking her influence in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger because she does not have the loaded colonial past. At the heart of Russia's efforts to gain a foothold in West Africa is an organisation shrouded in secrecy. The Wagner Group, run by a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin; this is a group of mercenaries who provide fighters and military training to foreign countries. This could be Russia's return to Africa after the cold war.

Implications of the Resurgence of Military Coups for Nigeria's Economy Refugee Generation and Worsening Living Conditions

One of the effects of military coup is that worsen citizens living conditions through displacement. Military coups and wars in Africa have led to increasing numbers of refugees, and displaced people forced to move to more stable areas. Globally, there are more than 100 million forcibly displaced people including refugees, internally displaced persons and asylum seekers who have fled their homes to escape violence, conflict and persecution (UNCHR, 2021). The UNHCR states that 87,784 Nigerian refugees are found in other countries, while there are 1, 509 asylum seekers, 3,880 refugee returnees and about 3,167,581 IDPs in 2022 (UNCHR, 2022).

An estimated 44 million people across 15 countries in West Africa and the Sahel are facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023, according to the Food Security Information Network.⁸⁶ The FSIN says Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone met the criteria to be considered major crises in 2023. Conflict and insecurity was a main driver of acute food insecurity in Mali, Niger and Nigeria, while economic shocks tend to drive food insecurity in coastal countries. Food inflation has risen by 58% in Sierra Leone and 54% in Ghana between June 2022 and June 2023.⁸⁷ The removal of fuel subsidies in

Nigeria in mid-June has also contributed to inflation rising, and difficult conditions for citizens.

Economic Sanctions and Suspension of Membership in Regional Organizations

21st century military coups in Africa are usually accompanied by condemnation and sanction. Such decisions are often made as a response to the exacerbating political and security situation in countries hit by military coups. The supra regional organization, African Union and the continent's sub-regional regional blocs often impose political sanctions on states involved. In 2000, the AU's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), adopted the Lomé Declaration on the framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes of government, which defined four cases of unconstitutional change of (a democratically elected) government, namely, i) a military coup d'état; ii) an intervention by mercenaries; iii) a seizure of power by armed dissident groups and rebel movements; and iv) a refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power after free, fair and regular elections (European Parliamentarian, 2017).

In the most recent case, in Burkina Faso in 2015, the swift condemnation by the PSC ensured that the coup was short lived, proving the AU's commitment to its own principles. The AU's role has not been limited to sanctions. As a return to the situation preceding the coup is sometimes impossible, the AU insists on the organisation of free and fair elections within a clearly defined deadline as a prerequisite for the return to constitutional order. The African Union (AU)'s constitution condemns and rejects unconstitutional changes of governments. Article 30 of the constitution stipulates that "governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union." (African Union, 2017).

ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, has suspended Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger after their governments were overthrown by the military. In the immediate aftermath of each coup, ECOWAS also imposed sanctions and closed borders. It has also pushed military authorities to commit to a clear timeline to transition to an elected

civilian government. ECOWAS has taken a notably stronger line in response to coups since Nigerian President Tinubu became its chairman in early July 2023. At the time, he spoke strongly in support of democracy, saying the organisation must not sit as “toothless bulldogs” when military officers “turn their guns against civil authorities” (ECOWAS, 2023).

ECOWAS has since threatened the use of force against Niger. At a meeting on 10 August, ECOWAS said it remained determined to “keep all options on the table for a peaceful resolution of the crisis” and agreed to activate the ECOWAS standby force. ECOWAS ended the communique by underscoring its “continued commitment to the restoration of constitutional order through peaceful means” (ECOWAS, 2023).

Similarly, following the May 2021 coup d’état in Mali, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended the country’s membership and imposed sanctions against the junta. Guinea’s membership in ECOWAS was also suspended in the wake of the September 2021 military coup. The moves which have certainly raised concern and created uncertainty over the economic situation in the two countries; it negatively impacts the goals and plans for completing regional economic integrations as stipulated in ECOWAS protocol for free trade and movement of goods, persons and services. (ECOWAS, 2023).

Retarded Economic Development

Africa is struggling to achieve the goals of sustainable development set in the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which aims at building a strong and globally integrated and influential economy. (African Union, 2018) Additionally, Africa is keen on adopting peace and political stability as the backbone of these development aspirations through the Silencing the Guns. However, the political landscape across the continent is largely blocking efforts to carry out the development agenda through coup d’état.

The military coups witnessed in West Africa created tensions and instability in countries such as Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea, these coups distract leaders and even investors from investing huge resources, because of fear changing policies, these can prevent developing nations from coming to Africa and even Nigeria, the biggest economy in Africa.

Coups can stir instability in economic plans and some of the military administrators in decades past encouraged widespread financial corruption. In Nigeria for example, political tensions and coups between 1966 and 1998 underdeveloped the country's natural resources, and oil in particular; the military administrator plundered the resources and pushed the country to the top of the list of the most corrupt African countries, clear example was the era of Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha (BBC News, 2022).

Rise in Global Prices of Strategic Commodities

Political unrest caused by military coups in Africa slowed down main economic activities such as agriculture as witnessed between Nigeria and Niger, in August 2023, the oil industry and mining across the continent suffers supply shock when coups occur. Political parties or military/rebel groups fight for the control of these resources or disrupt supplies in order to place pressure on their opponents.

Rising prices and profit margins of crops: Cocoa prices, for example, would significantly increase whenever African producer countries are hit by political instability or military coups. Africa is the largest producer of cocoa with a share of two thirds of the global supplies. Destabilization in Mali, Niger, Gabon, Burkina Faso and other countries can affect cocoa production, supplies and prices from Western Nigeria and even Ghana. Majorly, Ivory Coast alone produces 50 percent of the continent's cocoa supplies. The Ivorian government and rebels used large revenues from cocoa exports to fund their military operations, thus prolonging political tensions, civil wars and coups which hit the countries over the years. The impact was a reduction in the production of this commodity, which was further exacerbated by destruction of farms and shortage of machinery. (Ikoku, 1985).

Increasing prices of industrial metals: The mining and quarry industry account for 20 percent of Africa's gross domestic product, and represents a major source of revenue for many African countries, especially Nigeria. African countries produce a significant share of diamond, gold, bauxite, tin, columbite and others. Guinea for example, is a major producer of

bauxite, used globally in producing aluminum, holding 26.4 per cent of the world's reserves and accounting for 22 percent of global production. (Oyeleye and Agbaje, 1991).

Trade and Investment Disruptions

Trade disruptions can result from factors like international conflicts, natural disasters, or global economic downturns. These disruptions can lead to reduced exports of Nigerian goods and increased prices for imported goods, affecting consumers and businesses. Nigeria as a country export huge raw materials to developed nations of Europe, USA and Asian countries too, vulnerability in West Africa through coup can impede trade relations with these global partners and even affect prices of her goods in the sub-region. Investment disruptions can occur if Nigeria experiences political instability, regulatory changes, or security issues. Foreign investors may become hesitant to invest in the country, which can slow down economic growth and job creation. Frequent changes in economic policies can create uncertainty for businesses. For instance, shifts in taxation, trade regulations, or monetary policies can affect business operations and profitability. Policy uncertainty can also hinder long-term planning, making it difficult for businesses to make strategic investments.

Impact on Foreign Relations and Aid

Nigeria's foreign relations play a crucial role in its economic well-being. Strained relations with key trading partners can lead to trade disruptions and reduced access to international markets. A decrease in foreign aid or assistance can impact Nigeria's ability to finance critical development projects, such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure.

The international and diplomatic implication of these coups is that insecurity caused by terrorist groups in the Sahel can push further south into Nigeria, which can destabilize further Nigeria's precarious security situations, displacement, trade dislocation and a further downward spiral of the nation's economic conditions. it can be deduced that abysmal performance of constitutional government and leadership gaps in nations like Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso and many other nations triggered conditions that questioned the rationale for continuous subscription of democracy in these states. (Omotola, 2022). In the last two

decades, the level of disillusionment has deepened. Essentially, disillusionment within this context emanates from abysmal performance of governments, injustice, lack of freedom, corruption, the disconnect between the rulers and the ruled and the failure of the state to judiciously perform her constitutional responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

It is important to conclude by stating that coup d'etat are contagious, the success of one coup can lead to similar coup in other countries-that may explain why between 2020 and 2023, more than six independent African states were in the throes of direct or indirect military rule. The recent resurgence of military coups in Africa are highly linked to mal-administration and failure of liberal democracy in Africa according to Akinshotokun, the D.G Labour Party Presidential Campaign (Arise News, 19th September, 2023, 8pm). Citizens of most African countries are wallowing in poverty and squalor and do not know where the next meal will come from, while the politicians and democratic leaders weaponize poverty and hunger for their undue continuation in power.

Recommendations

- i. With the growing concern over the resurgence of military coups in Africa and their potential implications for Nigeria's economy, it is imperative that both domestic and international stakeholders take proactive measures to safeguard the stability and prosperity of the Nigerian economy.
- ii. Strengthening Democratic Institutions: Nigeria should continue to strengthen its democratic institutions and processes. Upholding the principles of transparency, accountability, and free and fair elections will contribute to political stability and reduce the likelihood of military interventions;
- iii. Nigeria should collaborate with neighboring African countries and regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to collectively condemn military coups and ensure swift responses to such crises through diplomatic means.

- iv. Develop effective conflict resolution mechanisms and initiatives at the national and regional levels to address grievances and disputes peacefully, reducing the likelihood of military intervention as a means of resolving political crises.
- v. International Diplomacy: Nigeria should engage with international partners, including the United Nations and major global powers, to garner support for the protection of democratic values and discourage military takeovers in Africa.

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EFFECT OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY: A RANDOM GLOBAL OVERVIEW

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ABSTRACT

As the first casualty of political conflict is humanity, the pervading political conflicts in the contemporary international system, have demanded a sobering consideration, if the derailed long walk to global peace, will be put back on track. Although no nation in the global community is immune to the problems of political conflict, as well as other social challenges, it is ironical that in terms of intensity and scope, a lot still needs to be done. This paper examines the effects of political conflicts on national and international stability, and information is sought through secondary sources. The theoretical framework adopted is predicated on conflict theory, advanced by Karl Marx, who asserts that the Society is in a perpetual flux, on account of competing needs, over limited resources. Research revealed an avalanche of political conflicts, emanating from conflict of interest, identity conflict, ethnic and religious conflict, while power politics, is also discernible. It is therefore recommended that an ambitious scheme, to promote international peace, must be hosted by the United Nations Organization, through a greater emphasis on preventive Diplomacy and mediation. A review of article 2 of chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which weakens the UN's intervention in conflicts, must be undertaken, because resolution of conflict in the contemporary international system, has become more dynamic, pragmatic and controversial than ever.

Keywords: Contemporary International System, Humanity, Peace, Political Conflict

Introduction

Newton's Third law of motion states that for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Any discussion on global political conflict, must take into cognizance the strong view of Kissinger (1994:17), that "almost, as if according to some natural law, in every century, there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, as well as the intellectual and moral impetus, to shape the entire international system, in accordance with its own values". Paradoxically, as the political terrain in the wide world is inundated with actors, both state and non-state actors, there are likely groups that will feel suffocated or frustrated, even, in a society that may be assumed to be well organized. When such groups feel that their aim can never be achieved by such a system that is on ground, one logical sequence will be to resort to conflict, which may lead to heightened violence. The global society, over many decades ago, has been contending with a variety of governance styles, with undulating degrees of accommodation, leaving the global society tormented by political and social tensions.

Ideally, several satellite nations serving as vanguard of ideology groups, assist in dissemination of acrimonious political threats, waves of attack and issues that are inimical to peaceful co-existence. The persistence of the political conflict is an ominous signal for the global quest for political sanity, economic stability, social wellbeing, ethnic homogeneity, as well as the attainment of the long-term goal for global peace. All the talk of peaceful co-existence, emanating from the ideological camps, could not alter the fundamental reality, that the pre-eminent powers in the world, the United States and Russia, are ever locked in geopolitical competition, which has become a serious danger to international peace and security.

Although there is a litany of reasons, capable of promoting political conflicts, this paper intends to examine some issues germane to conflict of interest, identity conflict, Ethnic and religious conflicts as well as power politics. The paper takes off on an exposition of conflicts theory, first developed by Karl Marx who opines that society is in a stage of perpetual flux, on account of competing needs, over limited resources. It's a truism that conflict

anywhere, and under any guise, costs lives and liberty, and often fans out as a threat to peace and security, in the global community.

Theoretical Framework and Conceptional Clarification

This paper will adopt the phenomena of Conflict Theory, first developed by KARL MARX (<http://www.investopedia.com> terms). It seeks to explain the wide range of social phenomena, including wars revolution, poverty, discrimination and domestic conflict, as well as international violence.

Conflict theory focuses on the competition, among groups within a society, over limited resources. The theory views that the society is in the state of perpetual flux, on the account of ceaseless competition, over limited availability of needs. Conflict theory is invoked, to explain an avalanche of social conflicts, through historical narration.

It is the belief of some theorists, as Marx did, that social conflict is the force that ultimately drives changes and development, in human society. It alludes most of the fundamental evolutionary trends in human history, such as democracy and civil rights, to those capitalistic strives, to control the masses [distinct from the crave for social order].

The holistic views of conflict theory, can be gleaned through a perusal of the following concepts; Competition, Revolution, Structural inequality and War. A brief analysis of each concept is considered desirable:

Competition

By a simple meaning, it is the activity or condition of striving to gain or win something or establishing superiority over others. This can be through fair or foul means. In social terms, competition is a contest between people or groups of persons, for control over resources. In this definition, resources can have both literal and symbolic meaning. People can compete over tangible resources like land food and mates, but also over intangible resources, such as social capital. In economics, competition refers to the process by which various sellers try to offer better products, lower prices and other advantages, to choosing their wares over a rival.

Concerning the advent of revolution, Conflict Theorists are of the view that since conflict occurs between social classes, one outcome of this conflict is usually a revolutionary event. This is based on the idea that a change, in a power dynamic between groups, does not happen on the pretext of a gradual adaptation. Rather, it comes about, on the assumption of conflict between these groups.

Conflict theorists believe that conflict inherently exists between social classes and can lead to revolutions. Social inequality can cause revolutionary effect, where by groups with less power, find ways to go against the ruling class and take some of it back. This may cause shifts in the power dynamic, between social classes. Revolutions are typically large-scale events that occur suddenly and result in societal change. Looking at the concept of structural inequality, this is a condition where one category of people are given the attributes of an unequal status, in relation to other categories of people. This relationship is perpetuated and reinforced by a confluence of unequal relations in roles, functions, decisions, rights and opportunities. Structural inequality occurs when the fabric of organizations, institutions, governments or social networks contain an embedded cultural, linguistic, economic, religious belief, physical or identity-based bias, which provides advantages for some members, and marginalizes or produces disadvantages for other members. (Wikipedia Cited 15/11/23)

Concerning War, Conflict theorists tend to see war, as either a unifier, or a “cleanser” of societies. Conflict theorists see war as a result of a cumulative and growing conflict, between individuals and groups, and between societies. They contend that a society may become united in some ways, and in other ways, conflict could still become endemic. On the other hand, war may also result in the extermination of a society.

In order to obtain a credible resolve on the posers above, the concept of political conflict, will be sparsely attempted, to evoke a significant part of an intellectual discourse and critique on the patters, processes and possibilities of political life, attitudes and interactions between nations in the contemporary international system.

Political conflicts are disagreements, disputes or struggles between individuals, groups or nations, with opposing views, interests, or ideologies in political matters. These conflicts can manifest as debates, protests or even wars, and can arise from various issues, including power struggles, resource allocation, or differing political systems. Calming down our nerves are Akinboye & Ottoh (2005), who in their erudition, opine that conflict has remained a permanent feature in the life of a society, and citing Dahrendorf (1959), submit that whenever there is life, there is conflict. They add that in any social relations, conflict is assumed to be permanent, which has made the human society an anarchical one, since conflict occurs, even in the midst of co-operation among individuals or groups. The salutary of recurring conflicts compelled the modern society to institute laws, for the regulation of the emerging conflicts.

Therefore, as political conflicts, whether occurring within a country or in a multiple number of countries, witness a catalogue of deadly adversarial impacts on both national and international systems, this paper will explore such likely factors driving political conflicts.

Political Conflict of Interest

Political conflict of interest occurs when private interest of politicians or public Officials may compromise their ability to make impartial decisions in the public interest. There are many examples of political conflicts of interest, but for the sake of emphasis, we are taking two empirical local case studies. In the first republic, on the floor of the Western House of Assembly, on the 14th April, 1964 a motion of censure was tabled, against the N.N.D.P Government of the day, led by the Premier, Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, and his deputy, Chief Remi-Fani Kayode. The mover of the motion was Hon. I. Ositelu (Ikeja North), seconded by Honourable J.O Awopeju, (Ijebu Remo North) (Hansard, Western House of Assembly, 14th April, 1964).

Among the litany of allegations of conflict of interest against the Government, was the betrayal of the People of the Western Region by Akintola-led Government, to decipher personal interest, from his official obligation, as the Premier of the Western region, and father

of all. Having vowed on oath to protect the sub-ethnic groups that constitute the Western Region, he still went ahead, to undertake what was alleged to be a base recourse to sectionalism or sectional prejudice and interest, as political method and policy.

The Premier and his Deputy were accused of propounding the philosophy of the difference between the Yoruba and the Ijebu, and capped with the mass dismissal of Ijebus from Western Nigeria development Corporation, etc.

The second, considered worthy of preference, is another allegation that the Premier was allowing the members of his household, to engage in unwholesome competition against the product of a trade of industry of his own government. For instance, the Fanta industry by A.G Leventis was being advertised by members of his household, against the Mirinda and Pepsi Cola Industry owned by the Government of Western Region.

(Ref. Hansard, Western House of Assembly, Tuesday, 14th April 1964 Lack of confidence in NNDP Government).

Another dimension of political conflict is the territorial conflict which arises from the claims by two or more state, to a piece of land or water, that is, a situation whereby two or more states exhibit territorial ambitions which are difficult to reconcile (Reuck, 1996). The post-colonial Africa has witnessed more intense conflicts of interest, resulting from the struggle for territories and disagreement over boundaries. The artificial colonial boundaries were no longer acceptable to those states that are contiguous (Akinboye and Otto (2005).

The volatile impact of attempts at regaining territories lost to another state, which is regarded as irredentism, otherwise seen as another form of nationalism, often leads directly to serious interstate conflicts (Diehl, P.F, 1999). As a result of the value placed on territories, it has led to an avalanche of conflicts in the contemporary international arena. In fact, it will be difficult to contradict Milton Edwards and Hunch Cliffe (2008), who argue that some of the most enduring images of the twentieth Century have been generated by the Palestine- Israeli conflict of interest embracing several indices, capable of generating conflict of Interest. They assert that since the early roots of the conflict, the battle between Palestine and Israeli has been

about territoriality, identity, ethnicity and religion, economics, competing nationalisms, colonialism and imperialism (P.22). Despite being of the same Semitic origins, some liken the deep animosity between Palestinians and Israelis as due to competing nationalist agendas, while some others contend that the conflicts between them are really multifaceted.

Identity Conflict

Identity-based conflicts are based in people's psychology, culture, basic values, shared history and beliefs. Identity conflicts threaten people's basic needs and their survival. Worrisomely, these views tend to be more abstract, ambiguous and intangible. Identity refers to individuals' perception of themselves and their place, within a specific social or cultural group. They are often tied to their political and economic views, and affiliations, shaping their preferences on various issues. The Rwanda Bosnian and Cambodian episodes and others are classical and inexhaustible course studies.

Certain aspects of identities can create intense favours or destructive conflicts. If an identity has been heavily reinforced or is highly significant to someone, such as ethnicity or nationality, then threats to that identity can be hard to ignore. Cultural patterns in a group can create conflicts. Identity is used as a tool, to frame political claims, promote political ideologies or stimulate and orient social and political action, usually in a larger context of inequality of injustice, and with the aim of asserting groups distinctiveness and belonging and gaining power and recognition. (<http://en.m.wikipedia.org> cited 19-11-2023).

One of the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict goes back to the nineteenth century, when the Zionist movement conceived the idea of building a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. The project met with bitter opposition, on the part of the Arab population of the country.

Ethnic Conflict

Much as it relates to identity group, it also has ethnic colourization. From this perspective, as conflict scholars, (such as Albert 2001, 1999, Schmid, 2000) have identified ethnicity as a source of political conflict, a little detour into the sociological exposition of the concept, will

be sparsely attempted, for a little understanding of how ethnicity has impacted on our society and human behaviour.

Popenoe (2012) submits that it is difficult to develop a clear definition of ethnic groups. According to him, some people use the term to denote the people from a certain geographical area, such as the Irish. Sometimes, the term ethnic is used to mean people who speak the same language or have the same religion. A common sociological definition and the one given by Gordon (2012) which this paper will adopt, is that “an ethnic group is any group which is socially differentiated, has developed its own subculture, and has “a shared feeling of people-hood”.

Ironically, as the Middle East, remains the most troubled spot in the international community, where both the Arabs and Jews inhabit predominantly, it won't be out of place for curious people to explore what the Jews have in common, that united them as an ethnic group, strengthening their resolve to withstand unabated conflicts, over many decades. We may hazard a guess that their bond is their feeling of shared peoplehood of Jewishness. They regard themselves as the descendants of the biblical group of exiles and wanderers, who received the Ten commandments. They are a people who collectively recall the fate of their ancestors, the discrimination and persecution suffered in the hands of powerful oppressors, thousands of years ago. This little treatise will help to throw some highlights on why ethnicity predominantly, is a set of cultural, social, and psychological agents that can either strengthen conflict or douse tension.

While Gurr (2000) says that ethnic conflict is quite possibly the most important source of conflict in the numerous wars now occurring throughout the world, Goldstein and Pevehouse (2011), add that ethnic conflicts play a role in many international conflicts, and that ethnocentrism, based on an in-group bias, can promote intolerance and ultimately dehumanization of an out-group, as in genocides in Darfur (Sudan), Rwanda, and Bosnia, South African Apartheid, the persecution of Jews and other minorities in Nazi Germany and slavery in the United States (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2011:963). In their further elucidation

of the deadly impact of ethnic violence globally, Goldstein and pevehouse (2011), further put forth the bloody ethnic violence that erupted in Kenya in 2008, after a disputed presidential election, where a mob, from one ethnic group, attacked and drove away the members of a rival ethnic group from a formerly mixed town. Religion, taking its birth in the belief system, as a cause of political conflict deserves a space, however infinitesimal. Mimicking Appleby (2000), one reason ethnic conflicts often transcend material grievances, is that they find expressions as religion conflicts.

Religious Conflict

As religion is the core of a community's value system, in much of the world, people whose religious practices differ from others, usually look down on those other faiths, to the point of treating them with utmost disdain, and seeing them as unworthy of humanity. Although, there is nothing inherent in religion that mandates conflict, fundamentalist movements are a great menace, as they challenge the values and practices of secular political organizations, besides their own religious establishments. Worrisomely, the secular practices threatened by the fundamentalist movements, include the rules of the international system, which treat states as formally equal and sovereign, whether they are "believers" or "infidels". What remains conspicuous in the transnational belief system is that religions are often taken as a higher law than state laws, and international treaties. For example, Iran Islamist fundamentalists train and support militias in other states, such as Iraq and Lebanon. Appleby (2000) goes further by alluding to the Jewish fundamentalists, who build settlements in the Israeli-occupied territories, and vowed to cling to the land, even if their government evacuates it, in response to the UNO directive.

Power Politics

As political conflicts involve multi-dimensional aspects, and as each identified for discussion embraces inexhaustible issues, an attempt to shift our overviewing to power politics, as a veritable source of political conflict, will be randomly attempted. First, what is power politics?

Oxford Dictionary defines power politics as a political action by a person or group, which makes use of, or is intended to increase their power or influence. The concept of power politics provides a way of understanding systems of international relations. For instance, states compete for the world's limited resources, and it is to an individual state's advantage, to be manifestly able to harm others. Power politics, as revealed by Akinboye and Otto (2005:61), "constitutes an aspect of the power theory", which simply means politics of force or 'real politics'. Essentially, it refers to the conduct of international relations, by the use of force or the threat of force, without consideration for the right of justice. It explains a situation in which irrespective of the right or wrong of a case, one side obtains what it wants and the other accepts what it must.

Economic inequality is the unequal distribution of income and opportunity between different groups in society. This is a concern in almost all the countries around the world and often, people are trapped in poverty, with little chance to climb up the social ladder. Political repression is the act of a state entity controlling a citizenry by force, for political reasons, particularly for the purpose of restricting or preventing the citizenry's stability, to take part in the political life of a society, through which their standing amongst their fellow citizens is curtailed. Political repression is so widespread in the Western and Eastern world, and what comes to mind particularly, are the ongoing conflicts, that are witnessing loss of human lives could be gleaned from Russia/Ukraine debacle, Israeli/Palestine unending human carnage in Gaza, besides the checkmated but still smoldering repressions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Middle East to mention, but a few.

Sectarianism, which ordinarily is an excessive attachment to a particular sect or party, manifests in ethnic identity, class, or region for citizens of a state, including factions of a political party. This concept is a carry-over from the historical activities of the Middle Ages, but its reinforcement and acrimonious impacts in global governance of the contemporary era, calls for a reinforced political and social peace building education.

The global problems associated with environmental issues could be gleaned from deforestation, overgrazing, pollution and climate change. The combination of these vices could contribute to environmental degradation and lead to decreased crop yields and water shortages. These factors can all contribute to poverty, as people will be unable to produce enough food to feed their families. While these vices could be prevented through better practices, based on necessary enabling cautions, pioneered by education in a comprehensive manner. It is our candid view that only a sustained and meticulous conflict resolutions mechanisms could assist in overcoming the global challenges, posed to National and International Stability. As the United Nations Organization is the umbrellas under which international peace resolves, a random check on its activities will be attempted.

The United Nations Organizations

The United Nations is an International Organization founded in 1945. At the moment it is made up of 193 member states. The functions of the United Nations are guided by such purposes and principles specified in its founding Charter.

The institution has evolved over the decades and has been struggling to keep pace with a rapidly changing world. The UN is a grouping of states, and is therefore premised on the notion that states are the primary units in the international system. The Institutions of the UN reflect an uneasy hybrid, between traditions of great power consensus, and traditions of universalism, that stress the equality of states (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2017:331). In view of the enormous overseeing powers of the United Nations and its institutions, to nip disputes in the bud, what can then be their challenges in ensuring global stability? Perhaps, Goldstein and Pevehouse (2011) have a further solution to the inquisition. In a treatise, they over that the UN and its other International Organizations, have both strengths and weaknesses in the anarchic international system. State sovereignty creates a real impediment for such organizations on a practical level, because no central world government performs the function of coordinating the actions of states, for mutual benefit. Furthermore, state sovereignty also severely limits the power of the UN and other International Organizations, simply because, in

deference to the dictate of the Charter of the UN, governments reserve sovereign power to themselves, and are very reluctant to delegate it to the UN or anyone, else.

In view of these identified limitations, the UN has had a mixed record with these strengths and weaknesses, as in some ways, it is providing remarkable global management while in other ways, it is appearing helpless even, against tampering with the sovereignty of even modest-sized states (not to mention great powers (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2011:236). The UN Charter of 1945, which set down the procedures in its Chapter VI, for peacefully resolving disputes and threatening situations before getting out of hands and which made provisions for the restoration of peace in its Chapter VII, has no enforcement power in its resolution. In view of the lacing in the operation of the United Nations, and in the interest of global stability, this paper is putting up some recommendations, considered adaptable for enhancing national and International political stability.

Recommendations

This Paper is recommending a greater emphasis on preventive Diplomacy and Mediation as the most effective way to diminish human suffering and the massive economic costs of conflicts, as a starting point. The United Nations, which has been playing an important role in global conflict prevention, must be further empowered to be able to bite and not merely barking. A review of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter must be undertaken. Article 2 (7) states that the United Nations has no authority to intervene in matters, which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, while this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures, under chapter VII of the Charter. The actual resolution of conflict in the contemporary International System has become more dynamic, pragmatic and controversial than ever, and those who framed the Charter could never have envisaged the disturbing trend that instability continues to wreck on the global society. States often frustrate the prompt intervention of the United Nations prompt action, due to their invocation of sovereignty, which hinders external intervention, except with the express permission of states and perhaps, after harm might have been done.

Conclusion

The issue of political conflicts, as it affects national and international conflict, contains inexhaustible case studies. Resolution of conflicts which have ethnic, religions, power display and identity conflict, already discussed in the paper, often breed series of unanticipated political problems.

Although, it is difficult to manage but nonetheless, the tinkering with Chapter VII of the United Nations Organizations and its institutions, will reduce the rate of the global political problems, rampaging the global community. As the Middle East is perhaps the most volatile region in the world, where its instability is a persistent threat to global peace, which also serves as the incubator of much of the terrorism that is of such great concern to the global community, the opinion of Carter in “Palestine Peace Not Apartheid” (2007:205/206), that there are two inter related obstacles to permanent peace in the Middle East, deserves an attention. Carter (2007) submits that “Some Israelis believe they have the right to confiscate and colonize Arab land and try to justify the sustained subjugation and persecution of increasingly hopeless and aggravated Palestinians. And some Palestinians react by honouring suicide bombers as martyrs to be rewarded in Heaven, and consider the killing of Israelis as victories”.

As provocative and accurate as the impasse between Israel and Palestine represents, the only response to put an end to the continuing tragedy, as presently being witnessed in Gaza, is to reinvigorate the peace process, through negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. In what could be appropriately referred to as the lamentation of Carter, in one of his publications – Carter J. (2007) *The Blood of Abraham*, Carter painfully submits thus:

The Blood of Abraham, God’s father of the chosen, still flows in the veins of Arab, Jew and Christians, and too much of it has been spilled in grasping for the inheritance of the revered patriarch in the Middle East. The spilled blood in the Holy Land still cries out to God –an anguished cry for peace (2007:XV).

Similarly, if the acrimony embedded in International Politics is set aside, and the United Nations Organization is given the necessary empowerment, which the sovereignty of nations creates, as a stumbling block for the effectiveness of the UN actions, the other conflict

zones of the world, like Ukraine, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sahel, Iran including Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, including the Gaza Conflict, and other areas, can be effectively attended to, by the long arm of the United Nations Organization. These conflicts, which have serious effects internationally will be checkmated by the amendment to Chapter VII of UN Charter.

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ETHNO-RELIGIOUS POLITICS AND VOTING PATTERN IN NIGERIA'S ELECTIONS: 1999-2023

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ABSTRACT

The politics of religion, region and ethnicity have permeated Nigeria's political landscape to the detriment of social relations, voting pattern and legitimate democracy. The history of voting pattern in Nigeria has shown that since the First Republic, primordial sentiments have been the influencing factors in determining the voting pattern in Nigeria. Politicians and adherents of religious movements; regional and ethnic groups have used religion, regional and ethnic platforms to achieve political ambitions, thereby promoting ethno-religious groupism in Nigeria. This study examines the influence of religion, region and ethnicity on the voting patterns of the Nigerian electorate, especially in the Fourth Republic. It employed the exploratory, qualitative research design, using thematic analysis to analyse data collected from secondary sources of published and unpublished articles, journals and online resources. Findings revealed that general elections in Nigeria are usually marred by dominance of ethno-religious sentiments as determinants of voting behaviour and political participation across the country. The study concludes that the political behaviour of the electorate and voting pattern is largely determined by religious affiliation, ethnicity, regionalism and related primordial other issue-based politics. It is recommended that the reports of the 2014 Constitutional conference on the rotation of the office of the President among the six geo-political zones should be implemented. This would ensure a level playing ground for the various constituent members across ethnic, religious and regional divides in the country.

Keywords: Religion, Regionalism, Ethnicity, Voting Pattern and Politics.

Introduction

Within the context of its plural composition, Nigeria's political history has witnessed the employment of religious, regional and ethnic instruments by politicians to achieve personal ambitions. Consequently, this has affected the voting patterns in Nigeria's elections.

Democratic developments and elections have been characterized by a political behaviour of rigging, the manipulation of religion, ethnicity, regionalism and nepotism as rightly observed by Olayode (2015), Metumara (2010) and Rufai (2011). Voting pattern during elections is based on voters' affinity with leaders that belong to the same religious groups, ethnic cleavages, region and other sentiments. The Fourth Republic (1999-2023) elections are noted by the outrageous voting display of impunity, religious bias, ethnicity, regionalism, tribalism and violent rigging. The voting pattern is also based on the above characteristics instead of issue-based campaign and elections. The voters are not mindful of credibility, effectiveness and outstanding record of candidates' performance instead they enfranchise their rights on the basis of ethnic, regional and religious affiliation or belongingness.

The 1993 elections which had a Presidential Muslim-Muslim ticket of Abiola/Babagana Kinjibe witnessed a campaign of calumny. Ihonvbere (1999, p.115) opined that NRC campaigned that an Abiola presidency will impose Islam on Nigeria with the tendency to marginalize the Christians. The Christian community further accused the SDP of not respecting the religious sensitivity of the country with a Muslim-Muslim ticket. It was depleted in 2019 and 2023 general elections. Thom-Otuya (2016, p.62) reiterated that 'our election into leadership or political offices is engulfed by cheating, fraud and violence. Any contestant who is rigged out of election is always frustrated and can easily rebel against the society due to injustice'. This situation could be worsened if both rivals belong to different religious organizations as noticed in the northern part of Nigeria in 2011 when a Christian defeated a Muslim opponent.

The dominant perception of politics and governance in Nigeria is that political positions are means of self-enrichment rather than calls to national service (Oladipo, 2000). This suggests why people go to the extent of unnecessarily using religion, region and ethnic advantage and grouping to achieve their political ambitions. Religion, region and ethnicity play major roles as sources of identity in the polity than national identity in Nigeria (Opeyemi,

2016), and many politicians and electorates allow them to become determinant factors in their voting pattern.

According to Dung (2017), there are several factors which influence voting behaviour or pattern in Nigeria. They include: party identification model, social structure model, dominant ideological model and rational choice model. Others are ethno-religious factors, money-politics and vote-buying, perception of voters on political corruption, party ideology and affiliation; these and others have combined to affect the voting pattern and entire democratic process in Nigeria (Oloyede, 2015; Ibrahim, 2015; Owen & Usman, 2015; Anejionu et al, 2016; Ukase, 2016; Lawal, 2016; and Nwobashi & Itumo, 2017; Alfa and Marangos, 2016).

This study therefore examines the influence of religion, region and ethnicity on the voting patterns of the Nigerian electorate, especially in the Fourth Republic. It employed the exploratory, qualitative research design, using thematic analysis to analyze data collected from secondary sources of published and unpublished articles, journals and online resources.

Conceptual Clarifications

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is more than just the composition of language, culture and history; it is about perception of identity by groups, family and community or attribution by outsiders (Agara & Ibebunjo, 2022). The feelings that one's social group or ethnic group has been marginalized due to preference given to an ethnic group against others simply defines ethnicity. Ethnicity is one of the keys to understanding Nigeria's pluralistic society. It distinguishes groupings of people who for historical reasons have come to be seen as distinctive by themselves and others on the basis of locational origins and a series of other cultural markers. Ethnicity results from mere classification of people by others and it is assigned "according to the requirements of the classifiers" (Fowler, 1991; Staub, 1989 & Eriksen, 1996 p.8). Hence, "ethnic boundaries are between whoever people think they are between" (Fardon, 1987, p.176).

It is pertinent to note that the present Nigerian political system evolved from the British colonialist constitutions, particularly the Bourdillion constitution of 1939 created a platform for regional government. The colonial masters encouraged ethnicity in Nigeria, through their divide and rule policies. The 1946 Richard constitution divided the country into three regions, namely North, East and West without laying emphasis on the heterogeneous, multicultural and diversity of the nation. Political parties that were formed then were thus based on the various regions created by the colonial masters. Scholars of Nigerian politics (Alfa, M. & Marangos, J. 2016) have insisted that the issue of ethnicity and inter-ethnic competition for federal power have always influenced the voting behavior of the electorates in Nigeria. Three competing schools of thought have dominated the interpretations of the link between ethnic solidarity and the proclivity of voting pattern.

First, the primordialists see ethnicity as historically rooted and embedded in people's way of life and culture, and enforced by social institutions, collective myths and memories-developed from early socialization, and hence likely to continue over time. Second, instrumentalists perceive ethnicity as a platform for the trailing, mobilization, exploitation and manipulation to achieve individuals and groups vested interests. Third, social constructionists portray ethnicity as an invention of the human imagination, an intellectual construct devoid of objective realities (Agara, & Ibebunjo, 2022). In whichever ways, ethnicity plays a major role in the voters' behaviour and voting pattern in Nigerian elections. The negative role of ethnicity in Nigerian politics has affected the development of a nascent democracy because of its disintegrative impact on national unity.

Religion

There is no generally accepted definition of religion in scholarship. However, religion can be seen as a range of social-cultural systems, including designated behaviours and practices, morals, beliefs, sacred places, ethics or organizations, which generally relate humanity to supernatural and spiritual elements (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). Religion brings different people together. Religion is the worship of the supernatural; and it derives its force from man's

observation that nature or the unseen appears so powerful, harsh and unfriendly. He therefore seeks harmony with it through prayers, worship and adulation (Ejituwu, 1995: p.97). According to Jacobsson and Lindblom (2016, p.78), Durheim posits that the role of the sacred in all societies makes “elementary forms of religious life pervade collective life to the extent that there is basic division of the world into the sacred and profane, the former being the shared sacrosanct ideals that unite a group, the symbols that represent it, and collective rites that strengthen group allegiance, and generate the capacity to act in unison”.

Vaughan (2016) writing on the role and politicization of religion advanced that the divisiveness of religion manifests in its politicization, becoming a tool of struggle for the control of Nigeria state across religious boundaries, and this is rooted in the people’s strong allegiance to religious affiliations than political parties. Hence, Opeyemi (2016) is of the opinion that the bond between politicians and religious leaders are inseparable in Nigeria. As long as elections in Nigeria are stage-based on the primordial sentiments, the electorates will be without the basics of political culture which will strengthen their determination of the choice of voting. Ethnicity, religion and regionalism become tools for acquisition of, sustenance and consolidation of political power at the Centre, in Nigeria. The table below indicates how politicization of religion in Nigeria creates negative perception and its consequences in the table below.

Table 1: Perception and Consequences of Religionization of Politics in Nigeria

S/N	Perception	Consequence
1.	People see religion as a tool for political benefit	Endorsement of wrong candidates/vote-buying.
2.	It makes people think politicians are more important than religious groups.	Motivates people to go beyond the boundary between politics and religion.
3.	It portrays religion as a business.	Vote-buying.
4.	Politicians think it is possible to hijack religion to create division in society.	Religious intolerance and disunity in the Country.

5 .	People think that electioneering is an opportunity for religious groups to capture power for the benefit of their adherents and to demonstrate superiority.	Threat to other religious groups.
6 .	It portrays religion as a platform for unhealthy rivalry.	Perception of hostility.
7 .	The involvement of politicians with different religious affiliations means mutual suspicion.	Electoral violence and hate speech.
8 .	Political power determines the destinies of people rather than the supernatural, and God is indifferent to the political mismanagement of national wealth.	Struggle for power, vote-buying, and endemic corruption.
9 .	Politicians know that religion is the easiest tool to use to get sympathy from their followers	Religious conflicts during elections.
1 0	It makes followers think that a person of the same faith as them can govern better than others, thereby causing conflicts among different group.	Religious intolerance.

Source: Okolie-Osemene (2021).

Abimbola (2010, p.103) argued that it is a core value of Islam never to allow other religion to coexist together. Islam religion does not separate the state from the religion; therefore, the adherents tend to transform the state into an Islamic state by every means. This suggests the reason behind the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The Boko Haram sect perceives Nigeria as a by-product of western imperialism and its antics promoted through Christianity. Therefore, Boko Haram sect consider the existence of Nigeria as a secular state, permitting the operation of various religions and their philosophies as antithesis to Islam. In light of the following the voting pattern and dynamics during elections in the period purview has always been influenced by competitive tendency of the two main religions in Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopted Rational Choice Theory, propounded by Downs (1957) and Arrow (1986). The rational choice theory of elections postulates that political behaviour and voting pattern of the electorates is a rational choice determined by certain indicators, such as economic benefit, resource allocation, distribution of goods and services, allocation of juicy political offices and favour (Downs, 1957; Arrow, 1986). The theory is either an evaluative or non-evaluative discourse. When the rationality is based on performance measurement, it becomes evaluative because of the process of measuring and evaluating the regimes performance to determine whether the candidates deserve voter's choice or not.

The clientelistic considerations, such as favouritism, patronage, ethnicity, religion, regionalism and family-ties are non-evaluative aspect of rational choice theory. It is primarily sentimental and emotive. The theorists are of the opinion that elections in African countries, more especially Nigeria are mostly considered on clientelistic rationalism where the ethnic, religious and regional cleavages are determinants of voting pattern. They also identified what they termed "Swing votes" in developing democracies, where they asserted that ethnic, religious, patronage and clientelistic satisfaction of the voters when measured with evaluation of performance of the leaders in office can influence the voting pattern of any election. It is evidenced that both 2015 and 2019 presidential elections were greatly being influenced by ethno-religious sentiments. Therefore, by this implication the voting pattern in Nigerian elections is mostly being influenced by the non-evaluative form of rational choice theory.

Dynamics of Voting Pattern in Nigeria Democratic Process

Every polity exists with a belief system inherent in the people. The greatness of any nation is a product of the political culture and behaviour (beliefs, dispositions and orientations) which is prevalent in that society (Chandra, 2007). The acceptance of any political regime as legitimate is determined by the primordial orientation of the citizens of a given political community towards politics. Therefore, political culture is a pattern of shared values, moral norms, beliefs, expectations and attitudes that relate to politics and its social context.

According to Chandra (2007), political culture involves the understanding and the commitment of a people to a shared way of organizing a political society. He further observed that political culture is broader than public opinion because it is transcendent and enduring. In the Nigerian political culture, it is difficult to separate the behaviour of the electorates from the influence of history, as traceable to the impact of the colonial rule. The development of political system in Nigeria still hinges on the platforms created by her colonial masters. As Ojie (2006) has rightly said:

the inherent colonial legacies of merging multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups to form the present-day Nigeria gave the political elites the chance of usurpation of ethnic and religious variables in Nigeria's democracy towards their quest for power and this has made the political behaviour and voting pattern of the electorates to be divisive and sentimental towards the elite's manipulation of ethnicity and religion (Ojie, 2006: p.23).

Political behaviour and voting pattern in Nigeria are affected by an amalgam of rival ethnic groups that were set against each other in a fierce rivalry in a struggle for power and competition for control of scarce resources and this has been visible in the electoral processes, and sometimes even threatens the corporate existence of the nation. Dung (2017) identified some major factors that influence the voting behaviour in Nigeria to include: social structure model, party identification model, dominant ideological model and rational choice model. The social structure model emphasizes the voting behaviour which is affected by social group membership or affiliation. This is evident in Nigerian context where every citizen belongs to one religious association, ethnic group or regional affiliation. Of course, the pluralistic nature of Nigerian society and the constitutional right of "freedom of association" is an enabling ground. Affinity to a particular social group becomes an added advantage for any politician to receive votes from his/her group members, as it is perceived that the winner of the election will advance the course of that social group and the members will become benefactors of the political regime.

Most political campaigns are in the rural areas where greater percentage of the electorate are social group based. Politicians use their local languages to convince voters and

lure their votes based on religious and ethnic affinity. The Muslims use their mosques to influence their members, while the Christians on their own part openly request that votes must be cast along religious lines. Party identification informs voters' decision based on partisanship. Each party member is by his/her political allegiance expected to vote for candidates of their party. It is also important to note that party affiliation does not pay much in Nigerian political behaviour except with unswerving loyalty based on sentimental attachment. The rational choice model emphasizes the essence of evaluation, where issue-based and policy designs of political parties are determinants of voters' choice of voting. Voters evaluate the dominant ideologies of the candidates and then rationally chose who to vote for. It is vital to note that common voter in Nigerian elections has no rationality in choice as they tend to sentimental voting.

General elections are generally marred by dominance of ethno-religious sentiments as determinants of voting behaviour and political participation across the country. From the presidential through gubernatorial, national and state assemblies' elections, aspirants were largely chosen on the basis of ethno-regional identities (Sule, Sani & Mat 2017). This has been the culture in Nigerian elections where votes are allotted according to ethnic allegiance and religious sentiments by each particular section or group in the country where their candidates emerge irrespective of whether he will win through their votes or he will loss (Lenshie, 2014). Political behaviour and elections in Nigeria are affected by poor institutionalisation of democratic values and culture. Consequently, inter-ethnic competition or tribalism is a great weakness which leads to instability in Nigeria's democracy.

Agbu (2004) in his study of political culture and voting behaviour of Nigerian voters advanced that ethnic militias turned into a constituted authority and an unofficial threat to the electoral process and democratic development in the country. He observed that, as a result of the entrenchment of the politics of ethnicity and regionalism, the three main ethnic groups and regions Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba dominating North, West and East formed a culture of establishing ethnic militias who became violent and intimidating during elections prompting

for candidates of their ethnic belonging. Thus, voting pattern is forcefully imposed regionally by these thugs. The case study of the disenfranchisement of voters in Lagos State during the 2023 gubernatorial election simply explains this incidence.

Apart from ethnicity, region and religion, other factors that determine political behaviour and voting pattern of electorates in Nigeria are rigging of elections, Prebendalism, manipulation and political violence. Nigerian democracy is identified as Prebendel where the leaders who control power use every means possible to maintain power at all cost while those outside the corridors of power are using every available means possible to capture power all for selfish interest. This, include massive rigging of elections, intimidation and harassment of voters and opposition, manipulation of electoral process, vote buying, use of political thugs, political assassination, corrupt practices etc. This has been the norm for many decades to the extent that voters either vote towards that process or abscond away from the election process there by rendering democracy absurd with electorates not determining who will lead.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In spite of the fact that there is constant emphasis on the need for the citizens of this nation to put efforts in promoting national interest above ethnic, regional and religious interests, yet there is no politician in Nigeria who will win an election devoid of the support of members of his/her ethno-religious affiliation because of ethno-religious sentiments. Hence, politicians tend to give prioritized attention to the needs of their ethnic nationalities at the detriment of the national interest. Unfortunately, this groupism promotes the activities of anti-democratic forces and creates a platform for the democratic under-development and sectionalism in Nigeria.

The study recommends that since election winning is a game of numbers, an enabling platform should be created to enable both the minority and majority ethnic groups to produce the President of Nigeria, by implementing the recommendation of 2014 Constitutional conference on the rotation of the office of the President among the six geo-political zones; and a conscious and deliberate orientation programme be evolved that is aimed at transforming the

citizenry from the primordialistic mentality of ethnic and religious bigotry; this will eliminate the voting pattern that is influenced by religion, region and ethnic differences.

The study also suggests that politicians in Nigeria should make paradigm shift from the colonial political system in formation of party and create political ideologies that will suite the plurality of Nigerian society, as to build national cohesion, integration and socio-economic development that is not basically on ethnicity, region and religion.

The religious leaders should focus on morality of the members, more than financial benefits, as proposed by a friend, when politicians come to seek our prayers and votes, religious leaders should rather speak to their consciences than praying for their successes. There must be deliberate and constant efforts to restore the right societal values, in all strata of Nigerian society.

The Power of the people which is an essential in democracy must be reclaimed by Nigerian citizenry. Given the foregoing, it is recommended that the electoral umpire called INEC should be overhauled, and if possible, nullify the ‘act’ that allows the appointment of the Chairman by the President to give way to the leadership grow-up, like the civil and public service.

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**APPRAISING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC COMPLAINTS COMMISSION IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PROMOTION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN
KWARA STATE, NIGERIA: 2015- 2020**

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ABSTRACT

This study examined the role of Public Complaints Commission in Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Good Governance in Kwara State, Nigeria, 2015- 2020. The study adopts the structural functional theory as its theoretical framework. Survey research design was utilized and focus was on Public Complaints Commission Kwara State. Sample size of 400 respondents was determined using Yamane's formula, and data were collected using primary and secondary sources. The findings of the study reveal that Public Complaints Commission Kwara State employs Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms, particularly mediation and other inquisitorial methods in resolving conflicts. The study also found that the Commission's conflict resolution methods were effective during the period under review. However, findings highlighted inadequate funding, logistical challenges, insufficient staff training, poor welfare, limited public awareness and weak legal framework as factors hindering the optimal performance of the Commission in Kwara State. The study concludes that the Public Complaints Commission plays a critical role in resolving conflicts which brings about social stability, justice, fairness, transparency and accountability which are all indicators of good governance. The study recommends public enlightenment campaigns to promote awareness and understanding on the activities of the Commission, adequate funding by the Federal Government, review of legal framework by the National Assembly, and appointing committed personnel with improved remuneration, working conditions and capacity building opportunities.

Keywords: Public Complaints Commission, Conflict Resolution, Governance

Introduction

The Ombudsman was founded by the Swedish Parliament in 1809 to investigate public complaints about administrative officers' abuse of power and to provide or suggest remedies and relief to ordinary individuals. This system was adopted by Finland in 1909, followed by

Denmark in 1953 and Norway in 1963. Following that, it was adopted by numerous Commonwealth countries under various titles. For example, the United Kingdom and New Zealand adopted the system under the term 'Parliamentary Commissioner'. In India, it is known as the 'People's Protector' (Lok Pal and Lok Ayukta) and in Nigeria, it is known as the 'Public Complaints Commission' (Danladi, 2016; Hilhorst et al., 2018).

The Public Complaints Commission is a type of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism in Nigeria that is used to resolve conflicts between citizens and governmental agencies (Olanipekun, 2015). It was set up to provide an alternative means of seeking redress for aggrieved citizens who had no means to institute legal action in Court against actions and inactions of Government Officials in the Federal, State and Local Governments. The mandate is also extended to cover Incorporated Companies registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA). Through the use of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) methods of mediation, arbitration, and conciliation, it provides the complainant with easy, amicable, and appropriate grounds for mediation, bargaining, and reconciliation. The mandate of the Commission is created in such a way that the citizens especially those at the grassroots of the society are the highest beneficiaries as they get justice without any cost. The Public Complaints Commission's actions are based on the principles of law, justice, and fairness which are indicators of good governance. Therefore, the Commission was established to strengthen democracy through good administration which leads to good governance of the society.

However, over the years, there have been growing concerns over several infractions and abuse of citizens' rights by government establishments and corporate organizations. These include unlawful sack of workers, non-payment of retirement benefits and pension of workers, unpaid worker's salary amongst others. This development amounts to gross abuse of power, injustice and maladministration. For instance, the summary of annual operational statistics of complaints received and resolved in the 37 State Offices and Headquarters shows that the total number of cases received by the Commission between 2018 and 2019 was 130,033, out of

which 45,412 (35%) were resolved and 84,621 (65%) were pending (Public Complaints Commission Headquarters Annual Report, 2018 & 2019).

This raises concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of the method of conflict resolution employed by the Public Complaints Commission. In light of these concerns, this study seeks to investigate role of Public Complaints Commission in Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Good Governance in Kwara State, between the period of 2015-2020. To achieve the main purpose of the study, the study specifically seeks;

1. To find out the conflict resolution methods employed by the Public Complaints Commission in Kwara State.
2. To determine the effectiveness of the method of conflict resolution employed by the Public Complaints Commission in Kwara State.
3. To find identify the factors hindering the optimal performance of Public Complaints Commission Kwara state in conflict resolution.

The study is organized into five sections. Section one provides an introduction to the study. Section two contains the conceptual review, empirical studies and theoretical framework. The methodology is the focus of section three. In section four, the data collected were presented, analysed and findings were discussed. Section five concludes the paper and provides recommendations.

Conceptual Review

Ombudsman

An Ombudsman is a person appointed or elected by the legislature to investigate citizen complaints about administrative acts or decisions made by government agencies from which the ombudsman is independent, and who makes recommendations to the legislature as an officer of that body (International Ombudsman Institute, n.d.). The role of Ombudsman institutions according to Alemika (2015) are to promote and protect rights of the individual, promote more efficient public administration, provide a cost-effective dispute resolution process, serve as a bridge between the government and the public, strengthen cooperation

rather than litigation, as well as provide increased public access to dispute resolution. Amollo (2015) emphasize that the principal mission of the Ombudsman is to protect the public from the abuse of power by public offices and officers. The role of the Ombudsman in broader terms is to defend and promote human rights, serves as a democratic control system for the bureaucracy, serve as a channel for redressing grievances about administrative inequity and provides a tool for combating bureau-pathologies.

In Nigeria, the Federal Government created the Public Complaints Commission to investigate citizen complaints of unfairness, corruption, unfair treatment, and abuse of office by public officials. The Commission was established to investigate such situations and make recommendations for disciplinary or corrective action (Ikenwa, 2019). The Commission operates as a single body with headquarters in Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria. The Commission has 37 States Offices spread across the 36 States of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory. It also has Area Offices in each States of the Federation. The Public Complaints Commission is therefore autonomous of the government, being responsible for ensuring that administrative practices and services of public bodies are fair, reasonable, appropriate, and equitable, and being able to conduct non-threatening confidential investigations and protect complainants from retaliation.

Table 1: Summary of Annual Operational Statistics of Complaints Received and Resolved by Public Complaints Commission, Kwara State, 2015-2020

Year	Total No. of Cases Received	Total No. of Cases Resolved	Total No. of Cases Pending
2015	484	403 (83%)	81 (17%)
2016	554	424 (77%)	130 (23%)
2017	750	655 (87%)	95 (13%)
2018	782	699 (89%)	83 (11%)
2019	835	671 (80%)	164 (20%)
2020	510	313 (61%)	197 (39%)
Total	3,915	3,165 (81%)	750 (19%)

Source: Public Complaints Commission, Kwara State Annual Report of 2015 - 2020.

Table 1 indicates the summary of operational statistics of complaints received and resolved by Public Complaints Commission, Kwara State between 2015-2020. Over the six-year period under review, the total number of cases received by the Kwara State Public Complaints Commission was 3,915. Out of the total number of cases received, 3,165 cases, representing 81% were successfully resolved, while the total cases pending were 750 representing 19%. The table also shows the trend in the resolution of cases over the years. For instance, in 2018, 89% of the total number of cases were resolved, however this gradually declined in the subsequent years, with the lowest rate of 61% recorded in the year 2020.

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is a precursor to development. It harps on the idea that conflict is unavoidable in all aspects of human life. Conflict resolution therefore refers to the tactics and activities involved in aiding the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Wallenstein, 2018). Ujagare and Malappurath (2020) asserts that conflict resolution involves terminating conflict through methods that are analytical and that get to the root of the problem. Conflict resolution is therefore a process that allows two or more parties to work out a peaceful solution to their differences through the different conflict resolution methods. Conflict resolution methods are the instruments and methods for facilitating or enhancing increased security and stability, as well as resolving existing conflicts.

Good Governance

Governance in the context of a modern nation-state is about providing for the fundamental needs and aspirations of citizens, through governmental institutions and processes (Jega, 2021). Agbodike, Osawe and Igbokwe-Ibeto (2015) views governance as the responsible use of state resources and power to accomplish and promote the well-being of citizens. Good governance therefore entails the proper exercise of authority, the ability to solve problems and resolve conflicts, the ability to effectively manage resources for development, and a high level of responsiveness to citizens' demands and interests (Otoghile, Igbafe & Aghontaen, 2014). The indicators of good governance according to the United Nations (2016) are "participation,

rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus-oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability”. The concept of good governance therefore harps on rule of law, justice, equity, and fairness, which the Public Complaints Commission seeks to achieve through conflict resolution.

A just and peaceful resolution of conflict is necessary for good governance. According to Alasow and Bilgin (2020), societies characterized by greater participation, accountability, transparency and equity, particularly among public officers and authoritative bodies, tend to exhibit higher the degree of good governance and effective conflict resolution. Miall (2003) stresses the integral role of conflict prevention in societies governed by principles of good governance, asserting that legitimate institutions provide an established procedure for resolving conflicts over resources, values and authority without resorting to violence.

Empirical Review

A study was conducted by Akpa, Achanya and Cinjel (2020) to assess the influence and challenges of the Public Complaints Commission in redressing administrative injustice in Nigeria between 2007-2017. The study adopts the institutional theory to evaluate the effectiveness of the institution. The study collected data from both primary and secondary sources. The findings of the study showed that there is a gap in the existing legal framework of the Public Complaints Commission. The finding also highlights lack of independence, inadequate powers to implement its recommendations and decisions, and lack of a well-equipped complaints management system as obstacles to the effectiveness of the Commission. The study recommends amendment of the existing legal framework to enable the Commission enforce decisions and ensure its independence.

In another study, Moshood, Oladele and Mosobolaji (2019) investigated the function of the Public Complaints Commission in redressing injustice in Oyo State, Nigeria. The study adopts the social justice and utilitarian theories as its theoretical framework. The study used the survey approach, and employed both primary and secondary source of data. The study found that the Public Complaints Commission possess the necessary investigative powers to

address to address administrative injustices faced by citizens in Oyo State. However, its effectiveness is hampered by inadequate funding and lack of public awareness regarding its activities. To enhance the effectiveness of the Commission, the study recommends adequate funding, increased public awareness, review the of powers of the Commission and appointing technocrats to take charge of its affairs.

In a comparative study, Igwenyi et al. (2020) evaluated the Ombudsman systems in Nigeria, the United Kingdom and Russia. The study identified some of the bottlenecks confronting the Public Complaints Commission in Nigeria, including inability to enforce judgements, financial constraints and administrative failures. The study highlights that the Russian Ombudsman works better than that of Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical underpinning for this study is the Structural Functional Theory. The structural functionalism theory has its origin in the works of Emile Durkheim (1893) who was particularly concerned on how society remained relatively stable. Other notable theorists include Herbert Spencer (1896), Robert Merton (1949) & Talcot Parsons (1977). The functionalism theory emphasizes the notion of organic relationship between the different structures or units that exist in a system. The theory posits that the society consists of both structures and functions that are interconnected and interdependent.

As a result, these structures must function effectively to maintain societal equilibrium and meet the needs of the system. Therefore, any flaw in one area of the system causes issues, imbalances, and prevents the desired end (Udenta, 2009). The use of structural-functional theory in this study is motivated by its ability to provide a systematic explanation of the fundamental variables investigated. The Public Complaints Commission is regarded as an integral structure within the system which aims to resolve conflicts to promote peace, stability and good governance in the society.

Therefore, the theory is very appropriate and relevant because;

- a. It looks at every aspect of the activities of Public Complaints Commission, how it functions and how that helps society function.
- b. It also aids in the integration of all areas of the Public Complaints Commission in order to address the demands of persons in society.
- c. It also shows us how the activities of Public Complaints Commission helped to stabilize society through conflict resolution which leads to good governance.

However, the structural-functional theory did not escape criticisms. The theory was criticized for using the society and institutions as the primary unit of analysis. The theory was also criticized for over-emphasizing the importance of integration within the system, while downplaying the role the individual and agency in the system (Giddens, 1979). However, despite these inadequacies, the theory is still considered very relevant for the purpose of analysis of in this study.

Methodology

The study adopts the descriptive survey research design, focusing on Public Complaints Commission Kwara State. The target population of the study comprises Public Servants in Kwara State Ministries, Departments and Agencies; and employees in Local Government Councils of Kwara State. Kwara State has 29 Ministries, Departments and Agencies with a population of 8,995, and 16 Local Government Councils Staff with a population of 11,017, totalling 20,012 (Office of Kwara State Head of Service; and Kwara State Local Government Service Commission, 2021).

To arrive at the sample for this study, mixed methods sampling techniques was used. First, simple random sampling technique was used to select four (4) Ministries Departments and Agencies and six (6) Local Government Councils. The selected MDAs are Ministry of Communication, Office of Head of Service, Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs and Ministry of Education and Human Capital Development; while the selected LGs are Ifelodun, Ilorin East, Ilorin South, Kaiama, Moro and Offa Local Government Areas. Second, the four (4) selected Ministries Departments and Agencies and six (6) Local

Government Councils were divided into different strata of Departments using stratified sampling technique. Thereafter, sample size of 392 was chosen at $\pm 5\%$ precision level using Yamane's Published Table and applying Yamane's Formula. However, the researcher rounded it up to 400 to make up for non-response, unreturned and, poorly completed questionnaires.

In collecting data for the research, both primary and secondary sources were utilized. The primary data were collected directly from the sample respondents through the use of questionnaire and in-depth interview with key stakeholders in the Public Complaints Commission of Kwara State. Out of the 300 questionnaires administered to the Local Government Councils in Kwara State, 285 were returned and 15 were not returned. Also, out of the 100 questionnaires administered to Kwara State Ministries, Departments and Agencies, 92 were returned and 8 were not returned. In total, 377 questionnaires were returned and 23 were not returned. Total number of 377 questionnaires retrieved was therefore used for analysis in this study. The data obtained through the in-depth interview were incorporated and synergized to corroborate the data from the questionnaire.

Presentation and Analysis of Results

This section presents the analysis and interpretation of the data collected in the course of conducting the study. It also discusses the major findings of the study.

Table 2: The Conflict Resolution Methods Employed by the Public Complaints Commission Kwara State

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Mediation	191	50.6
Arbitration	82	21.7
Conciliation	56	14.8
Adjudication or Litigation	29	7.6
Other Inquisitorial Methods	19	5
Total	377	100

Source: Researcher's Field Work, 2023.

Table 3 presents the opinion of the respondents on the methods mostly employed by the Kwara State Public Complaints Commission in conflict resolution. Findings show that 191(50.6%)

of the respondents indicate mediation, while 82(21.7%) indicate arbitration. Additionally, 56(14.8%) of the respondents indicates conciliation, 29 (7.6%) indicate adjudication or litigation and 19(5%) of the respondents mentioned other methods of conflict resolution. This finding correlates with views of the key respondents interviewed. A participant noted “The methods usually used by the Commission to resolve conflict is through negotiation, mediation, reconciliation and arbitration often called ADR or Alternative Dispute Resolution” [IDI- 18/10/2021]. Another participant highlighted:

The methods used by the Commission include case conference, interview/guestly testimonies, on the spot investigation and correspondence. Case conference and on the spots, investigation seems most effective because both method avails the opportunity of confirming the act and incidences of concern. Case conference brings all parties involved together for an amicable settlement” [IDI- 20/10/2021].

Another third respondent emphasized, “I think Public Complaints Commission recognized mediation as important tools for conflict resolution” [IDI- 25/10/2021].

Table 3: The Effectiveness of the Methods of Conflict Resolution Employed the Public Complaints Commission Kwara State

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Very Effective	180	48
Needs Improvement	120	32
Not Satisfactory	45	12
All of the Above	32	8
Total	377	100

Source: Researcher’s Field Work, 2023.

Table 4 above presents the views of respondents on the effectiveness of the methods of conflict resolution of Public Complaints Commission Kwara State. It indicates that 180(48%) of the respondents believe the methods were very effective, on the other hand, 120(32%) feels there is still need for improvement. Additionally, 45(12%) of the respondents were of the opinion that the methods are not satisfactory and 32(8%) of the respondents indicates all of the above provided responses. This finding shows that majority of the respondents were of the view that the methods of conflict resolution of Public Complaints Commission of Kwara State was very

effective. Corroborating the quantitative data with the in-depth interview, a participant emphasized that “The effective and efficient method of conflict is mediation and arbitration” [IDI – 18/10/2021]. Another participant mentioned “The Commission do pay visit to our organizations on regular basis, we usually have conversations bordering on how to institutionalize good governance and enthrone justice, equity and fairness in administration” [IDI – 21/10/2021]. Another participant noted “Yes, I think the methods of conflict resolution largely determine the level of conflict that is resolved by the Commission in Kwara State” [IDI – 25/10/2021].

Table 4: The Factors Hindering the Optimal Performance of Public Complaints Commission Kwara State in Conflict Resolution

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Inadequate funding	207	55
Low patronage by both public and private sector organizations	95	25
Recommendations not Binding	75	20
Total	377	100

Source: Researcher’s Field Work, 2023.

Table 5 presents the opinion of the respondents on what they consider as factors hindering the optimal performance of Public Complaints Commission Kwara State in conflict resolution. The data show that 202(55%) of the respondents were of the view that inadequate funding is the major impediment. Also, 95(25%) of the respondents identified low patronage of the Commission by both public and private sector organizations and 7(20%) of the respondents cited the non-binding nature of the Commission’s recommendations as an obstacle. To complement the data obtained through the questionnaire, key respondents were interviewed. One participant outlined several challenges faced by the Kwara State Public Complaints Commission between 2015-2020, including inadequate funding, logistics problems, non-training and retraining of Staff, lack of publicity, poor welfare package, and moribund enabling Act.

The participant emphasized that paucity of funds significantly hinders the investigation and resolution of cases reported. The participant added that the Commission also faces a major challenge in mobility due to lack of vehicles, which is necessary for Officer's to go round and carry out investigations [IDI – 18/10/2021]. Another participant pointed out that “The major problem of the Commission is finance, as the Officials of the Commission cannot do much without it” [IDI – 20/10/2021]. A third participant stressed that “The Public Complaints Commission should be given adequate constitutional powers to enable it discharge its function of conflict resolution effectively and efficiently. The participant call for the need to amend the Act establishing the Commission to ensure stricter sanctions for those who treat the invitation of the Commission with levity [IDI – 18/10/2021].

Discussion of Findings

The finding of this study reveals that Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism primarily mediation, and other inquisitorial methods of conflict resolution through case conference, interview/guestly testimonies, on the spot investigation and correspondence are employed by the Kwara State Public Complaints Commission. This finding is corroborated by a study conducted by Beqiraj et al. (2018) who reveals that most Ombudsman institutions use the inquisitorial model of dispute settlement, with alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, such as mediation and arbitration, also being employed within various models.

The findings also revealed that the conflict resolution method employed by the Kwara state Public Complaints Commission was effective during the period under review (2015-2020). This effectiveness is evident in the data provided in table 1, where a total number of 3,165 representing 81% cases were resolved out of a total of 3,915 cases received. This confirms that the Kwara State Public Complaint Commission was able resolve the majority of cases lodged before it.

The finding of the study highlights inadequate funding, logistical challenges, lack of training and retraining of staff, poor welfare package, inadequate awareness and weak legal framework as factors hindering the optimal performance of Kwara State Public Complaints

Commission. This finding is also evident in table 1, which shows the total number of cases that are pending. The number of pending cases varied from year to year with the highest number, 197 cases recorded in 2020, and the lowest, 81 in 2015. This fluctuation in the total number of cases unresolved and pending is driven by these challenges highlighted by the findings of this study. It was also found that there is also consistent with previous studies by Akpa et al. (2020) which highlights gap in the existing legal framework, lack of independence, inadequate powers to implement its recommendations and decisions as obstacles to the effectiveness of the Commission. The finding also aligns with that of Moshood et al. (2019) which reveals that the effectiveness of the Commission is hampered by inadequate funding and lack of public awareness regarding its activities.

Conclusion

This study sheds lights into the critical role the Public Complaints Commission Kwara State plays in conflict resolution and good governance. The study argues that the Commission serves as a vital tool in conflict resolution, and upholding the principles of law, justice, peace and fairness which are the indicators of good governance. The study found that the Commission employs Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), primarily mediation and other inquisitorial methods of conflict resolution through case conference, interview/guestly testimonies, on the spot investigation and correspondence.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made;

- i. There is need for public enlightenment campaigns to promote public awareness and understanding on the activities of the Commission. This can be achieved through advocacy programs, seminars, workshops, mass and print media initiatives.
- ii. The Public Complaints Commission should be adequately funded and its independence should be safeguarded to enable it perform optimally.

- iii. There is need for the National Assembly to review and strengthen the legal framework of the Public Complaints Commission. This would empower the Commission to carry out its functions effectively.
- iv. There is the need to appoint personnel that are committed to pioneer the affairs of the Commission and their remuneration, working conditions and capacity building opportunities should be improved upon.

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A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL AND FOREIGN PEACE-BUILDING INTERVENTIONS EFFORTS IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The study of war continues to evolve to include contemporary aspects of it that pervade the central focus of strategic studies. More than ever before, states are constantly acquiring military capabilities in a world faced with the ever-possibility of war. This study examines the comparative assessment of African and foreign (international) intervention efforts in restoring peace through adopting peacebuilding strategies in Africa. While the study adopted a comparative approach, it is also an ex-post facto study. The theory of 'Mutual Democratic Pacifism' was selected for the study. However, the study concluded that modern peacemaking operations in Africa are not by committing resources to states solely to keep the peace for a short term. Rather, further efforts should be harnessed to include long-term assistance for sustainable political and economic development, hence, preventing possible regression and relapse.

Keywords: Africa, Foreign, Intervention, Peace-keeping, War

Introduction

In modern Strategic Studies war or the prevention of war has become the main preoccupation. This is not to say that the study of war has become obsolete or should be rendered so. The study of war, rather than becoming obsolete, has pervaded the central focus of strategic studies because states are constantly acquiring military capabilities amidst the ever-possibility of war (Stockholm International Peace & Research Institute, 2022). However, the possibility of war

has always been the foundational study of international relations, and at the same time central to security studies. In fact, security studies have always operated from the paradigm set by Clausewitz's perspective on war; that war is not a social aberration or mass psychological disorder, but rather a rational instrument of policy, just as diplomacy or economic sanctions. By extension, it is a continuation of politics by other means.

Then the notion of war according to Clausewitz, is a political activity intended to compel one's opponent to fulfil one's will. It is simply a brutal form of bargaining (Sheehan, 2013). In retrospect, between the 1970s and the 1990s, the discourse of war became fashionable among certain academic and intellectual circles with varying arguments that war had become obsolete and on the decline; and that the use of military force as a foreign policy option was increasingly unattractive among states. However, advocates of this idea based their argument on the fact that foreign policy objectives had become more intangible, with less emphasis on territorial expansion and more emphasis on trade.

On the contrary, that is not the case in Africa with catalogues of intra- and inter-communal conflicts, local wars, armed insurrections, armed rebel activities and terrorism in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. (Souare, 2006; ACSRT, 2022; SIPRI, 2022). Africa parades the worst-case scenario of armed conflicts with shades of huge consequences. The continent is in the theatre of war amidst the global reality of modern governance fast paced with innovation and technology (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022). One would ask if Africa would ever embrace a developmental path after several post-independent conflicts with interventionist resolutions of varying kinds. Just like the morning dew, the African continent is tied in a rigmarole of fresh armed conflicts. For instance, 32 armed conflicts were reported the world over in 2021; and more closely, Africa has the highest number of about 15 conflicts followed by Asia (nine), the Middle East (five), Europe (two) and America (one) (Ivan et al, 2022; SIPRI, 2022).

Consequently, for the first time in a decade, these conflicts are rated high-intensity armed conflicts like the armed conflicts in Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), Ethiopia (Tigray), Mali, Mozambique (north), the Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram), the Western Sahel Region, the CAR, the DRC (east), the DRC (east-ADF), Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), and South Sudan. However, to say that almost half of the global armed conflicts in 2021 took place in Africa, with a total of 15 (47%) is nothing but altruism, with huge displacement of persons, billows of forced migration and refugees (UNAID, 2022).

To beam more light on this, in 2021, the socio-political crises of high intensity in Africa were from Chad, Ethiopia (Oromia), Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Morocco-Western Sahara, Nigeria (Biafra), and Sudan. 72% of the socio-political crises were linked to opposition to the internal or international policies or certain governments or to the political, social or ideological system of the State as a whole (ACSRT, 2020; Ivan, et al 2022); 41% to demands for self-government or identity; while 31% to disputes for control of territories and or resources. However, there were four successful military coups (in Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan) and three failed coups (in CAR, Niger and Sudan), compared with just one coup in the region in 2020 (in Mali). Apparently, there was no substantive progress in any of the region's peace processes in 2021, although sub-Saharan African states continued to host more multilateral peace operations (22) than any other region of the world (SIPRI, 2022).

Instructively, the *raison d'être* of this paper is to examine the efforts and effects of African and foreign interventions in restoring peace through adopting peacebuilding strategies; and also, to examine the primary motives behind it. While the paper adopts a comparative approach, it is also an ex-post facto study, taking examples of such intervention as its basis for evaluation. The paper is structured into the following sections. Section II is on extant literature which comprises of conceptual analysis and theoretical framework. Section III examines foreign peace-building interventions in Africa. Whereas Section IV examines Africa-based peace-building interventions, Section V concludes the paper.

Extant Literature

a. Theoretical Framework

But then, the paper examined the resurrection of the theory referred to as ‘the Mutual Democratic Pacifism,’ which is derived from Immanuel Kant’s ‘hypothetical world’ that countries with a common constitutional republic and sharing a similar political regime, do not go to war amongst themselves; a situation of perpetual peace reigning amongst and between them (Ellis 2007, p. 766). The contemporary re-articulation of this theory in the early 1980s is traceable to the writings of Michael Doyle (Grayson 2003). The underlying idea behind the Kantian conception of perpetual peace is the assumption that citizens (states) will not choose to go to war except in circumstances where it is necessary to protect themselves against aggressive overtures by another nation.

So, as remedy to this, Kant’s idea suggests the possibility of all nations practicing democracy, and if this is actualised, then there would be no antagonist nations. Therefore, there would not be need for nations to go to war with one another. Thus, the ‘democratic peace theory’ main assumption is that democratic countries are peaceful and are most unlikely or rarely to wage wars against each other (Baylis & Smith, 2001). In this equation, more democratic countries translate into a more peaceful world (Patapan, 2012) and an absence of war.

Interestingly, among Liberal scholars and statesmen, this theoretical postulation by Kant has received phenomenal and equally enthusiastic acclamation. For instance, former President Clinton expressed the notion that the best policy for ensuring security and building durable peace is by advancing the acceptance of democracy everywhere (Foreignaffairs.com, 2015). Hence, there is need to ‘force’ or ‘persuade’ non-democratic states to accept and adopt the democratic political format and war against such states is a necessity to promote democracy and consequently spread peace. This, however, is in consonance with the Kantian paradigm that states with liberal republicanism must be universal and should be spread in order to achieve peace among states. This makes war against non-democracies as a necessity because they are

regarded as oppressors of their own people and threats to freedom in liberal countries as well (Pugh 2005).

Currently, there are three schools of thought that further elucidate the Democratic Peace Theory. The first is the 'Structural Approach' which asserts that nations are encumbered from going to war by various economic, social and political expenses for the government and the population at large. This structural proposition emphasizes "the constraints on political leaders in democratic states with regard to dispute and war initiation" (Maoz & Russett 1992, p. 246). The constraints inherent in the complexity of the democratic process such as separation of powers, impose strong legal restraints on the possible excesses of the leaders on the use of executive powers (Morgan & Campbell 1991; Rummel, 1983), make war an unattractive option.

Elman (1997) is of the opinion that political ideology helps democracies to differentiate between possible allies and hostiles. Put differently, democratic states treat each other with high esteem and respect while non-democratic states are perceived with suspicion epitomised by the aggression and tyranny with which they treat their citizens. Thus, among democratic states, the dominant political norms and traditions emphasise peaceful competition, dialogue, persuasion and compromise, unlike in non-democratic states where the tradition of behaviour favoured "elimination or subjugation of political opponents and the forceful resolution of political conflicts" (Doyle, 1986).

Finally, research conducted by the protagonists of the Democratic Peace Theory has upturned and challenged the Realist interpretation of International Relation which argue that democratic peace depends on other factors rather than regime type. According to their findings (Danilovic & Clare, 2007), the possibility of war ensuing between democratic nations is very unlikely. Democratic leaders are not so much interested and are unlikely to employ military force in pursuing their objectives when compared to non-democracies or non-democratic states. It is generally believed that democratic states will find solutions to conflicts through the use of diplomacy and deliberations rather than war. For instance, in a speech by George W. Bush in

1994, he affirmed why he was so keen on democracy which is because democracies do not grapple with each other.

While this may be accepted, the democratic peace theory does not offer explanations of why there are internal conflicts and the prevalence of wars or conflicts that seem to be on the increase in the world today. In a bid to proffer an understanding of this phenomenon, many scholarly and seminar works have been carried out concerning it, thereby leading to classifying conflicts according to; (1) the parties involved in the conflict (Chazan, et al, 1992, pp. 189-210), (2) the issues that generate the conflict (Holsti, 1991, pp. 306-34), and (3) the factors that cause the conflict (Furley, 1995, pp. 3-4). The proliferation of internal conflicts, particularly in Africa and the many attempts to understand and categorise them into types by scholars have added to the lexicons of conflicts. Thus, we now have such terms as 'internal conflicts' (Brown 1996), 'asymmetrical warfare' (Mack, 1974, 2008; Arreguin-Toft, 2001), 'civilian-based civil wars' (Anderson, 1999); 'fire next door' (Francis, 2006), 'new wars' (Kaldor and Vashee 1997), 'small wars' (Harding 1994), 'civil wars' (King 1997), 'ethnic conflicts' (Stavenhagen 1996), 'conflicts in post-colonial states' (van de Goor et al 1996), 'Ethno-religious wars' (Furley, 1995), 'greed and grievance' (Berdal and Malone, 2004, Collier, 2004), 'guerrilla/insurgence warfare' (Clapham, 2000), and 'unconventional warfare' (Merari, 2007), to label conflicts in Africa.

The prevalence of internal conflicts has generated the need to look for solutions, particularly as war in a region or state has the effect of stimulating the same in neighbouring states; a situation Francis (2006) has called 'fire next door,' or causing a serious refugee problem in neighbouring states. The global tendency is towards ensuring security through ameliorating the causes of the conflict, and intervention to resolve and reconstruct the state through peacemaking and peace-building interventions. The aim is to restore peace and security through interventions and to restore peace through peace-building and making efforts.

b. Conceptual Clarifications

Strategy is seen as the use of combat or the threat of combat, for the purpose of the war in which it takes place (Paret, 1986). Strategy is, therefore, the use of armed force to achieve military objectives and by extension, the political purpose of the war. Thus, the modern study of strategy is based on and includes the development, intellectual mastery and utilization of all a state's resources for the purpose of implementing its policy in war. The notion of war, particularly internal war, is symptomatic of and signifies a total breakdown of peace and security.

i. Peacebuilding

This is an attempt at reconstructing peace, not enhancing it, as what is non-existence cannot be enhanced. In particular reference to Africa, where internal wars have weakened and hence have made most states very fragile, the roles played by both African and non-African intervention forces in restoring peace in such states, raise four main considerations. First is that, although the incidents of failing, failed, and collapsed states are not solely an African situation, nor is it unique to the continent. However, the impact on the socioeconomic fabric of the state and the consequences seems to be more drastic and pronounced than anywhere else.

Second is that the incidences of failing, failed and collapsed states in Africa seemed to be on the increase and especially, it seemed like a Post-Cold War phenomenon. The events accompanying the Post-Cold War era have not only excluded the African continent but also marginalised it from the mainstream happenings. These may have actually accentuated and accelerated the process that has engendered failed or collapsed states syndrome. Third is the extent of the domestic efforts needed to put off the flame of collapse that has engulfed the states in Africa. Such efforts must essentially and substantially be complemented by sub-regional, regional and international support. It may actually be that the more far-gone on the road to total collapse a state is, the greater will be the role of foreign intervention needed in its reconstruction and peacebuilding. Fourth is that foreign interventions are not always and

necessarily 'neutral,' both in motivation and impact. Such interventions may result in being part of the solution to state collapse, part of the problem, or both.

On the other hand, the issue of intervention in international politics is not a recent concept. As Bull (1984, p. 1, cf. Oppenheim 1985) has noted, the concept actually means "dictatorial or coercive interference by an outside party or parties in the sphere of jurisdiction of an independent political community." However, not all, including the instances discussed here are dictatorial, coercive or interfering. Nevertheless, intervention can take several forms, ranging from forcible to non-forcible interference. On one extreme in the continuum, intervention can take the form of open and direct, often by the use of military force or threat.

Foreign Peace-Building Interventions in Africa

For many decades and in most cases, foreign peace-building intervention has been to safeguard foreign nationals living within the affected countries and the pursuit of strategic interests (Jakobsen, 1996). This has been the reason adduced by France and Belgium to justify their intervention in the Congo/Zaire crises in 1964, 1977, 1978, and 1993. A not-too-often-taunted reason is that they intervene primarily because of the profit to be made from the crises.

Such interventions, most often, are made to further geostrategic and political interests. Hence, such unilateral external intervention usually originated from the national interests or foreign policy objectives of the intervening state. Examples abound in the instances of both the French and Libyan interventions in the protracted conflict in Chad, Cuba's decision to send troops to Angola, and U.S. covert support for UNITA, were all linked to the national interests of the intervening states (Dowden, 1994; Power, 2002).

France has had to intervene many times on behalf of its former colonies. The legal basis on which these interventions have taken place has been on the basis of a series of bilateral defence agreements entered into with these former colonies being apart from the agreement for granting independence. These bilateral agreements entitled and empowered France to deploy troops to its former colonies whenever such requests were made (Kouassi 1993). It was on the basis of this legal and formal agreement that French troops were deployed to Chad and

Zaire when they felt that their security was imperiled. France's intervention in Chad in 1969 was able to halt the advance of the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT). Also notable was France's intervention between 1980 and 1982 when Chad's state system was threatened with total collapse. Libya's interference in Chad's internal affairs led France to solicit for A.U (then OAU) peacekeeping forces to be deployed, with France offering logistic support (McNamara, 1989; Chipma, 1989; Zartman, 1986). In 1983, for the third time, France's intervention saved Chad from collapse when its troops enforced an interdiction line on behalf of the government of Chad to prevent the rebel and Libyan forces from pushing south.

In 1977 and 1978 in Zaire, France's intervention was sought and given partly to safeguard and protect its growing investment in the country as well as in response to a U.S. appeal to protect the country from the encroaching influence of Cuba and Communism (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1990; Zartman, 1989). As Zartman (1989) had elaborated, France's intervention was in the form of airlifting Moroccan troops and equipment to Shaba when the rebels invaded for the first time in 1977. It included the deployment of paratroopers, army engineers and technicians who directly engaged the insurgents in Shaba, forcing their retreat from Kolwezi into Angola in 1978.

U.S. range of interventions in Africa has moved from geostrategic to humanitarian. Initially, U.S. intervention in Africa was from the perspective of the Cold War, to forestall Soviet and communist expansionism in Africa. Hence, U.S. counterinsurgent measures to insurgencies are seen as inspired by left-wing movements. After the Cold War, humanitarian assistance was offered to those countries that were in need to alleviate the hardship of their people. In the early 1980s, the U.S. joined forces with France to neutralise the influence of Libya in Chad, including contributing military and financial aid to OAU (AU) to support the post-civil war reconstruction efforts of the OAU (AU) peacekeeping force. U.S. motivation was two-pronged; first to ensure the survival of the country and second to protect Western capitalist investment and interests in the resource-rich Central Africa. Its insistence to keep

Zaire afloat financially was because the nation was of crucial significance as a source of raw material suppliers to the West.

It is notable, in late 1992 that the U.S. was at the forefront of leading a coalition of Western states in Somalia's Operation Restore Hope. This was an unprecedented mission of mercy with U.S. contingents of 36,000 men and women; the largest peacekeeping and humanitarian force ever mounted. Apart from being charged with making the country safe for humanitarian supplies, the U.S. contingents were also involved in controlling Somalia's warring factions and maintaining peace until the United Nations Operations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM 2) could resume its peacekeeping mission in the country and the U.S. officially withdrew its forces in 31 March 1994.

Africa-Based Peace-Building Interventions

African interventions in other African states have usually taken the form of military intervention either organised at regional or sub-regional levels by OAU (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The second form in which the interventions were taken is by individual and often contiguous states. Most popular of these interventions are the OAU (AU) Inter African Forces in Chad (1981), the ECOWAS Observer Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia in the 1990s and the OAU (AU) Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda from 1992 to 1994 and in Burundi in 1994.

The OAU (AU) intervention in Chad was the first of its kind and of such intervention in the annals of African peacekeeping operations. This is because the Charter of the organisation has made no provision for such. The only provision for conflict management in the Charter was to invoke the organisation's Conciliation and Mediation Commission and resort to ad hoc institutions in the settlement of any dispute. However, in the case of Chad and subsequent cases, the decision to establish an intervention force was taken at the organisation's summit held in Nairobi in June 1981. The interventionist force was made up of about 4,800 troops drawn from Nigeria, Zaire and Senegal; and was headed by a Nigerian. However, the force failed and was forced to withdraw. The reasons for the failure which became subject matter

for many scholarly works (Pittman 1984; Zartman & moo 1992; Amate 1986), were majorly inadequate financial and material support combined with logistics, mission, and communication difficulties. Most crucial to the failure was that of the seventeen countries listed to contribute troops and logistics, only three were able to muster the political will to do so. To bolster up the peacekeeping force, Nigeria had to incur a debt of \$80 million that was never paid back but had to be written off by the Nigerian government.

Although the rationale for the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 was to foster economic cooperation among the member states, which were predominantly from the West African region, ECOWAS at their meeting in Banjul, Gambia, in May 1990, was compelled to take a decision to intervene in Liberia by the Heads of State of the organization. In August of that same year, a military intervention force codenamed ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was sent to Liberia to halt the country from sliding into anarchy (Lowenkopf, 1995). Although encumbered by a number of factors; among which was the fact that not all the member states were eager to contribute troops to the ECOMOG force initially, Guinea, Uganda, Tanzania, and Senegal, later contributed, and the initial accusation that the intervention force was sent ostensibly to foster the hegemonic interest of some particular states shelved (Gambari, 1991). Of equal importance was the argument of some of the member states that ECOMOG had no basis in the instrument establishing ECOWAS (Vogt, 1993). In addition, the mandate of ECOMOG was initially ambiguous both the diplomats and troops sent were confused about what to make of it, whether they were a peacekeeping or peace-enforcing force; whether they were to impose a cease-fire or merely to act as a policing body. Ultimately, as Gambari (1991) reported, “complications, dissensions, and dissonance” set in their interpretation of the ECOMOG mandate.

The OAU (AU) intervention in Rwanda in October 1990 was occasioned by the incursion of over 10,000 guerrillas made up of the exiled Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) into North eastern Rwanda and the occupation of several towns. The ability of the government to repel them made the intervention unnecessary. However, the forces had to

intervene a second time to monitor the cease-fire agreement reached in July 1992 between the various Rwandan factions. The OAU (AU) force collaborated with a joint political-military commission made up of representatives from Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Belgium, France and the United States. The role of OAU (AU) was later expanded in February 1993 to include not only monitoring but also resettlement of the displaced persons in the demilitarized zones. A peace agreement was finally reached in August at Arusha, Tanzania, under the auspices of OAU (AU) with Tanzania as a mediator.

In nearby Burundi, certain events were unfolding that were to spark off a genocidal war between the Hutus and the Tutsi army. In October 1993, the president of Burundi was assassinated and this was followed in April 1994 by the death of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in an aircraft crash under suspicious circumstances at Kigali airport in Rwanda. Again, this incident sparked off the most hideous ethnic hostilities and cleansing in history with over 500,000 killed; made up of mainly Tutsis. Although the OAU (AU) intervened, it was nevertheless hindered and rather incapacitated by lack of resources available to it. This setback manifested in the inability of OAU (AU) to match its political will with concrete action.

Concluding Remarks

It is imperative to note that the lessons of modern peacemaking operations in Africa clearly indicate that it is not sufficient to put resources into states solely to keep the peace for a short term rather, further efforts should be made to include long-term assistance that can help in sustaining political and economic development and hence, prevent possible regression and relapse. A closer look at the instances of foreign interventions in Africa will certainly show that such interventions have not always provided both early and full solutions to the besetting and perennial problems of Africa's political instability which, most often tend to lead to circumstances of failed or collapsed state. On the other hand, some of these interventions; either from within (Africa) or without (foreign) have also the tendency to exacerbate, prolong

or make the crises protracted either by introducing new and extraneous factors such as ideology and political differences to what were essentially local conflicts.

International interventions, most often, are not concerned primarily with the preservation of the state and its structure, but rather, with the political and ideological complexion of those who controlled the state. In this regard, two factors can be deduced which give multinational interventions an edge/merit over unilateral interventions. First is that multinational interventions diffuse the specific interests which unilateral/foreign powers interventions seek to project or protect. However, the longer multinational intervention forces prolonged their stay in a failed or collapsed state, the more the inclination to take a position between the warring factions and hence the loss of impartiality and the effectiveness in carrying out the mandate of their intervention.

It is important to note that before actual peacebuilding operations in collapsed, failing or failed states can begin, it is necessary that actual fighting between the warring factions must be stopped or controlled through a cease-fire. This requires both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. Peacebuilding can only proceed from a position where political reconciliation among the warring factions and contending parties has commenced and this will need the interventions of multilateral organisations with experience and clout to make this happen. Countries that make up this multilateral organization must be ready to contribute the necessary resources in money and men.

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CYBERCRIME IN THE NIGERIAN BANKING SECTOR: IMPLICATION, ACTION AND THE WAY FORWARD

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ABSTRACT

This essay, as many others that have been written on the subject have done, attempted to look at the consequences of Cybercrime in the Banking Industry in Nigeria, and the potential threat that it poses to National Security. It also tried to highlight some of the measures already taken to tackle the problem and tried to explain why these measures are not yielding the desired result to make further recommendations on how to tackle the menace. The Space Transition Theory, amongst other existing theories in Criminology, was adopted by this Academic Paper as it best describes the phenomenon of Cybercrime in the Nigerian Banking Sector. For easy access to source material on the topic of choice and ease of reference, this Paper adopted the Narrative Research Method as its methodology. The summation of the findings of this research work is the fact that cybercrime and criminality are like diseases that mutate and adapt to solutions proffered. Therefore, governments and organizations fighting these phenomena must be dynamic in their approaches.

Keywords: Cybercrime, Banking Industry, National Security

Introduction

The epic transformation in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has brought with it immense benefits and corresponding negative implications key among which is the Cybercrime phenomenon. Cybercrime in Nigeria is a disturbing trend that is developing rapidly in scope frequency and it is gaining traction among jobless idle youths. It is affecting almost all facets of Nigerian society, as everyday activities become heavily reliant on the internet and Information Technology as a whole, with the Banking Industry being the worst hit. The number of unbanked Nigerians has dwindled significantly over the years. As of

December 2021, the number of people with Bank Accounts has grown to approximately 133 million people According to Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System Plc (NIBBS) an additional 18.7 million accounts became active (Michael, 2022). This means that a larger number of people are now vulnerable to cybercrime because knowledge of Cybersecurity among Nigerians is limited. Even though it has reduced the cost of processing and it has facilitated the transmission of information, in the banking subsector, leading to drastic changes (Oludaja, 2012),

Cybercrime in the banking sector and the country at large has become multifaceted and hydra-headed in that no one can predict the long-term effects. According to Omodunbi et al, “In Nigeria today, several internet-assisted criminal activities known as Cybercrimes are committed daily in various forms such as fraudulent electronic mails, pornography, identity theft, hacking, cyber harassment, spamming, Automated Teller Machine spoofing, piracy, and phishing. Cybercrime is a threat against various institutions and people who are connected to the internet either through their computers or mobile technologies” (Omodunbi, 2016). Why this problem is so worrisome is that a sizable chunk of the population in Nigeria have limited or virtually no knowledge of the computer and the workings of the internet so they become vulnerable. More so, at the turn of the 21st century, Nigerian Internet usage increased dramatically as compared to the close of the 20th Century. Whereas the number used to be less than 5% in 2002 – 2003, it stood at over 30% by the end of 2012 – and the growth is only poised to accelerate (Sesan, 2015).

The situation is worsened due to the increased usage of web channel transactions by bank customers. The Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System (NIBSS) in its latest Industry Fraud Report found that the highest number of fraudulent cases (35.5% of the total) were committed on the web channel, transactions that are done using a web browser. Transactions done over phones were responsible for a loss of N410 million at 11.7 percent of the entire loss value (Eleanya, 2023). This has led to so many losses for people with monies in the banks as reported by NDIC and captured by Eleanya “The Nigeria Deposit Insurance Commission

(NDIC) said in 2018 that Nigerian banks lost over N15.5 billion (\$41.6m) to fraud, a massive jump from what the industry recorded in the previous four years. The industry lost the sum of N12.30 billion to various frauds between 2014 and 2017. About 89 percent of all financial services fraud happened through electronic channels while only 11 percent was non-electronic” (Eleanya, 2023).

Definition of the Concept of Cybercrime

The term “Cybercrime” evolved with time as it was initially referred to as “Computer Crime” because the availability of the Internet was restricted to some sections, like the US military (Gbenga Sesan, 2015). The launching of the World Wide Web in 1994 and the subsequent increase of computer networks and personal computers transformed "computer crime" into what is now referred to as Cybercrime (Gbenga Sesan, 2015).

The Tech Term Online Computer Dictionary simply defines Cybercrime as “criminal activity done using the computer and the internet”. Some of these criminal activities according to Tech Term include inter alia; downloading illegal music files and videos, stealing money from online bank accounts, and creating and distributing harmful viruses on other computers. The most disturbing, according to Tech Term is identity theft in which criminals use the internet to steal personal information from other users for nefarious activities (TechTerms, n.d.). Techopaedia on the other hand defines it as “a crime in which the computer is the object of the crime (hacking phishing and spamming) or it is used as a tool to commit an offense” (Techopaedia, 2017). On his part, Maitanmi defines cybercrime as “a type of crime committed by criminals who make use of a computer as a tool and the internet as a connection to reach a variety of objectives such as illegal downloading of music files and films, piracy, spam mailing, and the likes” (Ayinde, 2013).

For the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), cybercrimes span across a diverse scenario including; crimes against children (usually involving child pornography or child rape); theft of intellectual properties and/or publications, phishing, intentional dissemination of malware to national and international internet fraud (Adesina, 2017).

From the above definitions, Cybercrime covers a wide range of criminal activity within the virtual cyberspace created by the internet. For Cybercrime to take place there has to be a gadget (computer, Cell phone, etc) and the internet.

Theoretical Framework

Various theories exist that try to explain the Cybercrime phenomenon within the field of criminology. Because the concept of cybercrime is relatively new, many scholars have tried explaining it within the framework of existing theories on criminology. However, K Jaishankar has propounded a new theory known as “The Space Transition Theory” that is gaining acceptance. It is the opinion of this work that the Space Transition Theory best conceptualizes the phenomenon of Cybercrime and criminals in the Banking Industry in Nigeria.

Space transition theory argues that people behave differently when they move from one space to another (for example from physical space to cyberspace and vice versa). It explains the behaviour of cybercriminals within the context of physical space and virtual space. Virtual space provides the anonymity needed by cyber criminals that plague the Nigeria Banking Industry. It also argues that “People with repressed criminal behaviour (in the physical space) have the propensity to commit a crime in cyberspace, which, otherwise they would not commit in physical space, due to their status and position” (Jaishankar, 2007). This theory profiles the cyber criminals operating within Nigerian cyberspace. Furthermore, the virtual space gives a lot of time for the criminals because all activities can be done within the comfort of a room or a concealed space without the fear of being detected, and in Nigeria, cybercriminals seem to have all the time as they are mostly jobless youths.

The collaboration between cybercriminals in Nigeria and elsewhere to defraud people lends a lot of credence to the Space Transition Theory as the theory also states that “Strangers are likely to unite together in cyberspace to commit a crime in the physical space”.

Methodology

This research used the Narrative Research Method also known as the Narrative Inquiry or Narrative Analysis (Reissman, 1993). This method uses word-based materials like journals, periodicals, dailies, field notes, text, etc as raw data. The flexibility of this method helped this research to have a lot of access to materials on the topic of choice.

Brief Origin of Cybercrime

Cybercrime predates the internet as data thefts are considered in some quarters as cybercrime. According to Independent Security Buzz News, the beginning of Cybercrime is traceable to the creation of a code-breaking machine called the Enigma Machine by British cryptographer Alan Turing in 1939 (Training, 2017). However, the origin of modern-day cybercrime is rooted in the 1960s and 70s and it is easier to trace as it coincides with the evolution of the internet (VNP, 2017). However, what is difficult to trace is the actual origin or the exact first instance of Cybercrime activity. What is traceable or the first major attack carried out on a digital network is that of John Draper in 1971, according to Le VPN. Draper was said to have built a “blue box” with a whistle that allowed him to make free long-distance calls (VNP, 2017).

The first large-scale attack was in 1989 when seventy million United States dollars was stolen from a Bank in Chicago (Training, 2017). This triggered shock waves around the world and the first legislation in Britain to try and stop the activities of internet fraudsters. Back in Nigeria in the 90s, fraud was popularly called ‘419’ about the criminal code that framed the criminal justice system in Nigeria (Nigerian Communication Commission, 2010). Tech savvy cons cashed in with the coming of the internet to export ‘419’. Now the most familiar reference to this nefarious activity in Nigeria is ‘yahoo yahoo’. A case of cybercrime in Nigeria that stood out and made the countries already battered worse is that of Amaka Martina Anajemba who conspired with Emanuel Nwude and others to swindle a Brazilian man of a whopping sum of two hundred and forty-two million United States dollars (Glenny, 2001).

She was arrested and convicted in July 2005. The case was believed to inspire then-President Olusegun Obasanjo to establish the Economic and Financial Crime Commission.

How Nigeria is ranked in Cybercrime

The Premium Times, an online news medium in its 2017 August 22nd Edition, reported that Nigeria is ranked third in internet crime globally behind the United States of America and the United Kingdom according to the Nigerian Communication Commission (Nigerian Communication Commission, 2010). Therefore, it was not surprising that Nuhu Ribadu, the erstwhile Czar of the anti-corruption fight in Nigeria, concluded in 2007 in an address to mark the fortieth annual session of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law in Vienna, stating that “The country has therefore carved a niche for herself as the source of what is now popularly called 419-mails, named after Section 419 of the Nigerian Criminal Code (Capp 777 of 1990) that forbid advance fee fraud. For instance, Nigeria is ranked first in the African region as the target and origin of malicious cyber activities; and this is spreading across the West African sub-region” (Ribadu, 2007).

Consequences for the Banking Industry in Nigeria

Cybercrime has impacted and is still impacting different sectors of Nigerian society, particularly the international image of the country has been greatly dented by the activities of cybercriminals. However, of concern to this essay are the consequences for the Nigerian Banking Industry. The internet has experienced explosive growth with the number of hosts connected to the internet increasing daily at an exponential rate (Odumuboni, 2014). Cybercrime has become one of the major highways of pilfering money and economic espionage.

Since the advent of cybercrime, the Banking Industry worldwide has been the traditional target of cybercriminals the reason is so obvious that it does not beg for any answer. Banks in Nigeria like their counterparts around the have become heavily reliant on E-Banking and the opportunities therein. The phenomenal rise of mobile communication and the drive from the Central Bank of Nigeria towards a cashless economy has contributed to the growth

of cybercrime (Stephen A. Ojeka¹, 2017). E-banking has brought with it a lot of ease in banking transactions with the introduction of Internet Banking, ATM Cards, etc but with attendant risks.

The 2014 Annual report of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), shows that, between the years 2013 and 2014, fraud on the e-payment platform of the Nigerian banking sector increased by 183% (Adesina, 2017). The Premium Times reported in its 2017 May 31st Edition that in 2016, the Nigerian Deposit Money Banks (DBMs) lost a total sum of 2.19 billion Naira to Cybercriminal activities. This, according to the Online Newspaper was made known by Adebayo Adelabu, the Central Bank Deputy Governor Operation. Ojeka et al wrote that “According to a report by Nigeria inter-banks settlement systems, Nigerian banks have lost NGN 159 billion between 2000 and 2013 to cyber-crime and according to Nigeria-based information and communications technology company New Horizons Limited, NGN 413 billion (USD 2.5 billion) is being lost annually to cyber-crime” (Stephen A. Ojeka¹, 2017).

The introduction in 2015 of the biometric identification systems (BVN) by the Central Bank, which consists of an eleven-digit number that acts as a universal ID across all the banks in Nigeria in 2015 aims at linking multiple accounts to a single owner to reduce fraud. However, cybercriminals have capitalized on it to phish (identity theft) and defraud the unsuspecting public through fraudulent text messaging. According to Omodunbi et al, “Phishing scams are ubiquitous and are exponentially increasing. It has become one of the fastest growing cybercrimes in Nigeria”. Another worrisome trend in the Banking Industry is the theft of ATM cards or credit card numbers. This can be stolen by hackers when users type the credit card number into the Internet page of the seller for online transactions or when withdrawing money using an ATM card (B. A. Omodunbi, 2016). The hackers can defraud the card owner by way of impersonation and different applications can be used to retrieve this information such as keyloggers at cybercafés or cloned websites.

The Sun Newspaper reported in its June 17th, 2017 edition gave a breakdown of what the Banking Industry has lost to cyber criminals as made available by the Nigerian Central Bank Governor, Godwin Emiefele. This was contained in the Nigerian Electronic Fraud Forum Annual Report during a stakeholder's workshop on Cybercrime. A breakdown as reported by the paper showed that across-the-counter transactions lost the highest amount to cybercrime with a total loss of 522.7 million naira, followed by Automated Teller Machine losing the sum of 464 million naira. The sum of 320.66 and 235.17 million were lost to Internet banking and mobile banking respectively. Other losses from e-commerce were 132.25 million, and 83.77 million was lost to web transactions. Other losses amounted to 205 million naira. A total of 19,531 cases of cybercrime were recorded in 2016 as against 10,744 in 2015 representing an 82% increase (U, 2017).

The Potential Threat to National Security

In a forum organized by the National Security Adviser in Lagos for stakeholders in June of 2014, the then National Security Adviser informed the forum comprising of the military, technocrats, and bankers among others, that cybercrime in the banking industry and other sectors poses a real national threat that should concern every stakeholder (R, 2014). The Guardian Newspaper editorial of 31st March 2015 reported that if left unchecked the thriving electronic fraud (Cybercrime) in the sector "...can wipe out entire profit line of individual Banks, as well as send a wrong signal against the financial inclusion drive" currently going on in the country. The editorial also reported that "already, the total loss made by Nigeria's Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) due to fraud-related cases have been put at about N203 billion in the last 14 years, a development, which persists in the industry with sophistication and some cases left unreported by some financial institutions". That was as of 31st March 2015 (Editorial, 2015). And the trend seems not to abet event with the stringent laws that are being put in place. If the profit line of banks in Nigeria is wiped out as a result of cybercriminal activities, it can collapse the entire banking industry and trigger a serious national security issue for the country.

Another dimension is the movement of funds by terrorist organizations using electronic banking outlays like wire transfers by individuals to so-called charitable organizations who in turn fund terrorist activities or to terrorist sleeper cells.

Measures Put in Place to Curtail the Rising Menace

Even though the Nigerian Criminal Code Act of 1990, particularly section 419, seems to cover offenses like cybercrime, the rising tide of the phenomenon warrants more to be done because just like technology is evolving every day in the telecom industry so also is the criminal sophistication in the industry and fighting the menace can be very complicated affair and fighting it a more complex affair. What is more, Internet cybercriminals keep perfecting their fraud methods, leading to losses amounting to billions of naira year in and year out in the Nigerian Banking Industry. Below are some of the measures put in place.

1. The creation of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission in 2003 by the erstwhile administration of Olusegun Obasanjo was the first major indication of the Nigerian Government's willingness to tackle the problem of cybercrime in Nigeria. The Economic and Financial Crime Commission Act (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, as amended) provides the legal framework for the establishment of the Commission. This Act repeals the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (Establishment) Act 2002 (Adesina, 2017).
2. Legislations against cybercrime in Nigeria include the Advance Free Fraud Act of 2006 which deals with internet crime issues and regulates cybercafés and internet service providers. The most recent legislation against cybercrime is the Cybercrime Act of 2015 which came into law in May of 2015. The bill Prohibits Electronic Fraud in all Electronic Transactions in Nigeria and for other Related Matters and it clearly defines cybercrime with penalties attached. The Cybercrimes Act 2015 is, thus, the first legislation in Nigeria that deals specifically with cybercrimes and cyber security (Adesina, 2017).

3. Compulsory registration of Subscriber Identification Module (SIM Card). The Nigerian Communication Commission directed the compulsory registration of all SIM cards to deal with the rising tide of insecurity. This measure was also geared at tackling cybercrime. This was to enable the Commission to have a central database of all cell phone users (E, 2011).
4. Registration of Cybercafés. In 2013 the Nigerian Communication Commission directed through a public notice that all cybercafé licensees and operators should maintain a database of subscribers who use their services to check crime (A, 2013).
5. Banks in Nigeria have been adopting global best practices such as the latest version of the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards certification to mitigate cybercrime in their systems (Ifeanyi, 2016).
6. The Bank Verification Number (BVN) introduced in 2015 aims to link accounts by way of the use of biometrics as a means of identifying and verifying all individuals with bank accounts.
7. The Inspector General of Police has acceded to a request by the Central Bank for a Card Fraud Unit to be established within the Nigerian Police Force to help combat cybercrime (Ifeanyi, 2016).

Why Current Efforts Seem Not to Be Yielding the Desired Result

Indications point to the fact that whatever the Government and the Banks are doing in checking cybercrime this menace seems to be insufficient considering the astronomical rise of cybercrime between 2014 to 2016. There seems to be inappropriate and reckless management of customers' data by the banks in Nigeria according to a security assessment carried out by Easy Solution Limited, a global e-fraud protection firm in 2016 (U, 2017). The firm also reported that there is an invasion of the Nigerian Banking environment with over 185 fake mobile applications being deployed by fraudsters on the websites of 15 Banks extracting

unsuspecting customers' personal information to defraud them as of the close of 2016 (U, 2017).

The directive to register all SIM cards has not been fully complied with by SIM card owners and service providers. Currently, there are pre-registered SIM cards in circulation making the activities of cyber fraudsters easier. This has led to the constitution of a Task Force to enforce compliance with SIM card registration by the Nigeria Communication Commission in October 2017 (A A, 2017).

Worst still, of the total 86.5 million Bank Accounts in Nigeria only 30.1 million have so far been captured by the BVN exercise constituting just 34.5% according to the Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System. Those accounts not captured remain vulnerable to cyber fraud. Unsuspecting customers have also had their details stolen by way of phishing as a result of the BVN registration.

The creation of a Card Fraud Unit by the Nigerian Police Force has done little to stop ATM card fraud. Of the over 1,461 reported cases of ATM card fraud in 2015 only 41 of the fraud cases were solved. This makes the Card Fraud Unit toothless. Furthermore, the level of computer literacy amongst the law enforcement officers deployed to combat cybercrime is decimal.

Conclusion

Cybercrime is a dynamic and complex phenomenon. It keeps evolving with every new technological development in the internet and the telecom industry, therefore fighting it requires tenacity and dynamism. Even though a lot has been done by both the Government and the Banking Industry to check the menace of cybercrime in the Banking Industry, there is still work to be done in that regard given the complex and sophisticated nature of the phenomenon.

In order for it to be adequately dealt with, the underlisted are recommended.

Recommendation

1. The Central Bank and other Banks in Nigeria will do well to adopt and implement the “Group of 7 or G7 Nations’ Cyber Security Guidelines agreed on by the G7 countries (Germany, USA, Italy, France, Japan, Britain and Canada). The guideline came into effect in these countries on May 26, 2016.
2. As controversial as this may seem it is the opinion of this write-up that cybercriminals when caught should be engaged by the authorities after serving out their punishment. Every cybercriminal is technology savvy and most of them are jobless youths with nothing to do.
3. There is an urgent need for those at the forefront of fighting cybercrime to be trained in modern-day computing and the internet to keep them abreast with best practices in fighting the menace and it should not just stop at that but it should be a mandatory continuous training as cybercrime keeps evolving.
4. It appears that the 2015 Cybercrime Prohibition and Prevention Act has done little to deter cybercriminals therefore there is a need for the National Assembly to revise this Act to enable stiffer penalties.
5. There is a need to build an international collaborative platform to combat cybercrime since cybercriminals are not bound by boundaries.
6. Charity Organizations in the country that often get wired funds from overseas should be thoroughly investigated alongside their sources of funds.

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THE NEXUS BETWEEN CONFLICT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This article appraised the relationship between conflict and sustainable development in Nigeria. Nigeria has tenaciously found it arduous to attain sustainable development goals due to corruption, nepotism, political brinkmanship, internal conflicts among others. When it degenerates into destructive proportion, conflict undermines human development, weakens social cohesion and institutional mechanisms thereby impeding sustainable development. Development is the creative ability of the people to transfer national resources into goods and services. Most extant publications on conflict and development have not directly established the impact of protracted conflict on sustainable development. Given this scenario, this paper examined the deepening widespread nature, typology, and main sources of conflict; ways of resolving same in Nigeria. It also outlined the sources of conflict to include bad governance and corruption, poverty, ethnic marginalization, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and human right violations among others. The research methodology is descriptive, historical and analytical with secondary sources. It is concluded that conflicts undermine the attainment of sustainable development. Hence, the article recommends committed sincere leadership, even distribution of resources, promotion of rule of law, protection of Fundamental Human Rights, gainful employment for the youths, adequate remuneration for civil servants and a multi-agency involvement in resolving conflicts. It further suggested that effective implementation of the National Peace Policy Roadmap would provide optimum approach for tackling conflicts towards enhancing sustainable peace and development in Nigeria.

Keywords: Conflict, Development, Sustainable Development, Corruption, Nepotism

Introduction

International community has been largely successful in averting interstate conflicts since the end of the World War II and the Cold War. The rise in intrastate conflicts is baffling. The transformation from inter-state to intrastate conflict from the later part of the 20th Century in West Africa brought a number of its economics to near collapse. Consequently, the sub-region's security environment has often been viewed as precarious and unstable. For decades, countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau were crippled by conflicts and incessant killings were prevalent (Afolabi, 2009:24). Insurgencies in the Sahel region affecting the West Africa Countries of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania including Arab region, send alarming signals of the possible re-surfacing of internal and regional violent conflicts. On the international scene, the Arab-Israeli conflict is an example of a conflict of global scale. Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the Middle East has not been peaceful till date. Other conflicts involving world powers are the ones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, the Punjab region, and Northern Ireland. These conflicts have resulted in the vicious cycle of underdevelopment.

Conflicts in Nigeria can be traced back to colonial times and the aftermath of independence. From the late 19th century to mid-20th century, the British colonization of Nigeria resulted in various conflicts, with resistance movements such as the Anglo-Aro war (1901-1902), the Sokoto caliphate resistance (1903-906), and the Ekumeku Rebellion (1883-1914) against the British rule. Nigeria gained Independence from Britain in 1960 but soon faced internal divisions. In 1967, the Eastern region declared Independence as the Republic of Biafra, leading to a bloody civil war that lasted until 1970. The conflict caused millions of deaths, economic devastation and underdevelopment. Some of the worst violence has been between neighboring communities and ethnic groups over claims of land ownership. Land disputes have fuelled most of the inter-communal and inter-ethnic conflicts in the southern oil region, where land ownership attracts compensation payments and amenities from multinationals.

In the northern part of Nigeria, desertification, has pushed mostly nomadic communities' southwards in search of pasture. As they enter lands controlled by settled farming communities, violent conflict often erupts (Uleyo, 2021). Some of the worst violence recorded in Nigeria in recent years have been between so-called indigenes and settlers' communities, especially in the northern and central regions. Rivalry between Muslims and Christians has also ignited violence in Nigeria, especially with regard to the adoption of strict sharia (Islamic law) by states in the predominantly Muslim north.

Other ethno-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts that have affected Nigeria's development for years include inter-ethnic conflicts of Kano in 1953, 1966 and 1995 between the Kano indigenes and the Igbo (Albert, 1993); the Maitatsine intra religious conflict of Kano in 1980 (Akinteye, 2001); the Ugep-Idomi (Cross-river state) conflicts in 1992 (Obono, 2001); the Tiv-Jukun (Taraba State) conflicts (Best and Shehu, 2001) and among the Yoruba of Ife – Modakeke in Osun state (Albert, 2001). According to Adesina (2005), most of the violent conflicts that have rocked Nigeria over the years and intensified in recent times are part of the consequences of a failed development process. They have also left frayed nerves forcing frustrated Nigerians to bare fangs against erstwhile peaceful neighbors at the individual and communal levels (Williams, 2001). This paper examines the deepening nature, and sources of conflicts in view of the implications for sustainable development in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarifications.

Understanding the term Conflict

A common denominator which runs through the various definitions of conflict is disagreement, whether among people, groups, countries or even within an individual. Beyond this literal meaning, psychologists, economists/bankers and peace and conflict resolution experts have their own peculiar conceptions of conflict.

In psychological theories of personality, conflict is "a state of discomfort or stress caused by an individual's experiencing two or more desires or needs that are incompatible" (Grigg, 2006). Other psychologists disagree with this interpretation of conflict. However, they

agree that conflict triggers any personality disturbance. Indeed, modern stimulus response psychological theorists like Dollard and Miller, are of the opinion that conflict is a result of significant competition between drives or responses.

From the perspective of conflict resolution experts, the term connotes “Opposition among social entities directed against one another” (Wright, 1990). Kriesberg (1973) regards conflict as “a relationship between two or more parties who believe they have incompatible goals”. In the same view, Aid (1994) and Hoivic and Meiger (1994) define conflict as “incompatible behavior between parties whose interests are, or appear to be incompatible or clashing. Coser (1956) defines the same concept as “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. In this paper, conflict is defined as a state in which people, ethnic or religious groups or countries are involved in a serious disagreement which may or may not result in bloody confrontation.

The Concept of Development

This refers to the processes and strategies through which societies and states seek to achieve more prosperous and equitable standards of living (Wright, 2004: 25). Gana (2001) states that development relates to the capacity and creative ability of people to transform the Natural resources of their environment into goods and services through the application of their talents, skills and labour power.

From the above, a country which cannot develop the skills and knowledge of its people and utilize them for effective economic growth cannot stand the test of changing times. Development is a process which enables human beings to realize their potentials and build self-confidences. For Jega (2002), development must be conceived of as involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and National institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of absolute poverty.

Sustainable Development

Sustainable development is a programmed, developed to meet the needs of the present generation and also those of the future generation. Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) is a universal decision established to make the world a better place. Nicholas & Perpetual (2015) defined sustainable development as the overall change and improvement in any given society as related to individual progress. It covers a wide range of interrelated issues in the area of environmental, economic, social and political, all within the limits of the world's natural resources to ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by the year 2030.

Furthermore, sustainable development provides a better quality of life for both the present and the future generation (shah, 2012). Oxford English Dictionary indicates that it is the ability to exist constantly. According to Blewitt (2008:4), it is the process of people maintaining change in a balanced environment, in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.

Theoretical Framework

There are several theories that explain conflicts among individual and group of communities. These theories determined the context of conflict within the communities. For the purpose of this paper, Greed and Grievance theory was adopted as the framework of analysis.

Greed and Grievance Theory

The Greed and Grievance theory of conflict was used to analyse the relationship between conflict and sustainable development. The two phenomena have been recently utilized to explain conflict onset among rational choice analysts, greed and grievance. The former reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents. The later argues that relative deprivation and the grievance it generates fuels conflict (Murshed and Tadjoeeddin, 2009). From these perspectives, Ted Gurr (1970) asserted that sustainable development is hindered by conflicts as resources are depleted or mismanaged, leading to environmental degradation and economic

instability. In contrast to the theory of greed proposed by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), many argue that the theory of grievance allows for the better explanation of the occurrence of the violent conflicts which consequently impedes sustainable development.

Methodology

The study adopted qualitative research design in carrying out its investigation in order to acquire an indepth analysis of the issue under consideration. The data employed for the study were gathered from secondary sources. As such, the paper relied majorly on reviewing documentary and newspaper commentaries; public and private libraries on the subject. Furthermore, the study also made use of internet materials wherein relevant articles were carefully retrieved. It utilized both content analysis and trend analytical techniques for the analysis of data. As such the information employed for analysis in the study were carefully extracted from logical chain of evidence presented in journal papers, conference papers, edited books, documentary materials among others.

Deepening Nature of Conflicts in Nigeria

Nigeria is made up of six geo-political zones, each with its unique history and context of conflicts, these include: North-east (States: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe Taraba, Yobe); North-west (States: Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Kebi, Sokoto, Jigawa Zamfara); North-central (States: Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau) and FCT (not a state); South-east (State: Anambra, Enugu, Imo, Abia and Ebonyi); South-west (States: Lagos, Ekiti, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ogun) and South-south (States: Akwa Ibom, Cross-River, Edo, Delta, Rivers).

S/N	GEO-POLITICAL ZONES	HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF CONFLICTS
1.	North – East	This zone is famous for Boko Haram insurgency; the terrorist group responsible for human rights abuse across Nigeria, Niger, Cameroun and Chad. This conflict has triggered an acute humanitarian and forced displacement crisis, with devastating social and economic impacts on the population further deepening under development and regional inequalities. The most affected states are Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. The most affected groups are

		women, children and Youths. Boko Haram's tactics included multiple mode of attack including suicide bombing.
2.	North-West	The North-west geopolitical region is suffering deadly conflict involving herder-allied groups, vigilantes and jihadists. The spike in jihadist activities in the region could soon become a land bridge connecting Islamic insurgencies in the Central Sahel with the decade-old insurgency in the Chad region of north-east Nigeria.
3.	North-Central	Conflict in the zone has escalated and expanded as tension between famers and herders' have risen. The conflict centers on agricultural households and nomadic cattle-herding groups who came into conflicts over land access. Farmer-herder conflict often consists of attacks by one group and subsequent retaliation from the other.
4.	South – East	The South-east geo-political region has been replete with violent dispute between communities. The region is also facing violent activities of the members of the movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MA SSOB) and indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB).
5.	South-South	The South-south geo-political region is known for youth's militancy and sea piracy. The youth militancy is easily associated with control of the oil resources in the Niger Delta. This resource wealth has not translated to economic success for most inhabitants of the State; instead, the region suffers from ecological degradation as a result of oil spills, youth unemployment, and extensive inequality between local population and employees of oil companies. These issues are compounded by ethnic and political tensions in the region. Sea piracy has been increasing in the region and this gives Nigeria Government and members of the International Community deep concerns.
6.	South West	From 1999, the South-west has been bedeviled by ethnic violence. Up to 2003, there were several cases of violent conflicts between the Yoruba and Hausa in Lagos, Shagamu, and Oke-Ogun area. The problem has abated. There are also incessant violent clashes between the factions of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) especially in Lagos and Oyo States.

Table1: Geo- political zones with History and Context of Conflicts in Nigeria

These violent conflicts have contributed largely to state of underdevelopment and scuttled millennium development goals in Nigeria. Each of the conflicts has claimed thousands of lives and destroyed property as well as human displacement. As Albert rightly observes:

The conflicts disrupt and destroy families' community life. They particularly undermine family systems through the deliberate targeting of women and the recruitment of children to join ranks of fighters (Albert, 2012:3).

The loss of livelihood, owing to the destruction of infrastructure and natural resources, and lack of employment opportunities coincides with a weak social safety net and a decline in the capacity of the government to provide service, such as health and education. The testimony since 1999 reveals that violent conflict impacts negatively in the rule of law, state capacity and democratic political process.

The crisis had gender differentiated effects on the area's population. Thousands of men, elderly ones including children have been kidnapped or killed, as well as their property stolen, leaving thousands of women as both widows and sole remaining breadwinners. The inability of the Nigeria State to find lasting solution to the conflict issues produces a breakdown of law and order and the perpetration of human rights abuses on a large scale.

Typology of Conflict

Two broad categories of conflicts have been identified. These are internal conflicts (or intra-state conflict) and international conflict or inter-state conflict. Internal conflict is one in which the governmental authorities of a state are opposed by groups within the state seeking to overthrow those authorities with force of arms (Eminue, 2004:15). It may also be seen as one in which armed violence occurs primarily within the borders of a state.

Interstate conflicts on the other hand take place between two or more nations and involve forces of more than one state (Puchala, 1971:142). It is apt to observe that Africa has experienced both types of conflict over the years. Nigeria is currently embroiled in intra-state conflicts. However, Africa has also witnessed a third type of conflict, namely, internationalized internal armed conflict. Such conflicts, which are essentially civil wars, have

varying degrees of external involvement. Examples include the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola and Sierra Leone.

The likelihood of conflict escalation depends on the way the parties involved have managed it. Where parties or institutions do not manage conflict well and react with force, conflict can escalate. How the state responds to the matter is very important. If its response mechanism is not good enough, the problem would continue to be there. That many of these conflicts are still lingering means that more have to be done by government and non-governmental agencies in dealing with the situation as no sustainable development can take place in Nigeria as these problems exist.

Sources of Conflicts

There are several major sources of conflict in Nigeria, including:

- **Bad Governance and Corruption:** Post-Colonial rule in West Africa countries has been fraught with several challenges. Elemental among them are the issues of bad governance and corruption. Corruption in Nigeria has been highlighted as one of the underlining factors in the Niger Delta conflict and the more recent, yet very pronounced, Boko Haram insurgency (Ejibunu, 2007:16; Brock, 2012:13). The uneven distribution of wealth and the competition for control over these resources often lead to conflicts between different regions, political elites, and communities. In affirming the linkage between corruption and violence in Nigeria's Niger Delta, Hassan (2007:19) indicates that seeing money coming from the Federal Government earnings from crude oil sales, with essentially none of it reaching the ordinary people, created conditions for insurrection.
- **Human rights violations:** Incidences of human rights abuse and violations are numerous in Nigeria. These form the basis for the eruption and renewal of violent conflicts and civil strife in the country. Across the nation, there are reported incidences of sexual and gender-based violence, reprisal killings, and high social injustice, repressive and brutal leadership and unequal distribution of state resources among

others. All these serve as both triggers and consequences of war. Violations of human rights of local citizens has been one of the factors causing the militancy in the Niger Delta region (Ejibunu, 2007: 17). He noted that many of the Oil companies in the region were responsible for the environmental pollution and economic marginalization while the state supinely works on. The 1992 killings of youths from Bonny, a local community, during a peaceful demonstration against the ecological pollutions and marginalization was caused by Shell Company (Brisibe, 2001:35).

- **Poverty:** Poverty also stands to be one of the major setbacks in Nigeria and the West Africa Region. According to the 2012 UNDP Human Development report, nearly half of the Sub-Saharan Africans live in poverty (UNDP, 2012). Consequently, the poverty that many Nigerians endure can be seen to be one of the major contributing factors to the occurrence of violent conflicts in the country. A research conducted by Vinck et al (2011), 30 percent of the Nigerian population indicated that poverty was one of the main sources of conflicts in Nigeria. Nigeria has a high level of income inequality, with a significant portion of the population living in poverty. This inequality often leads to social unrest and conflicts between different social classes.
- **Ethnic Marginalization:** Ethnicity by itself is not violent. However, the concept has been manipulated in societies polarized into two imbalanced divides with one faction feeling marginalized' (Annan and Danso, 2013). Correspondingly, James fearson and David Laitin (2003) also believe that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity by itself is not a major and direct cause of violent civil conflict". Nevertheless, to a larger extent, for a heterogeneous community like Nigeria, ethnicity and religious practices have become a diving factor that continues to drive violent conflicts within and among communities and states, destabilizing the peace in the country. Tensions often arise between these groups, especially in areas where they live in close proximity to each other.

- **Small arms and Light weapons proliferation:** Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation is one of the major challenges in Nigeria. Nigeria remains an area of considerable SALW proliferation because of their affordability, accessibility and availability; and porosity of the borders and legal frameworks legitimizing their use (Keili, 2008:19). The circulation of illegal arms within and across the states has increased the proclivity of conflicts within the country. Small arms proliferation has contributed to the mobilization for undemocratic overthrow of government, increasing casualties and violent inter-communal and intra-state conflicts in West Africa.

Flowing from the review above, one of the factors threatening sustainable development in many parts of the world today, including Nigeria, is violent conflict. Every violent conflict carries in its trail destruction of human, material and natural resources useful for the development of mankind. Positive conflict transformation is thus a vital infrastructure of sustainable development. On the other hand, sustainable development enhances peace. Under development breeds deprivation, poverty, hunger and disease.

Relationship Between Conflict and Sustainable Development

It is obvious that there is an inverse relationship between conflict and development (the greater the conflict, the less the development). Countries which find themselves involved in armed conflict frequently show regress rather than progress in development indicators (such as socio-economic growth, provision of health and education, and improvement in infrastructure etc.). The percentage of less-developed countries that are currently in conflict situation equates to 33%, and has increased to over 50% in the last two decades (Stewart, 2003:326).

In Nigeria, all these conflicts have contributed to state of underdevelopment. The complex interaction of events which characterizes conflict (fighting, displacement of people, deaths, physical destruction, and international embargoes on military expenditures) has a drastic impact on sustainable development. At the Macro-level, violent conflict is always associated with a clear decline in gross national product, fluctuations in growth rate prospects and an increase in budget deficit. A rapid reduction in imports and exports accompanied by

high inflation and unemployment is also in most cases inevitable. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognizes that: “Sustainable development cannot be realized without peace and security; and peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development.”

Low levels of human development increase the risk of conflict; conflict can destroy economic and social capital, undermining human development. Countries that can sustain peace and mitigate the risks of conflict tend to achieve higher levels of human development. Weak countries tend to have lower levels (Wandember, 2015:122). Peace strives on justice and fairness, equity, trust, friendship, mutual respect, communication, a common aspiration and similar elements. Peace building as core message of peace education is an intervention designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict by creating a sustainable peace. It addresses the potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution, and stabilizes society both politically, socially and economically.

Stable and conducive societies tend to attract more capital, particularly longer-term investment, thereby creating jobs and allowing for long-term productivity growth. Similarly improved social outcomes, such as greater education attainment, better health and more poverty alleviation, and provision of basic services, also mitigate the risks of conflict. Environmental development in the form of inclusive access policies, disaster preparedness and conservation efforts can also minimize the risk of conflict by ensuring fairness, sustainability and resilience. When such outcome is achieved countries can witness a virtuous cycle of peace and sustainable development.

Conversely, conflict can unstitch development gains by destroying physical capital and infrastructure, thereby impeding social progress and raising transitive costs for businesses. Obviously, severe destruction of infrastructure could induce as many indirect deaths, since health care depends highly on a good infrastructure and smooth-running supply chain. This can lead to deterioration in fiscal positions as well as lower investment in socio-economic development in countries affected by violent conflicts. Sustaining peace requires an

understanding of the underlying structural drivers of conflict beyond the immediate triggers. Thus, a clear distinction between the “absence of conflict” and “durable peace” must be underscored. An absence of conflict does not necessarily imply that a society is operating at the frontier of peaceful conditions. The latency of conflict suggests that it is critical to address these structural drivers of conflict even in the absence of conflict. Thus, assessment of conflicts must “go beyond the dichotomy of fragility, and look for dimensions of fragility that may be present even in supposedly non-fragile countries” (UNDP, 2016).

Nigerian government officials should be exposed to conflict prevention strategies through formal and informal peace education. It is also necessary to train Nigerian Community leaders, civil servant, law enforcement agents and staff of non-Governmental Organizations in practical conflict management. Such training programs, as organized in other parts of the world most especially in Northern Ireland and South Africa, emphasize practical ways for turning violent conflicts into opportunities for positive international forces, and local struggles (Obi, 2012:8).

Imperative of a Coherent National Peace Policy

There is a need for National Peace Policy Road Map (NPP) that emphasizes social, political and economic integration of Nigeria’s diverse ethnic, religious, cultural and other identified groups. The policy should establish a framework for dealing holistically with the cross-cutting issues of small arms proliferation, access to and management of natural resources, the need to deal with problems of environmental degradation, massive population flow, human and drugs trafficking, political and financial corruption, private sector interests in economic development, respect for human rights, viable political structures, the capacity and programs supporting reconciliation processes in post conflict communities and states. The policy should also seek to integrate the country’s peace building initiatives and conflict prevention, management, resolution and transformation mechanisms by various stakeholders into a cohesive whole, and to provide an environment in which Nigerians enjoy sustained peace and development.

Conclusion

This paper points out that contemporary conflicts in Nigeria have grossly undermined the attainment of sustainable development and security. Violent conflict has disentangled development gains by destroying physical capital, infrastructure and human resources which would have been utilized for the attainment of sustainable development. For conflict resolution to be relevant it has to relate with sustained efforts that address not only the military dimension of conflicts, but also the political, economic and social aspects of conflicts. Civil society should also cooperate with the state towards ensuring that the National Peace Policy integrates all the issues raised and is effectively implemented to make Nigeria more peaceful. This would put the country on the path of sustainable development

Recommendation

- i. Nigeria needs committed and sincere leaders that will lead by example and who act as good, responsible and responsive fathers to all the component sections and people in the country so as to promote peace and harmony within the confines of their respective domains.
- ii. Nigeria leaders must ensure an even distribution of resources among the various geo-political zones in the country to avoid any feeling of alienation.
- iii. Nigeria leaders should endeavor to promote the rule of law to guarantee peaceful co-existence among people and a peaceful transition of power from one government to the other.
- iv. The protection of Fundamental Human Rights must be guaranteed by Nigeria leaders should also promote, protect and guarantee the fundamental human rights of their citizens. Opposition must be tolerated while the fourth realm of government, the press must not be censored.
- v. Eradication of Poverty must be made a major policy instrument for peace and stability in Nigeria that is riddled with conflicts is the eradication or at worst, a reduction of

the monster of poverty. This can be achieved in a number of ways as suggested below:

- vi. Equal access to qualitative education should be made possible for all citizens should be given equal access to qualitative education to enhance human and societal development.
- vii. Provision of gainful employment for the youths in Nigeria Government in Nigeria should also strive to provide gainful employment for all her citizens especially the youths.

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SECURITISATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN POST-AMNESTY NIGER DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The constant deployment of the Nigerian military as a weapon of intervention in the Niger Delta region over the genuine agitation for socioeconomic and environmental justice is an issue of immense concern. The agitation from this region is securitized as a threat to national security by the Nigerian state due to the dynamics of conflict escalation. The paper examines the utility of force as a conflict resolution mechanism by the Nigerian government in the Niger Delta crisis. The study employed descriptive qualitative research design through content analysis, while it adopted securitization theory as theoretical framework. The study addressed the question of military deployment in the Niger Delta region from three periods. viz; pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict. The study concludes that the continuous deployment of the military in the Niger Delta region rather complicates the crisis as communities in the region are constantly invaded at the slightest suspicion leading to abuses and violations. The study, therefore, recommends that non-kinetic, peaceful and genuine peacebuilding that addresses the root of the crisis remains the best approach towards resolving the Niger Delta crisis for sustainable peace and development.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Niger Delta, Post-Conflict, Securitisation.

Introduction

The Niger Delta crisis is intractable. This is so because the Nigerian state perceives the Niger Delta question from the prism of national security. The reason (s) for this misperception is not far-fetched. The Niger Delta region is richly endowed with natural resources with oil and gas accounting for over 85% of Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Paradoxically, the region remains the poorest, due largely to the ecologically unfriendly extraction of oil and state policies ((Dokubo in Ibaba, 2013). Oil exploration in the region has been characterized by poor environmental management practices resulting in high numbers and huge volumes of oil spills, devastation of mangrove forests, improper disposal of effluents and other production wastes, and gas flaring. This has resulted in pollution of water resources and farmlands, thereby making fishing and farming, the traditional occupation of the people unsustainable. The environmental pollution as well as the presence of the industry has far-reaching health and socioeconomic implications (Obi & Rustard, 2011). Oluyemi (2020) argues that the conflict erupted as a result of the insensitivity and negligence of Nigerian government and transnational oil companies as well as their intransigence toward the grievances of the local people of the region about the unwillingness to address the continuing environmental degradation resulting to their hardship social and economic conditions.

The militarization of the Niger Delta region by the Nigerian state derives from the exclusive right of ownership and control of oil and gas resources bestowed on the Federal Government by various laws after the First Republic. Etekpe (20017) states that the plight of the Niger Delta is tied to some federal legislation that limits the region from maximizing the benefits of the oil resources. These include the Mineral and Petroleum Act, 1969 (Cap. 350, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, 1969 under the Petroleum Act, 1969, the Offshore Oil Revenue Act, 1971, the Land Use Act, 1978 (Cap 202, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990), the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act, 1988 (Cap 131, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1999), the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, the Oil Terminal Dues Act (Cap. 339,

Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990), and the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission Decree No. 23 of 1992, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Decree No. 86 of 1992. Others are the National Inland Waterways Authority Decree, 1997, the Onshore-Offshore Dichotomy Act, 2004, and the Petroleum Industry Act, 2021.

Some Scholars have argued that the incursion of the military in Nigerian political system explains the *raison de'être* the use of soldiers has remained a preferred approach even in internal security matters (Oluyemi, 2020). Since independent, the military held sway for twenty-nine years out of the initial forty years, before her return to civil rule in 1999 (Odinkalu, 2013). Nigeria had her first military rule from January 15, 1966, to October 1, 1979. However, the involvement of the military in democratic governance has been described as an aberration. The constitutional role of the military is to defend the people, uphold the constitution and secure the territorial integrity of the Nigeria (Mailafia, 2019). In the same vein, Afeno (2014) posits that the deployment of Nigerian armed forces to support the Nigerian police in carrying out their internal security operations has always been favorably considered by the government with the belief that such military intervention is more effective in ensuring the internal security.

The militancy struggle for oil equity and justice in the Niger Delta region is historical and has taken several forms over the years. From Isaac Adaka Boro's 12-day revolution (1966), nonviolent protests by Ken Saro-Wiwa led Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, MOSOP, (1995), to the Kaiama Declaration by Ijaw youths (1998), the military has been used as an intervention mechanism in the Niger Delta region for the maintenance of national security. However, worthy of note is that the continued deployment of the military in the Niger Delta has not only done more harm to the locals and worsened the plight of the Niger Delta, it has also aggravated criminal activities such as sea piracy, oil theft, pipeline vandalisation and local oil refining in the region.

Definition of Terms

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is a way for two or more parties to find a peaceful solution to a disagreement among them. Conflict resolution is the process of ending a dispute and reaching an agreement that satisfies all parties involved.

Niger Delta

The Niger Delta region is located in the Atlantic Coast of southern Nigeria. It is the largest wetland in Africa and the second largest delta in the world (Izah & Aigberua, 2023; Nnaemeka, 2020). The region spans approximately 70,000 square kilometers and harbors diverse ecosystems, including mangroves, swamps, and tropical rainforests (Nnadi et al. 2022). The ecosystem of the area is highly diverse and supportive of numerous species of terrestrial and aquatic flora and fauna and human life. It ranks amongst the world's most prolific petroleum production area. The oil and gas exploitation has resulted in several million barrels of crude oil spillages and gas flaring. The Niger Delta region is subject to intense environmental degradation associated with oil and gas extraction, including water pollution, air pollution, land pollution, and industrial waste disposal (Nnadi, et al, ibid). It comprises of six states, including Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, and Rivers.

Post-Conflict

Post-conflict is a conflict situation in which open hostilities have come to an end. According to Cunningham (2017), post-conflict context can be conceptualized as a transitional period bounded by past war and future peace.

Securitisation

Securitization in International Relations and national politics is the process of state actors transforming subjects from regular political issues into matters of "security": thus enabling extraordinary means to be used in the name of security (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Securitization theory challenges traditional approaches to security in IR and asserts that issues are not essentially threatening in themselves; rather, it is by referring to them as 'security' issues that they become security problems.

Brief Literature Review

Arinze (2013) in Brown (2014) in his work titled “The Military and Internal Security in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects” argued that military involvement in the internal security operations is inevitable as the security threat level becomes aggressive. Section 217 (c) of the 1999 Constitution provides the basis of involvement of the military in internal security operations in Nigeria. It provides the President with the authority but subject to approval of the National Assembly to invite the military in “suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore law and order”. This move however, is not without challenges of its own as the military is not particularly trained for internal security operations unlike the civil authorities and as a result, consistently engage in acts which are not civil enough. The military usually encounter problems when engaged in civil operations.

Musa (2019) in his study titled “How using the military in Nigeria is causing, not solving problems” contends that the deployments of the military to restore order and keep peace is largely due to the inability of the police to contain violent conflicts, particularly in areas where there is armed conflict. How the study notes that using the military in Nigeria is causing, not solving problems, including the undermining the legitimacy of the military mission, as well as failing to quell the violence. The study concluded that the rules of engagement are often ignored as soldiers only worsen the security situation for ordinary people.

Siollun (2021) examined the deployment of the military in maintenance of internal security in Nigeria. In a paper titled “Nigeria’s Military is Part of the Problem, it’s Also the Solution” the author noted that with the police overwhelmed, the involvement of the military has been tasked with acting not just as an army but as a proxy police force. The military’s deployment across the country gives it leverage and makes it part of the solution. However, the paper concluded that the frequent deployment of the military internal security situations has amplified civil-military conflicts and human rights abuses as well as degraded its professionalism.

Similarly, Akor (2021) in his article titled “Nigeria’s military and internal security” opined that the use of the military in civil space has not always worked or has never worked. The military’s style of policing the country is “not to detect or investigate crimes” but to shock, terrorise, brutalise, use mass murder and rape as an instrument of subjugation and control. So when there is a skirmish anywhere or a crime is committed, rather than investigate and apprehend the offenders, the military just carry out what they call ‘a reprisal’ against the community involved, brutalising and killing enough people and destroying as much of the community as they could afford to. Consequently, what the military end up achieving by their reprisals is radicalisation of the community.

Theoretical Framework

Securitization theory explains how national security threat is processed by state actors to justify emergency actions for self-preservation. During the Cold War the concept of international security was understood in military terms as the threat or use of force by states. The end of the Cold War, however, sparked a debate over ideas of security in International Relation (IR) between ‘narrowers’ and ‘wideners’ as scholars sought ‘critical perspective’ to explain the emergence of new challenges to international stability, such as environmental degradation, immigration and terrorism (Fierke 2015).

The narrowers were concerned with the security of the state and often focused on analysing the military and political stability of the state. Dissatisfied with this, wideners sought to reconceptualize its understanding of the term security to account for its broadening agenda beyond the narrow concepts of state and military security, and beyond the concerns of state actor. Through the formulation of securitization theory, the Copenhagen School advanced the argument that national security policy is not a natural given, but carefully designated by politicians and decision-makers (Williams, 2003). According to securitization theory, political issues are constituted as extreme security issues to be dealt with urgently when they have been labeled as ‘dangerous’, ‘menacing’, ‘threatening’, ‘alarming’ and so on by a ‘securitising actor’ who has the social and institutional power to move the issue ‘beyond politics’. Thus,

security issues are not simply ‘out there’ but rather must be articulated as problems by securitizing actors. ‘It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one’ (Waever, 2004)

Scholars associated with the school include Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. The Copenhagen School framework is premised on Buzan’s (1983) *People, State, and Fear: The National Security Problem*, in which he recognized the nexus between development, peace, security, human rights and social justice. This broad view is a paradigm shift from the traditionally restrictive conception of security, anchored on militarism. Prominent in this critical view is the notion of *securitization*, which describes how state security/national security threats are processed.

Consequently, Waever proposes what he describes as *desecuritization*, whereby issues are moved out of the sphere of exceptionality and into the public sphere. He identified five spheres of potential threats to security that a state could face; military, political, economic, societal, and environmental (Awanen, 2020). Building on Waever’s proposition, Booth and Jones (1998) in their reconceptualisation of human security introduce the concept of *emancipation*. Furthermore, they contend that while security is desirable; the prospect of human security is only realizable when people are emancipated from real-life problems, referred to as condition *survival* – the ability to have the basic needs of life such as food, shelter, safety, etc. Defined as the struggle of a person or a group of people to exist, condition *survival*, according to them, is a threat to security.

Judging from the above, the use of securitisation theory shows that the politics of national security is about threat magnification. This threat magnification demonstrates the exceptionality of the threat, which, in turn, requires urgent and extraordinary responses. Therefore, rather than view the crisis as a people faced with existential threat, the Nigerian state sees it from the prism of national security that justifies military deployment in the region.

Methodology

The designed utilized in this study is qualitative research approach. This is an approach where qualitative data rely mainly upon secondary sources such as textbooks, materials from the internet and published journals, articles etc. Data from these sources were qualitatively analyzed through content analysis.

Discussions

The Joint Military Task Force he Joint Military Task Force (JMTF), also known as Operation Restore Hope‘ comprises military personnel and combatant troops drawn from the Nigerian Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Police and the Department of State Security (DSS) tasked with addressing security issues in the Niger Delta region (Chiluwa, 2011). Commonly known as the JTF, the deployment of the Special Force in the context of Niger Delta insurgency can be periodised into three epochs: pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict. The original mandate of the JTF was to protect oil installations and waterways in the Delta region following recurrent reports of vandalisation of oil facilities in the area by ethnic youth activists (ibid).

Pre-Conflict Period

Recent history of military occupation of the oil communities began in 1990s, which marked out the Niger Delta region as the only part of Nigeria where a special military force was deployed, especially in Ogoni and Ijawland (Okonta & Douglas, 2003). Beginning in December 1992, the conflict between the Ogoni and the oil companies escalated to a level of intensity on both sides. Led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), launched a nonviolent campaign in 1990 against the government and Royal Dutch/Shell to protest environmental degradation and the area’s economic neglect. At the end of the struggle, over 2,000 civilians were killed and around 100,000 were internally displaced (Haller, 2000). The group’s efforts led Shell to cease production in Ogoni in 1993. Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP members, the “Ogoni Nine,” were executed by the military regime in 1995.

Subsequently, the Ijaw Youths Conference galvanised the Ijaws' struggle for oil resource control with the formation of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), and issued the Kaiama Declaration on 11 December, 1998 (Etekpe, 2017). In anticipation of the December 30 ultimatum set by the Kaiama Declaration, the military administrator of Bayelsa State, Lt. Col. Paul Obi, declared a state of emergency from December 30 to January 4, 1999. The military deployed two warships and about 15,000 troops to occupy Bayelsa and Delta states as the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) mobilized for 'Operation Climate Change' (Omotoso, 2014). During the disturbances, several people were brutalized, many youths were killed, and women were raped (HRW, 1999). In November 1999, the army destroyed the town of Odi, Bayelsa State and killed scores of civilians in retaliation for the murder of twelve (12) policemen by a local gang (HRW, *ibid*). This action by the state ignited violence by the region's youth as legitimate weapons of protests, and the Niger Delta struggle took a decisive turn (Oluwaniyi, 2021; Ebiefa, 2011).

Conflict Period

Subsequent actions by Ijaws against the oil industry included both renewed efforts at nonviolent action and attacks on oil installations and foreign oil workers (Aghadiuno, 1999). Meanwhile, the confrontation between the Mujahid Dokubo Asari-led Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and Ateke Tom-led Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) intensified, with the two militia groups fighting for control of bunkering routes around Port-Harcourt, Rivers State. The state campaign against the NDPVF emboldened Asari who began publicly articulating populist, anti-government views and attempted to frame the conflict in terms of pan-Ijaw nationalism and "self-determination." (Falade, 2009). Consequently, the state government escalated the campaign against him by bringing in the military and police in June 2004. After launching a mission to wipe out NDPVF, approved by President Olusegun Obasanjo in early September 2004, Asari declared "all-out war" with the Nigerian state as well as the oil corporations and threatened to disrupt oil production activities through attacks on wells and pipelines.

In response to the insurgency, the Nigerian government launched a massive military crackdown on militants. Codename ‘Operation Flush Out’, the JTF took over the region. Thousands of people fled their communities and scores of people were killed by the military offensive (Okonta & Douglas, (ibid). however, by the end of 2008, it was obvious to the Nigerian government that military actions alone were not enough to combat the violence in the Niger Delta region (Oluwaniyi, (ibid).

On 25 June 2009, President Musa Yar’Adua, granted amnesty to Niger Delta militants who were willing to surrender their weapons and renounce armed struggle within a 60-day ultimatum (6 August–4 October 2009). By the end of the amnesty period in October 2009, 20 192 ex-militants (and non-militants) had surrendered their weapons, consisting of 2 760 arms of different classes and calibre, 287 445 ammunitions, 3 155 magazines, 1 090 dynamite caps, 763 explosives and sticks of dynamite, and 18-gun boats – to the Presidential Amnesty Committee (ibid). According to the PAP, about 30,000 ex-militants have been demobilised.

Post-Conflict Period

There is relative peace in the Niger Delta region, yet some critics think that the fragile peace is not sustainable. Despite this, the JTF is heavily stationed across the region as though the crisis has not ended. Currently operating under codename ‘Operation Delta Safe’, the presence of the military in the region is barely tolerated by the people as there seems to be no genuine move to placate the grievances of the region. For instance, the militarization of Gbaramatu Kingdom, Delta State is marked by a military station in Ikpokpo, a formation in the place formerly known as Camp 5, military houseboats at Ibafan, Kengha Gbene (Omonigho, 2017), TekeyeGbene (Kokodiagbene, Otunana), Jones Creek, Sengbene, Oporoza Waterfront, and Seiturobubor (Saharareporters, 2016). In addition, towards the 2019 presidential election, military hardwares in form of gunboats and helicopter gunships and personnel, were deployed to the area. The troops carried out stop and search operations on vessels and people aboard the marine transportation vessels (Tribune, 2019). Gbaramatu is

the hometown of former Niger Delta militant leader, Government Ekpemupolo aka Tompolo.

Consequently, leaders of the region including Chief Edwin Kiagbodo Clark, advised the Federal Government to withdraw all troops deployed to the Niger Delta, and to enter into talks with the people (Okafor, 2016). In the same vein, youth groups such as the Ijaw Youth Congress, IYC, called on the Federal Government to dismantle the military occupation of the Ijaw nation and the Niger Delta and stop laying siege on communities in the region. According to the council, the killing and maiming of people and the burning down of communities by the Nigerian military at the slightest provocation by criminal elements were a huge threat to the peace and stability of the region (Igoni, 2022).

However, this acknowledgement and several others have not been matched with actions as efforts to address the Niger Delta crisis have failed. Several intervention initiatives in the Niger Delta ranging from Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, owing to various reasons, have fallen short of adequately addressing the developmental challenges of the region (Paki & Ebienfa, 2011; Aliu, 2020). Additionally, one of the reasons adduced for the failure of the Presidential Amnesty Programme concerning peacebuilding, according to Ijaw National Congress, INC, is that the amnesty programme failed to address the fundamental issues of the Niger Delta crisis because it was executed with “militarization rather than with civilianization”, bereft of mediation and conflict transformation (Gbaramatu Voice, 2022).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study examined the use of military force as a conflict resolution mechanism in the Niger Delta region. The Niger Delta region suffers existential challenge arising from unfriendly environmental practices by multinational oil companies and obnoxious government policies. The government’s excessive deployment of the military against the backdrop of the dilemmas

faced by the oil-producing communities that militancy emerged in the Niger Delta region. The Nigerian state has largely relied on a military approach in handling the Niger Delta question, rather than address the root of the crisis. Apart from the flawed implementation of the Presidential Amnesty programme, several issues that affect the region are yet to be addressed. Additionally, the prevalence of the military in the Niger Delta offers oil companies false sense of impunity whose operations often wreak havoc in the communities and defy the rights of the people in the region.

Oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta still suffer from extreme poverty and underdevelopment since the inception of the amnesty programme. Yet the military remains heavily deployment in the region with menacing tendencies. It should be emphasized that the Niger Delta crisis has long past the phase of conflict management. There must be a paradigm shift going forward. It is now time to address the issues and find agreeable solution to the conflict with a view to transforming it for mutual benefits. Consequently, the long-term solution to the Niger Delta crisis lies heavily in a nonmilitary and peaceful approach.

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HARNESSING DIGITAL TOOLS FOR CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND RECONCILIATION IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the potential of digital technology in promoting peace, conflict transformation, and reconciliation in Nigeria, a country facing complex conflict tensions. The primary objective of this study is to identify conflicts in Nigeria that requires digital solutions in order to provide recommendations and strategies for effectively utilizing digital tools in enhancing conflict transformation and reconciliation efforts in Nigeria. The research employs qualitative research approach. The findings highlight the significant impact of digital tools in conflict transformation, leveraging on platforms like social media, mobile apps, and data analytics to facilitate dialogue and understanding among conflicting parties. The study also proposes strategies to overcome a major challenge identified: the pervasive threat of IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra) driven by deep-seated ethnic tensions and a desire for secession.

Keywords: Conflict Transformation, Digital Tools, IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra), Social-Media, and Peacebuilding

Introduction

Terrorism has become a global threat. Various organizations, such as the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the National Security Research Division at the RAND Corporation, the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), and others have made intensive research on terrorist attacks to develop countermeasures that mitigate or eliminate the negative impacts of terrorism. However, terrorist attacks still present a serious tendency. In 2012, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) responded to 8441 attacks

in the world, a sharp increase of 66.6% from the year 2011. The 8441 attacks caused 15401 fatalities, a significant increase of 88.9% compared with 2011.

It was recorded that in 2011 alone, over 15,000 people were killed in terrorist-related attacks around the globe. This was due to the collective activities of the Al-Qaeda affiliate's terrorist groups (AQAP, AQIM, AQI, and AQKB) the Pakistan Taliban, the Somalia Al-Shabaab, and another local terrorist group. In 2015 four groups were responsible for 74 percent of all deaths from terror-related attacks. They are ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda. ISIL surpassed Boko Haram as the deadliest terrorist group in 2015. ISIL undertook attacks in 252 different cities in 2015 and was responsible for 6,141 deaths in the year. Boko Haram had an 18 percent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 5,478 deaths during the year. Al-Qaeda had a 17 percent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 1,620 deaths in the year. The Taliban in Afghanistan had a 29 percent increase in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 4,502 deaths from terrorism during the year.

Terrorism on the continent of Africa has been rising sharply over the decade. Non-state (terrorist groups, militias, rebel groups, etc.) have increasingly targeted civilians in their campaigns of violence. From Somalia to Mali and Nigeria to Mozambique, the continent has repeatedly witnessed grisly acts of violence targeting its civilian populations. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), in 2015 there were 381 attacks targeting civilians in Africa resulting in 1,394 fatalities. This number rose sharply throughout the years and by 2020 there were 7,108 attacks targeting civilians resulting in 12,519 fatalities (Raleigh, et al 2010). The threat of terrorism has grown so much on the continent that by 2020 seven of the top 10 countries in the world in terms of terrorism risk were in Africa, according to global risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft (Brown 2010).

Before the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, Nigeria had experienced terror-related attacks from other terrorist organizations vying for prominence in the orgy of death and destruction. The first recorded major terror-related incident was in 1980 by "the Maitatsine

religious sect” in Kano, followed by the October 1993 hijack of a Nigerian Airways flight in Kano led by Jerry Yusuf from a group known as the Movement of the Advancement of Democracy in Nigeria. Terrorist attacks were also perpetrated by the Movement of the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and other South-South and South-East groups predicted agitations against environmental degradation, perceived marginalization, and the quest for resource control.

Data from Nextier SPD Violent Conflict Database shows that in twelve months, from August 2020 to September 2021, Nigeria recorded 46 terrorist attacks resulting in 435 deaths, 21 injured persons, and 17 kidnapped persons. 75.9 percent of the fatalities were civilians, while the balance of 24.1 percent were security agents. Despite government claims of successful campaigns, terrorism remains a major security challenge in the country. The growing insecurity leads to significant losses, both in direct and indirect costs of the conflict and in the price of building peace.

While it is hard to derive the exact economic cost of an ongoing violent conflict (Mueller, 2013), data from the 2021 Global Peace Index, shows that the economic impact of violence in Nigeria has almost doubled since 2007. The figure increased from \$69.39 billion in 2007 to \$132.60 billion in 2019. In the last 12 years (2007-2019), the estimated multiplier effect of direct and indirect violence was \$1.35 trillion, meaning that the ongoing conflict costs about 30 percent of Nigeria’s GDP. According to Hanna et al., (2021), as the hostilities continue, children feel the burden increasingly.

Regardless of the devastating and negative impact of terror-related attacks on the lives and livelihoods of Nigerians, there are strong pieces of evidence of efforts by state and non-state security actors and local stakeholders to curtain these menaces and entrench peace and security. In light of the foregoing, this study was designed to determine the frequency of terror-related attacks in selected states in Nigeria concerning fatalities resulting from the terror-related attacks. The study also responds to key research questions which bothered on:

- i. What is the general assessment of fatalities in Nigeria?

- ii. What is the frequency of terror-related attacks to fatalities?
- iii. To what extent are the terror-related attacks on fatalities in Nigeria?

To look at the relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities emanating from the attacks, a null hypothesis was formulated stating that: there is no significant relationship between the terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria.

Conceptual Framework

Terrorism

Terrorism comes from the term terror, which conjures up thoughts of dread and panic. It is an unprovoked, random, and unpredictable act meant to instil fear in the targeted victim (s). Terrorism remains a challenging topic to define and operationalize. This is due to the intangibility of the phenomena, which varies based on the historical and geographical contexts in which it is applied making it a value-laden notion. The United Nations issued the most widely accepted definition of terrorism in 1992, defining it as "an anxiety-inducing method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, where the direct targets of violence are not the primary targets, in contrast to assassination" (White, 2004, p.4). Terrorism is defined as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to achieve a political, economic, religious, or social purpose through fear, coercion, or intimidation," according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which provided the data for this study (GTD, 2016: 9).

This broad definition includes bombings, armed assaults, banditry, and assassinations, among other things. The definition of terrorism proposed by Ajayi and Adesote is used in this paper (2013). The researchers defined terrorism as the use or threat of violence that has limited physical destructiveness but produces fear and shock, and so has a strong psychological impact while examining the Jonathan administration's counter-terrorism efforts. This definition was chosen since it emphasizes subject matter descriptions and includes both successful and unsuccessful terrorist actions. It also incorporates the GTD's proposed definition (2016).

Domestic and global terrorism have been characterized as distinct types of terrorism. Domestic terrorism refers to terrorist operations carried out in a host country against fellow citizens, their property, and the country's institutions and policies, whether for political or other causes. Consider the terrorist operations of Boko Haram in Nigeria and Sri Lankan Tamils. Transnational terrorism, on the other hand, involves more than one country. This can be due to the victims, targets, institutions, and supporters, terrorists, or the consequences (Sandler and Ender 2008). The 9/11 incident in the United States is a good illustration of global terrorism.

Insurgency

Fatality

A fatality is the death of a human-caused by an accident or is the quality of the disaster being able to cause the death of a human(s). Other causes of fatality exist in Nigeria such as neonatal disorders, communicable and non-communicable diseases, man-made and natural disasters maternal mortality among others. Fatality in the context of terrorism is a death caused by the activities of terrorists, on the way to and from the workplace, market, within the surrounding, or during other works or movements directly or indirectly related to the occupation. Between 2011 and 2021, Boko Haram was responsible for thousands of fatalities in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Nigeria is the country most affected by the terrorist group's attacks. States in the Northeast register the highest number of fatalities. Borno is by far the most threatened state, in that, Boko Haram has caused over 34 thousand deaths in this area. For this paper, we are concerned with fatalities caused by the conflict in terror-related attacks.

Insecurity

The concept of insecurity is a multi-faceted and cross-cutting topic that has sparked controversy. Varied researchers have different perspectives on insecurity, with some linking it to how it affects individual lives and existence. Human security, according to the UNDP (1994), includes chronic dangers such as starvation, sickness, and repression. Insecurity is defined as a condition of worry or anxiety caused by a real or perceived lack of protection or inadequate freedom from danger (Beland, 2005; Achumba, Ighomeroho, and Akpor-Robaro,

2013). Achumba et al. (2013), on the other hand, believe that insecurity is a state of being exposed to danger, risk, or anxiety. When a person or thing is not in danger or at risk of physical or moral violence, accident, theft, or decay, it is said to be secure (Eme and Anyadike, 2013).

Remote variables, as well as direct and proximate factors, were highlighted by Achumba, Ighomeroho, and Akpor-Robaro (2013) as two (2) key contributors to insecurity. Lack of institutional capacity resulting in government failure; pervasive material inequities and injustice; ethnoreligious conflicts; public-government perception conflict; inadequate security system; loss of socio-cultural and communal value system are some of the remote variables. Immediate and proximal factors, on the other hand, include permeable borders, rural/urban drift, corporate social irresponsibility, unemployment/poverty, and terrorism.

Theoretical Framework

This research paper employed the Frustration – Aggression theory as its analytical framework. The Frustration-Aggression theory was propounded by Dollard, Miller, Mowrer, Sears, and Doob in 1939 and later developed by Miller in 1941 and Berkowitz (1969) is commonly known as the frustration-aggression-displacement theory. The theory says that aggression is the result of blocking or frustrating, a person's efforts to attain a goal (Breuer and Elson, 2017). Frustration is that feeling which is experienced when what is being expected is not achieved or when there is an interference in gaining the desired goal. When first postulated, the theory states that frustration always precedes aggression, and aggression is the consequence of frustration. Dollard et al. (1939) put forth the suggestion that the strongest aggressive reactions are those directed toward the perceived sources of frustration. Aggression towards the source of frustration is one type of retaliatory behaviour (Breuer and Elson, 2017).

Similarly, the theory's premise and insights will be extremely useful in the efforts to provide ways for addressing security concerns that security budgets in the country have failed to solve. Ethnicity which is already an existing problem become so heightened in recent times with loud hues of marginalization manifesting in forms of resource control, and secessionist

agitations among others. More so, the reactive response of the government in this respect has escalated the spate of terrorist attacks, most especially as the act of criminality has been diversified to incorporate kidnapping, and banditry among others. These have overstretched the security architecture of Nigeria which has resulted in the high rate of terror-related attacks and fatalities.

Methodology

This study used correlational designs. Correctional design is a non-experimental design in which relationships between or among variables are assessed without manipulating independent variables or randomly assigning participants to different conditions (Kerlinger and Lee, 2010). The choice of correlational research design is due to its suitability in obtaining information that is related to the degree of relationship between two or more variables (Cohen and Manion, 2009). The study seeks to determine the relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria. Hence, correlational design is appropriate.

The data were gathered and sorted out by the researchers from Nigeria Security Tracker (NST). Descriptive statistics comprising frequency and percentage were used to analyse and answer the research questions. The relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities was analysed using Pearson Product Moment Coefficient (PPMC) at 0.05 level of significance to test the hypotheses. The use of PPMC allows data analysed to be correlated with less error (Sambo, 2008). It is therefore suitable for correlating terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria.

Data Presentation and Analysis

Research Question One: What is the general assessment of fatalities in Nigeria?

Table 1: Fatalities in Nigeria




Table 1.1 shows the highest and lowest fatalities in Nigeria from 2011 to 2021. The highest number of fatalities was recorded in the year 2014 with 15,600 deaths while the lowest was in 2011 with only 1,096 deaths. While there was a steady increase in fatalities recorded from 2011 (1,096), 2012 (3,761), 2013 (7,276) to 2014 (15,600), in the years 2015 (12,795), 2016 (5,748), and 2017 (4,633), there was a significant decrease in the number of deaths recorded. However, from 2018 (6,545), 2019 (8,340), 2020 (9,694) to 2021 (10,398) there was a steady and significant increase in the number of fatalities.

Research Question Two: What is the frequency of terror-related attacks to fatalities?

Table 2: Location, frequency, and percentage of terror-related attacks

Locations of Attack

Location	Freq.	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Abia	108	.9	.9	.9
	129	1.1	1.1	2.0

Adamawa	325	2.7	2.7	4.6
Akwa Ibom	164	1.4	1.4	6.0
Anambra	229	1.9	1.9	7.9
Bauchi	136	1.1	1.1	9.0
Bayelsa	319	2.6	2.6	11.7
Benue	509	4.2	4.2	15.9
Borno	2050	16.9	16.9	32.8
Cross River	187	1.5	1.5	34.4
Delta	596	4.9	4.9	39.3
Diffa	61	.5	.5	39.8
Ebonyi	156	1.3	1.3	41.1
Edo	290	2.4	2.4	43.5
Ekiti	174	1.4	1.4	44.9
Enugu	143	1.2	1.2	46.1
Extrême-Nord	67	.6	.6	46.6
FCT	241	2.0	2.0	48.6
Gombe	82	.7	.7	49.3
Imo	2	.0	.0	49.3
Imo	253	2.1	2.1	51.4
Jigawa	56	.5	.5	51.9
Kaduna	828	6.8	6.8	58.7
Kano	221	1.8	1.8	60.6
Katsina	350	2.9	2.9	63.5
Kebbi	29	.2	.2	63.7
Kofia	1	.0	.0	63.7
Kogi	1	.0	.0	63.7
Kogi	263	2.2	2.2	65.9
Koza	1	.0	.0	65.9
Kwara	141	1.2	1.2	67.1
Lac	2	.0	.0	67.1
Lac	26	.2	.2	67.3

Lagos	443	3.7	3.7	71.0
Maradi	2	.0	.0	71.0
Mayo Moskota	1	.0	.0	71.0
Mbreche	2	.0	.0	71.0
N'Djamena	3	.0	.0	71.0
Nasarawa	135	1.1	1.1	72.1
Nassarawa	80	.7	.7	72.8
Ngouboua	1	.0	.0	72.8
Niger	266	2.2	2.2	75.0
Nord-Ouest	1	.0	.0	75.0
Ogun	275	2.3	2.3	77.3
Ondo	279	2.3	2.3	79.6
Osun	171	1.4	1.4	81.0
Oyo	216	1.8	1.8	82.8
Plateau	499	4.1	4.1	86.9
Rivers	549	4.5	4.5	91.5
Sagme	1	.0	.0	91.5
Sokoto	115	1.0	1.0	92.4
Tahoua	2	.0	.0	92.4
Taraba	312	2.6	2.6	95.0
Tillabéri	4	.0	.0	95.0
Yobe	237	2.0	2.0	97.0
Zamfara	363	3.0	3.0	100.0
Total	12097	100.0	100.0	

Source: Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), (2022).

Table 1.2 shows the location, frequency, and percentage of terror-related attacks in Nigeria. Borno State experienced the highest frequency of terror-related attacks with 2,050 contributing 16.9% (valid) and 32.8% cumulative percent respectively. Kebbi state has the lowest frequency of terror-related attacks with 29 frequency, 0.2 valid, and cumulative percentages respectively.

Research Question Two: To what extent are the terror-related attacks on fatalities in Nigeria?

Table 1.3: Terror-related attacks in Nigeria from 2011 – 2021




Table 1. 3 shows the number of terror-related attacks in Nigeria from 2011 to 2021. The year 2011 has the lowest number with only 203 while the year 2021 has the highest number with 2,283. In the years 2011 to 2016, there were increases and decreases, on the one hand, the years 2017 to 2021 experienced a steady increase in the number of terror-related attacks. The implication is that, as the number of terror-related attacks increases, the number of fatalities also increases.

Hypothesis H₀: There is no significant relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria

Table 1.4: Relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria
Correlations

		Number of Attacks	Number of Death
Number of Attacks	Pearson Correlation	1	.385
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.121
	N	11	11
Number of Death	Pearson Correlation	.385	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.121	
	N	11	11

Table 1.4 presents the Pearson coefficient of correlational analysis in the terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria. The findings showed that ($r=0.385$; $P>0.05$) meaning that there exists a weak positive but insignificant correlation between the two variables, thus we have to accept the null hypothesis which states that there is no significant relationship between terror-related attacks and fatalities in Nigeria, implying that increase in terror-related attacks does not have a significant relationship to increase in the rate of fatalities in Nigeria.

Discussions and Findings

Based on the results of the analysis herein above stated, the study discovered that 2014 recorded the year with the highest number of fatalities followed by 2021 and 2011 with the lowest as shown in Table 1.1. Furthermore, Table 1.2 confirmed that in the period under review, Borno State experienced the highest frequency of terror-related attacks with 2,050, with Kebbi State having the lowest. Similarly, Table 1. 3 showed that the year 2011 has the lowest number of terror-related attacks with only 203 while the year 2021 has the highest number with 2,283.

More so, the study also finds that terror-related attacks are not the highest cause of fatality in Nigeria. This assertion is confirmed in Table 1.4 (correlation table) where the computed r value is 0.385 and $P > 0.05$ indicates the 2 variables; terror-related attacks and fatalities are not significantly related/correlated as there is not enough evidence to show that the two variables have strongly associated, hence the null hypothesis is accepted. This finding disagrees with the studies of Nextier SPD (2021), Global Peace Index (2020), Mueller (2013), and Hanna et al., (2021) who found that terror-related attacks and fatalities correlated with each other. These studies showed that terror-related attacks have no significant impact on fatalities in Nigeria. This finding implies that, even though terror-related has no significant correlation with fatalities in Nigeria, the attacks still play a vital role in the number of fatalities in Nigeria, government and security forces should be helped by all stakeholders to provide credible intelligence that will lead to forestalling terror-related attacks as well as reducing the number of fatalities from these attacks.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Nigeria is facing an increasing threat of terror-related attacks, which has serious implications for the development of the country, even though not at a significant level to overall fatalities recorded in Nigeria. In the last decade, many Nigerians have fled from their homes as a result of those incidents to other states and neighbouring countries. The Federal government has numerous military operations, but the impact has been insignificant. While reduction in terror-related attacks by the dreaded Boko Haram terrorist and ISWAP, there were renewed attacks in the last 2 years by the newly declared terrorist group “Bandits”. The mass kidnapping of innocent citizens with a high ransom demand, killing, abduction, and arrogant counter-show of force by the bandits concerning military operations, shows that the government’s effort to counter-terrorism has not yielded the desired results. Against this backdrop, government must address the root cause of terrorism which is the structural inequalities that drive people to terrorism.

In the light of the above, the study makes the following recommendations:

- i. Nigerian government must fix the root causes of terrorism and address the political and socio-economic factors (inequality, poverty, and unemployment among others) that birthed terrorism amongst the once peace-loving people of Nigeria.
- ii. There is a need for a more responsive and inclusive system of government anchored on strong democratic institutions.
- iii. There is need for security sector reform. The inability of the government security agencies to rise to the threat from non-state violent actors is a manifestation of the State's weakness;
- iv. Security operatives at national and regional levels should work together to deploy surveillance over the borders; and
- v. Nigeria has many ungoverned spaces or places with minimal government presence. Terrorists and other miscreants use these spaces as safe havens.

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CHINA'S INCREASING SECURITY PRESENCE IN AFRICA: IN WHOSE STRATEGIC INTEREST?

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ABSTRACT

China's increasing security presence in Africa seems to be more about the protection of China's strategic interests, such as its access to Africa's natural resources and aid to its economic growth and development, global influence as against the protection of citizens of African nations. These growing presences are in areas of peace keeping and peace support operations, arms sales, naval bases, military training and logistics supports. The objective of this paper is to examine the real intention of China's increasing security presence in Africa and in whose strategic interests this motive is serving. The paper adopted a quantitative method of data collection. Realism was used in providing a framework for understanding the concept of China's increasing security presence in Africa and who is strategically benefiting. The findings of this paper are: China's increasing security presence in Africa is as a result of Africa's rich natural resources, markets for its goods and services, protection of its economic investments. It therefore recommends that since China's increasing security presence in Africa is as a result of its strategic economic gains, protection of its citizens, creating conducive Sino African relations, build international influence, there need for African countries review the various security pacts it has signed with China so as not to allow China sink deeper into the security architecture of Africa especially the gulf of guinea and the gulf of Aden which are important for Africa's economic and security strategic development. There is an urgent need for African countries to boast and strengthened it security so as to protect lives and property for sustainability.

Keywords: China, Interests, Security, Strategic, Africa

Introduction

Security issues occupy a central and dominant position of discuss in the day-to-day affairs of many nation states. The promotion and protection of a nation's national security interests are very important and usually stated in most national policy documents. Security has moved beyond the protection of a nation from territorial aggressors to include the security concerns

that emanates from other states and non-states actors and even the security concerns of other countries both the ones a nation shares border lines with and the ones outside of its region. Security therefore, has increasingly become criteria in the promoting of a nation's national interests. It is not only limited to human and physical security, but goes on to include economic and trade, political, educational and cultural as well as diplomatic security.

The end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States of America has increased the quest, approach and interests of nation states on the critical issues of security concerns poses. Many nations are equally becoming interested in various aspects of other nation's national life with particular reference to economy and trade, security, political etc. Nigeria for instance is interested in the security situation in West Africa, Africa and globally. So also, are the United States of America, Russia, Turkey, Israel, France and China, which is the subject and focus of this study. China's first and continuous interests in Africa started with an economic intent before it metamorphosed into other areas such as political, cultural as well as security. This is so because Africa is a fertile ground to advance its cause effectively.

China haven assumed the status of a world power with the second largest economy after the United States of America began to advance its national interests on various fronts. One of such fronts for advancing its cause was Africa, which had the needed opportunities for advancing it cause. Haven invested heavily in Africa, China was now faced with the challenge of protecting and at the same time promoting its economic investments. It became dawn on China to begin to address the security situation of Africa or else its investments and opportunities will be greatly affected.

Therefore, the numerous security challenges both within their region and outside if their region is of paramount concern to them. For Bayes (2020), the drivers of China's increased security engagements in Africa are both practical and political: protecting its economic interests, protecting Chinese citizens, boasting military modernization, strengthening Sino African ties, as well as building international influence. One of the most common determinants of international relations has been the increased dominance of nations among its peers through such instruments as: economy and trade, cultural and educational exchanges, political and diplomatic relations, security etc. These related areas of influence have thus become avenues through which many nations try to exercise their international relevance over others.

China and Africa cannot be said to be related regionally, continentally and culturally. Why then the increase in its security presence in Africa? Konrig (2018), this rising role in security undergirds Beijing's economic statecraft and commercial interests in Africa, helps professionalize China's military and protect its citizens there, and furthers its ambitions to be

a major power with global influence. China has three main areas of strategic economic interests in Africa: firstly, the potential of Africa as a market for China's manufactured goods; secondly, Africa as a source of energy (oil); and thirdly, Africa as resource pool for raw materials to meet the demands of China's growing economy (Shelton, 2001 & Alden, 2005). Ultimately, it is no surprise that this hidden motive of China towards Africa is typical and naturally bound in every human to protect its interests where huge investments have been made. And as a matter of state policy, China has also replicated this increase security presence in other regions where she has strong interests too. Although, we might agree that the nexus between economic growth and national security has gained prominence in China since the mid-1990s (Wang, 2004).

It has thus become compelling to state the obvious that since China has no close border relationship with Africa and neither does Africa pose any security threats to China's sovereignty, China's presence, is largely due to the protection of her massive economic investments on the continent which by all implications has been undertaken under huge cost implications which usually are meant for profit making and invariably needs protection from intruders and competitors. By way of stating the obvious therefore, the compelling reasons for China's increasing security presence in Africa are that of dominance, protection, survival and prestige. It is also a way of capitalizing on the porous security situation on the continent to further advance and exacerbates her interests on Africa's huge natural resources.

In furtherance to this assertion, the aftermath impacts of China's increasing security presence has showed in whose interests this motive has been tilted to. Worthy of note is the fact that the terms and conditions of operations on the part of China's security presence is unclear, porous and ambiguous. The major challenge for the continent is many African states are trapped in the lack of political will and good governance to exercise their legitimate mandate of monitoring China's security presence on the continent. The focus of this paper is construed around who is the real beneficiary of China's increasing security presence on the continent and the imminent danger this involvement poses. In realizing the aim of this paper, it raises certain questions. What could be the driving force for the increasing Chinese security presence in Africa? What are the imminent dangers on China's increasing security presence in Africa? In whose interest/benefit is China's increasing security presence in Africa? The objectives of this paper include among others, to determine Chinese economic interests in Africa, interrogate the security strategies of China in Africa and to inquire about the infrastructure that are being protected by China in Africa.

Literature Review

It is a common postulate that China's increased activities in Africa were linked to China's growing demand for Africa's natural resources; empirical data also lends support to this claim (Maswana 2009). China's military relations with Africa date back to the 1950s when China gave its support to revolutionary and independence movements in Africa. The Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia was a seminal in the Sino-African relationship (Larkin, 1971). China's security relationship with Africa has evolved significantly since the 1960s and early 1970s when China was a modest provider of military assistance and training for African liberation and revolutionary groups.

China has become an increasingly important supplier of conventional and light weapons to African governments and stepped up the volume of its military exchange visits. It is a major troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, a member of the international anti-piracy force in the Gulf of Aden, and is taking steps to protect its growing physical presence and interests in Africa (Shinn, 2015). There are basically three forms of the Chinese military presence in Africa today: first, selling weapons to some African countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe; second, participating in the UN peacekeeping missions in the region; and third, maintaining a naval force against the Somalian pirates near the Horn of Africa (Lanteigne 2016; Sutter 2016 & Enuka 2011:).

Theoretical Framework

In establishing and ensuring a standard setting for this paper, it adopted realism as its theoretical framework. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. Realism is a theory of international relations that argues that states are the primary actors in the world, and that they are motivated by self-interest. Realists believe that states are constantly competing for power and security, and that they will use all means necessary to achieve their goals. The state's interests provide the springs of action, the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states, calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state's interests, success is the ultimate test of policy and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state (Waltz, 1979).

In the context of China's security presence in Africa, realism is used to argue China's motivating interest and desire to protect its own interests, such as the access to natural resources and its growing economic influence on the continent. In furtherance to this, realist position would also be attributed to China been the second largest economy in the world after that of the United States is poised to create more market for its goods and services and for the

energy as well as raw material concerns of China. Hence there is also the growing influence of other global powers for Africa, such as the United States, Russia, India and France. Hence, this has also accounted for China's growing influence in the security domain in Africa.

China's African strategic, security and economic posture in Africa

China has more and more interests, whether they are economic, political, or military which it needs to secure. Therefore, in addition to the developed major powers in the West and those Asian countries around it, China has been trying to develop its relations with as many countries as possible in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. China has been the most active in Africa, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, over the past two decades (Sutter, 2016). China's presence in Africa is not a new concept. But the most notable historical account of China's presence in Africa can be traced to the late 1950s.

China has attempted to espouse a relationship based on common identity and historical experience. It has been argued that China justified its initial involvement in Africa in the 1960s on the basis of these similarities (Snow, 1995). The first point of commonality, according to China, is that China and Africa belong to the same club. Be it the third world or the south; and secondly, that China and Africa are united against common opponents, usually encompassed by the west or the north (Snow, 1995). Duggan asserts that in Sino-African relationship; therefore, China's foreign policy towards Africa is all-encompassing and deals in all areas of human exchange, such as economic cooperation, social and cultural exchange, and military interaction (Duggan, 2020).

China's involvements on the continent can be referred to as 'a renewed relationship centered on economic, trade, security, cultural and educational exchanges, diplomatic relations as the basis for these new engagements. These new relationship fronts or areas of engagements between the countries of Africa and China were not explored by the countries of Europe and America. China continues to re-engage Africa on many fronts due to the continent's disadvantages and its slow pace to economic development and the fact that China needs Africa for its economic growth and prosperity.

China has invested heavily in Africa and these investments cannot be left unprotected going by the level of insecurity, uncertainties and instabilities of various kinds currently being experienced on the continent. There are so many civil unrests in Africa that have hampered economic development on the continents. The military coups which have created political instabilities in Niger, Mali, Sudan, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Gabon, the kidnapping and insurgent groups terrorizing Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel which continues to call for urgent security efforts to tackle the menace. For China to have chosen to invest in Africa despite these challenges means that the risks and risk measures must have been well thought out.

This will continue to account for an expanding security presence in Africa. And as long as Africa continues to aid China's economic trade investments, development and sustains its energy needs despite its porous security situations, China will have no option other than to invest and play prominent roles in the security architecture of the continent. China being the second largest economy in the world after the United States and also being Africa's largest investments and trading partner, it is therefore not out of place to take part in the security architecture of Africa. The amount of trade grew from US\$10 billion to US\$40 billion between 2000 and 2005, and in 2009, China became Africa's largest trading partner, surpassing the US and the European Union (EU) (Sutter 2016). The amount reached US\$220 billion in 2014 and is expected to increase to US\$400 billion by 2020 (Forum 2016).

The key factor behind the growing China-Africa trade involves China's import of African oil, as well as other raw materials. Given its effort to diversify the source of energy that it needs for its economic development, China began to import oil from Africa in 1992. The quantity of African oil to China increased from 500,000 tons in that year to 708 million tons in 2010, and China today imports at least one-third of the oil that it consumes from Africa (Wang and Zou 2014). Oil and other raw materials are playing such a large role in China-Africa trade that it is found that, in general, African countries with fewer resources tend to suffer trade deficits with China (for example, Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, and Morocco) while those with rich resources tend to enjoy surpluses (for example, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Angola, Libya, and Gabon) (Eisenman 2012).

China's role in peacekeeping and peace support operations in Africa

Peace keeping and peace support operations have been one of the most veritable tool used to manage an already broken conflict or war. Peace keeping operations are well known mechanism used by United Nations and regional organizations like African Union and European Union to manage conflict situation through the deployment of troops whose mandate are to main peace through guiding principles such as: impartiality, non-use of force except in the case of self-defence and defence of the mandate. China been a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council has been involved in the peace keeping and peace support operations of the United Nations became prominent in the early 1990s. China's involvement in UN peacekeeping is the most significant.

China began to contribute personnel to the UN peacekeeping missions around the world in 1992, and Africa now has become the destination for the majority of Chinese personnel stationed abroad for such missions (Lanteigne, 2016). China's military presence in Africa reached a whole new level under the rule of the current Chinese president, Xi Jinping (Sutter, 2016 & Duchatel, et. al. 2016). China, which had contributed only non-combat

personnel (such as doctors and engineers), deployed its first combat troops to support the UN peacekeeping missions for South Sudan in 2012 and Mali in 2013. Additionally, the naval force against the Somalian pirates has been used to evacuate Chinese civilians from nearby countries experiencing turmoil, such as Yemen in 2015.

China's role in peacekeeping and peace support operations in Africa has been growing rapidly in recent years. China is now one of the largest contributors of troops and police to UN peacekeeping missions particularly in Africa. But this massive contribution from China to the United Nations peace keeping and peace support operations is not without some strategic interests. China's increasing presence in Africa on various strategic sectors continues to generate some responses in relations to what China stands to benefit as a result of these engagements as against the notion of brotherliness, kind and humanitarian gestures. China's participation in peacekeeping operations in Africa is motivated by a number of factors.

First, China has significant economic interests in Africa. It is the continent's largest trading partner and a major investor in its natural resources. China's participation in peacekeeping operations can help to protect these interests. Second, China is seeking to expand its global influence and Africa as a region occupies these geo-strategic needs of China on the global pedestal of influence. China's participation in peacekeeping and peace support operations will build a long-lasting relationship between the countries of Africa and China's national and international interests in the region. Third, China is also interested because as a member of the Security Council, gaining such experience in peacekeeping and peace support operations will in no small measure boost its credentials.

China's military is relatively inexperienced and therefore lacks international experience in peacekeeping and peace support operations and China's participation in peacekeeping operations in Africa will by all standards and opportunities improve its expertise. China's increasing roles in Africa continues to generate mixed reactions as to the true intention of its presence. On one hand, China is seen as beginning to play active roles in the peace keeping and peace support operations in Africa because of boasting its international credentials and as a member of the Security Council. And this is owing to the fact that other members of the Security Council already playing and actively participating in peace keeping as a strategic engagement.

China's bilateral security cooperation as prerequisite for military bases in Africa

Military basis occupies strong strategic position in the ranking of global or overseas security presence by any nation. China began to increase its international security presence by opening a strategic military base in Africa. This is the latest indicator of China's expanding military presence in Africa which is attracting the most attention, which is the establishment of China's

first military overseas outpost in Djibouti, an Eastern African country located in a strategically important point near several regional flashpoints (Lanteigne, 2016). This Chinese overseas military base is unprecedented and China refers to it as a 'logistical support and fast evacuation facility.' It will be operated for many different military purposes (Braude & Jiang 2016; Duchatel et al 2016; Orion 2016).

In addition to providing logistical support for the UN peacekeeping missions and the Chinese force against the Somalian pirates, as well as helping evacuate Chinese non-combats and civilians in the area, it will serve to collect intelligence, support future counter-terrorism operations, and protect the critical sea lane in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait for China. Securing this military base in Africa will undoubtedly increase China's military influence on the continent, and the Chinese military presence will arguably expand even further if the rumors about the proposals for more Chinese military bases in such African countries as Seychelles, Kenya, Tanzania, Namibia, Angola, and Nigeria are proved true (Duchatel, et. al. 2016).

President Mugabe in 2005 announced a new 'Look East' policy, turning its back to the West, and facing the East 'from where the sun rises' (Brautigam, 2009). Despite the country's dangerous turmoil, and instability, China supplied Zimbabwe with about \$28million in arms between 2005 and 2007 (SIPRI, 2010). Aside the sale of light weapons, China built a weapon factory for Zimbabwe (Meidan, 2006). In 2005 China sold to Zimbabwe 6 jets for its air force. This was soon followed by 12 jet fighters and 100 military vehicles, valued at about \$240 million (Brown & Sriram, 2008). China supplied tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, antiaircraft batteries, riot control gear and radio-jamming equipment (Eisenman, 2008). The Nigerian government's frustration with US congressional interference in the delivery of patrol boats for the troubled Niger Delta contributed to its decision to switch to Chinese military equipment.

China granted Nigeria \$1million in 2001 to upgrade its military facilities. A \$251 million contract was negotiated between Nigeria and China to purchase twelve F-7M Air guard multipurpose combat aircraft and three FT-7NI dual-seat fighter trainer aircraft (Chau, 2007). The deal included twenty-three PL-9 short-range air-to-air missiles, unguided rockets, and bombs for antitank and run runway denial missions, and training twelve Nigerian pilots in China. China sells aircraft to Egypt and Kenya (Hellstrom, 2009). Light strike aircraft such as the K-8 and the JF-17 multi-role combat aircraft have been sold to Algeria, Botswana, and Morocco (Grimmett, 2008). China's security cooperation with individual African countries has been growing in recent years.

China now has security cooperation agreements with over 50 African countries. China's security cooperation with African countries takes a variety of forms, including:

military aid and training, security cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, sales of military equipment. China's increasing security presence in Africa is tilted towards promotion and protection of its interests other than that on the basis of cooperation with African countries on bilateral or multilateral fronts for development and prosperity. China is not fully committed to the principles of security cooperation.

Implications of China's security presence on African conflicts

In the pursuits of national interests, many nations have become distracted in its quest to influence power dominance internationally. China's security presence in Africa is beginning to wear new looks with particular reference to its impact on African conflicts and its resolutions. It has been argued that China appears indifferent to whether or not its activities fuel or perpetuate political instabilities and conflicts in Africa (Taylor, 2004). Giry (2005), argues that the continuation of unconditional Chinese investments in Africa may very well do just that on the one hand, China has helped to combat security threats in Africa, such as terrorism, piracy, and political instability. On the other hand, China has also been accused of supporting authoritarian regimes and of exacerbating conflicts in Africa.

China's contribution to conflict resolution in Africa is immense. China has made a number of contributions to conflict resolution in Africa. In one instance, China has provided financial and logistical support to peacekeeping operations in Africa. China has also helped to train African security forces and has provided them with military equipment. In addition, China has continued to play key roles in mediating conflicts in Africa. The key role China plays in the mediation of the peace agreement in South Sudan in 2015 has been greeted with mixed feelings. Some stakeholders see China's involvement as a way protecting its strategic interests in South Sudan so also are perceived involvement in Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali. This goes to show that China's interventions are visible in areas where it's economic and other strategic interests are threatened. Africa will as a matter of state and regional policy wake up from its slumber and check China's motive on conflicts resolutions on the continent.

Issues and challenges of human rights in the midst of China's increasing security presence in Africa have come under intense debate lately. In the wake of Africa attracting foreign direct investments on the continent so as to boast its economies and China equally hoping to boast and advanced it economic development through its Africa penetration will breed fertile grounds for human right violations. This will be so since both parties in their quest will neglect issues of human rights to advance it cause. It has been argued that China is not concerned with neo-liberal principles of democracy, good governance, human rights, and therefore attaches no conditionalities to its relations with African countries (Giry, 2004 &

Taylor, 2004). This has resulted in China doing business with dubious and questionable despotic regimes on the continent (Taylor, 2005).

Other than Sudan, Shinn & Eisenman (2005), have highlighted China's promotion of military cooperation and arms sales to Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti as well. Draper (2006), pointed out that China's thirst for oil trumps humanitarian considerations. China has been criticized for its lack of transparency about its security cooperation with African countries. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess the impact of China's security presence on human rights in Africa. Africa and African peoples continue to suffer human abuses, violations and maltreatments from Chinese known companies with the host countries checkmating China. These human abuses have been attributed to the investment clauses that are often not in the public domain for citizens to know the extent of such terms and conditions of contract.

In justifying China's increasing security presence in Africa, there has been various divergent views concerning the status of China's increasing security presence viz-a-vis its economic and trade investments on Africa. In its literal purpose, China's security involvement on African economies is meant to stir growth, development and opportunities. Except if Africa is unable to and unwilling to bargain for her interests. Chinese investments have been seen as beneficial to African economies, particularly when they are coupled with transfer of skills and technology to Africans (Alden, 2005). There are those who are of the position that China's presence on the security on African economic development had been not been favourable to Africans. Taylor (2004), view China's economic involvement in the African continent as a threat Trade between China and African countries is largely unbalanced, with the scales tipped in favour of China. The overall impact of China's increasing security presence on Africa's economic development is complex but largely tilted towards China.

Findings

This paper found out that China is neither a friend nor a foe. This is because the fruits of China's increasing security presence can be beneficial for both parties depending on how both parties are able to negotiate for the advantages of their presence and the opportunities it offers and the circumstances of such alliance. But what it exhibits is typical of any business venture or entity that is interested and driven by the desire for investments for profits. China's increasing security presence in Africa is in the best interest of China due to a number of reasons: Chinese companies benefit from the protection that Chinese private security companies offer, Chinese citizens living and working in different part of Africa will on the long run benefit from the increased security presence and China's growing military

cooperation with various African countries has lifted and boasted China's geopolitical and regional ambitions and credentials.

Conclusion

China's increasing security presence in Africa is a complex issue with a variety of implications. It is important to understand the different factors that are motivating China's growing security presence on the continent, as well as the different interests that are being served. Those who argue that China's increasing security presence is not beneficial to Africa point to the following: China has been accused of supporting authoritarian regimes in Africa, China has also been accused of using its security presence to gain access to Africa's natural resources, and China has also been accused of human rights abuses in Africa. China no doubt is Africa's major trading partner. Therefore, it is not out of place to protect its huge investments on the continent since Africa is presently incapable of protecting these investments.

With the growing security concerns and instabilities across Africa, China is concerned about a number of security threats with particular reference to terrorism, piracy, and political instabilities leading to military coups, the real motive apart from Africa not having the capacity to protect itself, is to increase its credentials like other world powers-United States, Russia, France, etc. China is likely to benefit from its increasing security presence in Africa by gaining access to Africa's natural resources and by strengthening its ties with African countries. China may also benefit from using its security presence to promote its own interests in Africa. Africa is likely to benefit from China's increasing security presence by gaining military assistance and training, as well as by having access to Chinese infrastructure but this is way lesser than what China will gain in the long run.

Looking forward, China's increasing security presence in Africa has showed that its presence is generally centered keenly on its interests. The under-listed are therefore recommended:

- i. The paper recommends that since China's increasing security presence in Africa is as a result of its strategic economic gains, protection of its citizens, creating conducive Sino-African relations and build international influence, there are need for African countries:
- ii. Review the various security pacts it has entered with China so as not to allow China sink deeper into the security architecture of Africa especially, the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Aden which are important for Africa's economic and security strategic development.
- iii. There is an urgent need for African countries to boost and strengthened its security so as to protect lives and property for sustainability.

- iv. African countries need to harness its raw materials and properly translate them into finished goods and services which will better the lives and peoples of Africa instead of leaving them for China to harness and sink deep into various aspects of our national lives such as security.

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EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The dynamics of globalization and regional economic integration play pivotal roles in the rapidly evolving security landscape. Over the past 14 years, Nigeria's engagements with Boko Haram insurgents have attracted global attention. With cross-border links, Boko Haram has posed a serious security challenge in Nigeria and the neighbouring countries - Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The crisis has led to the destruction of many lives and properties in the countries. This paper argued that elements of globalization have encouraged increased technology and security of states. In an attempt to identify the role of globalization in the violent conflict, this qualitative study adopted realism to serve as a framework for analysis. Data were collected from published articles, books, journals, and newspapers, which were analyzed using content analysis. The study found that the international community has contributed immensely to the conflict through counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, logistics, capacity-building assistance, and stabilization programmes. It is recommended that Nigeria and her neighbours must work in greater partnership to address the Boko Haram security threats because peace and security do not respect national borders.

Keywords: Boko Haram, globalization, insecurity, insurgency, Nigeria

Introduction

Nigeria is battling insecurity with all of its six geo-political zones having one form of insecurity or the other. Since its emergence in 2009, Boko Haram has been unleashing a systematic campaign of bombings, kidnappings, and drive-by shootings across much of North Eastern Nigeria. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported that fourteen million people across the six states in North Eastern Nigeria - Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa and Yobe were estimated to have been affected by the conflict (UNDP, 2017). Statistics by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs put the

figure of people in need of humanitarian assistance at 7.1 million. Thousands of lives have been lost and about 2 million people are internally displaced (UNHCR, 2019).

Since 2009, Boko Haram's terror campaign has arguably, become the biggest security issue facing Nigeria. The group's ideological focus has changed from simply promoting Islamic Puritanism in northern Nigeria to establishing an Islamic State in West Africa and in particular, the Lake Chad region. The group's campaign of violence was described as “the world’s deadliest terrorist organization” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). The critical challenge is to seek an understanding of the root causes of insurgency. Various scholars have pointed to the unaddressed and underlying structural and cultural conditions that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. According to Onapajo and Uzodike (2012) the root causes of insurgency include the failures of the Nigerian state, widespread poverty, political exclusion, economic non-inclusion, corruption, ethnic and religious chauvinism, politicization of religion, ideology and motivations of its founder and members, resort to religious extremism as seen in various conflicts around the world, etc.

The Boko Haram sect has attacked Nigeria’s police and military, rival clerics, politicians, schools, religious buildings, public institutions, and civilians. Over the years and with cross-border links, Boko Haram and ISWAP have posed serious security challenges in Nigeria and the neighbouring countries around Lake Chad - Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Today, insurgency and terrorism-related violence associated with Boko Haram remains the deadliest from insecurity across the northern part of Nigeria and the Sahel. Globalization has a significant effect on the flow of people, ideas, and information. The growing importance attributed to global initiatives aligns with the recognition that the fight against Boko Haram entails official diplomacy, military operations, and global actors. It is against this background that this study examined global initiatives in the fight against Boko Haram.

Conceptual Analysis

Globalization

Globalization is the movement of commodities, services, ideas, information, economic, and socio-cultural activities across national borders without constraints or strains. This renders national borders meaningless in worldwide economic integration. Thus, national borders should not be a barrier or a hindrance to the mobility of economic activities; rather, there should be a systematic openness of national economic activities to international enterprises, business organizations, entrepreneurs, and so on. Globalization entails the liberalization of a nation's economy to promote economic growth and liberalize the international economy to achieve international economic integration. Elements of globalization, such as the advanced information communication technology (ICT), have aided the overall strategy and tactics in the global war against Boko Haram. Many scholars claim globalization is expanding, deepening, and accelerating international connectivity (Ravenhill, 2017).

Globalization is a process of interconnectedness between many countries. If individuals in a country do not like how their country is being persuaded by foreign interference, they are more likely to take matters into their own hands. They see this as another country invading their way of life and turning them to do things against what they have believed in for centuries. These matters are usually committing acts that are considered terrorism (Passante, 2021). On his part, Cronin maintains that globalization embraces a number of penetrating mechanisms that have been exploited by terrorist networks (Cronin, 2003).

Globalization has allowed for many exchanges between people around the world. These exchanges include goods, ideologies, people and religion. Therefore, it can be inferred that globalization has provided a positive outcome to the world by bringing together countries and people. Nonetheless, it is crucial to state that while globalization has benefited many people, many people around the world also feel threatened by its spread. Globalization has benefited heinous acts like terrorism through involvement of modern technologies. Nguijoi

(2023) posited that the rise of international terrorism since 2001 and the progress of globalization generated a new form of regionalism, with the establishment of several regional cooperation frameworks ad hoc in nature, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU), G5 Sahel, though with some efforts to restore and strengthen existing regional institutions.

Insurgency

Abdu and Shehu (2019) view insurgency as a rebellion against a constituted authority either in the pursuit of a political goal or for selfish interest. Abdu and Shehu described insurgency as a revolution, revolt, rebellion, riot and mutiny. By insinuation, those carry out rebellious acts are insurgent groups involved in insurgency. Ukpong-Umo (2016) citing The US Department of Defense, DOD (2007), conceptualised insurgency as an organised movement which its aim is to overthrow a constituted authority or government through the use of subversion or armed conflict. For this study, the term insurgency is operationalized as the activities of a group of persons trying to forcefully or violently overthrow an established order (government) and replace it with a new social and political order conceived by the group. The term insurgency embodies different types of collective political violence, especially terrorism, guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare.

National Security

The concept of national security is elusive, thereby often confused by many. To survive, a nation needs to take charge of its security to survive and this include socioeconomic security, political security, energy security, environmental security, and so on. It must thus counter national threats to its well-being from other state and non-state actors. It is Walter Lippmann who first defined national security explicitly. “A nation has security,” he wrote, “when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war” (1943, p. 5). To Morgenthau (1948), national security and national interests are interrelated; where the former is seen in terms of power and therefore is the essence of politics. Similarly, Lippmann (1943) likened it to when a nation has security when it does not have to

sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war. Originally, the concept focused on military might but has now become encompassing and includes a broad range of facets, all of which impinge on the non-military or economic security of the nation and the values espoused by the national society (Anyadike, 2013). In sum, national security has to do with the protection of lives and properties of individuals and is normally viewed from the standpoint of the state.

Theoretical Framework

No single theory fully explains the effects of globalization on the fight against Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, but realism is favoured in this study. Realism is a school of thought that explains international relations in terms of power. The exercise of power by states toward each other is sometimes called *realpolitik*, or just power politics. Modern realist theory developed in reaction to a liberal tradition that realists called idealism. In realist logic, peace becomes a value when it is in the interest of a state. For example, because it provides an opportunity for economic growth, and thus for the expansion of power. For realists, maximizing power is the main national interest, they would argue against most of the peacebuilding activities and peace operations, because they are costly, time and resources consuming, hence draining the power of a state.

As long as the intervention does not serve crucial national security interests, a state should refrain from it. Moreover, states would be interested in keeping the peace, if it provides them with a position of power. In the defensive realist logic, regime change can result in an adjustment of the regional or global balance of power in the intervening state's favour, so it can maximize its security. Similarly, security cooperation, export of ideology, building alliances and investing in cooperation with like-minded contribute to the security of this state (Fowler, 2021). This paper incorporated the constructivist theoretical perspective.

Main Frame of the Study

The Evolution of Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria

In 2023, the Boko Haram conflict entered its fourteenth year. Since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency and the government's military response have killed tens of thousands of civilians and displaced millions across the Lake Chad region, which straddles Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Although major military campaigns in 2015–2016 by the MNJTF succeeded in degrading the group's territorial control, the group has proven remarkably resilient to and uptick in attacks in Nigeria and adjoining states.

In the early years of the conflict, most Western governments saw Boko Haram primarily as a problem specific to Nigeria. The group first emerged as an Islamic reform movement in the northeastern town of Maiduguri in the early 2000s. Its members followed the charismatic Salafi preacher Muhammad Yusuf, who condemned Western-style education and corrupt, secular governance while also cultivating strategic ties to the city's elites. The International Crisis Group reported that in 2009, clashes between Boko Haram members and police forces escalated into several days of armed uprising in Maiduguri (International Crisis Group, 2014). The Nigerian government brutally crushed the insurrection, leaving several hundreds dead—including Yusuf himself, who was executed in police custody. The subsequent evolution of the conflict can be roughly divided into three main phases.

The Nexus Between Globalization and Terrorism

Terrorism has always been a problem for the world to overcome. Globalization and terrorism have a relationship that coexists and has negatively affected countries globally. It has caused massive changes that have resulted in the weakening of countries and national borders. Zimmermann, posits that it has caused frustration, economic deprivation, political unrest, and social inequality among the populations. He further posits that globalization also brings inequality and through a state that no longer has the capacity to protect groups that are affected by the global economic challenges facing the world (Zimmermann, 2011). Amongst the problems of globalization are economic and social, which contribute to a large part of how the

concept has facilitated terrorism. These incentives for terrorist activity are caused by how globalization is shaping aspects of countries. It has also affected political and criminal networks. The increase of these factors that negatively affect the populations between various countries causes anger.

The internet, social media outlets, etc. have changed tradition which has resulted in how the new culture will be perceived. This drastic change and the failure to adapt or willingness to adapt to the new values and customs has a major impact on the growth of terrorism. Populations are reluctant to change, especially when they have experienced these changes make things worse. Murphy (2002) posits that globalization helps terrorism spread because the ideology behind it opens a door for new ways for terrorists to recruit, have access to financial opportunities, and obtaining weapons. As globalization continues to make appearances in countries globally, it is worth mentioning that as this study shows, it isn't just a bad omen for countries because it has provided positivity to countries like spreading of culture, flow of information, technological advancements, etc. (Passante, 2021). Finding the necessary tools to combat the negativities of globalization is expedient to achieve sustainable peace.

Local Response Against Boko Haram

Nigeria has tried to address the Boko Haram challenge on multiple fronts, though these efforts have so far met with little success. Nigeria has tried to address the Boko Haram challenge on multiple fronts, though these efforts have so far met with little success. The first effort was an increase in the defense budget from ₦396.5 billion (\$2.56 billion) in 2012 to ₦968.127 billion (\$5.69 billion) in 2014. The justification for much of this increase was to combat Boko Haram. In September 2014, the National Assembly approved a \$1bn external loan for the Federal Government to upgrade the equipment, training and logistics of the Armed Forces and security services in order to enable them to confront the insurgents more forcefully. Other measures include strengthening anti-terrorism legislation, boosting the capacities of the military and

other security agencies, exploring dialogue with the insurgents, declaring a state of emergency in the Northeast and launching military offensives against the group (Jerome, 2015:101).

The government introduced a deradicalization programme code-named Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC). The OPSC is designed as a multi-sector approach involving 13 key government agencies (including the Office of the National Security Adviser, the Nigerian Prisons Service, Nigerian Police Force, Department of Security Services, Nigerian Immigration Service, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, National Emergency Management Agency, National Identity Management Commission, Armed Forces, National Orientation Agency, National Youth Service Corp, National Directorate of Employment and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps) to deradicalise, rehabilitate, and reintegrate defectors (Nwankpa, 2019). Unlike the previous programme, the defectors are now streamlined into two categories: “high-risk” and “low-risk defectors”. While the high-risk defectors are to undergo prosecution, the low-risk defectors are exposed to rehabilitation and reintegration exercises. The programme principally targets “repentant insurgents”, and not the community, for a 52-week intensive exercise based on deradicalization therapies, vocational training, basic education, and religious re-education for reintegration into the society (Nwankpa, 2019).

The Nigerian Armed Forces has 130,000 active frontline personnel and 32,000 reserve personnel, ranking it 47th in the world in terms of conventional potential strength (Global Firepower, 2023). It is reputed to be well-versed in counterinsurgency due to its wealth of experience in operating in insurgency environments such as Liberia, and Sierra Leone and the recent operations in Mali, as well as successive participation in both the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) led peacekeeping operations across the world. Since the Congo crisis in 1960, Nigeria has contributed both military and police personnel to more than 40 peacekeeping operations worldwide. Nigeria’s major response to the insurgency since 2010 has been the deployment of its Joint Task Force (JTF), consisting of the Army, Air Force, Navy, State Security Services, and Police under unified command structures. Joint Task Force

encourages increased intelligence-sharing, force coordination and unity of direction, which are considered essential for any counterinsurgency operation, although this has been limited. Nevertheless, the Nigerian military has always intensified its campaign against Boko Haram.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a coalition of troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger fighting jihadists in the border areas and on the islands of Lake Chad, has continued to prevent either ISWAP or the Bakura Group from putting down roots in the area it is supposed to control (Crisis Group, 2020). The Multinational Joint Task Force has been instrumental in recovering most of the territories previously held by Boko Haram. The Force enjoys some financial support from the European Union, passed through the African Union, and a small cell of military experts from the UK, the U.S. and France provides assistance, notably in the form of intelligence. The force, headquartered in N'Djamena, focuses on the Lake Chad region, not the rest of Borno. It is organised into four sectors, with each sector manned by national units operating under the MNJTF flag. The MNJTF carried out a few large-scale operations between mid-2020 and late 2021. Then, in December 2021, it launched Operation Sharan Fage, on the Niger-Nigeria border, killing many insurgents and destroying training camps (Montage Africa, 2022). Nevertheless, Cole (2017) maintained that concerns over human rights abuses by security forces hampered greater cooperation, even as Boko Haram expanded its control of the northeastern countryside.

Globalization and Boko Haram

Globalization has a significant effect on the flow of people, ideas, and information. Globalization has linked peoples' lives more intensely and instantaneously than ever before. People everywhere have become connected and affected by events at far corners of the world (UNDP, 1999). There are new foreign exchange and capital markets linked globally, operating 24 hours a day with dealings at a distance being coordinated with information and communication technology. New information and communication technology tools, new actors (state and non-state), and new rules, such as multilateral agreements on trade, services

and intellectual property backed by strong enforcement mechanisms that are more binding for national governments, reducing the scope for national policy, have also emerged.

The rise of international terrorism since 2001 and the progress of globalization generated a new form of regionalism, with the establishment of many regional cooperation frameworks ad hoc in nature, such as the MNJTF, RIFU, G5 Sahel, though with some efforts to restore and strengthen existing regional institutions (2021). The greater international cooperation and advancements in Information and Communications Technology have continued to impact the war against Boko Haram. Brechenmacher (2019) identified three main areas of global priority in the fight against Boko Haram: strengthening local security mechanisms; restoring civilian administration and basic services, and supporting the reintegration of former fighters and others associated with non-state armed groups.

Global Response Against Boko Haram

Transnational threats recognize no national boundaries; the interconnectedness of the globalised world demands heightened collaboration and the sharing of information and expertise across borders (Odeniyi, 2023). Thus, the role of the international community in the fight against Boko Haram should not be underestimated. However, the international community was late to acknowledge the severity of the Boko Haram crisis and slow to scale up its response. Edwards (2021) posited that several factors explain this pattern. First, in the early years of the crisis, international partners were hesitant to push back against Nigerian authorities' assurances that the conflict response was under their control.

Boko Haram's kidnapping of 276 female students from Chibok made worldwide headlines, drawing greater policy attention to the crisis. France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the United States, and the European Commission, in cooperation, offered technical assistance and intelligence-sharing to help find the girls. On its part, the U.S. State Department formed a Nigeria Planning and Operations Group that brought together technical and regional experts as well as a military liaison to plan and coordinate rapid responses to the crisis.

With increasing concern about Boko Haram's threat to regional stability, the United States as well as France and the UK began to extend their focus to Nigeria's neighbours. Various U.S. agencies pushed for greater military cooperation between the Lake Chad countries, and the United States leveraged the Global Security Cooperation Fund and the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund to increase security assistance to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (Cole, 2017). This shift allowed the U.S. government to support military efforts against Boko Haram while circumventing the policy hurdles associated with direct aid to the Nigerian government. Also, according to Cole (2017), USAID launched several smaller-scale stabilization efforts aimed at increasing community resilience to violent extremism in the wider Lake Chad region. USAID ramped up humanitarian assistance in Nigeria from virtually nothing in 2014 to \$291 million committed for fiscal year 2017.

Also at the international level, the international community set up the Oslo Consultative Group on the Prevention and Stabilization in the Lake Chad Region to coordinate their response activities. The Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union Commission have adopted a regional stabilization strategy, which highlights short-, medium-, and long-term stabilization, resilience, and recovery needs (African Union's Peace and Security Department, 2018). In parallel, donors have also begun expanding bottom-up stabilization programmes aimed at addressing the drivers of insecurity at the local level. These efforts have generally fallen into three main categories: programmes aimed at strengthening local conflict prevention and mitigation systems, programmes aimed at restoring local governance and basic services, and programmes aimed at fostering social cohesion and ensuring the reintegration of former combatants.

Donor-Funded Stabilization Programmes Against Boko Haram

Brechenmacher (2019) noted that donor-funded local stabilization programmes have centered on three priorities, strengthening local conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, restoring civilian administration and services, and supporting reintegration and social inclusion.

Conclusion and recommendations

The forces of globalization have continued to impact the war against Boko Haram through counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, logistical, capacity-building assistance, and stabilization programmes. To tackle the activities of the insurgents, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria would need to adopt both hard and soft measures for security. This is possible by adequately utilizing the benefits of globalization to improve the national economy and provide good governance to the extent that it improves the level of education, solves the problem of unemployment, and reduces poverty — the factors that have repeatedly been pointed at as the contributing elements for many cases of insurgency in the African continent.

Similarly, improving the political, economic, military, and technological bilateral and multilateral relations of the states at the sub-regional, regional, and continental levels, through the processes of globalization, will help them fight Boko Haram insurgency. It is equally expedient for the states to invest in technology (beyond the insurgent groups) to the extent that technological globalization provides effective counter-insurgency tools. Nigeria should invest in space technologies that would help in early warning, intelligence gathering, and improved military operational capabilities against Boko Haram.

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THE EFFECTS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) CRISIS ON HUMAN SECURITY IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Internally displaced persons are vulnerable due to the displacement they have experienced from their natural homes and this vulnerability is increased due to lack of access to humanitarian aids which can be restricted by insecurity. This insecurity includes food, health, and personal insecurities, and lack of access to basic needs and privacy. Human security approach is the theory the study is anchored upon. The study found out that the insecurity issues associated with displacement include physical insecurity of people, health insecurity, food insecurity, and environmental insecurity. Also, the IDPs have relied on several strategies such as sticking to their traditions, forming communities to provide physical and emotional support, engaged in trading, skills acquisition and participating in group activities, and negative strategies such as begging for alms, engaging in transactional sex and outright prostitutions in order to make ends meet. Based on these findings, part of the recommendations made are: government should invest in comprehensive conflict resolution mechanisms at the community, state, and national levels; improved early warning systems should also be established which can be achieved through the integration of local community networks, technology, and information sharing platforms to detect and respond to early signs of tension or violence; humanitarian assistance should be strengthened and emphasis should be made on how to enhance security measures by the government.

Keywords: Internally Displaced Persons, Insecurity, Humanitarianism, Borno State

Introduction

Internally displaced persons are usually pushed out of their homes due to insecurity and forced to seek shelter in more secured and peaceful locations. However, in their flight away from insecurity, internally displaced persons are also likely to fall victims of further insecurity and often become sources of insecurity to the larger society themselves. It is estimated that there were 38.2 million internally displaced persons in the world as at the end of 2014, the largest number since 1989, the first year in which global statistics on IDPs are available (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2023). As at May 2022, the countries with the biggest numbers of internally displaced persons were Ukraine (8 million), Iraq (6.5 million). Others are Syria (7.6 million), Ethiopia (5.5 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (5.2 million), and Colombia (4.9 million), (Borychenko, Koval, Hudz, Holubkova, Golubkova, & Mazur). According to recent data by the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), a system developed to track and monitor displacement and population mobility across the world, 2,171,600 Nigerians currently resides in various IDP camps across Northern Nigeria.

These people are displaced by various natural and man-made catastrophes. Nigeria as a country has always struggled with various crises that have created IDPs in the course of her history, such as religious bloodshed in the north, militancy in the Niger Delta, or political crisis in the South West. Security issues have been felt across board in Nigeria, in almost all of the country's states and geopolitical zones. Reports also have it that internal displacement affects 24 of Nigeria's 36 states (Ejiofor, Oni & Sejoro, 2017). All of these are due to various crises. Each of these crises varies in order of magnitude and the level of displacement they caused. It has been stated that flooding is the second highest cause of internal displacement after conflict in Nigeria (Achendu, 2020). In Northern Nigeria, the post-election violence of 2011 saw about 65,000 persons internally displaced in the Northern part of the country. According to a recent study, communal clashes accounted for 13.33% of the IDPs in the area, natural disasters for 0.99%, and the Boko Haram insurgency for 85.68% (Karki, 2021). The preceding data shows that insecurity has been a major factor in the massive internal displacement of people, notably

in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states, which have been the epicentre of insurgent activities in North-eastern Nigeria since 2009 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2018).

This issue of insecurity leading to internal displacement has called for studies on how it affects the entire country. It is against this background that this study seeks to examine the extent to which internally displaced person's crisis constitutes a threat to human security in the Northern Nigeria.

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are to:

- i. examine the nature and dimensions of the human security issues facing the IDPs in the Northeast, Nigeria;
- ii. discuss the causes of internal displacement in North-East Nigeria;
- iii. identify the impact of IDP crisis on human security in North-East Nigeria.

The Concept of Human Security

The human security concept has become the latest trend in security studies to replace the state-centric concept of security which sees security as the absence of war and violence. As a result, state-centric security focuses on the use or threat of force to deter and suppress insecurity. However, experts have submitted that, while the term "security" is most often used to describe safety from external threats, it can also refer to a number of other concepts, including but not limited to: the absence of danger (e.g. freedom from want); the availability of a necessary resource (e.g. food security); the resistance to damage or harm (e.g., secure foundations); the maintenance of privacy (e.g. a secure telephone line); the maintenance of confinement (e.g. a secure room or (e.g. emotional security). Human security refers to a society's regard for its citizens' lives. It is the originally the elimination of fear and wants (Salleh, Ahmad & Jamil, 2018).

This means that humans are regarded as secure when there is nothing to make them panic, or uncomfortable. It is also beyond freedom from harm as it includes the opportunity to have access to basic things such as food, potable water and decent accommodation. Human

security is threatened by anything that lessens people's quality of life. This could be anything from war to a lack of access to resources, pollution, environmental deterioration, or population growth. Poverty, unemployment, conflict, violence, illnesses, and diseases, environmental degradation, natural disasters, domestic violence, transnational crimes, and human rights abuses are all examples of issues that can cause insecurity in individuals, which can then lead to the displacement of those individuals from their usual places of residence (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2023).

The Concept of Human Displacement

Human displacement means that people are taken away from their home or country of origin against their will. Since human beings have learnt to create community and live perpetually in one place, displacement can only arise as a result of forced circumstances. As a result, people also use the term forced migration instead of displacement. Forced migration is different from voluntary migration because people who are forced to leave do so suddenly or violently, while people who choose to leave on their own do so after planning and preparing (Zetter, 2018). Disaster or climate-induced displacement is when environmental stresses hurt people's lives and ways of making a living. This type of migration shows how environmental issues, like climate change, affect people's decisions about where to move. This is especially important when the weather is bad (Zetter & Morrissey, 2014).

There is also "development-induced displacement," which means the moving, resettling, and relocating of people because of state-defined development processes such as building cities, improving transportation, and building dams which force people to move.

The last type of cause of forced migration is conflict-induced migration, which is the focus of this study because it caused the rise of IDPs and the humanitarian crisis in Borno State, Nigeria. This type is when people have to leave their homes because of armed conflict, widespread violence, or weak state protection (Dryjanska, Sanchez & Parke, 2022). This is often because of persecution, war, violence in general, or violations of human rights (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Flagship Reports, 2020).

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

IDPs are people who are forced to leave their homes because of armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations, natural disasters, or disasters caused by humans, but who stay in their country. This definition suggests that the phrase “internally displaced persons” refers only to people uprooted by conflict, violence and persecution, that is, people who would be called refugees if they crossed a border. Nigeria has 3.3 million persons displaced by conflict –the highest number in Africa and on a global scale, Nigeria is ranked behind Syria with 6.5 million IDPs and Colombia with 5.7 million (International Organisation for Migration, 2023).

Theoretical Review

The human security approaches

The Human Security Approach was an instrument developed by the United Nations in 1994. The UNDP Human Development Report New Dimensions of Human Security coined the term “human security” within the UN system. It represents a paradigm shift in thinking about security which has traditionally centred on the security of the state instead of people. The reason for this, according to the report, being that the world will never be secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and in their jobs. It stressed that the two fronts in the battle for peace are ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ which the report considered to be the core of the human security agenda.

The main postulation of the approach is that human security is not limited to the prevention or elimination of physical harms but also extend to other aspects. The report highlighted four characteristics of human security: universal, people-centred, interdependent and early prevention. The UNDP provided the overall picture of the human security approach in the following four sentences, “Human security: is not just security of land, it is security of people; is not just security through arms, it is security through development; is not just security of nations, it is security of individuals in their homes and in their jobs; is not just a defence

against conflicts between nations, it is a defence against conflicts between people (Nazarova, Nazarov & Demianenko, 2018).

There are seven interconnected elements of human security: personal, economic, health, food, environmental, community and political security. The UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 particularly emphasises that “Human security means safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives-whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our communities or in our environment”.

The human security approach identifies four essential characteristics of human security which are:

- i. Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor nations.
- ii. The components of human security are interdependent
- iii. Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. It is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream.
- iv. Human security is people-centred.

The framework also delineates seven groups of threats to human security which are:

- i. Economic security threatened by persistent poverty, unemployment
- ii. Food security threatened by hunger and famine
- iii. Health security threatened by deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health care
- iv. Environmental security threatened by environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution
- v. Personal security threatened by physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labour
- vi. Community security threatened by inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions

vii. Political security threatened by political repression, human rights abuses, etc.

There are two ways to look at the Human Security approach: the Freedom from Fear Approach and the Freedom from Want Approach. While the main focus of the "freedom from fear" approach, is on what kinds of threats IDPs should be protected from, it also talks about the right ways to deal with the dangers that IDPs in vulnerable situations face. So, this approach called for a human security practice that protects vulnerable people from things like poverty, poor health, inequality, and malnutrition, which are all forms of human insecurity.

Methodology

Explanatory research design is adopted for this study. Data was gathered from key informant interviews (KII) and various extant literature which was consulted to a critical content analysis. The research work is based on both primary and secondary sources. Due to the focus of this study on a continuous phenomenon, the explanatory technique is employed in order to acquire a comprehensive insight on the connection between internally displaced persons and human security in the North-east of Nigeria.

Results and Discussion of Findings

Objective One: Nature and Dimensions of the Human Security Issues Facing the IDPS in the Northeast, Nigeria?

More than half of the people in the IDP camps are women and children, according to most estimates. Usually, female and children are seen as vulnerable people (Uzobo & Akhuetie, 2018). Being vulnerable mean that IDPs are not free from fear and want; two basic dimensions of human security. This means that internal displacement is a virtual guarantee of insecurity to the displaced even as it is to those who may not be directly affected by the violence that cause or led to the displacement.

From the information gathered, it was discovered that IDPs are often prone to security challenges by the virtues of being displaced. In addition, they also constitute security risks to the society or community that host them. For instance, the review of literature revealed the following;

In 2022, an online newspaper reported that the Nigerian army has trained at least 40 security guards in an effort to improve security in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps within Maiduguri, Borno's capital. They were also trained on how to disarm adversaries during attacks and how to defend themselves using combinations of physical combat techniques. This training was a response to a need; the need to eliminate insecurity. It is obvious that there have been incidences of violence among the IDP themselves and clashes between the IDPs and the peoples in the communities that surround the IDP camps. This is shown in the observation that the security training for guards would be helpful in cementing civil – military relationships with the host community while encouraging them to be actively involved in securing their own communities (Mom, 2022).

In an interview with one of the victims, it was reported that sexual exploitation goes on daily in camps as displaced persons have to be married or be attached sexually to camp officials in order to get the best supply of aids. To corroborate this, a woman from the Borno IDP camp, stated in an interview that she fled from her home after members of the dreaded terrorist group, Boko Haram killed her husband. She described her experience thus; “shortly after my arrival on camp, a soldier came to ask me to marry him. He was bringing food and clothes for me. After a lot of pressure from him, I allowed him to have sex with me. Two months later he just stopped coming. Then I realised I was pregnant. I feel so angry with him for deceiving me. When he was pretending to woo me, he used to provide for me, but as soon as I agreed and we began having sex, his behaviour changed towards me”. This pattern of enticing vulnerable women with basic needs seems common and this can be termed “Transactional sex”.

Another respondent, a woman said a soldier showed interest in her by bringing food items and clothes for her: “he is one of the popular soldiers here. I accepted him because I needed help to take care of my children. Feeding in the camp is only once a day so you have to accept any help that comes. We started having sex in my camp tent at night. But later, when I realised that I was pregnant and told him, he stopped coming to me”.

Similarly, a young beautiful girl narrated her ordeal with a member of the Civilian Joint Task Force in the camp:

“He was one of the camp officials. He promised to help and marry me. He usually takes me out in his car. When I told him I was pregnant, he asked me to abort the pregnancy. I refused and he said if I would not abort the pregnancy, we should separate. I reported him to the Army officers but nothing was done to him”.

Analysis of the perpetrators of sexual violence against the women in IDP camps has been identified to include members of the police and armed forces, intimate partners, and other relatives. Overall, a third of women who experienced sexual violence and almost half those who reported physical violence sought care (Ojengbede, Babawarun, Olayiwola, Ogun, Kongnyuy & Adorin, 2019). Most of the perpetrators are people who have gained authority over their existence due to their position in and around the IDP camps. The media coverage of gender-based violence against women in IDP camps in Nigeria is inadequate. Newspaper reports do not expose the implications of the crimes to attract public condemnation and application of the law for its control.

In addition, malnutrition and food insecurity are major challenges for small children living in IDP camps. Poor diet is a key driver of malnutrition in young children. One of the respondents complained to a researcher that they were not allowed to go out of camp in spite of shortages in the supply of food and other items. A number of them stated that they had to beg camp officials to intervene with the guards before a pass can be given. Hence, it was very easy for camp officials to take advantage of them. This shows that there is no security of basic human needs in the IDP camps.

Infectious diseases such as measles and urinary schistosomiasis are prevalent in IDP camps due to poor sanitation, inadequate healthcare, and inadequate vaccination coverage. Urinary schistosomiasis is a parasitic disease caused by *Schistosoma haematobium* and is usually associated with lesions in the genitourinary tracts of affected people (Musa,

Muhammad, Tijjani, Saidu, Gashua, Goje, Ojo & Idris, 2022). They are exposed to various physical and mental harms. Despite the presence of security agents, IDP camps are among the most insecure human habitat in the world. A study of three IDP camps in north-east Nigeria show that the elderly, widows, single and even married women in IDP camps face challenges such as lack of freedom, financial insecurity, Lack of adequate care (LAC); and family dis-integration. Lack of adequate care was mostly accounted for by respondents.

Objective Two: Causes of internal displacement in North-East Nigeria

The incidences of internally displaced persons in north-east Nigeria occur majorly due to violent conflicts caused by Boko Haram insurgency, herdsmen/farmers and remotely, issues like ethnicity/religion, politics, and flood. Amoke (2021) categorised causes of internally displaced persons into remote cause i.e. armed conflict caused by Boko Haram as identified above, and immediate cause i.e. the extra-judicial killing of the leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. However, these causes have been exacerbated by high level of poverty which is a breeding ground for all kinds of vices (ibid) and has encouraged some people to join in perpetrating the various attacks on innocent citizens which has led to internal displacement.

Objective Three: Impact of IDP Crisis on Human Security in North-east Nigeria.

The IDP camp as it is constituted in Nigeria is a breeding place for insecurity. This is made manifest by the socio-cultural framework in which many of the IDPs, particularly in the Northern, parts of the country exist. In the camp, there are able bodied men who are full of energy and often have nothing to do but while away time. These idle males are often a security threat to the IDP camp inmates and the neighbouring communities. Several clashes have been reported within IDP camps and between inmates of IDP camps and neighbouring communities. The IDP crisis in North-east Nigeria has significantly undermined various components of human security in the region. The displacement of people and subsequent packing them into camps have created threats to physical, health, community and political security in the affected region.

The lack of adequate protection measures and the overcrowded conditions in camps further exacerbate these security risks. The IDP camps are not as secure as government would want people to believe. In addition, many of the facilities are makeshift meaning that they are often not adequate protection against harsh weather condition, animal attacks and pest infestation. In term of physical security, IDPs are at the mercy of fellow human beings as well as animals and natural elements.

IDPs also contribute to food insecurity. Displaced populations often struggle to access sufficient and nutritious food. Limited resources, disrupted agricultural activities, and restricted movement due to conflict impede their ability to produce or purchase food. As a result, people who are hitherto producers are now turned to consumers due to displacements. The reduction in the number of active farmers and increase in the number of people who need food constitutes food insecurity because both the IDPs and the general population will suffer from having to share the little food available.

Evidence from secondary data available shows that most IDP camps have limited access to sanitation requirements; hence, some IDPs shared the resources of neighbouring communities, which posed some challenges to both groups. For instance, in IDP locations with no access to direct water sources, they sometimes travelled far distances to get water from neighbouring non-IDP communities. Thus, the IDPs were then often faced with long waiting times because they had to wait for the local community residents to collect water before they could. Similarly, most camps had either poorly organised toilets or none at all, so IDPs sometimes shared toilets with neighbouring communities or defecated in nearby outdoor bushes, in the process contaminating the shared surrounding environments and affecting neighbouring communities. Such negative adaptive actions cause environmental pollution and consequently increase the risk of infectious diseases, such as contamination of water, which could heighten the risk of diarrhoea diseases (Nnadi, Ezeani & Nnadi, 2020).

As reported by some IDPs, there dedicated waste dumps, but most of the time, IDPs simply throw their refuse in the drain, and when it rains, it piles up, and sometimes they just

throw it away anywhere. This unsanitary camp condition does not inconvenience only the IDPs, it also affects their neighbours who are equally exposed to various pathogens created by improper waste management practices in the IDP camp. So, IDPs can be a source of health insecurity for themselves and other communities that surround their camps. In addition to this, IDPs also contribute to insecurity outside their camps through the struggle for sustenance. The social fabric of communities hosting IDPs is often strained due to competition over scarce resources and the potential for social tensions. This can lead to the breakdown of social cohesion, discrimination, and marginalisation.

Conclusion

The crisis of internally displaced persons is a big challenge in Nigeria's effort at enhancing human security in the north-east region. It is evident that the crisis of internally displaced persons threatens every sphere of human security and if security is not assured, a lot of challenges which affect the people will arise. Hence for the Nigerian state to fully attain a high level of human security in the region, the all concerned stakeholders must take into recognition the needs of internally displaced persons as they have a great role to play in the development of the region and the nation at large. There is an emerging understanding that states will not be secured and cannot be secured until the people feel secured as well.

Recommendations

In line with the findings of this study, the following recommendations are considered relevant on the use of internal displacement and human security in Nigeria.

1. It is important that state and federal governments in Nigeria strengthen conflict resolution mechanisms at the community, state, and national levels.
2. Improved early warning systems should also be established. It is important to enhance early warning systems for potential conflicts and displacement.
3. Government and other stakeholders should strengthen humanitarian assistance. It is important to secure increased funding for organisations and agencies such as NEMA working on internal displacement in Nigeria.

4. There is also the need to enhance security measures. Government should work to improve existing security infrastructure and personnel in the north east and other regions prone to displacement.

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ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERAL UNIVERSITY WUKARI: FINANCIAL AND SECURITY EFFECT ON THE HOST COMMUNITY (2012-2020)

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ABSTRACT

The University is widely believed to be an institution for the training of top-level manpower. It is for this noble reason that governments around the world have made concerted efforts to increase access to university education. The Federal Government of Nigeria has been performing creditably well in this particular sphere with the establishment of numerous federal universities across the thirty-six states of the federation over the years. Many researches have focused on the relationship between the establishment of universities and access to education among citizens. However, the relationship between the establishment of universities and its impact on the host community has received minimal attention. Data for the study was obtained through primary and secondary sources such as questionnaire, interview and literature survey. The study found that the establishment of federal universities by the Federal Government of Nigeria has greatly enhanced the financial security of host communities and that this is one of the key motivations for continued establishment of federal university by the federal government. The study further revealed that one possible explanation is that financial security ensures survival, which suggests that the establishment of federal university to provide survival needs has continued for a while. The study concludes by suggesting that though, the Nigerian government has performed woefully in its task of providing adequate financial security for a majority of its citizens, the case of Federal University, Wukari providing financial security for the inhabitants of the host community is worthy of emulation.

Keywords: University Education, Wukari, Financial Security, Host Community

Introduction

The University is an institution for the training of top-level manpower. It is for this noble reason that governments around the world have made concerted efforts to increase access to university education. University education in Nigeria is provided at three levels in Nigeria

namely: the federal universities, state universities and private universities (Willott, 2011). It might interest us to know that university education does not only train man power, as it also provides financial security to people of the host community. This accounts for why Varnalii and Tomashevskyi (2019) argued that the inability to deliver financial security further destroys economic activities and normal functioning of society. Financial security is all about meeting people's basic needs, hence, the absence of it creates insecurity as those who lack financial security may become vulnerable since the state has refused to support them through conducive business environment.

Prior to 1960, Nigerians made concerted agitations for university education. This resulted in the establishment of the Asquith and Elliot Commission on higher education in 1943” (Okoli, Ogbonhah, and Ewor, 2016:61). A further impact of such agitations resulted in the creation of university education in Ibadan. Also, the higher institution which was referred to as University College Ibadan was used as a training hub of manpower for West Africa at that time (Otonko, 2012; Okoli et al, 2016). Following Nigeria’s independence, the responsibility of establishing the university rested mostly with the federal government and later, regional governments when it was introduced. The Eastern Region became the first region to establish university education in their territory, particularly in Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria in 1960 (Otonko, 2012).

Consequently, other regions like the Western region established their Universities (University of Ife) in 1962 in Ile Ife, Osun State. The Northern region created its own University (Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria) in 1962. In addition to the above, the University of Benin was also established in 1970 by the National Universities Commission (Okoli et al, 2016). The creation of states by the military government of General Gowon in 1967 put an end to regional governments that were in existence before; hence the federal government had to convert regional universities that were established into Federal Universities. The exclusive right to control higher education enjoyed by the then Federal Military Government of Nigeria, through Decree 1971, was upturned with the provision of the 1979 Constitution which

transferred higher education to the concurrent list (Nyewusira, 2014). The 1979 Constitution empowered state governments to establish their universities to extend the privilege of education to the majority of the citizens.

The determination for the establishment of federal university received a boost under the democratic rule of President Goodluck Jonathan in 2011. Thus, the nine federal universities established by Federal Executive Council in 2011 were the ones in Dutse, Dutsin-ma, Kashere, Lafia, Lokoja, Otuoke, Oye-Ekiti, and Wukari; in Jigawa, Katsina, Gombe, Nasarawa, Kogi, Ebonyi, Bayelsa, Ekiti, and Taraba State respectively (National Universities Commission, 2020). In addition to the above new federal universities created in 2011, “three more universities were also created by the federal government in 2013 by the Federal Executive Council (FEC) on 9th January 2013, they are in Birnin Kebbi, Gasau and Gashua in Kebbi, Zamfara, and Yobe respectively” (National Universities Commission, 2020:1). The above development is on the need to site federal universities to states where none had existed; hence a federal university was established in Wukari in 2011.

Schooling in university education provides higher financial security than those who do not undergo university education. The financial security of policymakers and that of their associate have also been noted as other reasons for the establishment of university education rather than expanding the existing university education. According to the researchers of such a study, clientelism, patronage, and corruption are the three most intense political forces that push states to expand access to education, rather than improve it (Kingdon, Little, Aslam, Rawal, Moe, Patrinos, Beteille, Banerji, Parton & Sharma, 2014: 2). Access to university education is relevant to the present study because, it is a potential instrument of financial security for people undergoing university education, while it is also an immediate financial security to policymakers and their associates who conceived the idea of the establishment of university education. Literature deficit on the best way to increase access to university education and the fact that this development is an instrument of financial security that has not be thoroughly investigated have informed this study.

It is against this backdrop that this study examines the “establishment of Federal University Wukari and its financial security effect on host community, 2012-2020. It becomes imperative to bring Wukari Town into light because the community that hosted one of the newly public universities by the Federal Government of Nigeria falls under one of the educationally less developed states (Willott, 2011). This study, therefore, intends to provide answer to the research question below:

- i. How has the establishment of Federal University Wukari enhanced the financial security of the host community between 2012 and 2020?

Literature Review

Understanding the concept of university education and Financial Security

Federal University Wukari is a public university established by the Federal Government of Nigeria to offer university education. University education is a degree - awarding institution. University education may be owned by private individuals or government. The university education owned by private individuals is referred to as private universities; while the ones owned by government are known as public universities. Public universities are established, run and managed by government at the federal or state level in Nigeria. More specifically, the public university we are interested in investigating in this study is the one established by the Federal Government of Nigeria.

The concept of financial security defies an acceptable definition, however, some scholarly definitions are considered in this study. Reznik, Getmanets, Kovalchuk, Nastyuk, and Andriichenko (2020:850) define financial security as the process of addressing the economic challenges of people to translate to addressing the challenges of national security of the state. What this definition implies is that the act of addressing the economic challenges of people is financial security that consequently translates to addressing the challenges of national security of the state. The reason for the above is because lack of financial security to meet the basic human needs can lead people into crime-related activities and pose a serious challenge to security. This implies that the need to provide an avenue that offers financial security is a

boost to the national security of the state. The above definition is corroborated by Rushchyshyn, Medynska, Nikonenko, Kostak, and Ivanova (2021: 234), for them, financial security is the provision of necessary resources for neutralization of threat against basic human needs. Therefore, financial security should be provided in order to ensure that people's basic needs are met, so as to prevent the outcome of the consequence of not being able to meet people's fundamental needs. For instance, financial security should strive to create jobs through direct and indirect means to address cases of unemployment and poverty, since there is an increase in the unemployment rate in Nigeria. For example, between 2017 and 2018, the figure rose from 18.8% to 23.1% (S. B. Morgen 2020:11). This increase in unemployment rate is a threat to the financial security and wellbeing of Nigerians.

A broader definition of financial security was given by Bowman and Wickramasinghe (2020); they argue that financial security is a concept that is tailored towards the development of infrastructure to enhance the financial wellbeing of people to provide motivation for everybody to pursue fair financial security in a fair and equitable manner. Financial security is all about the pursuit of infrastructural development to provide equal opportunity for everybody to succeed while also enhancing their welfare.

University education and financial security: Federal University Wukari

University education is a degree - awarding institution, while a public university is owned, run and managed by government. For instance, Madden (2017) argues that Victorial University (a public university based in Australia) added more money to the host community and boosted the district's employment. This additional fund coming to Victorial University and the host community has no doubt created opportunities for new businesses to spring up, thereby resulting in job creation. This job creation will make people involved in business to be financially stable and secure to provide for their basic needs. This financial security that has been offered to some people in the host community would not have been made possible without many students and staff of the University who are residents of the host community.

University of Birmingham (2013) posits that the siting of university education impacts the economy through the expenditure of students who ordinarily would not have come to the area had the university not been created. Also, the expenditure of people who visited the non-indigenous students in addition to the construction of university's new sports center that support the about 450 jobs during the construction period. Supporting the above, Kelly, McNicoll, and White (2014) finds out that the University of Kent has drawn thousands of students from outside the host community, thereby, has generated indirect employment in the area. Not only that, Dublin City University, contends that the University is an economic and civil player in the city of Dublin, acting as the major employer with about 1,200 staff in addition to the fact that businesses from far and near rely on the institution for buying and selling (Dublin City University, 2014). The various job creation opportunities that the presence of university education brings with it save the community people from the financial threat they would have been subjected to in the absence of the university.

Even though University education has started receiving less funding since 1980 as a result of greater return on investment in basic education when compared to university education (Addo, 2010). The Federal government of Nigeria has continued to create and approve request for more universities. As at August 2019, 174 universities have been established: Federal Universities 43, State University 52, and private universities 79 (Magaji, 2019). One begins to imagine why the Federal Government of Nigeria has continued to create more public universities without any future plan on how to fund them. Ezeibe (2016) partly explains the above development by contending that the rationale for political economy is aimed at providing explanations and solutions to the problems of economic growth and development facing the new nations since the beginning of the 1950s. What the above implies is that, the creation of more public universities might not be unconnected to the failure of government to pursue economic development where financial security is offered to the greatest number of the population. Therefore, the creation of more public universities might just be one of the justifications to solve little problem out of the enormous challenges that the pursuit

of economic development would have addressed. To justify the above position, Ogunode and Iroegbu (2018) in their study on, “perception of undergraduate students on the impact of siting higher institutions in a community: A case study of Federal University Wukari, Taraba State Nigeria”, found out that, Federal University Wukari is facing the challenges of inadequate funds, inadequate infrastructural facilities, inadequate lecturers, communal crisis, and inadequate instructional materials.

Marxian Political Economy Theory as Framework of Analysis

Thus, the Marxian political economy approach is adopted because of its suitability in explaining how the state, represented by the Nigerian Government creates university education like Federal University Wukari among others to intervene in the economy to stabilize the market and enhance the financial security of her citizens. The Department for International Development (2009) holds that political-economic analysis helps us to understand what drives political behaviour, how this shapes policies and programmes and, who are the main winners and losers, and what implications are these for development strategies.

The Marxian Political Economy Theory employed for this study is concerned with the following:

- i. The interest of different groups in society and how it generates policy outcomes that may encourage or retard development;
- ii. The role those formal institutions (e.g rule of law, elections) and informal, political, and cultural norms play in shaping human interaction and political & economic competition);
- iii. The impact of values and ideas, including political ideology, religion, and cultural beliefs, on political behaviour and public policy (Department for International Development 2009; Cohn 2012; Segrillo 2012).

They go further to observe that, economics can benefit everyone and that society can progress when the government intervenes in the economy (Corporate Finance Institute, 2015). To say that the siting of Federal University Wukari offers financial security to the host

community might not be an exaggeration; this can be seen from the direct and indirect employment that offer people financial security to address their basic human needs.

The decision-makers enjoy financial security from any intervention they embark upon. Thus, the establishment and siting of the Federal University Wukari is no doubt an intervention in the economy of the host community. This intervention is making the economy of the host community boom compared to when the Federal University was not established. Government intervention is necessary for the effective functioning of the market (Cohn, 2012). A community that houses a university education, particularly a public university is likely to enjoy financial security; this is so because of the job opportunities that people of that community stand to benefit.

Secondly, the role that formal and informal institutions, political and cultural norms play in shaping human interaction and political and economic competition cannot be over-emphasized. Though the people of Wukari where the Federal University is located have benefited in the areas of employment opportunities, and access to university education by the indigenes of Wukari among others. The university is equally helping the host community to shape her culture and ideologies. It is as a result of this that Ezeibe (2016:162) notes that “the political market is made up of those who demand a certain type of public policies and those who supply them. These actors are self-interested. Apart from the fact that the siting of public university in a particular location offers financial security through direct and indirect employment, such people's behaviours are also being shaped and influenced by the university.

Methodology

The research method adopted for this study is a mixed-method research method, meaning that both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used in the course of this study. The mixed-method research method employed in the study include gathering of data from questionnaire, interview and secondary data. The study followed the use of appropriate keywords on Google Scholar and Science Hub that are relevant to the study. The data collected

covered the period from 2012 to 2020. Content analysis and descriptive statistical analyses were combined to generate a logical result for the study.

The population of the study is Wukari Local Government area where Federal University Wukari is located. Wukari Local Government area consists of 241,546 populations (National Population Commission, 2019). Therefore, the total number of three hundred and ninety-nine (399) sample size was arrived at through Taro Yamane formula of arriving at sample size. Three hundred and fifty-four (354) questionnaires were administered among students, civil/public servants, and staff of private organisations in Wukari Town, while forty-five (45) members of the community were interviewed within the space of one week (May 17 to May 22, 2021). Out of the three hundred and fifty-four (354) questionnaires administered, three hundred and forty-six (346) questionnaires were filled and returned. This means that about eight (8) questionnaires were not returned by the respondents.

Forty-five (45) farmers and traders were interviewed in addition to opinion leader. Three hundred and thirty-six (346) questionnaires were filled and returned out of the three hundred and fifty-four (354) questionnaires that were administered. Taro Yamane formula was employed to arrive at a sample size of 399, simply because the population of the study is to an infinite, hence 10% of the population might be too large for the researcher to work with.

Ahmed (2009, p.39) notes that sample percentage or fraction is, $f = n/N$

Where,

n = population of strata

N = population of the study

Percentage of filled and returned questionnaires (f) = $346/354 = 0.9774 \times 354 = 346$

Percentage of un-returned questionnaires (f) = $8/354 = 0.02259 \times 354 = 8$

Result and Discussion: Federal University Wukari and Financial Security of the host community

How has the location of Federal University Wukari enhanced the financial security of the host community between 2012 and 2021?

Table 4.1: Respondents on, the location of Federal University Wukari (FU Wukari) has enhanced the financial security of the host community between 2012 and 2020?

S/N	Questions	Classification	Frequency	Percentage
1	Federal University Wukari has helped in the structural expansion of Wukari town	Yes	313	90.5%
		No	33	9.5%
		Total	346	100%
2	The establishment of Federal University Wukari provided employment to people of Wukari	Yes	334	96.5%
		No	12	3.5%
		Total	346	100%
3	The presence of Federal University Wukari has built harmony between Jukun tribe and other ethnic groups in Nigeria	Yes	229	66.2%
		No	117	33.8%
		Total	346	100%
4	The activities of Federal University Wukari have injected more money into the economy of Wukari town	Yes	280	80.9%
		No	66	19.1%
		Total	346	100%
5	The presence of Federal University Wukari has increased access of Wukari indigene to University education	Yes	322	93.1%
		No	24	6.9%
		Total	346	100%

Source: Field Survey 2023

From the above table 1, the majority (90.5% out of 100%) of the respondents opted for yes in the s/n 1 question, meaning that Federal University Wukari (FUW) has helped in the structural expansion of Wukari town. The above position was corroborated by the oral interview that was granted to twenty-four (24) farmers in the **three wards** that made-up Wukari Town and the group interview with twenty-one (21) yam sellers at Wukari Yam Market held on May 7, 2019, where they submitted that:

As a result of the establishment of FUW, many houses have been built for the habitation of both staff and students of the University. Not only that, other employees of the University have also built their houses, while others are still building.

Structural expansion has provided indirect employment like labourers and house builder who are engaged in building of houses among other things. This indirect employment provides financial security and support for those who engage in it. Structural expansion also

includes relaxation centers like Green Canopy, Credence Hotel, sachet water factories, Residential Estate, hospitals, primary and secondary schools among others built during the period of study. In s/n 2 question, the majority of the respondents (96.5% out of 100%) opted for 'yes, meaning that the establishment of Federal University Wukari has provided employment for people of Wukari. Thus, the foregoing observation was shared through the oral interview that was granted to twenty-four (24) farmers in the three wards that made-up Wukari Town and the group interview with twenty-one (21) yam sellers at Wukari Yam Market held on May 7, 2019, they observed that "The majority of our people work in the University as cleaners, while few others work as either teaching or senior non-teaching staff of the University". The direct employment opportunities that Federal University Wukari attracts gives beneficiaries the financial opportunities to meet their financial needs, hence offering them financial security against lack of threat to lack of basic human need.

In s/n 3 question, the majority of the respondents (66.2% out of 100%) opted for yes, meaning that, the presence of Federal University Wukari has built harmony between Jukun tribe and other ethnic groups in Nigeria. In addition to the above view, the oral interview that was granted to twenty-four (24) farmers in the **three wards** that made-up Wukari Town and the group interview with twenty-one (21) yam sellers at Wukari Yam Market held on May 7, 2019 said that:

It is the nature of an average Jukun person to show love, therefore FUW increases the cordial relationships between staff of FUW who are of Jukun extraction and their non-Jukun colleagues working together and marrying each other. Again, Jukun students and their colleagues who are non-Jukun show love to one another as they study together and choose friends among one another.

In s/n 4 question, the majority of the respondents (80.9% out of 100%) opted for 'yes' meaning that the activities of Federal University Wukari have injected more money into the economy of Wukari town. Supporting the above view is the oral interview that was granted to

twenty-four (24) farmers in the three wards that made-up Wukari Town and the group interview with twenty-one (21) yam sellers at Wukari Yam Market held on May 7, 2019. They submitted that “the activities of FUW have injected more money into the economy of Wukari town. The additional money that has been injected into Wukari community will no doubt create indirect employment through selling of goods and services among others. The people who are engaged in trading activities as a result of this university have been able to address their basic human needs that would have been impossible had the Federal University not been located in Wukari.

In s/n 5 question, the majority of the respondents (93.1% out of 100%) opted for yes, meaning that, “the presence of Federal University Wukari has increased access of Wukari indigene to university education” the above view was corroborated by the oral interview that was granted to twenty four (24) farmers in the **three wards** that made-up Wukari Town and the group interview with twenty one (21) yam sellers at Wukari Yam Market held on May 7, 2019 in this manner, “as a result of the establishment of FUW, many Wukari indigenes have been able to secure admission through merit-system and slots given to some influential leaders of Wukari”. The increased access to university education that the people of the host community have enjoyed in the period under investigation will offer holders of such opportunity enhanced financial security as they stand the chance of being employed in either public or private organisations after their graduation.

Discussion of Findings: Structural Expansion, Employment Opportunity and Access to University Education

Finding showed that there is structural expansion of Wukari town. The implication of structural expansion means that more people are coming into the host community as students, staff or visitors. The students, staff, and visitors coming into the host community spend on goods and services within the town. The spending of all these people creates indirect employment opportunity. Future structural expansion is very possible for the host community when indigenes of the host community exploit the opportunity at their disposal to enroll in the University. The structural expansion of Wukari also attracts infrastructural development.

Hosting a university is a sign of modernization as it has ability to attract modern basic infrastructures (Zych and Woloszyn, 2019).

Finding also showed that there are direct and indirect employment opportunities that the presence of Federal University Wukari provides. These might not be unconnected to individuals on the payroll of the University and the institution's capital spending. Thus, “the activities of the University of Birmingham accounted for about £28 million to the host community-Birmingham and about £53 million to the district in 2011-2012” (University of Birmingham, 2013: 24). People who live in a particular environment seem to patronize people around them than buying from a far place where transportation costs will be added up. It is as a result of this that most university staff who resides in a particular location patronise their neighbors’ who sell what they need. This development in a way helps to create indirect employment for the people in that line of business. Jam (2016) corroborated the above by saying that an indigenous group in Taraba State commended the Vice-Chancellor of Federal University Wukari for showing zenith degree of regard for Taraba State by giving contracts to companies owned by their sons and daughters. The indirect employment that the presence of Federal University Wukari attracts offers financial security and support to tackle threat arising from lack of basic human needs.

Further finding showed that there is increase access to university education of indigenes of Wukari Local Government Area. The objective of the Establishment Bill, 2019 (SB. 24) that seeks to create Federal University, Wukari is to ensure equality and access to tertiary education in the country” (National Assembly, 2020, para.1). This increase in access to university education has future advantage for indigenes that have embraced the university education, as they stand the chance of reaping future financial security when they complete their university degree. Kayani, Akbar, Faisal et al. (2019:89) justified the above by arguing that “the greater the degree of schooling, the greater the degree of household earnings and financial security against threat arising from lack of basic human needs. The above is further validated by World Bank Group (2018) when she posited that university education enhanced

the social and economic development of a nation because its interest is to enhance the wellbeing of people, enhance democracy and oneness among people of different groups and ethnicity

Evidence from previous study and the researcher's observation revealed that the university education (Federal University Wukari) established by Nigerian government in Wukari is plagued with infrastructural deficit, inadequate teaching and learning materials that have a negative effect on staff and students of Federal University Wukari.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The siting of public university such as Federal University Wukari is a deliberate attempt by the state to provide financial security for people in the society to stabilise the economy and enhance the economic wellbeing of the people in the host community and across the country. Establishment of Federal University Wukari is a tool for providing and spreading financial security to the host community and others. The research has vividly expressed the role of the continued establishment of federal universities in providing numerous benefits linked to the financial security of the people and host community. The implication of the establishment of more federal universities is that old ones will have to suffer funding challenges.

Therefore, the siting of public university, Federal University in Wukari town is one of the means used by the government to offer financial security to the host community through the structural expansion, provision of employment, and access to university education among others that the host community in particular and people across the country in general also enjoy. The role played by the public university owned by Federal Government of Nigeria has been able to meet the financial needs of people who benefits through the activities of the public university.

Based on the findings of the study, the study made the following recommendations:

- i. The Federal Government of Nigeria should continue the establishment of more public universities in communities across Nigeria where federal presence has not been felt;

- ii. In addition to structural expansion of the host communities and increase access to university education by indigenes of the host communities and other people;
- iii. The Federal Government of Nigeria should dialogue with the Academic Staff Union of Universities on the need to introduce tuition fees to ensure that the existing federal universities are well funded to solve challenges of infrastructural deficit, and inadequate teaching and research materials in Nigerian universities.
- iv. The Federal Government of Nigeria should ensure that the existing federal universities are well funded to solve challenges of infrastructural deficit, inadequate teaching and research materials in Nigerian universities.
- v. Findings of this study will assist stakeholders in university education to formulate policies and programmes that will aid federal universities to perform it role adequately in financial security and peacebuilding process.

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**INSECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF NATIONAL UNITY AS
DEVELOPMENTAL CHALLENGES: OPINIONS OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND
TERTIARY STUDENTS IN NORTH-CENTRAL AND SOUTH EAST NIGERIA**

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ABSTRACT

The study surveyed the opinions of civil servants and tertiary students in North Central (NC) and South East (SE) geo-political zones on the possibility of sustaining Nigeria's unity, the core threats to sustaining the unity and the consequences (developmental challenges) of not being able to sustain the unity. The population for the study comprised civil servants and tertiary students across the zones. Four states troubled by insecurity: Benue, Plateau, Imo and Abia States were purposively selected for the study. Using the Cluster Sampling Technique, 2680 samples (1434 from NC and 1246 from SE) were drawn. The samples were further stratified into civil servants (1178) and tertiary students (1502). Collected data were analyzed using frequency count and percentages. Decisions on core or non-core threats and developmental challenges were reached using a baseline of 50% >and < 49.9%, respectively. Findings revealed only 23.7% of respondents across NC and SE believed Nigeria can sustain its unity. 50.9% did not believe it would. Also, 81.7% and 81.5% of respondents, respectively, identified insecurity and political discrepancies as core threats to Nigeria's unity. While another, 54.3% identified poor resource allocation as core threat. Among the developmental challenges identified as consequences of lack of unity in the country were: political instabilities (64.2%) and war (51.4%). Based on these, the need to curb insecurity and political instabilities in the country was recommended.

Keywords: Sustainability, Unity, Beliefs, Threats, Terror, Fatalities

Introduction

Despite its diversities, Nigeria intends to remain united as an indivisible nation. This intention is contained in the preamble of her 1999 Constitution. There, it is stated that:

... the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria... firmly and solemnly resolved, to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation under God, dedicated to the promotion of inter-African solidarity, world peace, international cooperation and understanding... (FGN, 1999: p. 1).

As an amalgamated nation, and a product of British colonial delimitation, Nigeria is a nation of diverse culture, language, religion, ethnicity and history. The diversities emanated from centuries of distinct histories, origins, cultures and geo-linguistic peculiarities that are inherently unique to pre-colonial kingdoms, empires and clans around the Niger and Benue Rivers. Being a product of British colonial policy, Nigeria is geographically nothing other than a mashed collection of people who are culturally different but kept together by colonial politics and modern socio-political schemes and desires.

To remain as a nation, the country adopted a series of strategies. It is governed federally. It promotes national policies above regional ones and empowers its Federal Government more than its state and local governments. The country uses English, rather than its local languages as the official language. It operates centralized education system, adopts a National Youth Service Corp (NYSC) program and sustains only national security outfits such as Police, Military and Prison services. Over the years, the country has utilized these with the motive of remaining a united nation, a nation that its tribal differences will not trigger disintegration and clashes (Usman, 2021, Ayorinde, 2022).

The South-Eastern part of the country is also troubled by very active separatists who want secession from Nigeria. Their desire is violently promoted by a separatist group named Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Founded in 2014 by Nnamdi Kanu, the group has been the source of worries to the region. Though under arrest, Nnamdi Kanu, through the group has been alleged to be the one consistently disturbing the governance of the region, (Ogwu, 2023). Between July 3rd and 10th and from 31st July to 15th August 2023 the group declared days of

sit-at-home that were violently enforced. This resulted in the loss of life and properties (Ogunseyin, 2023). The separatist group is active and seems appreciated by common people whose experiences of failed conventional government may have left them with no choice but to support secession and perhaps, the actualization of a Biafra. South-Eastern states such as Imo, Abia, Anambra, Enugu and Ebonyi bear the brunt of IPOB. Certainly, the experiences of people in those states might make it difficult for them not to doubt sustainability unity in Nigeria.

Keeping a multi-ethnic and cultural nation united cannot always be easy. Many countries around the world have identified this as a major developmental challenge in their respective countries (Giddens, 2001, Iwundu, 2013, Campbell, 2014). Countries such as Ethiopia, Cameroun, Sudan and South Sudan are formed by amalgamation of different ethnic groups. Just as Nigeria in Nigeria, the countries experienced grievous threats to their unity. Just as Nigeria did between 1963 and 1967, many of these countries have experienced civil war. Their developmental efforts have been challenged by communal clashes and war that made them almost ungovernable (Jinadu, 2007; Haman, 2021). Current experiences of violence and political agitations in Nigeria are enough to affect the country's developmental policies and programs. Where and when there is insecurity and tensed moves towards maintaining unity, developmental strides would certainly be challenged.

Across the world, politicians, civil servants, security personnel, youths and members of organized unions are key stakeholders in societal sustainability (Javaid, 2010; Campbell, 2014). They are actors who initiate opinions and actions needed to implement and sustain policies and politics in their societies. In Nigeria, the workability of a system often depends on the actions and inactions of these categories of people (Raji, 2020; Ayorinde, 2022). Civil servants and tertiary students, for example, are key stakeholders who in offices, in school, in media and at gatherings express open concerns when issues become threatening. Thus, asking their opinions about the sustainability of the country's unity in research like this will not be out of place. Specifically, this research is designed to find out what the opinions of Nigerians

in the categories of civil servants and tertiary students across selected North Central and South Eastern states are on the possibility of Nigeria remaining united as a nation, irrespective of its diversities. The research also finds out the factors capable of threatening the unity and the implication of the country's inability to sustain its unity.

Research Questions

The following research questions were raised in the study:

1. Do civil servants and tertiary students in North Central and South East Nigeria believe Nigeria can sustain unity among its ethnic groups and remain a nation?
2. What, in the opinions of the civil servants and tertiary students in North Central and South East are the core threats to Nigeria's unity?
3. What are the developmental challenges the inability to sustain Nigeria's unity will cause the nation?

Theoretical Framework

This study is theoretically framed on Travis Hirschi's perspective on Control Theory. Travis identifies factors that connect people to society, keep them united and possibly discourage them from committing crimes that can obstruct the unity and peace of their society. He maintains that to control crime and threats to nationality, four types of bonds must exist in the system of the society. According to Travis, to achieve unity, a country must develop law-abiding behaviours in its citizens and residents. To develop the law-abiding behaviour, factors such as a sense of attachment, commitment, involvement and belief must be strong in the people (Giddens, 2001). This aspect of Control theory posits that when the factors are sufficiently strong in the system of a country, effective social control and conformity would be activated among people. People would become attached and unbreakable from society, to break the rules of society or become threats to the existence of the country. However, when the factors are weak, deviance such as agitation and secession motives and actions will occur.

Invariably, the theory suggests that a nation which promotes broad and fair access to socio-political opportunities will achieve a high rate of people's involvement in nation

building. When involved, the people are likely to develop sense of commitment to the growth of the nation, get attached to the success and failure of the nation and develop strong beliefs in the workings of the nation. This could be so strong that they wouldn't want the nation to crack and crash. But where these are lacking; people's involvement will be low, attachment will be lacking, and commitment will dwindle so much that people's belief in the survival of the nation could become negative.

Method

The study is a descriptive survey of the opinions of stakeholders (civil servants and tertiary students) in North Central and South East Nigeria on issues relating to the sustainability of Nigeria's unity. The issues considered were issues of belief in the ability of Nigeria to remain united as a nation, the issue of threats to sustaining Nigerian unity and the issue of the developmental challenges Nigeria's inability to remain united will cause the nation. The population for the study consists of residents of the North Central (NC) and South Eastern (SE) states of Nigeria. The South Eastern states include: Abia, Anambra, Imo, Enugu and Ebonyi. The states in north central include: Kwara, Niger, Kogi, Plateau, Nasarawa and Benue.

Imo and Anambra states in the southeast and Niger and Benue states in the north central were purposively selected from the study. Persistent incidence of insecurity in the selected states (Adebowale, 2022; Ogunseyin, 2023) made the researchers select them for the study. A Cluster sampling technique was used to sample a total number of 2680 respondents across the states (SE = 1246 and NC = 1434). The samples (respondents) were contacted at their cluster points such in tertiary institutions (Tertiary Students, TS), and State and Federal Ministries (Civil Servants, CS). Thus, for this study, two categories of stakeholders were considered these include: civil servants and students of tertiary institutions. The word "stakeholders" as used in this study would mean civil servants and students of tertiary institutions.

The Questionnaire has 2 sections. Section A consists of items seeking respondents' biographical data such as their employment, studentship, and political affiliations statuses. The

Section B consists of 3 parts. The first part has items testing stakeholders' beliefs in the sustainability of Nigeria's unity. Part II of Section B has items testing the opinions of stakeholders on the threats to Nigeria's unity and Part III sought respondents' opinions about the developmental challenges Nigeria's inability to sustain its unity will cause the nation. Each item on the questionnaire was structured positively with response options following the content of the items. Collected data were analysed using frequency count and percentages. A baseline of 50% was set to determine the threats that are core in obstructing sustainability of Nigeria's unity as expressed by the respondents. Thus, threats having 50% and above are classified as core threats and those having 49.9% and below are classified as threats that are not core.

Results and Analysis

1. Do civil servants and tertiary students in North Central (NC) and South East (SE) Nigeria believe Nigeria can sustain unity among its ethnic groups and remain a nation?

Table 1: Stakeholders' opinions on Nigeria's ability to sustain unity among its ethnic groups

Beliefs on		NC Stakeholders				SE Stakeholders			
Sustainability		CS		TS		CS		TS	
Total									
n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Sustainable		278	45.5	192	23.3	94	16.6	72	
10.6	636	23.7							
Hardly Sustainable		110	18	289	35.1	191	33.6	88	
12.9	678	25.2							
Not sustainable		222	36.5	343	41.6	283	49.8	518	76.4
1366	50.9								

*CS= Civil Servants TS= Tertiary Students ** NC= North Central SE= South East

Data on Table 1 show that in North Central, 45.5% of sampled Civil Servants and 23.3% of Tertiary students believed Nigeria can sustain its unity and remain indivisible. However, in the South East, it was 16.6% of sampled civil servants and 10.6% of tertiary students believed

the unity could be sustained. In total, 23.7% of sampled respondents, irrespective of their region, believed the unity can be sustained while 25.2% believed it would be hard to sustain it and 50.9% believed achieving the unity is impossible.

2. What, in the opinions of the civil servants and students of tertiary institutions in North Central and South East are the core threats to Nigeria's unity?

Table 2: Stakeholders' opinions on Nigeria's ability to sustain unity among its diverse ethnic groups

Threats to #Decision the Unity	*NC Stakeholders		*SE Stakeholders		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Poor infrastructure 22.9 nct	129	8.9	486	39.0	615	
Poor educational policies 14.7 nct	98	6.8	298	23.9	396	
High inflation 27.9 nct	167	11.6	583	46.7	750	
Religious differences 71.7 ct	912	63.5	1010	81.1	1922	
High insecurity 1225		85.4	967	77.6	2192	81.7 ct
Ineffective judicial system 32.9 nct	198	13.8	684	54.8	882	
Political discrepancies 81.5 ct	956	66.6	1220	97.9	2176	
Poor resource allocation 498		34.7	956	76.72	1454	54.3 ct

* NC= North Central SE= South East ** CT =Core threat NCT= Not a core threat

Decision is based on the summation of responses from NC and SE on each item

Data in Table 2 show what respondents from North Central and South East identified as core threats to sustainability of Nigerian unity. Specifically, 81.7% of the respondents identified high incidence of insecurity as the main core threat to the unity. Following this are political discrepancies, 81.5%, and religious differences, 71.7%. On the other hand, poor resource allocation was identified by 55.3% respondents. Factors recognized as not core threats include: poor educational policies (14.7%); poor infrastructure (22.9%); high inflation (27.9%) and an ineffective judicial system (32.9%).

Research Question 3: What are the developmental challenges inability to sustain Nigeria's unity will cause the nation?

Table 3: Opinions on developmental challenges that Nigeria's inability to sustain unity will cause

Developmental #Decision Challenges	*NC Stakeholders		*SE Stakeholders		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
War and insecurity 51.4 *cdc	790	55.1	590	47.3	1380	
Political instabilities 64.2 cdc	952	66.3	771	61.8	1723	
Economic crisis **ndc	498	34.7	263	21.1	761	28.3
International disapproval ndc	105	7.3	47	3.7	152	5.6
Infrastructural crises 48.2 ndc	659	45.9	635	50.9	1294	
Citizenship crisis 17.5 ndc	421	29.3	39	3.1	460	
Linguistic problem ndc	66	4.6	28	2.2	94	3.5

* Cdc =Core developmental challenges

**Ndc=Not a core developmental

challenge

Data in Table 3 shows the opinions of respondents across the two geopolitical zones on core and none developmental challenges the country could face if it failed to sustain unity among its ethnic groups. According to the data, 64.2% of respondents believed it would lead to political instabilities and 51.4% said it could lead to war and more insecurity. However, respondents believed crises such as economic inadequacies (28.3%); infrastructural inadequacies (48.2%); citizenship crises (17.5%); international disapproval (5.6%) and linguistic problems (3.5%) are not core developmental challenges the disunity could cause the country.

Discussion

Every nation needs unity and collaboration among its subgroups to develop and survive as a nation. This is true of Nigeria. Being a country of variant cultures, language and geographical entities, it needs effective coordination of its differences to survive and remain as one. Unfortunately, achieving this has been difficult. In recent years, the country faced a lot of challenges so much so that citizens' hope of an indivisible country has dwindled. In this study for example, it was discovered that only 23.3% of samples from North Central and 10.6% from South East believed the country's unity can be sustained. This is an indication of losing hope in the nation. It is a pointer to the fact that many believed the nation would break up one day.

The study also finds out the factors that threaten the sustainability of Nigeria nation. It was discovered that political discrepancies, insecurity, religious differences and poor resource allocation are the core threats. This finding corroborates series of opinions people have expressed in discussions and research (Raji, 2020, Adelabu & Oti, 2022, Muhammed, 2017). Political discrepancies are on the rise in the country and this is telling in people's development of trust in the survival of the country. The just concluded 2023 General Election did not go down without some build-up of disharmony among ethnic groups in the country. A European Union report on the election faulted it as a very divisive and threatening election. The report identified religious differences and political irregularities as main determinants of voters' choices. This amounts to political discrepancies that are capable of dividing the country (Ejekwonyilo, 2023).

Before and during the election period, some felt political activities in some key states of the federation such as Lagos, Kaduna, Rivers, Kano and Kogi set Nigerians against one another in the line of ethnicity and religion (Ogunseyin, 2023; Sun Newspaper, July 11, 2023). The crises became more pronounced with the strides of Peter Obi, the Labour Party Presidential candidate. His candidacy seems to have fuelled South Easterners' belief that the region had been segregated.

Certainly, the inability of Nigeria to sustain its unity would have some unfriendly implications for the development of the country. This study identified some of the implications of the opinions of the sampled respondents. For example, 64.2% and 51.4% of sampled respondents across the two geopolitical zones said the inability to sustain Nigeria nation would amount to heavy political instability and war, respectively. This is certainly not good. No nation can develop when these two consequences are rampant. Nations like Russia and Ukraine, Ethiopia, Sudan and Syria who are currently at war are not good examples of what any nation will wish. Thus, the inability to sustain Nigeria's unity cannot be wished.

Conclusion

Sustaining Nigeria's unity should be a serious business. This is because many Nigerians, particularly in the studied North Central and South East geopolitical zones expressed less hope in retaining Nigeria as a nation. Unfortunately, the people believed this could lead to war and serious political instability. This means that if Nigeria wants to achieve its clearly expressed interest in remaining indivisible as contained in the 1999 Constitution, more needs to be done.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the following are recommended:

1. Nigeria should step up efforts to improve the security of life and properties within its territory.
2. The government of Nigeria should be better structured and administered to prevent political discrepancies that are capable of undermining its unity.
3. More efforts should be made to coordinate religious differences in the country.
4. Using all means legal and logical, Nigeria should strive to remain a nation.

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PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE OF TRADITIONAL METHODS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN KALABARI KINGDOM OF RIVERS STATE

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ABSTRACT

This work is an analysis of the Principle and Practice of Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution, concerning the Kalabari Kingdom in Rivers State. The Traditional African System of Government was open and inclusive, where all people could participate in the decision-making process. African practiced participatory democracy, where decisions were taken by consensus at village meetings. However, with colonization, these Traditional practices and institutions were largely weakened and destroyed in many African societies, especially as the colonial masters introduced law courts which pronounce judgments rather than resolve conflicts according to the African administration of justice. African Traditional mechanisms of Conflict Resolution were largely effective and respected, and their decisions were binding on all parties. The study discovered that, the Kalabaris have various unique methods of conflict Resolution, ranging from the Family level (Wari Ogbo), the compound level (Polo- Ogbo), Town square (Ama- Ogbo), Sekobiri (Community level) and the involvement of the Ancestors and the Deities, such as the Sekiapu, Water- goddess and spiritual invocations.

Keywords: Terrorism, Insurgency, Terror-attacks, Fatality

Introduction

The works of scholars and human experiences show that peace is inevitable for human existence and interaction; yet, conflicts especially violent ones come up from time to time destroying peace needed for meaningful development. African societies before slave trade era and colonialism had well- established mechanism for peace education, peacebuilding, conflict management, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Some institutions and procedures were set out by Africans because they placed great emphasis on the peaceful resolution of disputes which was always aimed at resolving social harmony while at the same time upholding the principle of fairness, equity and justice as engraved in their customs and traditions.

Before the arrival of colonial forces and the amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates in 1914, Social Conflicts were Monitored, Prevented, Managed and Resolved through established institutions such as traditional rulers, councils of elders, age sects, chiefs, ancestral cults, religious beliefs and others. It needs to be emphasized that before the coming of the slave traders and colonial masters to Nigeria, Communities had their peculiar methods of monitoring, preventing, managing and resolving conflict. They also had their peculiar ways and manners of effecting peace-making, peace-building and confidence building. However, conflict is perceived in most parts of the world including Nigeria, as something abnormal, dysfunctional and therefore detestable. Yet, conflict is a fact of life and could be a precursor of position changes (Timothy, 2019).

Every plural society is bound to experience one form of conflict or the other. What makes a society an ideal polity is the extent to which the conflicting interests and needs in a society are constructively managed and resolved, so that violence does not threaten its continued existence. Conflict changes the rational man to think of alternative ways of meeting human needs and interests. What is to be emphasized, therefore, is not conflict *per se* but the ways man responds to it. If constructively handled, it can become an agent of growth and development for all parties. To this extent, conflict should not be demonized but confronted

with efficient procedures for cooperative problem-solving. Therefore, this study discusses the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of traditional mechanisms in conflict resolution in Kalabari Kingdom and makes a strong case for the adoption, support and promotion of these African ways and means in the pursuit of enduring peace which is a *sine qua non* for stability and meaningful development (David, 2018).

Conceptual Analysis

Principle

This is a Fundamental Truth or proposal that serves as the foundation of a system of belief of behaviour or for a chain of reasoning. It is also a general basic truth on which other truths or theories can be based on scientific principles, thus, a rule of conduct based on beliefs of what is right or wrong. The fundamental principles include balance, contrast, dominance, hierarchy, proportion and unity. The Importance of Principles is the chief guide to making teaching and learning intelligent and productive. They are also important for the governing of actions and the operation of techniques in any field of Education.

Traditional Methods

These are the Indigenous Methods that have existed for a long time without changing. According to Adebayo (1997), a society which neglects the instructive value of the past for its present and future, cannot be self-confident and self-reliant and will therefore lack internally generated dynamism and stability. In the same vein the Cable Network News (CNN) in March 2006, through its advertisement programmed, repeatedly beamed the assertion that, “the future of Africa lies in her past”. Also, when the then Deputy President of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki visited Nigeria, he lamented the conflict situation in Africa and pleaded that, Africa should adopt new ways of conflict Resolution which will be more effective and efficient than what is now operated as inherited from the European Colonial Masters. Zartman (2020) posits that, Pre-Colonial African Societies are reputed to hold secrets of Peace-making and Conflict Resolution embedded in their Customs and Traditions before the disruptive activities brought about by Colonization. To buttress this point, Amiara and Nwokike (2018), viewed it as the

Principle of Ubuntu, a concept that demonstrates the fact that Africans had, over the years, developed and tested varied methods of Conflict Resolution.

The Traditional or Indigenous Methods was anchored on the Dramatization of the issues involved in conflicts. The performance level of Conflict Resolution in African Societies enabled participants in the ensuing drama to further understand and appreciate the customs and norms bequeathed to them by their ancestors. In the process of the Traditional Methods, certain rules were observed by all participants in the drama of Conflict Resolution. The rules were tailored equitable distribution of justice and the maintenance of law and order, the disputants must also have confidence in the tribunal that will resolve the dispute, which include the Elders, Chiefs, Priests, priestess and secret- cult. The disputants must be ready to submit themselves to the constituted authorities.

Conflict

Conflict is an integral part and aspect of Human life unavoidable as far as interactions exist, thus Conflict is an inevitable aspect of existence and its occurrence is found in almost every nook and cranny of the world. Conflict is dynamic, and so also are ways by which Human beings tackle conflict. Because of Micheal and Ikiabo (2022) Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction and the concomitant of choices and decisions. Similarly, according to Iroye and Ajeh (2020), Conflict refers to a Universal phenomenon existing in all Human Societies resulting from their interactions and relationships, which may be positive or negative. The result of Conflict is based on the resultant effect of peoples varied emotions, desires, ideologies, goals and also modes of achieving their innate desires and interests. (Ibebunjo & Iroye 2018) . Lamorde and Ibebunjo (2022) perceive Conflict as the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving these goals. To buttress this point, Putra (2023) states that, Conflict occurs” when two or more people engage in a struggle over values and claims to status, power and resources in which opponents aims are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals”.

According to some authors, a conflict situation arises when two or more parties are unable to come to a consensus on a matter. Governments or nation-states may not always be involved in such conflicts as parties. Every party participating aims to gain certain goals in an incompatible stage between nation-states, including greater or more secure territory, security, access to markets, prestige, alliances, and the toppling of an enemy government (Ajayi, 2014). But Anyanwu (2017) positively look at the concept of Conflict as a natural phenomenon which challenges Individuals or Groups in a Community to strive to Manage their Disagreements, Differences, Goals and Interest by transforming their communities into fairer and more just place to live. Drawing from Adeyemi (2022), Conflicts are Etymological and may be classified as either “Actor-Oriented” or System Oriented”. Adeyemi perceives Conflict as an Actor or System where one may be motivated to embrace Conflict as an essential part of Human Interaction, or a problem which needs to be addressed or resolved. He added that, due to the destructive effects of wars and other forms of violent Conflict on Political order, it is viewed as a dangerous idea.

While human nature may have made Conflict an inevitable phenomenon in every society, which is mainly caused by the Competitive, aggressive, and survival instincts inherent in man, there is the need that Conflict must be resolved. (Umezurike, 2016). Afzalur (2011) regards Conflict as a disagreement that occurs between Individuals (personal Conflict), and between Groups (Group Conflict). Group interaction is first disrupted by an initial Conflict within the Group, often caused by internal differences of opinion, disagreements between its members, and scarcity of resources available to the Group. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, (2008) sees Conflict as the contradictions inherent in power relations which manifest themselves in Individual and Group interactions with one another and with nature in the pursuit of limited resources or opportunities.

Ekakitie (2009) Provides insight into stages and trends of Conflict, first and foremost, is the Latent Stage which produces signs signifying that Conflict exist between the Individuals and the Groups exist, next is the perceived Stage here, Individuals and Groups are now aware

that Conflict exists and their behavioural patterns reflects it. This stage is followed by the Felt Stage, where the Conflict has become real. The manifest Stage is also referred to as the Explosive Stage, which is confrontational and open aggression from the Conflicting Parties. Finally, the Aftermath Stage comes with the Conflict being resolved the kind of relationship that will be produced among the Disputants and the lessons to be learnt.

Conflict is a common occurrence in both personal and professional lives. It can be divided into various categories, such as interpersonal conflict, intrapersonal conflict, intra-group conflict, and inter-group conflict (Ajayi & Abdulraheem, 2022). Interpersonal Conflict is a Conflict between two or more Individuals, it is the most popular and recognized and causes that lead to the Conflict are Personality Differences, Perceptions (Experiences, Education, and Backgrounds), clashes of Values and Interests, Power and Status Differences, Lack of Information, Role in Compatibility, Stress and Scarce Resources (Whetten & Cameron 2012).

Intragroup is a type of Conflict within a particular Group, it happens when a person in a Group works to achieve a different goal than the other group. In this situation, there are several factions within this group like Political Parties fighting among themselves. Intergroup Conflict occurs between different groups, each seeking to accomplish their Objectives due to several fundamental differences between various units of the Group. Intergroup Conflict may occur due to the absence of Mutual Decision Making, Rivalries in Resources, differences in Goals or Perceptions, Misunderstanding, Competition and a set of Boundaries by Members to others which establish their Identities. Ofili (2016) posit that, these mutually exclusive group due to the mode of their social bond usually exhibits the “we” attitudes towards members of their mutual group while exhibiting the “they” attitude to the other members of the out-group.

Conflict Resolution

Conflict Resolution is a way for two or more parties to find a peaceful solution to a disagreement among them. The disagreement may be personal, financial, political or emotional. When a dispute arises, often the best course of action is negotiation to resolve the disagreement. Conflict Resolution can also be defined as any process used to manage,

determine or settle differences that may arise among individuals, families, groups, organizations, communities, nations, or any other social unit. The goal of Conflict Resolution is not to debate which person is right or wrong the goal is to reach a solution that everyone can live with, looking first for needs, rather than solutions, is a powerful tool for generating Win/Win options. Conflict can be resolved in a variety of ways including Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration.

Drawing from Iroye and Ajeh (2020) Conflict Resolution is a process by which disagreement or contentions between parties are amicably resolved either by themselves or an external body or personal.

Mayer (2012) asserts Conflict Resolution as a process by which people who are in disagreement, dispute or war reach an agreement to solve their differences. It involves approaches that depend on the kind of Social and Cultural context it occurs. Aiyede (2012) posited that Conflict Resolution conceptualized conflict to be a short-term phenomenon that could be a short resolved permanently through mediation and other intervention processes. Family conflicts like husband-and-wife marital crises were often resolved through mediation between the parents and the couples. The parents constituted the third parties during the intervention process to resolve the ensuing divergence of needs and interests of the conflicting parties. Interfamily feuds too were mediated upon by the family heads.

Francis (2020) sees Conflict Resolution as being different from the general category of Conflict Resolution which includes efforts and interventions to limit, contain, or regulate conflict. According to Paffenholz,(2009). Conflict Resolution is a process of solving the underlying causes of Conflict and rebuilding destroyed relationships between the parties. Conflict Resolution could be described as measures attempting to resolve the underlying incompatibilities of a conflict, including attempts to get the parties to mutually accept each other's existence (Peter, 2002). Furthermore, it helps parties develop common norms, rules and regulations on utterances, attitudes, actions and aspirations to allow peace to reign, rather than for violence to reign (Akpuru-Aja, 2021).

Brief History of Kalabari Kingdom

The Kalabari Kingdom are subgroup of the Ijaw people living in the Eastern Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. The Kalabari People are originally known as Awome, who came from the lineage of a man called Mein Owei. Kalabari Kingdom became a large Kingdom that had about thirty-five (35) settlers including the three (3) major towns, Bakana, Abonnema and Buguma and others, which is ruled and controlled by King Amachree XI, Prof. Theophilus Princewill CFR (who just passed on and will be laid to mother earth on 29th November, 2023. Before the coming of the Colonial Masters, Kalabari People were predominantly Fishermen.

The Major Sources of Conflict in Kalabari Kingdom.

The major sources of conflict in the Kalabari Kingdom include; Land, Chieftaincy, Personal Relationship Issues, Family Property and so many other factors. Kalabari Kingdom has a coastal region is surrounded by a large volume of water, which is endowed with lots of Mineral Resources especially Petroleum Products thus, the small piece of Land in the region becomes essential community which triggers Families, Groups and Inter-Communal crises. Power over Mineral Resource control, installations of Internet service providers (MTN, Airtel, Glo, Etisalat) in Family Land, the betrayal of Youths by the Elders because of proceeds from Multinational Oil Companies (MNOC) is now a major source of Conflict in the Kalabari Kingdom.

Kalabari Kingdom System of Conflict Resolution

The Kalabari People had various unique ways of settling Conflict, some of these methods used during the Pre-colonial era are still in existence, while some have been modified due to civilization and the uprising of Christianity welcome made some of the methods to fade away. The mode of settling Conflict differs and varies according to the degree and level of Conflict.

When Conflict arises within the Family level, for instance between husband and wife, father and son or mother and daughter, this Conflict can easily be resolved amicably, by the elder(s) of the family, by the Chief of the war canoe family or by the Family Chief, popularly known as the Wari-Dabo. For the same age-grade, when dispute arises, they most times settle

their dispute themselves, except a major dispute that cannot be handled by the age group, then it would be resolved by the chiefs of various Compounds. Also, when there are Conflict between the Women, the Women are mandated to settle their differences at the Wariku (the main palour of the house). Apart from this mode of settlement, there are settlement done at the Polo-Ogbo (Compound Arena), the Ama-Ogbo (Town Square) and Sekiapu (Cult Group).

The Polo-Ogbo (Compound) Settlement, ensures that each compound has a house which is referred to as “Inkpu”, where people convene for various important activities such as the “Iya” Ceremonies (highest marriage in Kalabari), Chieftaincy Installations and also the settlement of dispute. In the case of witchcraft, the accused will be given a dry gin and a little sand from the Inkpu to drink and a date will be given to the accuse, and if nothing happens to the accuse, the accuse will then summon the petitioner, who will now beat drum round the Town as a Town-crier saying, the accused is not a witch, this process of proving the innocence of the accused is known as “Erokpokpogola”.

The Ama-Ogbo (Town Square), has a house known as Ama-wari (Town Hall), just like the Polo -Ogbo, the Ama-Ogbo is a place where so many activities occurs, such as chieftaincy Installation, a meeting place for Chiefs, a place where marriages are conducted mainly the “Iya” (the highest marriage celebration). Note, that, when settlement is not properly conducted at the Polo-Ogbo, the accused person can refer the matter, in the form of appeal to the Ama-Ogbo. Most of the settlement done at the Ama-wari (Town hall) is usually conducted by the King who is referred to as the Amayanabo. Also, before a case is settled at the Ama-Ogbo, both the petitioner and the accused are to pay certain amount of money, and after the settlement, the winner will be refunded with its money and white chalk known as “Toru’ will be used to mark on the forehead of the Winner signifying Victory, whereas the loser money will be non-refundable. But presently, both the petitioner and the accused will give Twenty Thousand Naira (#20,000) each, non- refundable.

The settlement was done by the Sekiapu Group, which is an Ancestral Group, that believes in deities sand the Ancestors, before they proceed on any matter, they must first of

all libate, thus invoking the spirit of the Ancestors to be present in all their activities, thus , when cases like witchcraft or thief occur, the Sekiapu Group will send two (2) or three (3) delegates to accompany the Disputants who will also bring one (1) or two (2) family members, and they will all proceed to Aruchukwu in Igbo land for the Ancestors to pass judgment. On arrival from Arochukwu, the innocent person will now sing songs of freedom, victory, and celebration around the Town.

But the Judgment of the Spiritual deity of the Chukwu at times is questionable, especially when it involves beautiful women, because, if a person is not innocent, the victim will not be allowed to leave the place, which signifies that Chukwu has killed the person and they will spit blood to indicate that, the person is dead, an incidence occurred in Buguma a city in Kalabari Kingdom, where a pretty woman was not released and was told that, the gods has taken her, when some people came for settlement again, they saw her ,which signifies that, they just use fake blood to deceive the people that Chukwu has taken the woman. On seeing the people, the woman recognized them and asked them to inform her family that she was in Aru “Adim Aru”.

Punishment will be given the to guilty, while the winner of the case will be decorated with white chalk and paraded around the town for his/ her victory. Major cases were taken to Sekobiri (Community level) where the three main towns of Kalabari Kingdom with their Chiefs will be involved in the settlement of the dispute. Apart from these methods of dispute settlement, other modes are also used such as invocations of spirit, involving the ancestors and deities, water spirit or goddess, and the involvement of the sekiapu (cult group) for cases where an iron hand is needed like theft or witchcraft. Recently, most of these unusual powers have failed many people in their judgment (Timothy, 2019).

Theoretical Framework

Conflict Transformative Theory

Conflict Transformative Theory as espoused by the works of John Lederach in 1997, put emphasis not only on the end of direct violence, but rather a constant orientation of positive

and the end of structural (for instance, Inequality, Social Exclusion and Exploitation) and Cultural forms of violence (for example, perceived realistic and symbolic threats).

The Transformative Theory, addresses the reactions of Individuals, Groups, Cultures, Institutions and Societies to change (Collier 2003). This also sees Conflict as created by who is involved in a relationship, but once it occurs, conflict transforms the events, the people and the relationship that created the initial conflict. Conflict Transformative Theory also, pushes the development of change processes which explicitly focus on creating positive from the difficult or negative. It encourages greater understanding of underlying relational and structural patterns while building creative solutions that improve relationships. It also refers to the process of moving from conflict-habituated systems to peace system, this process is distinguished from the more common term of conflict resolution, because of its focus on system change.

Importance of Conflict Resolution in Kalabari Kingdom.

Conflict Resolution promotes consensus-building, social bridge reconstructions, and the re-enactment of order in society, Conflict hardly breaks up societies, it takes into account the cultural and social context. It looks at the history of preceding events which have led to the Conflict, and while concentrating on the Conflict itself and the process of solving it, it takes possible implications for the future seriously. Conflict Resolution also provides an opportunity to interact with the Parties concerned, with the hope of at least reducing the scope, intensity and effect of Conflicts, and finally, it performs healing function in the societies by stimulating and encouraging Peace and Unity.

Conclusion

The traditional method of conflict resolution as discussed in this study is an indigenous method which has been in existence since the pre-colonial period. It was inducted in the customs and laws of the land. It involves the appropriate principle of decision-making in conflict resolution, it is not to widen the gap between the conflicting parties in the sense that its utmost interest is for them to remain friends even after the settlement of disputes. Kalabari kingdom sure has a

unique way of settling Conflict, right from the pre- colonial period to this present Era, their mode of settling Conflict is generational and is passed on from one generation to another.

Recommendations

- i. In Kalabari Kingdom, emphasis should be placed on Traditional Dispute / Conflict Resolution as the first option in resolving disputes. Parties in certain personal relations such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and related matters should first opt to Traditional Dispute Resolution before approaching the formal legal system.
- ii. There is a need for a framework for appealing the decision of elders in the Traditional Dispute Resolution mechanisms. For instance, among the Kalabaris, the hierarchy of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms begins at the household level, then goes to the extended family level, Compound level, Town square level and Community level.
- iii. There is a need to develop an enforcement mechanism for Traditional Dispute / Conflict Resolution mechanisms by elders in our educational sector.
- iv. Need for codification of key Concepts, Practices and Norms of Traditional Dispute Conflict Resolution to protect them. Further such codification increases uniformity and consistency of application of traditional dispute/conflict resolution mechanisms by elders.

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UNRAVELLING THE TENSIONS, CONFLICTS AND IMPACT OF BEHAVIOURAL TARGETING STRATEGIES WITHIN ADVERTISING SECTOR

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ABSTRACT

The present study aims to examine the effects of behavioural targeting strategies on advertising within the context of digital entrepreneurship in Nigeria. More specifically, this research seeks to unravel the tensions, conflicts and overall impact of Behavioural Targeting (BT) strategies on digital advertising practices in the Nigerian market. The study employed a quantitative approach, sampling 449 internet users in Nigeria, and utilizes Structural Equation Modelling for data analysis. Findings reveal that the perception of BT significantly affects digital entrepreneurship, with a positive correlation between user perception and the growth of digital-based businesses. Furthermore, the study established that user perception mediated the relationship between BT strategies (Ads Intrusiveness, Ads Based on Users' Interest, and Ads Based on Browsing History) and digital entrepreneurship. Privacy concerns related to intrusiveness negatively impact user perception, while ads tailored to users' needs and interests, as well as those based on browsing behaviour, contribute positively to the growth of digital entrepreneurship. The study emphasizes the critical role of user perception in shaping the impact of BT on digital entrepreneurship in Nigeria. Recommendations include avoiding excessively intrusive tactics, aligning with real-time customer needs, and prioritizing the cultivation of positive customer perceptions for sustained digital business growth.

Keyword: Intrusive Tensions, Perception, Online Advertising, Digital Entrepreneurship

Introduction

The contemporary global business landscape has undergone a profound transformation driven by digital technology, with digital entrepreneurship at the forefront of this paradigm shift (Oladele et al., 2022). The internet's pervasive influence, as a powerful vehicle for global resource and information exchange, has not only enabled businesses but also catalyzed innovation and disruption. The exponential growth of the global e-commerce industry is a testament to the internet's impact, reflecting a shift from traditional practices to the era of digital entrepreneurship. Digital entrepreneurship, as defined by Muafi et al. (2021), encompasses businesses integrating digital transformation into their processes, whether they are entirely digital startups or traditional firms adapting to the digital age.

In this digital landscape, online advertising plays a crucial role, with global statistics indicating a substantial surge in digital advertising investments. Real-time, tailored digital ads have become the norm, prompting digital entrepreneurs to increasingly adopt Behavioral Targeting (BT) strategies. BT involves customizing ad content based on users' online behavior, such as browsing history and interests, providing insights into target market preferences. While enhancing advertising effectiveness, BT raises concerns about privacy infringement and intrusiveness (Alnahdi et al., 2014; Oladele et al., 2022)..

In the context of emerging economies like Nigeria, where digital entrepreneurship is gaining traction, understanding the dynamics of online advertising, particularly how BT strategies shape user perception, is crucial. This research aims to fill these gaps by exploring how BT strategies impact user perception and, consequently, influence the competitiveness, customer experience, and patronage of digital-based businesses in Nigeria. This study seeks to contribute valuable insights into the role of online advertising strategies in shaping user perceptions and influencing business outcomes within the Nigerian business landscape. By addressing these aspects, the research aims to enhance the understanding of digital

entrepreneurship in Nigeria and provide a foundation for developing effective online advertising strategies tailored to the dynamics of emerging economies.

Literature review

Digital entrepreneurship

In the contemporary business landscape, the focal point has shifted to digital entrepreneurship, driven by the rapid evolution of transformative digital technologies like social media, mobile services, the internet of things, cloud computing, big data, and robotics (Elia et al., 2020; Soluk et al., 2021; Zhao & Collier, 2016). This technological trajectory has brought about disruptions across various business facets, ushering in redefined models, strategies, and operations, consequently altering the competitive environment.

Despite the centrality of digital entrepreneurship, defining it precisely remains a challenge, leading to scholarly debates on its nature and scope (Zhao & Collier, 2016). Broadly, digital entrepreneurship is viewed as the process of creating innovative internet-based solutions in the form of products or services. It encompasses both emerging firms introducing digital products/services and established businesses transforming their traditional models through digital technology. Scholars like Davidson and Vaast (2010) described it as the conversion of physical or traditional models into digital processes, while Zhao and Collier (2016) emphasized the creation or transformation of businesses through novel digital-based technology.

Behavioural Targeting Strategies

Behavioral Targeting (BT), a concept not yet 30 years old, is a practice in online advertising that tailor Ads based on information about the interests of web users. Also known as online profiling or online behavioral targeted advertising (OBA), BT involves directing online advertisements specifically to individuals who are more likely to be interested in particular products and services. This is achieved through the collection of clickstream data, data warehousing, and the application of data mining algorithms to uncover consumer browsing patterns (Dwyer, 2011). Three key BT strategies are highlighted.

Ads Intrusiveness involves collecting user data, including browsing habits, through tracking cookies. Privacy concerns have surfaced since the early 2000s, leading to self-policing agreements and debates about data privacy in the wake of large-scale mergers. Privacy issues negatively impact consumer trust and buying behavior, potentially leading to regulatory interventions (Carrascosa et al., 2015; Dwyer, 2011; Li & Huang, 2016). Ads Based on Users' Interest relies on tracking user interests through third-party cookies, allowing digital entrepreneurs to predict products that may interest users. While enhancing ad effectiveness, this strategy raises privacy concerns and ethical considerations regarding personal data use (H. Li & Nill, 2020; Solomon et al., 2019; Vipin & Faizal, 2021).

Perception and Behavioural Targeting

Perception, a crucial aspect in understanding user attitudes, is described by various scholars as a mental phenomenon that involves interpreting and organizing sensations to produce meaningful experiences about a product or organization. Scholars like Pickens (2005) and Kalra et al (2016) emphasize the role of perception in shaping attitudes towards a phenomenon. Fish (2010) views perception as the acquisition of beliefs, indicating its significance in influencing user behavior. The success of BT strategies, as noted by Alnahdi et al. (2014), is contingent on the perceptions of internet users. This underscores the importance of understanding how users perceive and interact with BT strategies for their effectiveness. Pickens (2005) identifies four stages in the perception process: stimulation, registration, organization, and interpretation, emphasizing the complexity of the mental process involved in forming perceptions.

Ebrahim (2013) highlights that customer hold perceptions about elements like price, appearance, and attributes, and these perceptions play a crucial role in shaping their attitudes toward the object, such as Behavioral Targeting (BT) in this context. The customer's choice or preference is influenced, in part, by the value placed on these elements. Overall, understanding and managing perceptions become pivotal for the success of strategies like BT, as they directly impact how users engage with and respond to the digital landscape.

Theoretical Review

The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) are pivotal frameworks for understanding and predicting human behavior, especially in the context of technology adoption and online activities. In the context of the study on digital entrepreneurship and behavioral targeting, these theories provide valuable insights.

TPB, proposed by (Ajzen, 1991), focuses on the factors influencing individuals' intentions and subsequent behaviors. It posits that attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control collectively shape an individual's intention to perform a behavior. In the study, TPB can be applied to comprehend how digital entrepreneurs can influence users' intentions to engage with online advertisements. By emphasizing positive attitudes, shaping subjective norms, and ensuring users perceive control over their online activities, digital entrepreneurs can enhance users' intentions and behaviors beneficial for digital entrepreneurship.

On the other hand, TAM, initially introduced by Davis (1989) and subsequently expanded by researchers like Safari and Yu (2014), delves into users' acceptance of technology. Key factors include perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use. In the study context, TAM becomes relevant in understanding users' acceptance of behavioral targeting technologies in online advertising. Digital entrepreneurs aiming to employ behavioral targeting can leverage TAM principles by ensuring users perceive the usefulness and ease of interacting with tailored ads, thereby fostering acceptance and engagement.

By aligning advertising strategies with users' attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived control (TPB), while concurrently addressing users' perceptions of usefulness and ease of use (TAM), digital entrepreneurs can enhance the effectiveness of behavioral targeting, promoting user engagement and fostering the growth of digital businesses. The interplay between these psychological and technological factors becomes crucial in shaping users' perceptions and behaviors in the dynamic landscape of digital entrepreneurship.

Conceptual Model and Hypotheses

Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among the variables in the study. For this study, two major hypotheses were postulated:

- H1: Perception of behavioural targeting does not significantly affect digital entrepreneurship.*
- H2i: Perception of internet users does not mediate the interaction between Ads based on user interest and digital entrepreneurship.*
- H2ii: Perception of internet users does not mediate the interaction between Ads based on browsing history and digital entrepreneurship.*
- H2iii: Perception of internet users does not mediate the interaction between Ads intrusiveness and digital entrepreneurship.*




Figure 1: Conceptual model

Source: Authors' Construct, 2023.

Empirical studies

Studies conducted outside Nigeria have extensively examined various facets of online advertising, with a specific focus on BT. Ozcelik and Varnali (2019) delved into the effectiveness of customized ads, emphasizing the impact of promotional-focused content and heightened security concerns. Fachryto and Achyar (2018) concentrated on retargeted ads in Indonesia, revealing the perceived intrusiveness and subsequent negative attitudes among users. Li and Huang (2016) contributed insights into BT avoidance, linking goal impediment and privacy concerns to the avoidance behaviour. Chen and Stallaert (2014) explored the economic implications of online publishers engaging in BT, while Kumar and Patel (2014) assessed the effectiveness of online behavioural advertising in different stages of buyer behaviour. Breznitz and Palermo (2013) empirically examined the gains of firms using BT, highlighting its cost reduction effectiveness but acknowledging the superior revenue generation of traditional online advertising.

Shifting focus to studies within Nigeria, Udenze and Aduba (2020) scrutinized online advertising approaches on social media platforms, revealing modest utilization by Nigerian businesses. Solomon et al. (2019) explored awareness and usage of online advertising channels among small businesses, indicating a lower awareness level than claimed by respondents. Ikechukwu et al. (2017) investigated the influence of online marketing, communication, and on-time delivery on the regularity of visits and patronage of online stores, emphasizing their significance. Okon et al. (2016) examined determinants of effective online advertisements in Nigeria, highlighting critical factors such as internet surfing skills and advert content.

Methods

The study adopted a quantitative research methodology. The population of interest was the 92.3 million internet users in Nigeria. The study sampled 449 internet users in Nigeria using non-probability sampling techniques, specifically purposive sampling were adopted due to the substantial population size. The study focused on two main variables: digital entrepreneurship

(dependent) and behavioral targeting strategies (independent). Digital entrepreneurship was measured through the competitiveness of digital-based businesses, patronage, and the ability to provide a unique customer experience, while the mediating variable, perception of BT, gauged internet users' positive or negative perceptions of BT. The independent variables, ads intrusiveness, ads based on users' interest, and ads based on users' earlier browsing usage, were measured using items adapted from existing literature. The research employed a structured online questionnaire as its primary instrument. The link to the online survey underwent a pilot study to ensure accessibility and was then distributed across various social media platforms for two weeks to maximize respondent participation.

Validity was ensured through both theoretical approaches (face and content validity) and statistical reliability, utilizing internal consistency tests such as inter-item correlation and Cronbach's Alpha with a benchmark of 70% reliability. Data analysis involved descriptive statistics for demographic information and Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) for hypothesis testing. The analysis included assessing the measurement model for construct, discriminant, and convergent validity, as well as internal consistency. The structural model was assessed for fit, overall model fit, and predictive relevance.

Results and Discussions

Demographic characteristics

The table provides a demographic overview of a sample population of 449 individuals across various categories. In terms of gender, 61.7% are male, and 38.3% are female. Age distribution shows a concentration in the 18-25 years bracket (42.1%) and 26-33 years bracket (36.5%). Academic qualifications reveal a diverse group, with 53.2% being undergraduates, 21.2% postgraduates, and 14.1% having SSCE qualifications. Occupational diversity is apparent, with private firm workers constituting 28.7%, followed by students at 29.6%, and entrepreneurs at 18.3%. Civil servants make up 13.8%, and unemployed individuals are at 2.5%.

Table 1: Demographic data

Measure	Data	Frequency	%
Gender	Male	277	61.7
	Female	172	38.3
Age bracket	Less than 18years	4	0.9
	18-25years	189	42.1
	26-33years	164	36.5
	34-41years	60	13.4
	42-49years	28	6.2
	50years and above	4	0.9
Academic Qualification	SSCE	63	14.1
	Diploma (ND)	52	11.5
	Undergraduate	239	53.2
	Postgraduate	95	21.2
Occupation	Private firm workers	129	28.7
	Civil servants	62	13.8
	Unemployed	11	2.5
	Entrepreneurs	82	18.3
	Clergy	3	0.6
	Youth Corps Members	13	2.9
	Military	4	0.9
	Lecturer	3	0.6
	Student	133	29.6
	Consultants	9	2.1
n= 449			

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Assessment of Measurement Model

The measurement model underwent a thorough evaluation encompassing various dimensions: construct validity, convergent validity, discriminant validity, internal consistency reliability, and multicollinearity. Standardized factor loadings were generally above the .70 threshold, except for item AD2, which was retained for content validity. Internal consistency reliability, assessed through composite reliability (CR) and Rho_A coefficients, met recommended thresholds, indicating reliability. Convergent validity, as measured by Average Variance

Extracted (AVE), exceeded the .50 threshold for all constructs, confirming that each construct explained at least 50% of its items' variance. Multicollinearity, assessed via Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), raised no concerns, with all variables exhibiting VIF values below 5. These findings collectively affirm the reliability, validity, and absence of multicollinearity in the measurement model, underscoring the robustness of the instruments used and enhancing the credibility of the study's outcomes (Garson, 2016; Hair et al., 2018; Jain, 2019).

Table 2: Descriptive statistics, construct validity, convergent validity, and reliability

Constructs	Items Code	SFLs	VIF	Cronbach's alpha	Rho A	CR	AVE
Digital entrepreneurship	DE1	≥ .70 0.882*	< 5 1.618	≥ .70 0.821	≥ .70 0.764	≥ .70 0.70	≥ .50 0.746
	DE2	0.915*	1.249				
	DE3	0.876*	1.240				
	DE4	0.907*	1.610				
	DE5	0.888*	1.547				
Ads intrusiveness	AD1	0.836*	1.294	0.710	0.733	0.796	0.525
	AD2	0.542*	1.443				
	AD3	0.854*	1.218				
	AD4	0.774*	1.211				
	AD5	0.799*	1.432				
Ads based on interest	Int1	0.861*	1.403	0.722	0.70	0.701	0.511
	Int2	0.890*	1.402				
	Int3	0.753*	1.001				
	Int4	0.856*	1.192				
	Int5	0.782*	1.122				
Ads based on browsing history	ADBHi	0.758*	1.027	0.765	0.711	0.776	0.621
	ADBHii	0.745*	1.027				

		ADBHii	0.745*	1.003				
		ADBHiv	0.789*	1.323				
		ADBHv	0.867*	1.032				
Perception of behavioural targeting	P1		0.856*	1.965	0.830	0.831	0.898	0.746
	P2		0.861*	2.047				
	P3		0.874*	1.757				
	P4		0.876*	1.443				
	P5		0.768*	1.435				

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) criterion

The next step in assessing the measurement model was to test for discriminant validity. Henseler et al. (2015) recommended the heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratio of correlations to assess discriminant validity through the multitrait-multimethod matrix. The results, presented in Table 3, revealed that none of the HTMT values exceeded the threshold of 0.85, reinforcing the conclusion of adequate discriminant validity for the studied constructs.

Table 3: Heterotrait-monotrait ratio

Variables	1	2	3	4	5
Interest					
Intrusiveness	0.190				
Browsing history	0.367	0.306			
Digital entrepreneurship	0.738	0.366	0.246		
Perception of BT	0.534	0.427	0.665	0.705	

Note: Shaded boxes are the standard reporting format for the HTMT procedure

Source: SmartPLS 3output (Field survey, 2020)

Assessment of Structural Model

The structural model for the study was assessed for model fit and predictive relevance as recommended in Hair et al (2019).

Model fit and predictive relevance

The model fit evaluation utilized various metrics, revealing mixed results. While some measures like NFI and Rms_theta fell short, scholars caution against relying heavily on specific values due to the evolving nature of these metrics. Other indicators related to goodness of fit and predictive relevance met the criteria. The R2 values indicated that the model accounts for 31.4% and 41.6% of the variation in the perception of behavioral targeting and digital entrepreneurship, respectively. Stone-Geisser's Q2 values reflected medium and more than small predictive accuracy, strengthening the model's reliability.

Table 4: model fit and predictive relevance

Model fit	Value	Benchmark	Source
SRMR	0.076	< 0.08	Garson (2016)
NFI (Bentler-Bonett index)	0.702*	> .90	Benitez et al (2020)
Rms_theta	0.210*	< 0.12	(Ali et al., 2016)
R ² (Digital entrep.)	0.416	≥0.26	Cohen (1988)
(Perception of BT)	0.314		
Q ² (Digital entrep.)	0.166	>0, 0.25 and 0.50 depict	Hair et al (2019)
(Perception of BT)	0.231	small, medium, and large predictive accuracy respectively	
		HI ₉₅	
d _{ULS} (d _{ULS} <HI ₉₅)	0.183	0.218	Benitez et al., 2020
d _G (d _G <HI ₉₅)	0.158	0.168	Benitez et al., 2020

*did not meet the model fit conditions

Source: SmartPLS 3 output (Field survey (2022))

Structural Estimates




Figure 2: Path Coefficient

Source: SmartPLS Output, Field Survey (2022)

Table 5: Structural estimates

Structural estimates (Hypotheses testing)				Decision
Direct Path	β	t	f ²	
H1: BTPercept → Digital Entrep.	0.474	9.370*	0.264	Supported
Indirect Effects				
H2i: ADsInterest -> BTPercept -> Digital Entrep.	0.114	4.562*		Supported
H2ii: Browsing History->BTPercept->Digital Entrep.	0.133	4.650*		Supported
H2iii: Ads Intrusiveness-> BTPercept->Digital Entrep.	-0.166	5.912*		Supported

Note: *1.96 (p<0.05)

Perception of behavioural targeting strategies and digital entrepreneurship

The structural estimates reveal a noteworthy and positive correlation between the perception of behavioural targeting strategies and the advancement of digital entrepreneurship ($\beta=0.474$; $t=9.370$; $f^2=0.264$; $p<0.05$). In practical terms, a 1-unit augmentation in the perception of behavioural targeting strategies corresponds to a 0.474-unit growth in digital entrepreneurship. The effect size of 0.264 indicates a medium to strong effect. Consequently, the null hypothesis asserting that the perception of behavioural targeting does not significantly impact digital entrepreneurship was rejected. This aligns with Li and Huang's (2016) assertion that perception plays a crucial role in predicting behaviour, and, by extension, consumer behaviour predicts business growth. Supporting this, Kumar and Patel (2014) and Alnahdi et al. (2014) emphasized the influence of perception in shaping business growth through increased patronage.

Behavioural Targeting, Perception of Behavioural Targeting and Digital Entrepreneurship

The result shows that perception of behavioural targeting mediates the interaction between ads intrusiveness and digital entrepreneurship ($\beta = -0.166$; $t = 5.912$, $p < 0.05$). Perception of behavioural targeting also mediates the interaction between ads based on users' interest and digital entrepreneurship ($\beta = -0.114$, $t = 4.562$, $p < 0.05$). Finally, the interaction between Ads based on browsing history and digital entrepreneurship was mediated by perception of behavioural targeting ($\beta = 0.133$; $t = 4.650$, $p < 0.05$). By implication, the null hypothesis was rejected while the alternative hypothesis was supported. The findings align with the works of Fachryto and Achyar (2018) and Ikechukwu et al. (2017). Ikechukwu et al. (2017) similarly reported a mediation effect of perception in the interaction between behavioural targeting and increased patronage of online stores. Okon et al.'s (2016) survey of 200 internet customers revealed how the advert content shaped perception and improved patronage.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study delves into the relatively unexplored realm of BT in the context of digital entrepreneurship in Nigeria. It reveals that the use of BT has seen a significant increase in the

last decades, exposing many internet users to customized ads. The study emphasizes the crucial role of user perception in shaping the impact of BT on digital entrepreneurship. Privacy concerns emerge as a pivotal factor, with a direct correlation between heightened feelings of intrusion and a less positive perception of BT, consequently impacting digital entrepreneurship negatively. On the contrary, ads tailored to users' needs and interests, as well as those based on browsing behaviour, tend to alleviate privacy concerns and foster a more positive perception of BT, contributing to the growth of digital entrepreneurship.

The recommendations derived from the study highlight the importance of digital entrepreneurs controlling advertisement features to enhance value for consumers. Enforcing control and providing clear privacy policies are suggested strategies to alleviate consumer privacy concerns. Additionally, a focus on tailoring ads to users' needs and interests is advised to reduce tension related to privacy invasion. Targeting users' browsing history is recommended as a reminder strategy, ensuring users are exposed to specially targeted ads, positively influencing their perception, and contributing to digital business growth. Overall, advertising firms and digital entrepreneurs are urged to concentrate on building positive perceptions among internet users, avoiding excessively intrusive tactics and aligning with real-time customer needs and browsing behaviour. The study underscores that success in digital entrepreneurship lies in cultivating positive customer perceptions, emphasizing the need for entrepreneurs to prioritize shaping user perceptions rather than directly aiming for business growth.

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THE COVERT DEPOPULATION OF NIGERIA: THE FOREIGN CONNECTION

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ABSTRACT

The covert depopulation of Nigeria was being executed by reducing the male population through exposing them to armed insurrection under the guise of achieving religious, ethnic or political dominance. The depopulation agenda was first conceived by the innocuous Club of Rome before being championed by the United Nations and the United States. Nigeria was listed amongst the countries whose overpopulation was not only hurting the environment but also a threat to the security and interest of the United States. Using the qualitative approach and the descriptive narrative style, some sources and archival documents revealed spurious claim of global warming, climate change and the destructive effect of humans on the environment. Equally revealed was the deliberate creation of instability, wars, starvation and pestilence as the tool of choice to depopulate nations.

Keywords: Depopulation, Population Moderation, Global Warming, Climate Change

Introduction

The depopulation of Nigeria sounds like a myth, conspiracy theory or falsehood but it has become a necessity for foreign powers to determine the population increase or decrease. The external call for the depopulation of Nigeria has moved from the fringes of boardroom discussion to occupy the vantage places in the United Nations and her agencies. The gradual depopulation of some select countries is done to save the planet earth, from global warming and the activities of humans. At the world stage, it was initially called population moderation, population stabilization, degrowth, sustainable development, Agenda 2021, global warming and recently, climate change. In all these terms, the central objective is the depopulation of some select countries especially the Third World countries.

How did the hype about overpopulation, climate change, global warming and depopulation start? Obsessed by the population of the Third World countries, Aurelio Peccei

and Alexander King met at *Villa Farnesina* in Rome in 1965 to discuss collaboration on the depopulation to save the earth. They were later joined by Erich Jantsch and Hugo Thiemann to form an organization, called the Club of Rome (CoR) in 1968. The Club of Rome is an amorphous organization made up of select individuals who are not accountable to anyone but highly respected and influential in curbing the human population. Their reach and sphere of influence on depopulation can be understood by the US Government assessment of the Club; "...The Club of Rome, controlled by Europe's black nobility, is the primary promotion agency for the genocidal reduction of world population levels...(Wolfe, 1981).

The depopulation of humans and saving the earth became focal point of the CoR. After their first meeting in 1968, their manifesto and global objectives were published as a book called, *'The First Global Revolution'*; herein stated thus:

"...In searching for a new enemy to unite us, we came up with the idea that pollution, the threat of global warming, water shortages, famine and the like would fit the bill. In their totality and in their interactions these phenomena do constitute a common threat which demands the solidarity of all peoples. But in designating them as the enemy, we fall into the trap about which we have already warned, namely mistaking symptoms for causes. All these dangers are caused by human intervention and it is only through changed attitudes and behaviour that they can be overcome. The **real enemy, then, is humanity itself** (emphasis mine) (King & Schneider, 2011: p 145).

For the 'black nobility of Europe' called the CoR, humanity became their enemy and the need to eliminate this enemy became an obsession, hysteria, UN issue and a global necessity. From their manifesto, the CoR had no scientific proof about the harmful activities of humans but had to fabricate the fearmongering phenomenon about overpopulation and the apocalypse that could befall the planet earth as a result thereof. What started as the obsession of two Europeans (Aurelio Peccei and Alexander King) about the hazardous effect of the erroneous human overpopulation on planet earth, metamorphosed into a global phenomenon stretching from the US White House to occupy the central discourse of all members of the United Nations (UN).

It was in this sole global monopoly that the United States listed Nigeria as overpopulated and went further to demand that Nigeria reduces her population and fertility rate in order to reduce the carbon dioxide and the greenhouse emission to save the earth (Kissinger, 1980). The premises upon which Nigeria was labelled overpopulated was concerning because the CoR was not reliable in proving humans were the real enemy of the planet earth. In another development, the United States was of the position that the population of the Third World countries was hurting its overseas interest as well as her national security (Kissinger, 1980). It is this falsehood and its resultant actions by the United States and United Nation on population that necessitated this investigation. This paper will therefore examine the strategic importance of population, how Nigeria was earmarked for depopulation, relationship between overpopulation and US Interests. In addition, it will look at the relationship between instability and overpopulation, the means and method employed to depopulate Nigeria.

On the other hand, Nigeria being aware that population is a strong determinant of national power at the international arena and also aware that the premise upon which it was labelled 'overpopulated' were based on fabrication; refused to accept the US depopulation plan. In this logjam, the UN and the United States have covertly been depopulating Nigeria. This paper is out to prove the fabrication of overpopulation, depopulation plans and the execution of the covert depopulation.

Population is a Major Determinant of National Power

The determination of national power dynamics has been a topical issue for many scholars only to come up with different classifications and outcomes. Hans Morgenthau classified national power into permanent and temporary elements, while Kenneth Organski classified them as natural and social determinants (Paul, 2004). From their various classifications, the determinants of national power are not limited to geography, resources and population, but extended economic development, military power, political structures and national morale, just to mention a few (Zarghani, 2017). Most scholars point to population as a major determinant

of national power. It can therefore be said that the measure and determinant of the national power of any nation is mainly determined by the population size which will also reflect the military strength, the mobilization capability and the occupational power.

Without any doubt, population is the engine room that drives the socio-economic activities of any nation, its technological development as well as the source of military power of the state. With a large population, nation states are granted status in the international arena as population can be translated into enormous capabilities to produce international influence. The foregoing has testified to the inescapable imperative of population in the determination of the strength of a nation. Deductively, the pruning, reduction or extermination of any country's population is an act of war, a reduction in the power holdings of that country and the weakening of the country in terms of internal integrity, security and peace. It is this same population that the CoR has identified as the enemy of the planet earth which must be reduced or else the earth will be destroyed.

Theoretical Framework

This study is located in the Malthusian Theory of Population. The Malthusian Theory of Population was formulated by Thomas Robert Malthus in 1798. Malthus posited that populations tend to grow exponentially, while food production increases more slowly, linearly (Burger, 2019). In other words, populations grow in geometric progression while food production increases through arithmetic progression. In his postulation, he was worried that an unchecked population growth would eventually lead to an unsustainable food crisis situation where food supplies wouldn't be enough to sustain the population thereby resulting in famine, disease, and war (Ashraf & Galor, 2008). The Malthusian population Theory is therefore very significant in the discussions about relationship between population and resource availability. In order to stop the impending catastrophe, Malthus proposed two checks; the Positive Checks and Preventative Checks in order to bring the population down to a sustainable level. Explaining the checks; Malthus proposed that the Positive Check corrects the imbalance between food supply and population growth through increased death rates

caused by natural occurrences such as earthquakes, famine, floods and wars which reduces human population. Explaining Preventive checks, Malthus explained that these are voluntary measures taken to reduce population, such as celibacy, birth control, limiting family size and delayed marriage.

The Malthusian Theory is very relevant in this study in that population control and scarcity of resources form the focus of investigation. There is perceived overpopulation by the United Nations and United States about Nigeria, claiming that the burgeoning of Nigeria's population is unsustainable to the world resources. In line with the concept of Malthusian Theory, both the United States and the United Nations are warning Nigeria to reduce her population in order save the environment as well as the planet. This has been the position of the Club of Rome and the US Government. However, the crux of the matter is that the Malthusian Positive Check namely; earthquakes, famine, floods and wars could be induced deliberately to achieve increased death rates in countries adjudged to be overpopulated in a covert depopulation program. It has been proven that earthquakes, famine and floods which are natural occurrences can be artificial created through geo-engineering and weather modification:

The desirability to modify storms to support military objectives is the most aggressive and controversial type of weather-modification. The damage caused by storms is indeed horrendous. For instance, a tropical storm has an energy equal to 10,000 one-megaton hydrogen bombs (House et al., 2004).

This way, communities and human habitation can be destroyed. It is also possible to cause draught leading to dry river beds, long dry season which will lead to famine and deaths of animals, plants and humans (Brandon & Guy, 2023). Similarly, wars (communal, religious, insurgency, terrorism or gang warfare) can be instigated by humans through deliberate destabilization programs to reduce population (Wolfe, 1981)

Nigeria's High Fertility and Overpopulation Exacerbates Climate Change

There are open and implied stances by the United Nations and allied agencies as well as population agencies that accuse Nigeria of worsening the climate change phenomenon with

her high fertility rate and overpopulation. Even the Centre for Strategic and International Studies was emphatic about the rising fertility of Nigerian population. In its estimate, the rising fertility of Nigeria's northern states, is one of the highest fertility rates in the world which guarantees steady population increase.

This fertility rate and the steady rise of the population is responsible for climate-induced degradation, like water scarcity, inability to graze cattle on increasingly degraded land, including outbreaks of violence over farmland and grazing (Sciuba, 2021). From the estimate of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Nigeria is not only overpopulated, its high fertility rate is a source of concern to the protagonists of climate change. However, the apocalypse and blame game of overpopulation and climate change was rubbished by Dr. Les Woodcock cited by Morano, (2014), who debunked the human contribution to climate change, thus:

The theory of 'man-made climate change' is an unsubstantiated hypothesis' ... water is a much more powerful greenhouse gas and there it is 20 time more of it in our atmosphere ... whereas CO₂ is only 0.04% ... Carbon dioxide has been made out to be some kind of toxic gas, but the truth is it's the gas of life. We breath it out, plants breath it in. The green lobby has created a do-good industry and it becomes a way of life, like a religion (Morano, 2014 .p 6).

With the testimony of Morano, (2014) and the confession by CoR for having fabricated the human contributions to climate change; this line of investigation will be dropped while the depopulation discourse will be pursued.

Nigeria Targeted for Depopulation

The United States listed Nigeria as one of the countries that are overpopulated (Kissinger, 1980). This classification is concerning because, the United Nations will be putting pressure on Nigeria to depopulate in order to save the planet earth. It is concerning again because they feel that there are too many people emitting carbon dioxide from Nigeria and this carbon dioxide emitted by the "overpopulated" Nigeria is harming the planet earth and the environment, so they claim. The countries marked for depopulation by the United States:

Assistance for population moderation should give primary emphasis to the largest and fastest growing developing countries where there is special U.S. political and strategic interest. Those countries are: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia and Columbia. Together, they account for 47 % of the world's current population increase (Kissinger, 1980 p. 10).

What could population moderation mean? How can population of Nigeria be moderated? What are the different means of achieving population moderation? Till date, the United States has not repudiated this document nor denied Nigeria being a threat to its security and overseas' interest. The use of population *moderation* or *stabilization* is a euphemism for depopulation. It will be necessary to investigate what constitutes the US national and strategic interest. The NSSM 200 was clear about what these interests are:

Rapid population growth is not in itself a major factor in pressure on depletable resources (fossil fuels and other minerals), since demand for them depends more on levels of industrial output than on numbers of people. On the other hand, the world is increasingly dependent on mineral supplies from developing countries, and if rapid population frustrates their prospects for economic development and social progress, the resulting instability may undermine the conditions for expanded output and sustained flows of such resources (Kissinger, 1980 .p 5).

In addition, the extract mentioned the availability of instability should there be frustration in the free flow of these vital raw materials. There is no relationship between population and fossil fuel supply. Again, there is no relationship between instability and population increase? How increase in population will cause instability was never disclosed. But later in this paper, it will be unravelled. The point made in this document is that if the increase in population affects their supply of fossil fuel, they will create instability. This will be explained further in the paper.

Relationship between Overpopulation and US Interests. It is important at this juncture to explain the relationship between overpopulation (according to the USA) and the threat to US security and overseas' interests. As earlier posited; if the flow of fossil fuel and strategic minerals are disrupted; it will affect the economy of the United States. The NSSM 200 was equivocal about steady availability of strategic raw materials:

Whatever may be done to guard against interruptions of supply and to develop domestic alternatives, the U.S. economy will require large and increasing amounts of minerals from abroad, especially from less developed countries. That fact gives the U.S. enhanced interest in the political, economic, and social stability of the supplying countries. Wherever a lessening of population pressures through reduced birth rates can increase the prospects for such stability, population policy becomes relevant to resource supplies and to the economic interests of the United States (Kissinger, 1980.p 43).

The above quotation contains the nexus between overpopulation and the interruption of the free flow of essential raw materials to the United States from the Third World nations. However, US warned that the extraction and flow of these essentials must not be interrupted by the burgeoning of population. But if the burgeoning of population will affect the extraction and free flow of the essentials; the US advised its agencies that the lessening of the population of the affected area should apply. How would the United States 'lessen' the population of the exporting country? Why would the lessening of population be a condition to do business with exporting country?

Nigeria Accused of Undermining the United States' Interest in Africa

The NSSM 200 document documents the implication of the Third World countries' population on US interest and her security globally. Nigeria being part of the countries constituting threat to the United States through overpopulation is concerning. In addition, there was a clear warning of any country refusing to depopulate, or its burgeoning population affects the free flow of strategic raw materials will face forceful population reduction (Kissinger, 1980). It will be more concerning should the United States accuses Nigeria of undermining her interest.

We have received indications ... that the Nigerians have actually been opposing us all around Africa. Repeated below are pertinent portions of an Accra message based on sensitive sources about Nigerian efforts ...:
I am just informed by reliable Ghanaian friend that Nigerian foreign minister Joe Garba spent Monday-Tuesday, 26-27 April in Accra for secret visit with Ghana chairman Acheampong. Alleged visit coincident with Acheampong abrupt decision to cancel Secretary of State visit conveyed to Ambassador Black 1600 April 27 (US Embassy, 1976 .p 1).

The above quoted text is a diplomatic cable from the US Embassy accusing Nigeria of undermining her interest in Africa. The cable did not specify the specific acts that amounted to undermining the US all around Africa. This charge against Nigeria, though not specific was a serious label that could generate instability for any country that undermines the security and overseas' interest of the United States. Nigeria has been accused and therefore qualified for instability and depopulation. Nigeria is considered a hostile nation by the United States, by their own logic and perception, Nigeria merits the full retributions of the United States for daring to undermine the US in Africa or disregards its depopulation policy for Nigeria.

The Depopulation of Nigeria Plot. In the perception of the United States, Nigeria has posed an existential threat to the security and interest of the United States especially in Africa in the context of the foregoing. The bureaucracy in the United States were vexed with the audacity of Nigeria to considers itself powerful enough to dare the United States is punishable. How would the United States create the instability for overpopulation and undermining by Nigeria? The most covert method of depopulation of any overpopulated country, Nigeria inclusive is through; "...Famine, pestilence, war, or birth control ..." (Kissinger, 1980 .p 21).

The covert method of depopulation of Nigeria will be through Famine, pestilence, war, or birth control. The United States was overt enough to foretell the use of war, famine, pestilence and death, which bears identical resemblance of the Biblical text, the book of Revelation (6:8), which commentators later identified as Four Horsemen of Apocalypse (death, famine, war and pestilence). The Four Horsemen of Apocalypse will be used to depopulate Nigeria because throughout history this has been the route of choice. The question is then, how would the United States generate famine, pestilence, war and uncontrolled deaths to reduce the population of Nigeria?

Means and Methods of Depopulation of Nigeria

Having identified the use of death, famine, war and pestilence (The Four Horsemen of Apocalypse) as the instrument of choice for the dastardly act, how would they invent death, famine, war and pestilence to depopulate Nigeria?

...Investigations by (Executive Intelligence Review) EIR have uncovered a planning apparatus operating outside the control of the White House whose sole purpose is to reduce the world's population by 2 billion people through war, famine, disease, and any other means necessary...Its policy-planning group is in the U.S. State Department's Office of Population Affairs, established in 1975 by Henry Kissinger. This group is...conducting the civil war in El Salvador as a conscious depopulation project... Either they [governments] do it our way, through nice clean methods or they will get the kind of mess that we have in El Salvador...We look at our strategic needs, and we say that this country must lower its population-or else we will have trouble. So, steps are taken. El Salvador is an example where our failure to lower population by simple means has created the basis for a national security crisis. The government of El Salvador failed to use our programs to lower their population. Now they get a civil war because of it.... There will be dislocation and food shortages (Wolfe, 1981 .p 1).

The excerpt above is self-explanatory on how and why nations create death, famine, war and pestilence to reduce populations. The document explained how the United States created the Four Horsemen of Apocalypse in El Salvador in their depopulation program of that country. In El Salvador, which US classified as overpopulated, the United States Government mandated the government of El Salvador to reduce its population or face the consequences. The refusal of the government of El Salvador to comply with the depopulation policy made, US agencies to decide to depopulate the country by stewing civil wars, death squads and unrest in El Salvador. Characteristic of any armed conflict, there must be displaced people, homes will be destroyed, hunger will prevail as people cannot do business or farm; there will be outbreak of diseases as people live in squalor without adequate feeding and food availability. These are the multiplying effects of armed conflict. By creating the civil war, the United States has achieved the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, death, famine, war and pestilence. That is the punishment of those countries that have refused to comply with the US depopulation policy. The orchestration of tension, unrests, famine, starvation, diseases and civil war as means of depopulation of a targeted overpopulated El Salvador is called within this context, *El Salvador Treatment*.

Relevance of El Salvador Treatment to the Nigeria

El Salvador committed the same offence as Nigeria, overpopulation. Nigeria's offence is even worse than that of El Salvador because, according to the United States, Nigeria is undermining its interest in Africa. Will the United States create tension, unrests, famine, starvation, diseases and civil war as means to depopulate Nigeria?

1. Entire front page of May 26 issue of daily times carries article titled "Plot against Nigeria," that alleges Nigeria has been marked by "Some Western Powers" as target for "Destabilization." the article quotes unnamed diplomatic sources as saying the reason for this destabilization is to prevent Nigeria from "becoming strong, unified and capable of implementing ambitious development programs."

2. (U) Published sources cited by the times are an article by Harland Cleveland in the December issue of NATO Review, an article in the New York Times of March 17 entitled "Resentment Growing In Nigeria's North – a world away from the South," and an "Analysis recently carried out by International Political Surveys (IPS) based in Hartsdale, New York forecasting turmoil and revolution in Nigeria."

3. (U) Daily Times' reasoning is that Harland Cleveland proposed for NATO policy that Nigeria and Ethiopia be singled out for destabilization by "Promoting Regional, Religious And Tribal Differences... into large-scale conflict and eventual civil war ... the top layers of the British Allied Episcopalian establishment in the United States are strongly in favour of this destabilization process." the New York Times article is cited as "signalling NATO's offensive against Nigeria." According To the Daily Times: "in that article the paper played up the differences between the North and South asserting that people in the North regard the South 'with contempt and envy.' "Continuing its incitement, the paper reported that Southerners were better educated, more westernised and occupy a disproportionate share of key positions in industry and commerce". The paper highlighted the recent closure of colleges and universities in some northern states allegedly protesting against discrimination in the country's admissions policy.

4. (U) The Final Proof Of The Plot Is An IPS Forecast That States In The Wake Of Iran, Zimbabwe And Then Nigeria Face The Highest Risk Of Turmoil And Revolution (US Embassy, 1979 .p 2).

The above is a US embassy cable leaked by Wikileaks detailing the US plot to destabilize Nigeria. There are three sources mentioned in the leaked cable; namely; First, December edition of NATO Review article by Harland Cleveland. Second, New York Times article of March 17 entitled "Resentment Growing in Nigeria's North: A World Away from The South," by Carey Winfrey. Third, an International Political Survey (IPS) firm based in

Hartsdale, New York, whose survey forecasted turmoil and revolution in Nigeria. In this investigation, serial (3) of the document where Harland Cleveland, in NATO Review proposes the promotion of regional, religious, tribal differences into a large-scale conflict and eventual civil war; while the New York Times proposes NATO invasion of Nigeria remain significant.

In Nigeria there are the four Horsemen of the Apocalypse namely; war, starvation, hunger and pestilence. Nigeria is having the semblance of overpopulated El Salvador. The document above confirms that the United States are complicit in the creation and sustenance of Boko Haram who are killing Nigerians just like death squads killed lots of people in El Salvador.

According to the document, the US CIA are running a secret training camp in Cameroun, Chad and Niger where they recruit poor teens, camp them, indoctrinate and arm them to become terrorists but later turn around to kill them in counterterrorism operations. The Boko Haram insurgency has cost deaths, hunger, displacements, diseases and disappearances. Just like El Salvador, there are armed conflicts that are reducing the population of Nigerians every day. From the foregoing, what happened in El Salvador, (civil war, tension, unrest, deaths, killings and disease) are being replicated in Nigeria because Nigeria and El Salvador committed the same offence in the perception of the United States.

Extermination of the Male Population: Most Effective Method of Depopulating Nigeria

When vicious empires want to end the lineage of the vanquished, they exterminate the male stock (Bahmanyar, 2009; Venter, 2018). It is the most effective way of ending generations because the male stock of any nation are the seed bearers of the future generation (Iklé, 2008; Meiches, 2019). This was adopted in El Salvador in order to effectively reduce their population.

In the past year, 13,000 people in El Salvador have been killed in the civil war that has gripped the country... that is not enough...the civil war would have to be greatly expanded... El Salvador was targeted for "population control...There were just too many goddamn people. If you want to control a country, you have to keep the population down. Too many people breed social unrest ...To reduce population quickly...you have to pull all the males

into the fighting and kill significant numbers ... "The population might weaken itself, especially if the war drags on, [and] you could have disease and starvation, like what happened in Bangladesh and Biafra... you can create a tendency for population to fall very rapidly (Wolfe, 1981.p 3-4).

The document above is the US Executive Intelligence Review (EIR) which confirms that 13,000 people killed were not enough to reduce the population of that country. The most effective method of depopulating a country was to mass up the male population and kill them. In the case of Nigeria, the massing up of the male stock is ongoing and the extermination is equally going on thereby achieving the irreversible depopulation agenda.

How does male Extermination apply to Nigeria? When the United States was vexed with the overpopulation in Nigeria, their attention shifted to Northern Nigeria which has the highest population in Nigeria and by culture/religion do not accept birth control or conception (Sciuba, 2021). The United State has been stonewalled by predominantly Catholic or Muslim nations over its overpopulation and depopulation phenomenon. Most of the countries listed in NSSM 200 with the exception of Thailand are predominantly Catholic or Muslim nations. In Nigeria, there are predominantly Muslim North, fanatical Christian North Central and predominantly Catholic South Eastern Nigeria. Based on their religious beliefs, probably these are the areas that made Nigeria not to comply with US depopulation policy because of their religious faith or put it correctly, the areas whose influence stonewalled the US depopulation policy in Nigeria.

If these are the areas that are repugnant to depopulation, then these are the areas that will receive the male annihilation project. First in 1966, there was the British instigated tribal hatred between the North and the Ibos of the East (Moses & Lasse, 2018). The British were aware that getting the two regions to fight a religious or tribal war will depopulate the overpopulated areas of Nigeria (Baxter, 2015). Their information warfare produced an ethnic pogrom unprecedented in the history of Nigeria and followed by a civil war in which war, starvation, displacement and disease (Four Horsemen of Apocalypse) were unified and weaponised for depopulation (Daly, 2020) . The Ibos alone lost over Three (3) Million people

in that civil war, majority were the male population (Moses & Lasse, 2018). However, it seems the instigators were not happy with the population of the North. Therefore, implementing the El Salvador treatment in Northern Nigeria and South East Nigeria was not surprising, thus the ensuing religious, ethnic and death squad activities in Nigeria. The religious and ethnic conflicts have massed up the males in Nigeria into the following groups: Christian male militias; Muslim male militias; Tribal male militias; Fertile male inhabitants of the areas under conflict but are not part of the armed groups; Nigerian soldiers, predominantly male population of Nigeria; Nigeria police, predominantly male population of Nigeria; Religious militias who are predominantly male population of Nigeria; and Religious fanatics/extremists who fight to defend their faith during riots or unrest are predominantly male population of Nigeria.

This is how the instigators of male depopulation of Nigeria arrange the mass up of the male population of the Nigerian state for extermination. These males are armed and indoctrinated against each other with the narrative of tribal hate, religious supremacy, ethnic supremacy, intolerance, politics and criminality. With the arms flowing into these groups, angered by the indoctrination of hate; a war is instigated, and the slaughter commences. If XYZ number of Boko Haram has been killed, it is XYZ number of Nigerian males depopulated. If XYZ number of soldiers, policemen or bandits is killed, they are XYZ number of the Nigerian male depopulated. In the South East, the Nigeria police, military, innocent citizens and the activities of the pro-secessionist Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) are ensuring that the male population in the South East are also decimated.

In all these zones of Nigeria; the Nigerian Government and people are unconsciously annihilating its male population. As the war drags on, starvation increases, unemployment increases, displaced people become helpless, farmers cannot farm, businesses are destroyed, homes are destroyed, and disease are prevalent from malnutrition, hunger and outbreak of pestilence increase death toll across Nigeria. Within the ensuing scenario, there is depopulation going on, made possible by the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse namely; disease, starvation, war and death. Depopulation of Nigeria achieved? Yes, achieved covertly.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the depopulation of Nigeria in plain sight is a source of concern. The story of overpopulation originated from the Club of Rome, whose obsession for human population fabricated the phenomenon of global warming and climate change ascribing them to the destruction of the planet earth and the urgency to cull the global population in order to save the planet. In its own document *The First Global Revolution* admitted the fabrication of human devastation of the planet and environment. The climate change and global warming catastrophe protagonists and antagonists occupied the global stage in the bid to prove that culling the human population would reduce the carbon dioxide that was destroying the planet earth. Standing on the revelation from the Club of Rome and scientific evidences; climate change and the necessity to cull the human species was untenable. However, the advocacy for depopulation to save the earth was reinforced by the United States by officially stating that depopulation was inimical to its national security and strategic interest. In marshalling her defence, listed Nigeria as overpopulated and requires depopulation.

The depopulation was non-negotiable for the listed countries or else would experience wars, unrest, starvation and pestilence. El Salvador, was used to show how recalcitrant would suffer the refusal to depopulate. In El Salvador, death squads were sponsored, funded to create armed conflicts, deaths, displacement of persons, starvation and pestilence. There were supportive documents to show that the United States was not happy with the population of Nigeria, the allegation of undermining US interest and alleged creation, training and funding of a death squad to create the El Salvador syndrome in Nigeria. The whole goal was the covert depopulation of Nigeria. At last, the massing up of the male population of Nigeria for self-destruct was best option. Today, various male dominated armed factions are killing each other in Nigeria using the cover of religion, ethnicity, party politics and insecurity to achieve the desired covert depopulation of Nigeria. With the extermination of the male stock, there will be few males to procreate thereby reducing the population growth.

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AN EARLY WARNING DIMENSION TO CONFLICT PREVENTION IN NIGERIA THROUGH PEACE EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

To create a new and better tomorrow, humanity must learn from its past. The principles of non-violence, tolerance, human rights, democracy, and good government are among the lessons that have not yet been learned. Human physiology does not bring peace; rather, since the world can no longer afford conflict, we must educate peace in order to achieve it. People are unable to watch as the number of refugees from conflict and natural disasters rises, poverty spreads like wildfire, and funds intended for job training, healthcare, education, and other essential services are diverted to buy weapons. The purposeful endeavour to teach adults and children about the mechanics of conflict and to foster the development of peacemaking abilities in families, schools, and communities worldwide is known as peace education. Man and woman's minds are the source of conflict, hence it is important to deliberately work on instilling in them the skill of peaceful coexistence. Peace education is the most significant means of fostering a culture of peace. Thus, the study examines peace education, its core, and the ways in which it can be supported by the successful application of social studies curricula, especially at the elementary and junior secondary school levels, which are crucial junctures in a child's development as a person. The study argues that since growth cannot occur in a security vacuum, peace education is essential to advancing development.

Keywords: Early Warning, Conflict Prevention, Peace, Education

Introduction

"The process of teaching people about the threats of violence and strategies for peace" is a basic definition of peace education, which can be given both within and outside of a classroom (Mwanzia, 2015). According to this expansive definition, societies all over the world have learnt to coexist peacefully and have subsequently taught the following generation to do the same (Mulaisho, 2016). In this sense, the history of peace education is perhaps as old as human

history. Even though people have advocated violence in the name of various religious and philosophical traditions, these traditions have also been rich and significant sources of peace education. However, academics and the discipline of peace studies are the origins of peace education as it exists now (Salomon and Nevo, 2005).

According to Ian Harris, a specialist in peace education, the modern peace movement started with numerous intellectual endeavors to learn about violent conflict in nineteenth-century Europe, developed into socialist political theory, and then spread to the United States and other countries prior to World War I (Young, 1986). Following this, academics studied war and attempted to warn the public about its dangers. An increasing number of people attempted to convince governments and other parties to utilize mediation rather than war to resolve international conflicts. For instance, many American educators adopted progressive education, inspired by American educational theorist John Dewey, to teach their students about humanity in order to foster peaceful social advancement (Vaughan, 2018).

As educators sought to contribute to the worldwide endeavours to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," "to reaffirm faith in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women," "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained," and "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom," they found inspiration in the United Nations Charter. (Alachi and Michael, 2015). With this duty came a new urgency and sophistication in pursuing these universal goals through the study and promotion of sustainable peace through education. Not long after World War II, peace studies emerged as a more serious academic discipline.

During the Cold War, the prospect of nuclear war motivated many academics to focus their research on establishing a lasting peace. In particular, peace education scholarship has evolved in a variety of ways since the 1980s. While some have stressed reducing militarism, domestic abuse, and male aggression, others have worked to help students develop empathy and compassion, and several more have maintained that critical thinking and democratic

education are essential (Anthony, 2022). Since the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was established, human rights and peace education have gained significant traction as essential rights that every child should be afforded. The promotion of understanding, peace, and tolerance via education was seen by the CRC's framers as a fundamental right of all children, not as an elective extracurricular activity, as UNICEF expert Susan Fountain put it in her 1999 essay.

Conceptual Clarification

There are several definitions for the idea of peace education. While there isn't a single, widely acknowledged definition of the idea, some of the definitions will be looked at for the purposes of this study. According to Harber (2019), peace education is basically transformative and aims to foster a culture of peace. It develops the body of knowledge, abilities, attitudes, and values aimed at changing people's perspectives, dispositions, and actions that have initially caused or intensified violent conflict. It aims to bring about this change by fostering compassion, increasing consciousness, and pushing societal and personal action that will allow people to live, relate, and establish structures and circumstances that realize justice, non-violence, environmental preservation, and other peace principles.

The process of pro-actively educating people about the knowledge and abilities of observing and responding to early warning indicators is known as peace education, according to Rasheed and Abdullahi (2022). Beyond the scope of early warning systems, peace education also helps people understand how appealing cooperation or peaceful coexistence is, how to analyse conflict situations, and the connections between all the processes involved in promoting transnational peace and security. According to Solomon and Nevo (2005), peace education is an intentional effort to use all available socialization channels and tools to teach adults and children about the mechanics of conflict and to promote peacemaking abilities in families, schools, and communities around the globe. It concentrates on direct, organized violence, especially that of war and armed conflict, and offers instruction for world security.

The human and social dimensions of peace are the focus of peace education, which also introduces the concepts of human dignity and human rights with particular reference to issues like ecological balance, political participation, and economic equity. Of particular importance are the formative principles that underpin international human rights standards.

All things considered, peace education is an investment in the next generation and confirms that a more peaceful future for humanity can be ensured by teaching younger minds the values of peace, the abilities of conflict analysis and management, the identification of conflicts and their sources. The best peace education, according to Alachi and Michael (2015), aims to alter people's perspectives on other people's collective narrative as viewed from their point of view and, as a result, about their own social lives. It also helps people relate to that collective less angrily and more trustingly in real life. According to the definitions given above, peace education is a kind of education that promotes peaceful coexistence by instilling a culture of peace in each and every person because conflict originates in the minds of people. In order for progress to flourish, peace education is a deliberate attempt to instil the virtue of peace and stop conflicts from arising in society.

Qualities and Significance of Education for Peace

Irrespective of the perspective, peace education aims to create lasting peace with the following features. These traits, which can be summed up as follows from Pate and Dauda's perspectives (2015), are: Speaking with intention; Listening intently and thoughtfully; Encouraging respect for others' feelings and rights; Speaking about oneself rather than the other person; and recognizing potential obstacles to effective communication and knowing how to overcome them.

One of the main obstacles to growth in many of the world's poorest nations is violent conflict. The majority of the world's poorest nations are either embroiled in or have just recently ended an armed conflict. Possibly the most crucial instrument for advancing human growth and ending poverty is education. It is how future generations acquire the values, information, and abilities necessary for both their own personal safety and well-being as well

as for the advancement of politics, the economy, society, and culture. This could be one of the reasons Education for All (EFA), one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), places such a high priority on attaining universal, free, and obligatory primary education.

When there is violent conflict, education systems confront very difficult obstacles. International humanitarian law is especially crucial during times of crisis. The following provisions of the Geneva Conventions specifically address education-related protections during times of war: Parties to a conflict guarantee that children under 15 who are orphaned or separated from their families receive the proper education; Occupying powers should facilitate the maintenance of education; Children and youth who are interned should receive education; and Education should be provided throughout non-international conflicts. Due to the Geneva Conventions' development immediately following World War II, a major flaw in these rules is that they apply only to circumstances in which formal states of war have been declared between nations. The main issue in these circumstances, where conflicts are frequently waged by groups within countries and with no sense of accountability to international authority, is a disregard for the values and norms represented by the Geneva Conventions. Subsequent protocols, UN declarations, and resolutions have attempted to update accepted rules of engagement to accommodate the more complex nature of modern conflicts (Puspoayu and Firmansyah, 2023).

In the 1990s, there was a great deal of attention paid to the effects of violent conflict and war on children, which was thoroughly documented in a report that the UN Secretary-General commissioned (Smith, 2005). The study found several significant ramifications for the field of education, such as plans for the education of internally displaced people and refugees (Dryden-Peterson, 2019), tactics to stop the use of child soldiers, safety measures for girls against sexual assault, education about landmines, and trauma counselling. Many of the challenges mentioned have evolved into specialized fields of international development, and it served as the foundation for several initiatives. There have also been arguments made for the inclusion of education in humanitarian efforts (Calhoun, 2010). It was brought to light that,

as stated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1981 Convention on the Rights of the Child, education is a fundamental right. Just because they reside in a conflict-ridden area doesn't mean that children should be denied their fundamental right to an education.

Additionally, it has been stated that education plays a critical role in ensuring children's cognitive, psychological, and physical safety amid conflict. Education has the potential to mitigate the psychological effects of conflict by fostering a feeling of normalcy and consistency. In addition to providing life-saving knowledge on how to protect oneself from risk (such as sexual assault, child recruitment, and landmines), a secure learning environment may protect kids from the regular physical violence of a conflict (Shah et al., 2020). By promoting intellectual growth through the teaching of reading, numeracy, and, in certain situations, conflict resolution and peacebuilding techniques, peace education can also offer cognitive protection.

The need for peace education to be a part of first-line humanitarian aid interventions is still up for dispute. The fact that short-term solutions are divorced from longer-term growth strategies for the education sector poses a serious risk. This could be made worse if local education authorities' education sector staff isn't participating in the early phases and if the foreign organizations doing the quick solutions aren't the same ones doing the longer-term development assistance for education. But since the World Education Forum in 2000, this sector has advanced considerably, and the Dakar Framework for Action that followed includes a clear request for donor funding for the field, which is now referred to as "education in emergencies" (Kagawa, 2005). Although war is not the only description of this area, conflict-related interruption of education is undoubtedly one set of circumstances that meet the criteria for an emergency (Burde et al., 2017).

The creation of the Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE), which is headed by UNICEF, UNHCR, CARE International, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children Alliance, and UNESCO, has been a significant move. While INEE is not

mandated to execute or coordinate during times of crisis, it does facilitate information sharing among members and promotes teamwork. Determining minimal criteria for education in emergency situations has been one of INEE's objectives, and these standards are presently being applied in over 60 nations (Sinclair and Unesco, 2002). Even with these successes, people in other sectors could still need persuading that education should be a part of first-line humanitarian efforts. Research indicates that even after ten years of activism, education still only receives 2% of humanitarian help and is given the least amount of funding requests when compared to other necessities like food, health, housing, water, and sanitation (Cronin, 2008).

Education is still seen more as an immediate humanitarian reaction than as a component of longer-term development. The fact that field workers emphasize the need for earlier engagement with longer-term issues—such as obtaining accurate data, determining whether and how to reform education, and building better capacity—in their justifications for increased funding for education during the humanitarian phase contributes to the problem (Brown et al., 2001). They worry that reconstructing the educational system during the emergency response phase could bring back historical issues like unequal access and leave behind legacies that will be more challenging to address in subsequent stages of growth. Another argument would be that the inclusion of contexts affected by conflicts within the more general concept of "education and emergencies" has not been beneficial from the perspective of peace building (Dryden-Peterson, 2016). While conflicts certainly cause crises and result in situations similar to other emergencies (e.g., refugees, displaced persons, and infrastructure destruction), it is conceptually confusing to suggest that understanding the role of an education system during or after conflicts is the same as responding to natural disasters or humanitarian crises like famine, health epidemics, earthquakes, floods, or tsunamis.

The Early Warning Dimension to Conflict Prevention

It is vital that peace education be included in the curriculum of educational institutions given the current state of Nigeria, which is continuously threatened by security issues in various regions of the nation (Elachi, 2018). This demands drastic and immediate educational change,

which is essential to the peace process and could promote justice, equity, and unity within the country. Given the current situation, peace education is unavoidably required since each and every citizen needs an education to comprehend society and the workings of social harmony. Because it can address grievances that may inspire people to participate in disputes or violence, inclusive education is essential to preserving peace (Nwafor, 2012). In Dupuy (2011), Mitchell states that inclusive education, particularly when it comes to the "Education for All" perspective, encompasses more than just individuals with learning disabilities or physical or mental disabilities. Instead, it should be viewed from a systemic perspective that aims to guarantee that all students have access to the full range of social and educational opportunities provided by the school in order to prevent prejudice, segregation, and isolation (Eigbadon and Abioye, 2014).

Furthermore, since the existence of social justice through the defence of human rights, including the right to education, is a prerequisite for peace, education can only be considered as completely inclusive and capable of achieving its goal of fostering peace if it is enshrined as a universal right in national laws and policies. Additionally, peace education is required for the creation of a stable political system that would guarantee the long-term political and socioeconomic environment required for the advancement of the country (Igbuzor, 2011). Educational resources and provisions should be dispersed fairly in terms of quantities and places in order to guarantee equality and equity, which can prevent direct or indirect violence. Everybody will have plenty of opportunity to actively engage in the process of national development in an environment where educational possibilities are provided.

The reason for this is because inequalities in educational opportunities in any nation will inevitably lead to both short- and long-term imbalances, which may then escalate into high-level conflict or violence or even civil war. Because moral reorientation encourages people to do the right and avoid the bad, it is impossible to separate peace education from moral reorientation. Religious rules should not be the foundation for a person's morality or sense of what is proper. Education must provide the means for a person to acquire the capacity

for moral insight and critical thought. Such an educational curriculum needs to fully consider the multiplicity of viewpoints, the diversity of temperaments, and the complexity of social life. It must also acknowledge that moral norms must be continuously assessed (Nwafor, 2012:100). One could argue that disruptive disputes would be comparatively rare in a society where the majority of people are morally aware and benefit from a reasonable amount of peace education. Undoubtedly, a scenario like this will promote social development and cohesion (Tambiah, 1989).

Conclusion

In Nigeria, there are and have been numerous approaches to preventing and resolving disputes at all levels, including legal and traditional means, but none have been able to sufficiently stop the rise in disputes and violence. Instead, it seems that the level of violence is rising at a startling rate and proportion that has challenged not just the unity of our country but also its progress. Because of this, peace education ought to be a powerful instrument for fostering goodwill among Nigerians.

Thus, it is important to see the school as a setting in which students practice open communication free from restraints and biases towards individuals from other cultural and religious backgrounds. In fact, "schools would be able to play the critical role of teaching students how to manage and resolve conflict; how to manage and form interpersonal relationships; and how to enforce authority; as well as for communicating the value and the skill of peace building" (Oladimeji et al., 2023) if peace education is included in the curriculum. These skills are necessary preconditions for stable societies and national development.

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ASSESSING PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGIES IN ABUJA

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the current state of public transportation safety and crime prevention strategies in Abuja, Nigeria, focusing on the Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC). Rapid urbanization and population growth in Abuja have heightened the need for effective crime prevention in the public transportation system. The research assesses safety challenges associated with various transportation modes, including buses, taxis, and the light rail system. Socioeconomic factors influencing crime levels are considered, emphasizing the importance of addressing root causes. The study contributes to existing knowledge by conducting a comprehensive assessment, analysing crime causes, and proposing actionable recommendations tailored to the unique context of AMAC Abuja. The methodology involves a quantitative approach, utilizing surveys administered to public transport users in AMAC. Demographic characteristics of respondents, recent experiences with public transport crimes, and perceptions of crime vulnerability by transport mode are analysed. The findings of the study identify economic hardships, poor policing, and unemployment as primary contributors to public transport crimes and the implications indicates that certain demographic groups might be more susceptible to specific crimes in the study area. Recommendations include increased police presence, targeted security measures, community involvement, and addressing underlying socioeconomic factors. In conclusion, addressing the multifaceted nature of public transport crimes in AMAC requires a collaborative approach, involving stakeholders from various sectors.

Keywords: Public Transportation, Safety, Crime, Crime Prevention, Strategies, Abuja

Introduction

Public transportation (PT) plays a vital role in promoting mobility and economic development in urban areas. However, the safety and security of passengers within the public transportation system pose significant concerns for cities globally, including Abuja, Nigeria's capital. As Abuja undergoes rapid urbanization and population growth, the imperative for effective crime

prevention strategies and safety measures intensifies (Akinola et al., 2019). Despite its planned layout and robust infrastructure, Abuja grapples with safety challenges in its public transportation system (Bashir et al., 2018). The escalating demand for public transportation, driven by population growth and urbanization, has resulted in overcrowding, congestion, and a potential uptick in crime rates (Daniel, 2017). Offenses like theft, assault, robbery, and harassment not only compromise commuters' personal security but also erode trust and satisfaction with the public transportation system.

To comprehensively assess public transportation safety in Abuja, it is crucial to examine the vulnerabilities associated with different transportation modes. Abuja's public transportation system encompasses buses, taxis, and the recently introduced light rail system (Idris et al., 2019). Each mode presents specific security challenges and potential openings for exploitation by criminals. For instance, buses and taxis, characterized by overcrowding and lax regulations, create an environment conducive to pickpocketing and harassment (Nuhu et al., 2020).

To address public transportation safety challenges in Abuja, drawing on successful international case studies is crucial. Cities like London, New York, and Tokyo have implemented effective crime prevention strategies, offering valuable insights into Abuja's context (Oyefeso & Rotimi, 2020). Analyzing these approaches while considering Abuja's socio-cultural factors, institutional frameworks, and existing infrastructure is essential for successful implementation (Okoroafor et al., 2021). Engaging stakeholders, including policymakers, city planners, transport authorities, law enforcement, and the public, is indispensable for shared responsibility and a secure transportation system (Sokoto et al., 2020). Therefore, the aim of this paper contributed to the existing body of knowledge on public transportation safety and crime prevention strategies in Abuja, Nigeria. By conducting a comprehensive assessment of the current situation which is the recent PT crimes in AMAC, analyzing the vulnerabilities of different modes of transportation, exploring socio-economic

factors, and engaging relevant stakeholders, we strive to develop actionable recommendations for enhancing public transportation safety in AMAC Abuja.

The primary aim of this study is therefore to assess public transportation safety and crime prevention strategies in Abuja Nigeria, while the specific objectives are listed below:

To Assess the Current/Latest State of Public Transportation Safety in AMAC, Abuja, evaluating the Causes and Effectiveness of Existing Crime Prevention Strategies and proposing Recommendations for Improving Safety Measures and Reducing Crime Rates.

Conceptual and Literature Review

Public Transportation

Public transportation systems are a focal point for scrutiny by scholars specializing in transportation planning, urban studies, and public policy. Although a universally accepted definition is lacking, scholars generally conceptualize these systems as shared passenger services accessible to the public, operating on predetermined routes and schedules, relying on dedicated infrastructure, and frequently involving public ownership, regulation, or subsidies. The core idea of enhancing public mobility, alleviating congestion, and meeting societal needs is central to these definitions. In Nigeria, scholars often depict the public transportation system as a blend of formal and informal transport modes, encompassing buses, taxis, motorcycles (Okada), and tricycles (Keke nappes) used by the public for commuting (Adegoke et al., 2015; Ogunbodede & Alawode, 2016; Ayodele et al., 2020).

Descriptions of the Nigerian public transportation system frequently highlights its lack of proper organization, regulation, and infrastructure, leading to challenges like traffic congestion, subpar service quality, and safety issues (Ogunbodede & Alawode, 2016; Ukpata et al., 2020). Scholars underscore the significance of the public transportation system for urban mobility, as well as the accessibility of goods, services, and employment opportunities in Nigeria. Additionally, they advocate for policy interventions such as enhanced regulation, infrastructure development, and institutional coordination to address existing issues and improve the system (Ayodele et al., 2020; Gbadamosi & Adebisi, 2021; Iyawa et al., 2020).

Overview of Historical Background of the Abuja Transport System

Abuja, distinguished by its satellite towns, operates within a city-region structure. However, the transportation system is predominantly centred in the city core, giving rise to the development of informal bus services in suburban areas. As highlighted by Razak (2016), this has led to a disorganized, unregulated, and unreliable public transportation system, resulting in a reliance on private vehicles. The irregular road layout in the city further complicates transportation, impacting both the system's efficiency and the lifestyle of the society (Tini and Muhammad, 2018). Gbadamosi and Adenigbo (2017) emphasize a notable increase in vehicle inspections in satellite towns over time, indicating an increasing dependence on informal transport services. Despite the prohibition of minibuses in the city centre in 2013, commuters still favour taxis and paratransit, citing the inadequacy and discomfort associated with urban mass transit buses (Nwankwo and Barimoda, 2019). The introduction of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and the Abuja Urban Mass Transport Company Limited (AUMTCO) aims to tackle these challenges.

Motorcycle taxis, locally referred to as *okada*, were prevalent until their prohibition in 2006 due to safety concerns. This led to the emergence of tricycles (rickshaws) as an alternative, albeit with its own set of challenges, including accidents involving rickshaw drivers. Dayyabu et al. (2019) advocate for the integration of rickshaws in city-region transport planning, acknowledging their role in providing first and last-mile services for commuters. In summary, the evolving transportation scenario in Abuja underscores the necessity for a thorough and unified strategy to address safety, dependability, and accessibility concerns in both the city and its satellite towns.

Crime Prevention Strategies

In Nigeria, the operational efficiency of public transportation is significantly hindered by the pervasive issue of crime. Various forms of criminal victimization are experienced by both passengers and train station officials, with trains, roads, and railway facilities being frequent targets for attacks and vandalism (Badiora et al., 2020). An illustrative incident occurred in

March 2022 when terrorists launched a bomb attack on a train along the Abuja-Kaduna route, resulting in seven fatalities and over 100 passengers being kidnapped (Opejobi, 2022). The Nigeria Railway Corporation (NRC) has also reported an escalating trend in the theft of railway equipment (Aliyu & Ugwuezuoha, 2022). While there has been substantial scholarly attention directed towards transit crime in Nigeria (Olojede, 2019), there is a notable scarcity of data on the specific forms of criminality within public transportation in Abuja.

Crime prevention strategies in public transportation aim to ensure the safety, security, and comfort of commuters. These strategies encompass diverse approaches, including policy interventions, the deployment of security personnel, technological advancements, and community engagement. Scholars underscore the significance of community involvement in crime prevention, emphasizing collaboration between law enforcement agencies and community members to identify and address security concerns within neighbourhoods (Ahmed & Eme, 2016). Additionally, scholars recommend incorporating crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) principles in urban planning and architecture.

Scholars advocate for the implementation of targeted policing strategies that concentrate on specific crime hotspots and high-risk areas within Abuja city. Additionally, intelligence-led strategies, including data analysis and predictive policing, are considered effective approaches for proactive crime prevention (Abubakar & Ikani, 2019).

Existing Crime Prevention Strategies in Abuja, Nigeria

Policy and Legislative Frameworks: Securing the safety of public transportation in Abuja, Nigeria involves the examination of policy and legislative frameworks discussed by researchers. Although references directly about Abuja may be scarce, scholarly deliberations on transportation safety in Nigeria offer valuable insights into the existing policy and legislative measures. Noteworthy frameworks include the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), Road Traffic Regulations, Urban Development and Planning, and the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA).

Security Personnel and Training: The presence of well-trained and vigilant security personnel is pivotal in preventing crime within public transportation systems. In Abuja, a collaboration between the Nigeria Police Force and transportation operators ensures security on buses and major terminals (Ajayi et al., 2019). Moreover, training initiatives for security personnel, encompassing conflict resolution and customer service skills, contribute to fostering a safer environment for commuters (Okoli, 2017). However, optimal staffing levels and strategic distribution of security personnel are essential for comprehensive coverage. Security personnel play a crucial role in monitoring public transportation facilities and vehicles to thwart criminal activities, acting as a deterrent to potential wrongdoers and facilitating prompt identification and response to security threats (Coker & Atubi, 2013).

Technological Interventions: Technological advancements have transformed public transportation safety and crime prevention strategies, with Abuja incorporating tools such as Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras, panic buttons, and GPS tracking systems for enhanced security (Adediji, 2018). Notably, the implementation of the "Safe Trip Scheme" in Lagos enables commuters to send distress signals to a central control room during emergencies (Ogunjobi, 2016). The integration of technology with efficient emergency response systems holds the potential to significantly elevate passenger safety in Abuja. Scholars, including Tosin Adewole and Olumide Olugbode (2015), emphasize the pivotal role of technological interventions like CCTV cameras, adaptive traffic signals, and real-time information dissemination in enhancing public transportation safety. The World Bank's 2012 report on "Transport Sector Performance and Key Policy Issues in Abuja" emphasizes technology, including CCTV cameras, vehicle tracking, and panic alarms, for deterring crime, aiding emergency response, and enhancing safety. Research by Blankson et al. (2012) highlights the role of technology interventions, like surveillance and electronic payment systems, in improving communication, and security measures, and creating a safer public transportation environment.

Current State of Public Transportation Safety and Crime Prevention Strategies in Abuja


The present state of public transportation safety and crime prevention strategies in Abuja City, Nigeria, is a topic that requires up-to-date information and data. However, based on general knowledge of the region, certain aspects can be discussed. Abuja has made efforts to improve public transportation safety and implement crime prevention strategies with the aid of an established secretariat in 2004 saddled with the overseeing and regulating Abuja transport sectors such as the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), the Department of Municipal Affairs and Environment of the defunct Ministry of Federal Capital Territory (MFCT), the Department of Road Traffic Services, and Abuja Mass Transit Company (AUMTCO) (FCT Transportation Secretariat (Nigeria), 2016). The city operates several public transportation systems, including buses, taxis, and tricycles.

However, challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, insufficient resources, and the prevalence of criminal activities pose significant hurdles in ensuring a safe environment for commuters. Crime prevention strategies in Abuja involve various measures, including increased police presence, surveillance systems, and community engagement initiatives. Law enforcement agencies have been involved in deploying police officers at transportation terminals and along major routes to deter criminal activities and respond to emergencies.

Methodology

The Study Area

The Federal Capital Territory (FCT) was established in 1976 as part of Nigeria's capital relocation initiative from Lagos, developing into a modern city of over 8,000 square kilometres. Unlike states, FCT serves as the administrative territory, centrally accessible from all parts of Nigeria. Population projections show growth from 124,678 in 1977 to 378,671 in 1991. The Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), formed in 1976, oversees infrastructure but faces challenges in public transport supply, causing heavy reliance on private vehicles, and impacting traffic congestion and the city's socio-economic environment. These factors affect the realization of effective transport measures in the FCT.



Source: Dept. of Geog Buk, 2014.

This quantitative study evaluates public transportation safety and crime prevention strategies in Abuja, Nigeria, specifically focusing on government-owned operators using mini, midi, and maxi buses. Conducted in the Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC) route, the survey targeted public transport users, with a population of 778,567. Three terminals operated by the Abuja Urban Mass Transport Company (AUMTCO) were the primary focus. The survey methodology involved questionnaires administered to public transport operators, determining a scientifically acceptable sample size through park surveys. Data analysis utilized percentages and the Relative Importance Index (RII) for three key variables: Relative Security Index (RSI) gauging residents' perception of security for each transport mode, Relative Efficiency Indicator Index (REII) assessing respondents' perception of security agency efficiency in crime reduction, and Public Transport Cause Relative Frequency Index (PTCRFI) examining perceptions of the relative frequency of crime causes in Abuja.

The study derived these variables based on literature synthesis, employing a process akin to the RII, as seen in previous studies. Overall, the research provides a comprehensive quantitative analysis of public transport security in Abuja, informing strategies through multifaceted indices and synthesizing relevant literature findings. Respondents utilized the Likert Scale principle (Likert, 1961) to rate each variable of interest, ranging from 1 to 5 in descending order of significance or frequency. The Total Weight Value (TWV) for each variable was determined by summing the product of the number of responses for each rating and the respective weight value. This is mathematically expressed as follows:

$$TWV = \sum_{i=1}^5 N_i W_i$$

Where:

N_i = the number of respondents rating a particular variable, and

W_i = the average weight value assigned to the variable by the respondents.

Thus, for example, the PTCRFI for each PT crime cause was computed by dividing the summation of the respondents' responses to each of the five ratings on the cause by the product of the highest weight attached to the value and the number of respondents. This is mathematically expressed as follows:

$$TCCRFI = \frac{TWV}{\sum_{i=1}^5 A \cdot N_i}$$

The closer the PTCRFI of a cause is to 5, the stronger the respondents' rating of such a cause as Public Transport crime in Abuja (AMAC), and the farther it is from 5 the weaker the rating of respondents of such a factor as a cause of PT crime in the study area. Other variables were measured way similarly, and are interpreted accordingly.

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULT

Table 1: Profile of Respondents

Item	Classification	Frequency	Percentage
Gender	Male	182	42.1
	Female	250	57.9
	Total	432	100.0
Age	Less than 21	82	19.0
	21 – 30	148	34.3

	31 – 40	103	23.8
	41 and above	99	22.9
	Total	432	100.0
Marital Status	Single	144	33.3
	Married	288	66.7
	Total	432	100.0
Occupation	Civil Servant	168	38.9
	Artisanship	109	25.2
	Others	155	35.9
	Total	432	100.0
Religion	Christianity	203	47.0
	Islam	229	53.0
	Total	432	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 1 illustrates the demographic characteristics of the survey participants. From this table, it is evident that 42.1% and 57.9% of the residents surveyed in the study area identified as male and female, respectively. The distribution of respondents by age indicates that 19.0%, 34.3%, 23.8%, and 22.9% fall into the age brackets of less than 21, 21-30, 31-40, and 41 and above, respectively. Regarding marital status, the data reveals that 33.3% were single, while 66.7% were married. In terms of occupation, the respondents' distribution shows that 38.9% were civil servants, 25.2% were artisans, and others constituted 35.9%. This implies a predominant presence of civil servants in AMAC Abuja during the study period. Additionally, the table offers insights into the religious affiliations of the respondents, indicating that 47.0% identified as Christians, while 53.0% followed the Islamic faith.

Respondents' Latest Experience of Public Transport Crime in AMAC Abuja

The most recent experiences of the participants with public transport (PT) crime, whether firsthand or secondhand, are detailed in Table 2. In this context, a firsthand experience refers to instances where the respondent personally fell victim to a crime, whereas a secondhand experience denotes situations where the respondent witnessed a crime but was not directly involved.

Table 2. Respondents' Latest Experience of Public Transport Crime in AMAC Abuja

SN	Crime Committed	Latest Experience			
		Over 12 months	Last 9 months	Last 6 months	Last 3 month
1.	Pickpocketing	10.1%	3.8%	7.5%	2.1%
2.	Carjacking/car theft	1.2 %	3.1%	2.4%	1.1%
3.	Rape or Sexual harassment	2.7%	2.2%	6.6%	3.7%
4.	Assault and battery	12.8%	4.1%	8.1%	5.5%
5.	Kidnapping/Abduction	8.4%	7.6%	5.5%	2.3%
6.	Armed Robbery	3.2%	2.2%	1.2%	1.4%

Source: Field Survey, 2023

According to Table 2, 10.1%, 1.2%, 2.7%, 3.3%, 8.4% and 3.2% of the respondents had witnessed or been victims of such public transport crimes in AMAC as pickpocketing, carjacking, rape or sexual harassment, assault and battery kidnapping or abduction, and armed robbery respectively over the past 12 months; 3.8%, 3.1%, 2.2%, 4.1%, 7.6% and 2.2% had either witnessed or been victims of these PT crimes in the last nine months; 7.5%, 2.4%, 6.6%, 8.1%, 5.5% and 1.2% had witnessed or been victims of transit crimes in the same order in the last six months; while 2.1%, 1.1%, 3.7%, 5.5%, 2.3% and 1.4% of them had witnessed or been victims of the PT crimes in the same order in the last 3 months.

Another look at the table reveals that pickpocketing was the PT crime experienced most in the last 12 months (10.1%), rape or sexual harassment was the most experienced PT crime in the last six months (6.6%), kidnapping was the PT crime experienced most in both the last twelve months (8.4%) and over nine months to before the time of the survey (7.6%). Moreover, car theft was the PT crime least experienced in the last three months (1.1%) and the last twelve months (1.2%), while armed robbery was the least experienced PT crime in the last six months (1.2%). There was no report of such PT crimes as fare evasion, murder, and terrorism over the period among the respondents. Thus, it is obvious that these categories of PT crime are quite rare in the study area (AMAC, Abuja). Furthermore, the results of Chi-square tests carried out show that there was a significant relationship between PT crime

experience and such socioeconomic characteristics of AMAC residents as age ($\chi^2 = 32.713$, $p < 0.001$), gender ($\chi^2 = 17.401$, $p = 0.001$), and occupation ($\chi^2 = 27.174$, $p < 0.001$). However, no significant relationship was found between PT crime experience and religion ($\chi^2 = 24.717$, $p = 0.101$), education ($\chi^2 = 35.115$, $p = 0.093$), and the marital status ($\chi^2 = 29.575$, $p = 0.173$) of the residents in AMAC Abuja.

Mode of Public Transport (PT) crime Vulnerability in AMAC, Abuja

In Table 3, an attempt is made to categorise public transport crime by mode in AMAC. Information obtained on types of crime usually associated with different transport modes in the study area is presented below. Respondents were asked to rate the PT crime vulnerability by transport mode in some route within the scope of this study. According to the opinions of the respondents as presented in the table, okada passengers were the most vulnerable group to both rape or sexual harassment and kidnapping or abduction while vulnerable on foot are mostly affected by picking pocket and public vehicle passengers are said to be vulnerable to kidnapping or abduction in AMAC Abuja.

Table 3. Public Transport Mode of Crime

SN	Type of Crime	Mode			
		Foot	Okada	Motorcycle	Public Vehicle
1.	Pickpocketing	8.3%	6.4%	0.3%	0.0%
2.	Rape/Sexual Harassment	1.4%	37.9%	3.7%	8.8%
3.	Assault and Battery	7.4%	7.8%	2.1%	1.1%
4.	Armed Robbery	6.5%	18.1%	0.0%	0.8%
5.	Kidnapping/Abduction	0.8%	14.6%	1.8%	9.5%

Source: Field Survey, 2023

Additionally, a more in-depth examination of the table indicates that overall, passengers on okadas are notably the most susceptible group of travellers in AMAC, as their vulnerability index to any public transport crimes is either the highest or among the highest. Conversely, occupants of motorcycles are considered the most secure travellers, given that their vulnerability index to any transit crimes is either the lowest or among the lowest. Public vehicle passengers rank after motorcycle occupants and pedestrians, respectively, concerning vulnerability. These results demonstrate that no specific group of travellers is predominantly vulnerable to all categories of TP crime. However, passengers using different modes of transport face varying susceptibilities to distinct transit crimes. This finding aligns with Olojede, Daramola, and Olufemi's (2017) study. In contrast to the findings in Ilesa, where pedestrians and transit users were identified as the most vulnerable group, this study in AMAC reveals a different scenario.

Table 4. Relative Frequency of the Causes of PT Crimes in AMAC

SN	Cause	N	TWV	TCCRFI	Rank
1.	Poor policing/under-policing	432	2035	4.63	2
2.	Poor street system/urban planning	419	1743	4.16	8
3.	Substance abuse/Illicit drug use	432	1896	4.39	5
4.	Economic hardship/recession/poverty	432	2000	4.71	1
5.	Absence of CCTV and streetlights	412	1874	4.55	4
6.	Joblessness/unemployment	422	1924	4.56	3
7.	TV violence	431	1810	4.20	7
8.	Peer group influence	430	1874	4.36	6
9.	Family breakdown	426	1695	3.98	9

Source: Field Survey, 2023

According to the findings in Table 4, the primary factor perceived as the most influential cause of PT crime in AMAC is Economic hardship/recession/poverty. Following closely is Poor policing/under-policing. Joblessness/unemployment and the lack of closed-circuit television

(CCTV) are ranked third and fourth, respectively. Substance abuse/illicit drug use and peer group influence occupy the fifth and sixth positions. TV violence is positioned at seventh place, while joblessness/unemployment and family breakdown are identified as the eighth and ninth most substantial contributors to transit crime in AMAC.

Conclusions, and Recommendations

The demographic profile of respondents in AMAC, Abuja, reveals a diverse population with notable gender, age, marital status, occupation, and religious distributions. The prevalence of public transport crimes, as indicated in Table 2, highlights concerns such as pickpocketing, assault and battery, and kidnapping. The vulnerability varies across transportation modes, with Okada passengers being particularly at risk. The primary causes of public transport crimes are identified as economic hardships, poor policing, and unemployment. The implications of this study indicate that certain demographic groups might be more susceptible to specific crimes. For example, the youth (21-30 age group) may be more prone to assault and battery. Also, understanding the vulnerability of different transport modes is crucial for targeted intervention. Okada passengers, in particular, require heightened security measures. Economic difficulties, poor urban planning, and unemployment are identified as major contributors to public transport crimes. Addressing these issues could lead to a reduction in various criminal activities in AMAC, Abuja.

Therefore, increased police presence, especially in areas with high crime rates and implementing targeted security measures for Okada passengers and public vehicle users will enhance crime and security measures. Raise awareness about the specific risks associated with different transportation modes. Foster community involvement in crime prevention efforts. Implement programs to alleviate economic hardships, focusing on job creation. Explore technology-driven solutions to enhance public safety and Advocate for policies that address the identified causes of public transport crimes, such as improved policing, urban planning, and economic development. Addressing the multifaceted nature of public transport crimes in

AMAC requires a comprehensive and collaborative approach involving law enforcement, community members, policymakers, and relevant stakeholders.

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PEACE EDUCATION AS STRATEGY FOR MANAGING LAND GRABBING VIOLENCE IN ADO-ODO/OTA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, OGUN STATE

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ABSTRACT

Land grabbing in Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State, Southwest of Nigeria, by land owners known as 'Omo-onile', with the assistance of hired thugs, has caused incessant human rights abuses on residents and land purchasers. It is also a source of security concerns that have continued to affect the peace, unity, and development of rural communities in the local government area. The study examines the causes of land grabbing by land owners despite government's extant law prohibiting forcible occupation of landed properties in the state. Additionally, it also looks at how the incessant attacks by landowners and their thugs affect land purchasers, residents, the peace and development of Ota communities. The study explores how peace education can be an alternative solution to educate landowners, children, youths, and society on how-to live-in peace and harmony. The study is anchored on the social disorganization theory so as to interrogate the issue raised. Qualitative research methodology is employed in this research. Findings show that landowners' incessant attacks on land purchasers have caused setbacks to the development of rural communities, paralyzed businesses, and created fear among residents. It is recommended that government reviews the existing laws to convict and jail land grabbers who are selling land inappropriately and causing unrest in communities. Furthermore, the culture of peace education in families, schools, age groups, peer groups, and society at large should be received more attention from both the society and the government.

Keywords: Human rights, Land owners, Land grabbers, Peace education

Introduction

The importance of land cannot be overemphasized as it is regarded as a valuable resource that both human and animal cannot do without. Ajayi (2020) explains that land can be acquired through communal land tenure system, which promotes a community as the governing power of the land. Inheritance tenure system allows land ownership to transfer at the death of the main owner to the next of kin. Land is perceived as an essential wellspring of riches, social status, power, the basis of housing, food supply; however, it is rapidly becoming a scarce asset in the urban areas (Racheal, Olusola & Adedamola, 2020).

The scarcity of land in Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area exacerbated land owners, also known as ‘Omo-onile’, in reselling land previously sold to other people, which has continued to cause a lot of conflict in urban and rural areas of the local government area. Grabbing land in Ado-Odo/Ota, Ogun State, is a phenomenon that has been going on for some decades. Many indigenes of Ado-Odo/Ota comprising the young, old, chiefs, and district heads (Baale), are all in the business of selling landed properties in the area. Land grabbing in Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area has led to violent crises that have caused the loss of lives and properties, and many people have been injured. For example, the resident of Baba Ode Itusi-Ilogbo, Baba Ode, NAHCO, and neighbouring communities in the Atan area, Gbayunre village, and others in Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area have all been victimized and violated by land owners and their thugs.

Recently, community of Ajayi Egan in Ado-Odo/Ota was in a state of violence for days when clashes between two families of land owners and their thugs ensued due to a court judgement that favoured one side of the family as ownership of landed property, a majority of which had already been sold as at the time of judgement.

Meanwhile, the Ogun state government has enacted various stringent laws and punishments, such as long-term imprisonment, for land grabbers, but this has not deterred them from fraudulently and forcefully taking ownership or reselling properties sold to

someone else. Peace education has been seen by experts as a solution to educate children, youths, families, etc., at incipient levels to build the culture of peace in society. In view of this, it has become necessary to investigate peace education as a strategy for managing land grabbing violence in Ado-Odo/Ota LGA of Ogun state.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this research work is based on Social Disorganisation Theory (SDT). The SDT theory of violence has a long history in the field of sociology. The concern for social violence has occupied an important space in sociological lexicon since the time of classical sociologists. The theory is concerned with why violence is more common and prevalent in some neighbourhoods than in others (Abdullahi, 2016). The theory suggests that social disorganisation within a society, especially in urban centres, is a consequence of industrialisation, migration flows, neighbourhood deterioration, and the absence of social control (Rubington & Weinberg, 2010). Robert Park and his colleagues combined SDT with other theoretical propositions to investigate and examine the socio-ecological connection between neighbourhoods and violence. The idea was to deal with the environmental and social diversities of the criminogenic neighbourhood that catalyze youth engagement in violent acts (Bursik, 1998). Social disorganisation, according to Merriam-Webster, is a state of breakdown of effective social control resulting in a lack of functional integration between groups, conflicting social attitudes, and personal maladjustment.

It is one of the major problems of land grabbing by landowners with the use of force in order to cause fear and panic in the society. The families, youths, elders, community development associations, landlord associations, local and state government, police etc., have all failed in their roles and responsibilities in integrating the culture of peace, love, respect, and self-reliance into the society.

Land grabbing phenomenon in the Southwest of Nigeria

Land grabbing is a phenomenon in most southwestern states of Nigeria, especially in states like Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, and Ondo, where there is high density of human population competing

for economic opportunities. Industries such as banking and commerce, schools, manufacturing companies, churches, filling stations, hospitals, hotels, etc., are all in high demands for landed properties for various purposes. For example, Odubola (2019) noted that more than in any other state of the federation, land is a very strategic factor of production in Lagos state, as it attracts greater value there than anywhere else in the country. Meanwhile, land grabbing in Ogun state is prevalent in Ado-Odo/Ota LGA, which can be based on different reasons, such as the industrialized and business nature of the local government area, and many families claiming ownership of landed properties and selling such land inappropriately. The levity of past government in Ogun state to checkmate the activities of different families claiming ownership of landed property for decades exacerbated the syndrome of land grabbing by landowners in the state. Land grabbing is also a phenomenon in Oyo state, especially in Ibadan, where land grabbers are engaged in disposing landed properties from the actual owners, which has caused a lot of confrontation and unrest in different parts of Ibadan. Generally, land grabbing in the Southwest of Nigeria is a phenomenon that land purchasers and residents are battling on a daily basis.

Causes of land grabbing in Ogun State

Land is a highly coveted asset as noted by Justice Abiodun A. Akinyemi at the public lecture organized by the Association of Private Practising Surveyors of Nigeria Ogun State branch. He noted that the world, individuals, communities, and even nations attach so much importance to it, because of the vital role it plays in human existence. (Lawbreed, 2022).

Some of the causes of land grabbing in Ogun State according to Justice Abiodun A. Akinyemi are as follows:

1. Scarcity of Land: It is noted that demand for land totally outstrips its availability, especially in urban area. So, it is believed that might over right becomes the unwritten code, creating room and advantage for those who are more disposed to the use of force and violence over the law-abiding.

2. Untitled and unregistered land: Most of the land in Ogun State and Nigeria at large is untitled and unregistered. There is no register of titles in which investigated, determined, and verified proprietary rights and interests in all land in the state, with the names of their ascertained owners, are recorded. So, it will be difficult for people at rural or villages to conduct a search to ascertain the real details of ownership of land they are interested or intended to buy.

3. Uncertain and Undefined Boundaries: Whether genuinely or mischievously, many land owners do not know the exact boundaries of their land, especially with old natural boundary marks disappearing and being disputed. These exacerbates people selling other people's land to innocent purchasers, which later leads into conflict.

4. Multiple sale of land: Some land-owning families are notorious for knowingly selling the same land to more than one purchaser, thus creating conflicts. Sometimes, a sale done by older members of a family is denied by younger members of the same family in order to fleece the purchaser of more money or resell the same land to another purchaser who is willing to pay a higher price.

5. Ineffectiveness in the Implementation of the Land Use Act: The failure of government to properly and effectively implement the provisions of the Land Use Act is what has largely contributed to and encouraged the menace of land grabbing and dubious land vendors.

Activities of land grabbers in Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State

The activities of land grabbers in Ado-Odo/Ota LGA cannot be overemphasized, as they continue to exacerbate violence that affects the human rights of innocent Nigerians, and also violate the Ogun state's extant law prohibiting the forcible occupation of landed properties. Onsite investigations show that several villages and communities in Ado-Odo/Ota LGA are in a dilemma due to the activities of land grabbers and their thugs. These activities have caused many land purchasers to abandon their land construction and residents to live in perpetual fear. For example, residents in Baba-Ode, Onibuku, Ajayi Egan, Obeere, Gbayunre, Imoshe in Ejila Awori, Ikogbo, Feru village, Ajambata village, Itusi Ilogbo, Ayetoro, Itele, Iju-Ota, all in Ado-

Ota/Ota local government area of Ogun State, are all witnessing the menace of land grabbers in their communities on a daily basis.

Odubola (2019) noted that Landowners, known as 'Omo-onile', extort property owners for inexplicable reasons, and those who muster courage to face them end up harassed by thugs working for them. They demand cash from property owners to reclaim Land and most times, charge them at every stage of development of their property. The activities of land grabbers in Ado-Odo/Ota local government area mostly paralyze economic activities in most of the aforementioned communities. It endangers the lives of children, students, market women, collapses business activities, restricts people's movement, and causes panic among residents. Olope (2020) reports that the forceful takeover of landed property is rampant in Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State, often leading to loss of lives, while government legislation to curb this has not achieved much.

The "Prohibition of Forcible Occupation of Landed Properties, Armed Robbery, Kidnapping, Cultism and Other Anti-violence and Related Offences Law 2016" of Ogun State

According to Lawbreed (2022), Honourable Justice Abiodun A. Akinyemi, noted that the Law was passed in 2016, with a commencement date of November 14, 2016. As can be seen from its title, it covers much more than land-related crimes, though it has become better known in respect of land-related crimes. Indeed, it is more popularly referred to as the 'Anti-Land Grabbing Law'. The simple rationale behind the law (contained in Part 1 of it, comprising the sections 3 to 14), is to put an end, or reduce to the barest minimum, land-related violence.

Provisions of the Law and their implications

The provisions dealing with land grabbing are to be found in section 3 to 14 of the Law. Section 3, which deals with forceful takeover of land, aims to eradicate it.

1. As from the commencement of this law, no person or group of persons shall use force to take over any landed property in the state.
2. Any person or group of persons that contravenes any of the provisions of Sub-section (1) and (2) of this section shall on conviction, be liable to a term of Twenty-One (21) years.

Implications

1. Whether you are a landowner or the agent of landowner, if you use force to take possession of any land from anyone, whether the person is rightly or wrongfully on the land, you risk going to jail for 21 years if charged and found guilty under this law.
2. It does not matter that you are the genuine owner of the land or that the person you are forcefully ejecting is a trespasser.
3. This provision may also apply in a landlord and tenant situation against a landlord who uses force to eject a tenant, instead of following due process. Removing the roof, doors, or physically throwing out your tenant's properties may constitute forceful takeover of property under this section

Unlawful Use of Land Agent

Section 6 (1) provides:

Any person who places on any land or landed property any agent for the purpose of a forceful takeover of the land is guilty of an offence and, on conviction, be liable to a fine of five-million-naira (N5,000,000.00) or imprisonment to a term of ten (10) years or both such a fine and imprisonment.

Section 6 (2) provides:

Any person who enforces or uses agents for the enforcement of any judgement in respect of a landed property except as provided under the Sheriff and Civil Process Law is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of five-million-naira (N5,000,000.00) or imprisonment for Ten (10) years or both such fine and imprisonment.

Demand for Construction Fees

Section II provides:

Any person, who, whether for himself or acting as an agent of another, demands for any fine or levy in respect of construction work, e.g, roofing, repair or restoration of any property or disrupt or obstruct the same for the purpose of

demanding such a fine or levy is guilty of an offence and shall, upon conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Naira (N500,000.00) or to a term of imprisonment of not less than seven (7) years or both such a fine and imprisonment.

The Ineffectiveness of the Law Prohibiting Forceful Occupation of Landed Properties in Ogun State

Despite the Ogun State Government and its legislative arm's provisions of the anti-land grabbing law enacted to sentence/fine anyone found guilty of land grabbing to imprisonment not Less than 21years or a fine up to N5, 000,000.00, or as the case maybe, in order to deter, reduce, or eradicate land grabbing in Ogun state, it has not stopped the menace. Many of the land grabbers have been arrested on several occasions by the Nigerian police and the State Security Service (SSS), but they are later released on bail and thereafter become a threat to residents and the society at large. The will by the state government to really pull the bull by the horns in sentencing culprits and those found guilty to imprisonment according to the law remains a mirage.

According to Rasheed Osinowo, the Chief Executive Officer of Osinowo & Associate, "one of the problems of the Nigerian government is that they lack the will to enforce law. Government laws are clustered-concept, successful on paper but failure in reality. This is why land grabbing is still on the high side till now" (Odubola, 2019). Also, a report by the surveyors under the Association of Private Practising Surveyors of Nigeria, an arm of the Nigerian Institution of Surveyors (NIS) Ogun State branch, have decried the Ogun State anti-land grabbing law, describing it as 'useless' and 'ineffective' (Olatunji, 2022). Land grabbing in Ogun state can be reduced to the minimum if the law prohibiting the activities of land grabbers can be put into force and execution without favour. Additionally, the use of peace education to create awareness on the need to respect the human rights of everyone and live in peace with one another can also play a significant role.

Building the Culture of Peace

Culture of peace all over the world remain one of the best alternative practice and option for human to live in peace and harmony. It is important for families to look inward in correcting the abnormality and the negligence of not impacting the culture of nonviolence among children from the family levels. Akinyoade (2011), cited as in Adams (2009) states that “a culture of peace consists of values, attitudes, behaviours, and ways of life based on nonviolence, respect for human rights, intercultural understanding, tolerance and solidarity, sharing and free flow of information and the full participation of women”.

Since violence is prevalent among human being, the culture of peace remain an important tool used to respect other people’s opinion, tolerate others whether right or wrong, and respect for others human rights. The Nigerian government and other stakeholders should start looking at how peace education can be taking to rural communities and educate people through the school system, media, palace, market, etc., on how-to live-in peace and harmony with one another.

Importantly, the inculcation of peace education by the National Council on Education (NCE) as a core subject at the primary and secondary school levels and not as a sub-subject under social studies or other subjects is important and requires urgent attention. A curriculum on peace education should be design in other to response to the incessant attack by people and the prevalent flagrant of people to human rights and tolerance in the society.

Peace Education as an alternative solution to land grabbing

The purpose of peace education as a strategy to the incessant violent activities of land grabbing is to find a lasting solution, not just short-term solutions such as “the arrest and prosecution of thugs and landowners perpetuating terror in communities, which has not deterred or stopped their activities”. The introduction of peace education into our school curriculum system at primary and secondary school levels in order to build the culture of peace will go a long way in shaping the attitudes, culture, and mental behaviours of children who will be the leaders of tomorrow and those taking over from landowners in the future.

Oluwagbohunmi, Osalusi, and Abdu-Raheem (2013) noted that, since conflict cannot be completely eradicated due to its inevitability, one of the ways by which it can be reduced is through the school system. Having identified intolerance of other peoples' cultures as one of the root causes of conflicts, it is pertinent to educate the young ones about people's cultures and beliefs. Peace education, according to UNICEF, is an essential component of quality basic education. It is the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth, and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural, to resolve conflict peacefully and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level (Fountain, 1999).

How to use Peace Education to create awareness in Ado-Odo/Ota LGA

1. Conflict Resolution Education: Castro and Galace (2005), cited in Jones (2006), argue that CRE has the following common goals: to create a safe and constructive learning environment, to enhance students' social and emotional development, and to create constructive conflict. Governments and NGOs should work hand in hand to provide information about peace education as a tool for conflict resolution through organization of seminars. This will encourage landowners to explore alternative means of livelihood rather than being overly dependent on land grabbing as a legitimate business in Ado-Odo/Ota LGA.

2. Human Rights Education: The United Nations Human Rights notes that human rights education promotes values, beliefs and attitudes that encourage all individuals to uphold their own rights and those of others. It develops an understanding of everyone's common responsibility to make human rights a reality in each community (OHCHR, 2005). Human rights peace education will instil in the youths and adults who are involved in land grabbing how to respect one another's human rights and dignity. It will also create environment of peace, harmony, and a non-violent society, as the majority of landowners 'omo-onile', in Ado-Odo/Ota LGA are ignorant and don't really understand the implications of their actions on humans and society at large.

3. Good Governance: Poverty, which is one of the major reasons why people are desperately tuning to crime, should be eradicated in society. The high rate of unemployment and poverty exacerbates the high rate of crime among youths engaging in land grabbing, cybercrime, ritual, cultism, armed robbery, etc. Onoja (2012) notes that good government with the participation, the rule of law, transparency, equity and accountability leads to development. The government should be responsive, accountable, transparent, effective, and inclusive, and should also create awareness and avoid partiality in its action.

4. Economic Empowerment Program: The Ogun state government should provide economic empowerment and more job opportunities to the youths. This will create opportunities for them to engage rather than remain idle, providing them with a means of livelihood.

5. Preventive Measures: The government's law banning and imprisoning land grabbers in Ogun state should be maintained and made more effective. This will undoubtedly deter and reduce the violent activities of land grabbers in many communities. A government task force should also be established to patrol rural communities and monitor the activities of landowners and their thugs in Ado-Odo/Ota LGA, and other local government area of Ogun state.

Findings

The findings show that scarcity of land, untitled and unregistered land, uncertain and undefined boundaries, multiple sales of land, and ineffectiveness in the implementation of land Use Act, among others are some of the causes of land grabbing in Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State. The activities of land owners in Ado-Odo/Ota cannot be overemphasized. They continue to cause social unrest and human rights violations in some of the major communities in the LGA, such as Baba-Ode, Onibuku, Imohse community, and recently, at Ajayi Egan and Obeere in Atan Ota. One person was killed and several people were injured to varying degrees as a result of violence from the activities of these individuals.

It has also hindered the development of rural areas of the local government area, as many people are discouraged from purchasing, establishing, and residing in the LGA.

The teaching of peace education, including conflict resolution education, human rights education, preventive measures, nonviolent education, economic empowerment, youth education and development, and good governance, are some of the solutions proposed to address the incessant violence of land grabbing in Ado-Odo/Ota LGA of Ogun State.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, all hands must be on deck to create the atmosphere of peace and harmony in the society. The inclusion of peace education into Nigeria's education curriculum at primary and secondary school levels will go a long way in building the culture of peace among children who are going to be the leaders of tomorrow in Nigeria.

In view of the above, the underlisted are recommended.

- i. All land within Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area and Ogun State be adequately titled and registered by the Ogun State government. This will enable families, clans, individuals, groups, etc., to ascertain and identify their land boundaries.
- ii. Activities of land grabbers in some communities in Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area that create fear, panic, killing, and destruction of people's properties, such as what happen at Ajayi Egan and Obeere in Atan Ota, should be investigated by the Nigerian Police. Anyone found culpable should face the Law.
- iii. Inclusion of peace education into Nigeria's educational curriculum at primary and secondary school levels can be an alternative solution to the phenomenon of land grabbing in Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State.

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SCARCITY OF FUEL AND CURRENCY NOTES AS STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE ENHANCING POLICIES: A REVIEW OF THE IMPACT ON UNIVERSITY WORKERS

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of structural violence of government policy relating to fuel-currency notes hardship on university workers. The experience between January and March 2023 climaxed the hardship occasioned by the scarcity of fuel and currency notes at the same time. This study adopts mixed (qualitative and quantitative) methods. A total of three hundred and fifteen (315) semi-structured questionnaire were distributed to the respondents only two hundred and eighty-eight (288) were recovered and found valid for the quantitative data analysis. Also, ten (10) respondents were interviewed with a view to collecting qualitative data for qualitative aspect of the study. Quantitative data collected were analyzed using SPSS package while Qualitative data collected were analyzed using content analysis. The study reveals that government structural violence policy on fuel and naira scarcity negatively affected the transportation to work of the population of study as many could not afford the transport fare. The experience also negatively impacted on their livelihoods in the overall, as many of them could not meet their basic needs of life. Additionally, it affected their overall well-being and mental health. This study suggests increase in university workers' salaries, provision of free means of transportation and provision of palliatives to staffs as ways to mitigate the impact of the structural violence. This study further recommends that should always take into account the psychological well-being of the population formulating and implementing any public policies.

Keywords: Impact, Structural Violence, Government Policies, University Workers, Currency

Introduction

The socio-economic and political designs that significantly harm and unjustly treat minority people on a large scale are said to be structural violence. Lee (2019) posits that “structural violence, though mostly hidden and unrecognized, is a concept important enough in any study of violence”. As noted by Murphy (2022, p.1) “while the ethical stakes of physical violence are generally accessible, conceptual barriers limit the ability to explore the important ethical dimensions of structural violence”. Structural violence is a sort of violence that is built into the society's basic structure and is much of the time intangible to the individuals who stand to gain from it. Johan Galtung initially utilized the expression "structural violence" in 1969. Galtung (1969) argued that violence may be seen in social frameworks supporting inequality, injustice and overt physical acts of harm. ...that help disparity and unfairness notwithstanding obvious actual demonstrations of mischief. According to Galtung (1969), structural violence describes “any constraint on the human potential that is generated by economic and political structures, rather than by individuals or their decisions”. Farmer (2004) sees structural violence as the “diverse and frequently interconnected processes that produce and maintain inequality on various levels, both for individuals and communities”.

For communities on the margins, structural violence can have severe impacts. For instance, poor health can lead to higher rates of disease and mortality, especially among persons of color and those with low wealth (Krieger, 2011). Similar to how unequal access to education can reduce economic possibilities and prolong poverty cycles (Morse, 2007). The persistence of segregation and the concentration of poverty in some neighborhoods are the results of housing laws that exclude certain communities (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2010). Corroborating this, (Lee 2019, p.130) opined that “increasing poverty is another symptom and indication of structural violence”. Social justice and structural violence are closely related since the former causes inequality and the latter impedes efforts to create a society that is more just and equitable. Understanding the mechanisms and structures that support inequality is essential to addressing structural violence.

In Nigeria, the unequal distribution of wealth is one of the main causes of economic inequality. The federal government's fuel and naira policies that led to their scarcity in the first quarter of 2023, affected many business and economic opportunities negatively making more people slide into poverty, which in turn, further widened the inequality gap and deepen structural violence experience in the country.

It is against this backdrop that this study investigates the impact of government policy on fuel-naira scarcity which triggered structural violence in Universities and Nigeria as a whole.

Government Policy on Fuel-Naira Hardship

Nigeria, as a major oil-producing nation, grapples with the challenge of fuel scarcity, which has a significant impact on the scarcity of its national currency, the Naira. Several factors contribute to fuel hardship in the country, including inadequate domestic refining capacity. The refineries have suffered from years of neglect, with limited investment in maintenance and refurbishment (Amadi, 2020). This lack of proper maintenance has resulted in a deteriorating state of equipment, pipelines, and facilities, further compromising the operational efficiency of the refineries (Babalola & Adekoya, 2020). Many of the refineries were built several decades ago and have not undergone significant upgrades or technological advancements (Adefulu & Ehinmowo, 2021). The obsolete infrastructure contributes to inefficiencies, higher energy consumption, and increased operational costs (Ikejiofor & Iwuji, 2020).

The refineries often experience operational disruptions due to mechanical failures, power outages, and pipeline leakages (Adefulu & Ehinmowo, 2021). This feebleness of the nation's refineries has had serious implications for Nigerians, leading to fuel scarcity and long queues at filling stations (Nwoke, 2021), including affecting the economy and the Nigerian populace livelihoods.

Method

The study adopts mixed (qualitative and quantitative) methods. The study population for the research comprises the academic and non-academic staff (workers) of the Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria. The institution was used as case study in this research. Using the population of staff which is about one thousand four hundred and seventy (1470), the researcher employed the formulae propounded by Taro Yamane (1973) to determine the sample size. The formulae and calculation is $n = N / 1 + N (e)^2$. Random (for quantitative aspect) and purposively (for qualitative aspect) sampling techniques were adopted for the study. Questionnaires and in-depth one on one interviews were used to collect primary data for the study. Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) for the qualitative while thematic analytical approach was used to analyze qualitative. For validity and reliability..., the research instrument (questionnaire and interview guide) was given to a senior researcher in the field to validate. Also, the research instrument was administered to a sample of staff members at two different point in time with a view to comparing their responses for consistency. For ethical consideration, the respondents were made to take part freely. The respondents' privacy in the research was secured and safeguarded, and their anonymity was assured and ensured.

Result

The result as presented below addressed the research questions which also link the research objectives for the study. These are: How has the scarcity of fuel and naira affected the day-to-day operations universities? How has the fuel and naira scarcity affected the transportation of university workers? How has the fuel and naira scarcity affected the morale and productivity of university workers?; How did the structural violence of fuel-naira hardship impact the livelihoods of university workers?

Presentation of Results

Table 1 Demographic Information of the Respondents

Variables	Category	Frequency (n=288)	Percentage
Sex	Male	164	57.0
	Female	124	43.0
Age of respondents	30 – 50 years	208	72.0
	50 – 60 years	80	28.0
Educational qualification	SSCE/GCE	4	1.40
	OND	70	24.3
	HND/B.SC	126	44.0
	M.SC/Ph.D	88	30.6
Marital Status	Married	231	80.2
	Single	24	8.30
	Others	33	11.5
Job Position/Category	Academic staff		
	Non-academic staff	99	34.4
		189	65.6

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

The table above showed the demographic information of the respondents. The sex distribution of the respondents indicated that 164(57%) of the respondents were male while 124(43%) were female. The age of the respondents showed that 208(72%) were 30 – 50 years while only 80(28%) were between 50 – 60 years. Also, it was obtained that only 4(1%) of the respondents have SSCE/GCE educational qualification, 70(24%) had OND qualification, 126(44%) have HND/BSc. While 88(31%) have M.SC/Ph.D qualification. However, it was estimated that

231(80%) of the respondents were married, 24(8%) were single while 33(11%) were others. Nevertheless, analysis of this study revealed that 99(34%) of the respondents were academic staff while 189(66%) were non-academic staff

Table 2: How did fuel scarcity affect your daily commitment to work?

	Frequency	Percent
Frequently	189	65.6
Occasionally	99	34.4
Not at all	-	-
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

Distribution of the respondents' opinion on "how did fuel scarcity affect your daily commitment to work" as presented in table 2 showed that 189(66%) of the respondents said frequently, 99(34%) said occasionally while no traces of not at all was observed. This implies that, majority of the respondents were of the view that fuel scarcity affects their daily commitment to work frequently.

Table 3: How did naira scarcity affect your financial situation?

	Frequency	Percent
Difficulty in meeting basic needs	107	37.2
Increased stress and anxiety	39	13.5
Delayed or inability to pay bills	121	42.0
Limited access to healthcare or essential services	21	7.3
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "how did naira scarcity affect your financial situation" as presented in table 3 showed that 107(37%) of the respondents said difficulty in meeting basic needs, 39(14%) said increased stress and anxiety, 121(42%) said delayed or inability to pay bills, 21(7%) said limited access to healthcare or essential services. This implies that, majority of the respondents were of the view that naira scarcity affects their financial situation in delaying or inability to pay bills.

Table 4: Did the structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity affect your overall job performance?

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	190	66.0
No	98	34.
Not at all	-	-
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "did the structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity affect your overall job performance" as presented in table 4 showed that 190(66%) of the respondents said yes, 98(34%) said no. This implies that, majority of the respondents were of the view that structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity affect their overall job performance. Table 5: Did the structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity impact your motivation and job satisfaction?

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	195	67.7
No	93	33.3
Not at all	-	-
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "did the structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity impact your motivation and job satisfaction" as presented in table 5 indicated that 195(67%) of the respondents said yes, 93(33%) said no. This implies that, majority of the respondents were of the view that violence of fuel-naira scarcity impact or influence their motivation and job satisfaction.

Table 6: Have you sought any form of support or assistance to cope with the impact of fuel-naira scarcity?

	Frequency	Percent
Financial support from family or friends	134	47.0
Financial support from the University	154	53.0
Counselling or therapy services	-	-
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "have you sought any form of support or assistance to cope with the impact of fuel-naira scarcity" as presented in table 6 indicated that 134(47%) of the respondents said financial support from family or friends, 154(53%) said financial support from the university. This implies that, majority of the respondents' sought form of support or assistance to cope with the impact of fuel-naira scarcity from the university.

Table 7: How has the scarcity of fuel and naira affected the day-to-day operations Universities?

	Frequency	Percent
Significantly impacted operations	184	64.0
Moderately impacted operations	90	31.3
Slightly impacted operations	14	4.8
No impact on operations	-	-
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "how has the scarcity of fuel and naira affected the day-to-day operations of the study area as presented in table 7 indicated that 184(64%) of the respondents said significantly impacted operations, 90(31%) said moderately impacted operations, while 14(5%) said slightly impacted operations. This implies that majority of the respondents were of the view that the scarcity of fuel and naira significantly affected the day-to-day operations of the institution used as case study.

Table 8: Have there been any delays or disruptions in the delivery of essential services or supplies due to the fuel and naira scarcity?

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	195	67.7
No	93	33.3
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "have there been any delays or disruptions in the delivery of essential services or supplies due to the fuel and naira scarcity" as presented in table 8 indicated that 195(68%) of the respondents said yes, while 93(33%) said no. This implies that majority of the respondents were of the view that there been any delays or disruptions in the delivery of essential services or supplies due to the fuel and naira scarcity.

Table 9: How has the fuel and naira scarcity affected the transportation of university workers?

	Frequency	Percent
Severely impacted transportation	186	64.6
Moderately impacted transportation	92	32.4
Slightly impacted transportation	10	3.5
No impact on transportation	-	-
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "how has the fuel and naira scarcity affected the transportation of university workers" as presented in table 9 indicated that 186(65%) of the respondents said severely impacted transportation, 92(32%) said moderately impacted transportation while 10(4%) said slightly impacted transportation. This implies that majority of the respondents were of the view that the fuel and naira scarcity severely affected the transportation of university workers.

Table 10: Have there been any changes in the availability or accessibility of resources such as electricity or internet connectivity in the institution during the fuel and naira scarcity period.

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	93	33.3
No	195	67.7
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "have there been any changes in the availability or accessibility of resources such as electricity or internet connectivity in the institution during the fuel and naira scarcity period" as presented in table 10 indicated that 93(33%) of the respondents said yes, while 195(68%) said no. This implies that majority of the respondents were of the view that there is no changes in the availability or accessibility of resources such as electricity or internet connectivity in the institution during the fuel and naira scarcity period.

Table 11: How has the fuel and naira scarcity affected the morale and productivity of university workers?

	Frequency	Percent
Decreased morale and productivity	186	64.6
Slightly decreased morale and productivity	92	32.4

No significant impact on morale and productivity	10	3.5
Improved morale and productivity	-	-
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "how has the fuel and naira scarcity affected the morale and productivity of workers" as presented in table11 indicated that 186(65%) of the respondents said decreased morale and productivity, 92(32%) said slightly decreased morale and productivity while 10(4%) said no significant impact on morale and productivity. This implies that majority of the respondents' were of the view that fuel and naira scarcity decreased morale and productivity of workers.

Table 12: Have there been any instances of staff members facing financial difficulties or hardship due to the fuel and naira scarcity

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	278	96.5
No	10	3.50
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "have there been any instances of staff members facing financial difficulties or hardship due to the fuel and naira scarcity" as presented in table12 indicated that 278(96%) said yes while 10(4%) said no. This implies that majority of the respondents' were of the view that there are instances whereby staff members facing financial difficulties or hardship due to the fuel and naira scarcity.

Table 13: How did the structural violence of fuel-naira hardship impact the livelihoods of university workers?

	Frequency	Percent
Significantly impacted	196	68.0
Moderately impacted	92	32.0
Not at all	-	-
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "how did the structural violence of fuel-naira hardship impact the livelihoods of workers" as presented in table 13 indicated that 196(68%)

of the respondents said significantly impacted, 92(32%) said moderately impacted. This implies that, majority of the respondents' were of the view that structural violence of fuel-naira hardship significantly impacted the livelihoods of workers.

Table 14: Have there been any instances of staff members having difficulty in meeting their basic needs due to the fuel and naira scarcity?

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	278	96.5
No	10	3.50
Total	288	100.0

Source; Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "have there been any instances of staff members having difficulty in meeting their basic needs due to the fuel and naira scarcity" as presented in table14 indicated that 278(96%) said yes while 10(4%) said no. This implies that majority of the respondents' were of the view that there are instances of staff members having difficulty in meeting their basic needs due to the fuel and naira scarcity.

Table 15: How has the fuel and naira scarcity affected the overall financial situation of the institution?

	Frequency	Percent
Significant negative impact	188	65.3
Moderate negative impact	93	32.3
Slight negative impact	7	2.4
No significant impact	-	-
Total	288	100.0

Source: Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "how has the fuel and naira scarcity affected the overall financial situation of institution" as presented in table 15 indicated that 188(65%) of the respondents said significant negative impact, 93(32%) said moderate negative impact while 7(2%) said slight negative impact. This implies that majority of the respondents' were of the view that fuel and naira scarcity affected the overall financial situation of the institution.

Table 16: Fuel-Naira Scarcity and Structural Violence

S/ N	Statements	SD	D	NS	A	SA
1.	The structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity significantly affected my daily commitment to work	-	-	11 (3.8%)	188 (65%)	81 (28%)
2.	The structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity had a negative impact on my financial situation	-	-	1 (1%)	205 (71%)	82 (28%)
3.	The structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity significantly affected my job performance	-	-	2 (1%)	83 (29%)	204 (71%)
4.	The structural violence of fuel-Naira scarcity had a negative impact on my overall well-being and mental health.	-	-	2 (1%)	212 (74%)	74 (25%)

Source: Field Survey 2023.

Table 16 above indicated the distribution of the respondents on fuel-naira scarcity and structural violence, it was gathered that 11(4%) of the respondents were not sure that the structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity significantly affected their daily commitment to work, 188(65%) agreed while 81(28%) said strongly agreed. It was also revealed that 205(71%) of the respondents agreed while 82(28%) strongly agreed that the structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity had a negative impact on my financial situation.

Table 17: What are the suggested ways to mitigate the impact of fuel-naira hardship on FUOYE staff?

	Frequency	Percent
Increase in staff salary	188	65.3
Provision of free means of transportation	93	32.3
Provision of palliatives to staffs	7	2.4
Total	288	100.0

Source: Field Survey 2023.

The distribution of the respondents' opinion on "what are ways to mitigate the impact of fuel-naira hardship on university workers" as presented in table 17 indicated that 188(65%) of the respondents said increase in staff salary, 93(32%) said provision of free means of transportation while 7(2%) said provision of palliatives to staffs. This implies that majority of the respondents were of the view that the ways to mitigate the impact of fuel-naira hardship

on university workers include increase in staff salary, provision of free means of transportation and provision of palliatives to staffs.

Hypothesis testing

H₀: Structural violence of fuel-naira notes hardship has no negative effect on workers livelihoods.

Table 18: Regression Coefficients^a

Coefficients ^a						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.056	.284		.198	.844
	Structural violence	-.462	.132	.364	3.503	.001
a. Dependent Variable: SGL						

From the regression findings in table 8, the substitution of the equation:

$Y = B_0 + \beta_1 X_1$ become:

$SGL = 0.056 - 0.462 \text{Structural violence}$

However, the coefficient of structural violence is .462. This shows that structural violence of fuel-naira notes hardship on staffs is negatively related to staffs good living with statistical significant impact. The results of the analysis indicated that is a unit decrease in structural violence is followed by decrease 0.46% of staffs' good living. Therefore, structural violence of fuel-naira notes hardship has negative influence on workers livelihoods.

Discussion of Findings

This study examines the effect of structural violence of fuel-naira notes hardship on workers of the organization for this study. From the study, it could be seen that the majority of the respondents' revealed that fuel scarcity affects the daily commitment to work of University staff. The naira scarcity affected their financial situation including delaying or inability to pay bills. The study revealed that structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity affected staff overall job performance, staff motivation and job satisfaction. In addition, the findings of the study showed that staff sought various forms of support or assistance from the university to cope with the impact of fuel-naira scarcity. The scarcity of fuel and naira notes significantly affected the day-to-day operations of the organization for this study. Findings from the study corroborate the study by Akpan and Nnamseh (2015), who found out that petrol scarcity is a malady and a serious economic problem in Nigeria. Successive governments have, often

times, used it as a case for political advances, yet petrol scarcity remained a macroeconomic monster in Nigeria.

Also, the study revealed that there have been delays or disruptions in the delivery of essential services or supplies at the study area due to the fuel and naira scarcity and fuel and naira scarcity severely affected the transportation of staff members to and fro in the study area. The study showed that the fuel and naira scarcity decreased the morale and productivity of staff members in the study area. From the analysis of the study, it was also realized that there are instances whereby staff members facing financial difficulties or hardship due to the fuel and naira scarcity significantly impacted the livelihoods of staff in the study area. Findings from the study corroborate the Findings of Femi (2013) who revealed that it is an understatement to say that the fuel crisis has made Africa's largest oil-producing nation- Nigeria- a laughing stock in the comity of nations. It is a common knowledge that fuel scarcity can escalate inflation and worsen the problem of poverty in Nigeria. Many workers will lose their jobs as companies will find it difficult to cope with it.

More so, findings from the study showed that there were instances staff of the organization for the study had difficulty in meeting their basic needs due to the fuel and naira scarcity, as the fuel and naira scarcity affected the overall financial situation of organization. Finally, the study revealed that the structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity had a negative impact on their overall well-being, their mental health and livelihoods.

Conclusion

The dilemma of fuel and cash scarcity in Nigeria was indeed disturbing. Having money in the bank without having access to its withdrawal due to the menace of the scarcity of the new cash notes was a form of violence in itself. The problem hamstrung massive numbers of people from providing for their family and personal needs. Changing of the currency notes created more harm than good for the people and the economic condition of the country. From the study, it was clear that naira notes and fuel scarcity affected the transportation workers to and fro their workplace in the study area. Workers faced financial difficulties due to the fuel and naira scarcity, and the structural violence occasioned by it significantly impacted the livelihoods of workers.

Conclusively, findings from the study revealed instances where staff in the study area had difficulty in meeting their basic needs due to the fuel and naira scarcity, as the fuel and naira scarcity affected the overall financial situation. The structural violence of fuel-naira scarcity indeed had a negative impact on their overall well-being and mental health. Following these, the study recommends, access to free medical check-up, increase in staff salaries, provision of

free means of transportation and provision of palliatives to staffs as ways to mitigate the impact of fuel-naira hardship in the study area.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) IN NIGERIA: A PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

The difficulties faced by internally displaced people in Nigeria and the legal protections available to them have been examined in this work. To determine the extent of obstacles and legal safeguards afforded to them, the study employed content analysis of the body of existing literature. According to the study, internally displaced people in Nigeria face a wide range of difficulties, such as losing their homes, their traditional means of subsistence and income, their families and social networks disintegrating, their possessions becoming intangible, and their properties being lost. A cursory examination of the various factors contributing to internal displacement in Nigeria showed that violent conflict, particularly the deadly actions of Boko Haram and the militant Fulani Herdsmen, has been the primary cause of forced migration and internal displacement in the country for more than ten years. These displaced people experience numerous violations of their human rights in the absence of meaningful legal protection. Instead, it has been determined that the current institutional arrangement keepers are hampered by current policy deficits and the absence of a specific framework to adequately address the situation or cover medium- to longer-term requirements for the IDPs, even though they are finding it difficult to manage the situation, especially in the short term. Therefore, there is need for additional security measures to be considered to ensure the safety and well-being of the internally displaced persons in Nigeria, it is imperative to purposefully design a legal framework that will specifically address the challenges facing them.

Keywords: Internally Displaced Persons, Boko Haram, Fulani Herdsmen, Legal Protection

Introduction

According to some definitions, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are people who are vulnerable in their own countries due to either natural or man-made disasters. Circumstances brought about by a number of problems, such as conflicts and abuses or violations of human

rights. There are estimates of roughly 26 million people who are internally displaced within their own nations in more than 50 different countries worldwide. These people's displacement is a result of conflict and human rights abuses. Reports from 2008 stated that approximately 36 million people were displaced worldwide as a result of natural disasters alone. Although the term has been around for a while, it gained international attention following World War II and eventually emerged as a major phenomenon at end of the Cold War. Following the end of the Cold War, conflicts in Africa resulted in an enormous number of forcible global population displacements. Following a protracted civil war that left millions of people displaced over the course of about 30 months, Nigeria appeared to be spared the nightmare of forced displacement. (IDPs Handbook, 2008)

Once more, 444,781 households in Round 38 contained 2,182,613 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This represents a reduction of less than 1 percent, or 8,580 people, from Round 37, which saw 2,191,193 IDPs registered (May 2021). Between Round 38 and Round 33 of the previous year, there were 64,063 more internally displaced people in North East Nigeria, or nearly 3% more than there were in Round 38. In 2013, the Boko Haram insurgency and other humanitarian crises also caused 470,500 people to lose their homes in various communities. In Round 38 of 2021, the Internal Migration Organization (IOM)'s "Displacement Tracking Matrix" (DTM) assessment revealed that 2,182,613 internally displaced people (IDPs) in 444,781 households were found.

The international humanitarian community has yet to produce a legally binding document that specifies the standards for the status, rights, and responsibilities of IDPS, despite the fact that there are many IDPS throughout the world. This definition is found in the Refugee Convention (RC) 1951 and its 1967 Protocol, to these kinds of worries. It appears that this definition excludes people who have been compelled to leave their home countries because of environmental problems like climate change or natural disasters like bad weather, famine, floods, or earthquakes.

However, because of man-made disasters like violent conflicts, acts of terrorism, flagrant human rights violations by state or non-state actors, and state-sponsored development projects, this group of people has been displaced or evacuated from their home country, town, or state, and the Convention and its Protocol do not provide any guarantee of legal protection for them. This paper therefore aims to assess the general impact of international laws on the lives of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Nigeria. It will specifically examine the causes of internal displacement and the effects these causes have on the IDPs. Additionally, it will evaluate the IDPs' status under international law and the emerging trend of their legal protection, particularly under the Kampala Convention of the African Union. Using Nigeria as a case study, the paper makes the case that the Convention's obligations to its member states go beyond simply enacting laws to ensure the welfare of internally displaced people (IDP's) and include taking the required institutional, legal, administrative, and incidental steps to eradicate the underlying causes of internal displacement across the African continent.

Conceptual Framework

Who is an Internally Displaced Person?

The identity of an IDP 's is not widely agreed upon. The definition of an internally displaced person (IDP) that is most frequently used, referenced, and applied was developed by Francis Deng, a former UN representative who played a key role in the creation of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. A person or groups of people who have been compelled to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence in particular due to or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural or man-made disasters, are defined as internally displaced people under the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

The UN Guiding Principles' definition of internal displacement is adopted word for word by the AU Kampala Convention (2009), which also defines internal displacement as "the involuntary or forced migration, evacuation or relocation of persons or groups of persons within internationally recognized State border." Two characteristics of internal displacement

and obtaining the status of an internally displaced person flow from the definitions of IDPS and internal displacement given above. Internal displacement is, first of all, an unintentional movement. It is a forced migration of individuals or groups of individuals who, more often than not, have no other option than to leave the affected area. There is also the aspect of being imprisoned in one's own nation but removed from one's accustomed or comfortable surroundings.

Furthermore, even though IDP's are meant to be protected by their nation of origin, they might not be able to take advantage of that protection if internal conflict between rebel groups and the established government prevents the government from providing it. It's possible that the previous administration caused the internal displacement and is resistant to helping the IDP's.

Is there an increase in IDPs in the African Region?

In fact, according to data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), one-third of all IDPs worldwide are thought to originate from the African continent alone. (IDMC, 2012) The explanations for this are not implausible. The competition for political dominance and ideological supremacy was the first significant factor. The African nations that had been under military rule for the majority of their independence saw a resurgence of democratic movements at the start of the 1990s. However, by the end of that decade, the majority of African countries were enmeshed in one violent crisis or another.

The competition for control of natural resources is the second factor that motivates the first. For example, the 1991 start of the Sierra Leonean Civil War was about who would control the diamond-rich Kono districts. Nearly half of the 4.5 million people living in the country were internally displaced people (IDPs) at the time of its end in 1999. (Johnson, Eric, 2002)

The third factor is the frequent occurrence of intercommunal violence, which is typically associated with ethnic group disputes over land and boundaries. The towns of Ife and Modakeke in the west and the Aguleris and Umuleris communities in the east of Nigeria are

two examples. Conflicts over the use and extent of land possession occurred between "settlers" and "original inhabitants," or "indigenes," in addition to violent clashes over land ownership between communities. In Nigeria, there is always a political or religious undertone to violent conflicts. The Middle Belt of Nigeria, which serves as a sort of crossroads between the predominantly Christian Southern Nigeria and the predominantly Muslim Northern Nigeria, saw about 40,000 people forced from their homes in 2012. This resulted from conflicts between the about 40,000 people were forced from their homes in Nigeria's Middle Belt in 2012; this region is essentially the meeting point of the country's predominantly Christian South and predominantly Muslim North. Conflicts between the indigenous Christian farmers and the nomadic Muslim pastoralists were the cause of this. (IDMC, Nigeria Country Profile, July 2013)

Africa has long experienced terrorism. An exemplary case in point is Nigeria, where the Boko Haram sect has been waging terror attacks against its citizens for the past four years. The Northeastern states of Borno, Bauchi, Adamawa, and Yobe are the most severely affected. In April 2013, the Nigerian Joint Task Forces orchestrated a counterterrorism attack against the sect, which left hundreds of people displaced from Baga and its surroundings and left the town desolate due to the high number of civilian casualties. In May 2013, the sect carried out a retaliatory attack against the civilian population of Bama town in the same state, which led to additional population displacement. (IDMC citing the AFP, 2013)

Nigeria's Internal Displacement Problem and the Welfare of IDPs

The government has been concerned about the issue of internal displacement since the Nigerian Civil War ended in 1970. Resettling the thousands of people who had been displaced by the civil war and reconstructing the cities that had been destroyed by the conflict presented the government with two challenges. This was accompanied by an increase in the number of violent conflicts, including political, religious, ethnic, and communal disputes. Nigeria, a conglomeration of diverse ethnic, linguistic, and religious nations and nation states, is perpetually precarious on the verge of violent conflict. The landlocked South East is known

for its communal conflicts over land and boundary disputes, whereas the South West (wild, wild, West!) is dominated by conflicts and feuds for political power. The North is well-known for its religious conflicts and riots. The most recent of these is the insurgency led by Boko Haram, a phenomenon that has nearly always resulted in hundreds of fatalities, property loss, and internal displacement.

In August 2006, Nigeria turned over the region to Cameroon. Because the Cameroonian government promised to look out for their welfare, the majority of Nigerian residents decided to remain on the peninsula. On the other hand, recent events—such as the formal handover of the region to Cameroon—have demonstrated that Nigerians were the target of constant attacks, raids, rapes of women and young girls, and flagrant abuses of their human rights at the hands of the Cameroonian authorities.

Displacement's effects on IDPs in Nigeria

Vulnerability is the thread that connects all IDPs together. IDPs are members of that unique human group designated as vulnerable by international humanitarian law. There are several causes for this vulnerability. The first is that, in most cases, internally displaced people are compelled to abandon their homestead and relocate to uncharted territory without any valuables or means of subsistence. This is valid for all internally displaced people (IDPs), regardless of the cause—flood, civil unrest, climate change, or any other natural or man-made calamity. For instance, one of the Bakassi returnees' most fervent requests is that the government give them means of subsistence, such as fishing gear, so they can support themselves. (HealthAware, 2013)

Approximately 1,200,000 people were internally displaced between 2001 and 2007 as a result of communal conflicts between natives and settlers in the South Eastern states of Delta, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, the Middle Belt Benue state, and the North Eastern Taraba state, according to a 2007 National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) pilot survey. NCFR (2007) According to a fact-finding survey, 678,000 people were displaced in 2007 alone as a

result of ethno-religious violence in the northern states of Adamawa, Kano, Kaduna, Kwara, Plateau, and Taraba. NCFR (2007).

Comparable disputes between neighboring communities over boundaries (Ife/Modakeke in Osun State, Umuleri and Agwuleri in Anambra state, the dispute between Taraba and Plateau over Mambilla Hills, etc.) have resulted in at least 780,000 people being forced to relocate. Soil erosion, desertification, bush fires, floods, and other natural and man-made disasters have resulted in the displacement of approximately 780,000 people in the states of Abia, Anambra, Jigawa, Gombe, Kebbi, and Yobe. NCFR (2007). Post-election violence in Nigeria resurfaced between 2007 and 2011, seemingly from the ashes of the "Wild Wild West operation wet e!" In Nigeria, it started to become the norm. One of the main conclusions of a Human Rights Watch Project is that, during the presidential elections in April 2007 and April 2011, political fighting was the only discernible cycle of violence. (Watch Nigeria: 2011)

It is evident that the available data is concerning enough to raise government awareness of the plight of IDPs in Nigeria, even in the face of contradictory and disorganized reports and statistics on IDPs in Nigeria, as demonstrated above. Nigerian Institutional and Legal Framework IDPs Requirement.

Nigeria's internal displacement challenges

Human rights violations are one major issue faced by internally displaced people, and these individuals suffer the worst kind of violations, according to A. T. Akujobi & U. V. Awhefeada (2021). Nigerians who are internally displaced face numerous difficulties; some seek safety with friends and family, while others reside in host communities. Many more are dispersed throughout the nation's various IDP camps, and a smaller number have fled to neighboring nations like the Republic of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon as a result of the displacement. In the process, the majority of the victims encounter difficulties. The phenomenon of internally displaced people (IDPs) presents security challenges due to the loss of homes, traditional

livelihoods, and sources of generating income, dissolution of social networks and family units, loss of intangible assets, and destruction of records.

Women and children make up the majority of victims, as they are the most susceptible. In the majority of the IDP camps, sixty-two percent of the population is made up of women and thirty-eight percent of men. Children under the age of seventeen make up half of all those living in the camps. Many of the women are nursing their babies, while some are pregnant; many of the children are also found to be abandoned or separated. Children are typically the worst affected because "displacement not only disrupts their education and normal development but also frequently results in their being left to fend for themselves and at heightened risk of abuse." This means that children are left to fend for themselves during times of chaos during flight. Well, it is crucial to defend these impacted victims' rights as a result. Human rights are regarded as universalistic in nature, meaning that they apply to every person regardless of their ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, language, or religion. Regretfully, these people do not have enough normative protection, which makes their struggles even more severe. There isn't currently a specific law in Nigeria protecting IDPs, but attempts to create legislation and policy solutions have failed over the past ten years, primarily for lack of political will. (Romola, 2022).

A framework of laws and policies to safeguard internally displaced people's rights

The number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Nigeria has reportedly increased recently, primarily as a result of the country's escalating insurgencies, which were fueled by the deadly actions of Boko Haram and the militant Fulani Herdsmen. According to Oghuvbu and Okolie¹⁸, 300,000 IDPs were officially displaced by Boko Haram in 2013 alone. These individuals fled from Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno. Again, the Boko Haram insurgency and other humanitarian crises in 2013 forced 470,500 people from their homes in various communities. Nonetheless, data available indicates that Nigeria has the highest number of internally displaced people. However, based on available data, Nigeria is expected to have the highest number of internally displaced people in Africa in 2014—3.3 million.

Nigerian IDPs: Developing a Legal and Institutional Framework

The following recommendations must be added to the draft proposal despite it already being in place because they are crucial to the full, effective, and efficient promotion and defense of IDPs' rights in Nigeria: (1) The first international document on internal displacement and internally displaced people (IDPs) is the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Despite being non-binding, any country wishing to pass a domestic law on internal displacement and IDPs must always refer to the principles. The principle recognizes and identifies the rights and guarantees that are pertinent to the protection and assistance of internally displaced people (IDPs) during their displacement as well as during their repatriation, relocation, and reintegration. Together with economic, social, and cultural rights, these also include civil and political rights. (KALIN, 2008) Refer to Section III: Principles 10-23 and the accompanying Annotations.

The majority of educated youth are idle as a result of widespread unemployment brought on by the absence of guarantees for economic, social, and cultural rights. Without mentioning the clear economic consequences for the sustainable development of the Nigerian nation, this has exacerbated tensions frequently seen during ethno-religious conflicts, as these young people have become willing participants in these conflicts and have acted as a trigger for the rise in the number of internally displaced people. Here, we argue that the ESC right's justiciability would have served to lessen internal displacement brought on by various factors like floods and erosions, in addition to easing some of the tensions that are frequently displaced during violent conflicts and additional similar controllable or avoidable reasons of internal displacement. Additionally, the ESC right's justiciability leads to empowerment, which leads to work and a decent standard of living.

IDPs in Nigeria: Legal and Institutional Reactions

The explanation above demonstrates that internal displacement has been a problem ever since Nigeria gained its independence. However, Nigeria's successive governments have failed to implement a reliable plan for handling internally displaced people. It is important to remember

that although Nigeria was unable to support its own internally displaced people, it was at the forefront of protecting refugees fleeing Liberia and Sierra Leone and maintaining peace in those nations.

The organization will also be responsible for helping victims get back on their feet. According to S. 8 of the Act, every one of the 36 federation states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) shall recognize this Act as its own law and establish the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) with the same objectives as the federal NEMA. We argue that it is undeniable that neither the NEMA Act nor the agency are IDP-specific legal frameworks or institutions. Additionally, within the first two to four weeks of the emergency that caused the displacement, emergency relief must be provided. Nevertheless, we must emphasize that NEMA has played a crucial role in helping IDPs find camps and camping facilities.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, several research studies and accessible data indicate that the population of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Nigeria is increasing. Such forced migration has been linked to a number of factors, including environmental degradation and natural disasters, conflicts between communities and ethnic groups, land disputes, boundary disputes between indigenous people and settlers, conflicts between communities and ethnic groups, and electoral violence. Nevertheless, a cursory examination of the various causes showed that violent conflict, particularly the actions of Boko Haram and the militant Fulani Herdsmen, has been the primary cause of forced migration and internal displacement in and into Nigeria for more than ten years.

The displaced individuals experience numerous violations of their human rights in the absence of a robust legal and institutional protection system. The current institutional arrangement keepers are hampered by current policy deficits and the absence of a specific framework to adequately address the situation or cover medium- to long-term requirements for IDPs, even though they are finding it difficult to manage the situation, especially in the short term. Therefore, while other security measures are being implemented to ensure the

safety of the internally displaced persons in Nigeria, it is imperative to purposefully design a legal framework that will specifically address the challenges facing them. It appears that the security of those who are internally displaced needs to be addressed right now.

Recommendations

- i. Based on the legal framework, the Nigerian government must create a policy framework on internally displaced people (IDPs) that can be implemented by non-state actors, governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations alike.
- ii. In order to guarantee a thorough approach to internal displacement that prevents duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources, the government must coordinate the actions of all stakeholders on the IDP issue.
- iii. The government must guarantee that non-governmental organizations and groups have safe and unimpeded access to internally displaced people who need protection and assistance as soon as possible to avoid causing them more harm.
- iv. Resolving Nigeria's internal displacement issue requires a comprehensive approach. Government initiatives should be created to stop internal displacement and address its underlying causes, as has been previously suggested.

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THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN COUNTERTERRORISM IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The premise of this paper is that intelligence is the primary weapon in the struggle against terrorism; therefore, everything that is done in countering terrorism mostly has to be based on intelligence. The study examines the role of intelligence gathering in the intricate fight against terrorism in Nigeria. It considers the main trends of terrorism in recent times, what are the changes in the mode of operation of the various organizations and how the intelligence agencies dealt with their challenges? Furthermore, it evaluates the threats lying ahead in the future years and the technological and socio-economic developments influencing them. The work of intelligence against terrorism in Nigeria is demanding and requires a close look at the new social and technological developments, objective analysis of the new trends and threats as well as much insight. Intelligence gathering therefore is important in combatting terrorism, in reducing its tactical effects and strategic impacts. The US Congress Report of National Commission on Terrorism said “good intelligence is the best weapon against international terrorism”. However, without a comprehensive, intelligent and firm policy of all the governments and political leaders involved, terrorism will continue to present a real threat to the national development and future generations. The concludes that counterterrorism in Nigeria is grossly dependent on intelligence gathering and hence recommends that tactical improvements should be responsive to the new trends of terrorist activities in the nation.

Keywords: Counter-terrorism, Counter-intelligence, Intelligence, Intelligence Terrorism

Introduction

Terrorism has been recognized as a strategic threat to the internal stability and national development of many countries in addition to its being a danger to the security of international community. Intelligence in the field of counter-terrorism is different, and in many ways a more

demanding task than the classical intelligence, military and political, against enemy or rival states. During the work of intelligence agencies, the lives of many people are in continuous danger, because the rules of the game are cruel, for the personnel involved and for the terrorists themselves; the moral and ethical problems involved are more intricate. Terrorism as a tool in political or ethnic conflicts has increased internationally, regionally and nationally, which the nation, Nigeria has had her share for more than a decade. Radical Islamist terrorism, which in many cases is a component of ethnic and religious conflicts, has shifted from the Shi'a brand, developed under the influence of the Iranian Khomenist revolution, to the Sunni model. The significance of this is in the fact that the Sunnis are in an overwhelming majority over Shi'a in the Muslim world. The growth of this terrorist group has impacted many nations and has caused a lot of mayhem in Nigeria. The activities of terrorist groups in Nigeria have taken both religious and ideological approaches. It has become a big business because of its sponsors (terrorists) cut across both non-state and state actors.

A very important element of any state's counter-terrorism efforts is to gather intelligence regarding those plotting and perpetrating terrorist acts against it. The overarching goal is to maintain the integrity of national security, keeping the population safe in the process. Intelligence plays an important role in preventing terrorist attacks from occurring and in assisting law enforcement officers in apprehending persons suspected of committing terrorist acts whether before or after an actual attack has occurred. Both peacetime and armed conflict contexts require complex and extensive intelligence-gathering efforts due to the transnational and global nature and activities of some terrorist groups. Therefore, multinational, inter-agency cooperation plays a critical role in counter-terrorism prevention. The prevention of terrorist acts relies on good intelligence, and intelligence gathering by its very nature requires some degree of secrecy. Sometimes to reveal covert intelligence-gathering methods, or the extent of what is already known or not known, will undermine the effectiveness of the operation and put lives at risk. Hence, intelligence gathering in Nigeria requires protective measures and astuteness on the part of intelligence agencies.

Conceptual Analysis

Intelligence

Intelligence can be viewed as a subset of surveillance: a ubiquitous social practice, combining the process of knowledge and power and lying at the heart of all risk management. Intelligence is mainly secret activities-targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities (Gill, 2009, 214). Key factors that differentiate intelligence from other “knowledge management” are that the object is “Security”, some element of it will be conducted in “Secrecy” and because it is always relative to others, it will provoke “resistance”. Comparing Intelligence with Defensive Surveillance; intelligence contemplates “threat” while Defensive Surveillance is mostly described in terms of “risk”. Intelligence is therefore the means by which States seek to reduce the uncertainty and secrecy characterized by their efforts to maintain their sovereign survival.

Security Intelligence

Security intelligence (SI) is the information relevant to protecting an organization from external and internal threats as well as the processes, policies and tools designed to gather and analyze that information. The term security intelligence describes the practice of collecting, standardizing and analyzing data that is generated by networks, applications, and other agencies and the use of that information to access and improve an organization’s security posture (Johnson, 2010 & 2012). Gathering security intelligence is not a singular activity that organizations undertake, but rather a series of connected activities, technologies, and tools that work together to deliver the intended result.

Intelligence Gathering

Intelligence gathering (or intelligence collection) is the process of collecting information on threats to people, buildings, or even organizations and using that information to protect them. In the context of private security, intelligence gathering drives risk assessment and security strategies ([www.thinkcurity.com>articles](http://www.thinkcurity.com/articles), accessed 17/8/2022). Intelligence gathering is the

product of the processed information by the agencies of the government which is provided for both policymakers and other law enforcement agencies (Gill, 2009). Collecting intelligence to build up a detailed knowledge of threats to the country is at the heart of Secret Service work. The assessment and investigation process helps us to make decisions about how to respond to these threats and what protective measures to take. In Nigeria, the recent terrorist attacks and threats in virtually all parts of the country need serious and strategic intelligence gathering for effective counter-terrorism.

Counterterrorism

Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government or its citizens to further certain political or social objectives. The Department of Defence US dictionary of military terms defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

Counterterrorism, also known as anti-terrorism incorporates the practices, military tactics, techniques, and strategy that governments, military, law enforcement, business, and intelligence agencies use to combat or eliminate terrorism (Carter, 2004). Counterterrorism can also be defined as a framework and strategies required and deployed to defeat terrorism or policies designed to respond to act of terrorism. Counterterrorism is also a military strategy, aimed at undermining anti-government forces within a territory (McLean and McMillian, 2009). Counterterrorism is a framework of activities, strategies and policies designed by anti-terrorism agencies and government to combat and/or eliminate all forms of terrorism.

United Nations Office of Counter-terrorism (UNOCT) leads and coordinates an all-of-UN approach to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism. It provides leadership, coordination and capacity building in support of member states’ efforts to take practical steps to prevent and counter terrorism through a wide range of activities, projects and programmes.

Theoretical framework

The Mosaic Theory: The “Mosaic Theory” was proposed by Edmund Beecher Wilson (1893). He observed that in the normal development of *Amphioxus*, all three main types of symmetry, or cleavage patterns observed in embryos could be found. He then proposed a hypothesis that informed the mosaic theory associated with Wilhelm Roux in Germany.

The “mosaic theory” is essentially, a theory of informational synergy. It describes a process through which adversaries collect, combine, and compile items of information, some or even all of which are harmless in their own right. And it suggests an outcome whereby this process in a feat of analytic alchemy, converts the harmless information into something useful. The “mosaic theory” describes a basic precept of intelligence gathering: Disparate items of information though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance when combined with other items of information. Combining the items illuminates their interrelationship and breeds analytical synergies; so that the resulting Mosaic of information is worth more than the sum of its parts. In the context of national security, the mosaic theory suggests the potential for an adversary to deduce from independently innocuous facts a strategic vulnerability, exploitable for malevolent ends (https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship!573).

Intelligence Production Cycle: Intelligence for intent and purposes is not just information; rather it’s a product of evaluated information valued for its currency and relevance rather than its detail or accuracy in contrast with data. Intelligence and intelligence gathering denote the assemblage of credible information with quality analysis (Vandepeer, 2011). It refers to the information that has been evaluated and from which conclusions have been drawn. It is data that will be used proactively for strategic and tactical purposes (Onovo, 2004). Modern intelligence gathering relies essentially on both human efforts and electronic gadgets. The validity and reliability of any intelligence gathering depends on the intelligence production cycle. There are about five intelligence production cycles, which this study highlighted. They are: Planning and Direction, which involves the management of the data, to the delivery of the

intelligence product; the collection of data; the processing of data; and the analysis and Dissemination of the intelligence.

Contemporary Trends and Challenges for the Intelligence Community:

There are several new trends and challenges facing intelligence gathering in modern society which borders on recent developments, emerging actors and issues, a strategic trend of terrorism, and the implications on intelligence services. This study endeavored to x-ray some of them:

Changes in the Strategic Community: The end of the Cold War and the rise of various forms of international terrorism have been accompanied by unprecedented changes in the working environment of intelligence. There are about five developments which include: The proliferation of actors, sources of conflict, and means of using force; the expansion in the transnational character, reach, and impact of threats; the surge in technological innovation, leading to ever greater vulnerabilities from an increasingly diverse and disparate array of sources; the growing predominance of asymmetric and unconventional forms of conflict; and the increasing displacement of violence into urban areas and the domain of internal security and safety, accompanied by more economically, ethnically, religiously and ideologically induce societal strife. Some of these trends are the results of genuine transformations, while others may have always been present and have only recently become relevant to the intelligence sector. All, however, have implications for the operations of most intelligence services (*DCAF Backgrounder- Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Forces*)

Actors and Issues of Great Concern: Emerging actors, new and not so new include: International terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations; Governments that produce and make available weapons of mass destruction (WMD), provide safe havens for terrorists and sponsor the assassination of their political opponents abroad; Failing and failed States, which can result in endemic conflict, insecurity and mass migration, and turn into breeding grounds for terrorism and organized crime; Some multinational corporations and politicized citizen groups that seek to influence the outcome of international negotiations on

an array of issues; Statutory security forces that are not under effective State control, such as rogue military and intelligence entities; and Non-governmental security forces that may only be loosely supervised by the State, such as private military firms, paramilitary groups and militias.

Implications of these changes on Intelligence services: The work of the intelligence services has become more time-sensitive, complex, dangerous and controversial. Therefore, effective decision and policymaking are increasingly dependent upon the early identification of problems, rapid assessment of the likely consequences of decisions and real-time monitoring of their implementation. With changes in the strategic environment, there has been an increase in the number and kind of consumers of intelligence, both domestic and foreign.

There are four main areas where the intelligence services need to adjust their approaches: information collection and utilization; national coordination and cooperation among intelligence services and with other security sector actors; information sharing with international organizations and other countries; and public acceptability and accountability (*DCAF Backgrounder- Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Forces*).

The Information Revolution: The Information Revolution (IR) may be the most important new factor impacting the management and work of intelligence services. It has implications for information availability and access, as well as for its analysis. As a result of changes in collection techniques, there is now a surfeit of information in contrast to the information scarcity that characterised many aspects of the Cold War; the bulk of information for national assessments now comes from open-source intelligence, though a crucial portion is still generated by methods that largely remain the exclusive competence of intelligence services; and data mining and other automated collection techniques have become essential for the filtering and storing of information.

The IR has also had a dramatic impact on the way intelligence analysis is conducted. In particular, it has altered working relationships among individual analysts and analytical groups within intelligence services as technology trends have enhanced horizontal networking

and facilitated decentralization; making possible the privatization of assessment, with many companies offering expertise in global risk analysis whose products and services are often superior to those of government intelligence organizations; and contributed to the emergence of informal networks of information distribution that compete with intelligence services for the attention of policymakers. These developments require significant changes in the management and craft of intelligence. (*DCAF Backgrounder- Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Forces*).

National cooperation and coordination

In today's security environment, intelligence services have to work more closely with one another and with other national security services as well. The former is especially a challenge for larger countries with multiple intelligence services, though smaller countries usually also have multiple actors with intelligence-related functions, and thus a need for optimal cooperation. In most countries, central intelligence mechanisms consisting of officials at or near the cabinet-level are responsible for the coordination of national intelligence estimates. This can be supplemented by measures ensuring that all intelligence services have access to the same databases and documents, and that frequent contacts take place between agencies working on similar issues.

What should be the priorities of the Intelligence Community?

- (i) Building an integrated national intelligence capability with optimized collection capabilities.
- (ii) Strengthening analytical expertise, methods and practices across the intelligence community and encouraging an open, creative environment.
- (iii) Removing impediments to intelligence sharing within the intelligence community and with partners, and establishing policies that reflect the 'need to share' for all data, in place of the 'ownership by agency' approach.
- (iv) Exploiting scientific and technical advances, especially changes in information technology that make it possible to maintain and extend capacity to deal with emerging threats.

(v) Creating an intelligence ‘cyber-community’ in which intelligence producers, customers and partners can interact swiftly and securely in considering intelligence, at both the international and national levels.

(vi) Expanding technological capacities to handle the ever-increasing volume of signals being intercepted.

(vii) Focusing intelligence collection efforts on issues that private sector intelligence will not adequately address because they would be unprofitable, be too technologically demanding, or expose those involved to unacceptable legal liabilities. And above all:

The Impact of Civilian-JTF Counterterrorism in North Eastern Nigeria, a Success Story of Intelligence Gathering

The Civilian-JTF relevance to counterterrorism comes in three strategic areas: they are mainly of Kanuri ethnic extraction and speak the Kanuri language like most terrorist members; they understand the local terrains and with the hunters among them, they can penetrate the Sambisa Forest with fewer difficulty, unlike the soldiers; and more importantly, they know their neighbours who belong to the terrorist group. Given this environmental background, they provide operational assistance to the soldiers by identifying and arresting Boko Haram members, mounting and controlling security checkpoints within their localities, providing security information to the soldiers, monitoring the movement of people, and sometimes, in self-defence, using firearms against members of Boko Haram (OHCHR 2015; Kawu 2013; Hamza and Sawab 2013). There is enough literature on the success stories of operations of Civilian-JTF on Counterterrorism; however, this research will be limited to its contributions to intelligence gathering.

The collation of intelligence information improved the efficiency of the JTF activities in the North eastern Nigeria. In many villages, civilian-JTF members carry out searches at the entrances of markets, mosques and points of aid distribution, and inform the authorities about the presence of suspected individuals. Women carry out searches of other women (Abba, 2017). The complimentary roles of the Civilian-JTF address the failure of military intelligence to identify terrorists, their networks and locations, and their movement in and out of the

communities. This impacted operational success; for instance, there has been an increase in successful raids on Boko Haram hideouts, arrests of their members and seizure of their arms and ammunitions.

Conclusion

Intelligence is the primary weapon in the struggle against terrorism; therefore, everything that is done in countering terrorism has to be based on intelligence. The success of counterterrorism in any country is dependent essentially on the effectiveness of intelligence gathering. The study examined the role of intelligence gathering in the intricate fight against terrorism in Nigeria. It considered the main trends of terrorism in recent times, what are the changes in the mode of operation of the various organizations? Furthermore, it evaluated the threats lying ahead in the future years and the technological and socio-economic developments influencing them. Intelligence against terrorism in Nigeria is demanding and requires a close look at the new social and technological developments, objective analysis of the new trends and threats as well as much insight.

Recommendations

- i. Tactical improvements should be responsive to the new trends of terrorist activities in Nigeria;
- ii. Priorities of Intelligence Agencies should focus on the following: Building an integrated national intelligence capability with optimized collection capabilities and strengthening analytical expertise, methods and practices across the intelligence community and encouraging an open, creative environment;
- iii. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies should deal with all manner of corruption and sabotage and operate within ambit of the constitutions and edicts that established them;
- iv. There should be an intensified collaboration of National intelligence with both regional and international intelligence agencies to advance intelligence synergy; and

- v. The Nigerian government should pay more concentration on intelligence gathering than acquisition of weapons.

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AVENUES FOR NON-KINETIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION METHODS BY SECURITY AGENCIES IN RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Despite numerous initiatives by state and federal government to achieve a peaceful society in Rivers State, Nigeria, the outcome of the efforts, though successful in some instances, have generally yielded fragile peace, with sustainable peace still illusive in the state. These have necessitated the continuous intervention by security agencies, who are often perceived to be prone to use of coercive or kinetic methods in resolving conflicts. Against this narrative, Security agencies in the state have been found in numerous instances to intervene in conflicts through subtle and non-forceful means. Thus, this paper is aimed at highlighting the possible non-kinetic avenues that security agencies could exploit in resolving conflicts, the types of conflict resolution methods used and the effect of these approach on attainment of sustainable peace in the state. The paper has an objective, clarification of some basic concepts such as non-kinetic, conflict resolution, non-kinetic conflict resolution and security agencies. Furthermore, the paper adopts the Contact theory as guide for developing its analysis. Finally, this paper highlights factors that have affected the use of such non-kinetic methods and the way forward in further entrenching the adoption of non-kinetic conflict resolution methods by security agencies in rivers state.

Keywords: Human rights, Land owners, Land grabbers, Peace education

Introduction

The human society has been inundated with conflict since historical times. Extant literature on conflicts, particularly in Africa, suggests that an overwhelming percentage of these conflicts are resource-based (De Soysa 2002; Blench 2006). According to a recent United Nations report in Sylvester (2012), in the last sixty years, at least 40% of civil wars on the African continent have been connected with natural resources. According to empirical studies,

natural resources are at the root of territorial conflicts, which have been the most common form of conflict throughout history (USIP 2007; Alao 2007).

In Rivers state, violence during this period grew out of the political campaigns in 2003, as politicians competed for office and in the process, manipulated the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV), led by Ateke Tom, and the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, and used these groups to advance their aspirations, often rewarding gang members for acts of political violence and intimidation against their opponents. This eventually witnessed the emergence of other militant groups, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF) which unleashed mayhem on the state and region generally. This introduced militancy into the state and region, characterised by armed attacks, bombing of oil installations and hostage taking, particularly of foreign oil workers, a development which ushered in a Hobbesian Niger Delta (Ibeanu, 2006).

However, the government in an attempt to secure free flow of oil and to guarantee other economic activities, has at various times deployed troops to the area which have used force to open up oil platforms, actions which have resulted in wanton killings of people. The Odi massacre of 20th November, 1999 and the Ogoni pacification are all examples of the use of kinetic methods by security agencies to suppress the people even at instances of legitimate protest. Yet, the operations of some military and other security agencies in ensuring and further enhancing peace in the state, have not been through the expected and the already known use of force or kinetic means, as a lot seems to have been achieved through subtle and non-kinetic means.

It therefore becomes imperative that this paper is aimed at assessing possible avenues that security agencies could engage in non-kinetic conflict resolution in Rivers state of Nigeria. The state has witnessed occurrences of conflicts between the indigenous groups and government, as well as multinational cooperate authorities, communal crisis, political violence and sundry inter-group conflicts. Thus, this paper adopts the Contact theory, as guide for

developing its analysis, even as the paper will adopt secondary data collection method, by gathering information from text books, journals, newspapers and some unpublished articles in sourcing and analyzing data in descriptive form.

The objectives of this paper are to highlight the possible avenues for non-kinetic conflict resolution by security agencies in Rivers State of Nigeria. The paper will also identify the non-kinetic conflict resolution methods used by security agencies in resolving conflict in Rivers State, the factors that have affected the use of these non-kinetic conflict resolution methods by security agencies in Rivers State and the way forward.

Conceptual Clarification

In order to better comprehend the usage of some terms and phrases which may appear to be ambiguous, there is need to clarify the meaning and context under which they are used in the paper. Some of these concepts are non-kinetic, conflict resolution, non-kinetic conflict resolution methods and security agencies.

Non-Kinetic

This refers to the non-use of arms and ammunition or lethal force in resolving conflict which could be war, duel or intra or inter-group conflict and maintaining or building peace in a conflict area. Security agencies when often drafted to a conflict zone are expected to use force to maintain peace. However, some of the approaches adopted by the agencies to resolve contestations and maintain peace preclude the use of force. While the use of force may be antithetical to the realization of ultimate goal of achieving peace, the non-kinetic methods come in handy as useful alternative. The Maritime Component Commander Staff Officer's Handbook, in the same vein as earlier stated, identifies non-kinetic actions to include; convincing, frightening, inducing, informing, preventing, reassuring and withdrawing, etc, connoting the use of civil means other than brute force in preventing the brake down of peace and order, or restoring peace in conflict areas or between warring groups. These measures as adopted by security agencies in Rivers State, is what is referred to as non-kinetic in the paper.

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution consist of efforts aimed at managing actual or potential conflicts, some of which may be violent in nature, into peaceful (nonviolent) social and political change processes. The goal of conflict resolution is to address the root causes of conflicts and arrive at solutions that are mutually acceptable to all parties. Conflict resolution could be achieved through a variety of approaches, including conciliation, mediation, negotiation, and problem solving. Conflict resolution entails addressing the core causes of conflict by altering behaviours, attitudes, and institutions to make them less violent, hostile, and exploitative. The phrase is used to describe both the process (or the aim) of bringing about these changes as well as the end result. It is the process of determining the nature of a dispute and employing acceptable ways of resolving it (Ndiomu, 1999).

Conflict resolution, thus, involves the following: dispersing or diffusing the bad emotional energy that is present; allowing opposing parties to comprehend and overcome their differences; then, resolving disagreements in order to create solutions that are not imposed, but have been mutually agreed upon by all important parties, and thus addressing the core causes of conflicts. The deeply seated origin of conflicts is expected to be addressed and resolved through conflict resolution efforts, which also ensures that behaviors are no longer aggressive, nor are attitudes hostile, while the conflict structure has been modified (Ramsbotham et al., 2016). Other viewpoints notwithstanding, this paper adopts the opinion of Ramsbotham et al.

Non-kinetic Conflict Resolution Methods

The concepts of non-kinetic conflict resolution appear nebulous and as such, scholars have encountered difficulties in defining and conceptualizing it. This is because the expression is not commonly used in the discussion of conflict resolution and peace-making techniques. Non-violence method is most commonly used for easy definition. According to Nelson (2014), non-kinetic methods are a strategic application of tactics devoid of the use of force, to achieve goals or victory. Raymond (2016) posits that it is utilitarian in nature and also referred to as pragmatic non-violence, whose goal is to accomplish specific objectives and to defeat

adversaries through non-violent direct action. According to him, its main concern is to “power over others” and is expressed in more adversarial terms. Sharp (2000), a leading advocate of tactical non-violence, defines it as “a technique of socio-political action for applying power in a conflict without the use of violence.”

Non-kinetic methods are often a military or security agencies terminology. It is often used by the security agencies to mean non-violent means of maintaining peace in their area of operation. It is mostly perceived that the military and other security agencies generally, would use force to effect peace in their areas of operation, thus the use of any other means that does not involved force is termed non-kinetic means.

According to Kumtum (2001), non-violence methods of conflict resolution may not be exactly the same with non-kinetic methods of conflict resolution as used in the literatures. He posits that, the use of the expression ‘non-kinetic’ methods is mainly associated with security agencies and as such one should examine the role of security agencies as opposed to other stakeholders in conflict resolution or peace building in determining what non-violence implies.

The Setting: Rivers State

Rivers State was created in 1967 during the administration of Gen. Yakubu Gowon, with Bayelsa State being carved out of the State in 1996, from the decree of the Military regime of Gen, Sani Abacha. The state which accounts for twenty-three (23) local Government Areas (LGAs) for political and administrative convenience. The Local Government Areas include; Port Harcourt, Obio-Akpor, Okrika, Ogu-Bolo, Eleme, Tai, Gokana, Khana, Oyigbo, Opobo-Nkoro, Andoni, Bonny, Degema, Asari-Toru, Akuku-Toru, Obua-A dual, Ahoada-West, Ahoada-East, Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni, Emuoha, Ikwerure, Etche, and Omuma. The state is bordered to the east by Imo, Abia and Akwa Ibom States, and to the west, Bayelsa and Delta states and the south by the Atlantic Ocean. The state capital, Port Harcourt, is a metropolis that is considered the commercial centre of the Nigerian oil industry. (Ejoyi and Sunday, 2009).

With a population of 5,198,716 as of the 2006 census, Rivers State is the 6th most populous state in Nigeria. It is a diverse state that is home to many minority ethnic groups, including the Ogoni, Ikwerre, Ijaw, and Okrika people. The state is particularly renowned for its linguistic diversity, with 28 indigenous languages being said to be spoken in Rivers State. The 26th largest state in Nigeria by area, Rivers State's topography is replete with numerous rivers that flow through it, including the Bonny River (Ejoyi and Sunday, 2009). Figure 1 is the political map of the state, showing its twenty-three LGAs and the three Senatorial Districts.




Figure 1 – Political Map of Rivers State (Ejoyi and Sunday, 2009)

Literature Review

In his recognition of the multi-faceted nature of the conflict in the Niger Delta, Onuoha (2005) ranks the conflict in the region (with Rivers state as a prominent state in the region) in what he terms the “hierarchy of conflict in the Niger Delta”, in a descending order, based on the intensity of conflict as; self-determination, Resource control, citing of development project, oil spill, conflict between elders and youths, leadership tussle in associations, chieftaincy

tussle, and land dispute. Thus, substantiating the view point that the conflict in the region and indeed the state, goes beyond the quest for resource control. This awareness is considered critical in this paper, as it is necessary for proper assessment of the possible avenues through which security agencies can embark on non-kinetic conflict resolution.

Non-kinetic Conflict Resolution Initiatives

Almost every attempt directed at resolving conflicts have a combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic operations, ranging from full-scale invasions, to helping in rebuilding efforts. Since conflict resolution methods have been the subject of so many research, various dimensions of such efforts, which are largely actions devoid of use of lethal force abound. For instance, Hang (2005), studying North Korea's nuclear test firing as an example, states that although it "involved physical destruction, its intended effects on the enemies were a show of strength and deterrence" and therefore it is non-kinetic. He analyzes intent behind the action and the method with which it was carried out, to determine whether it could be categorized as non-kinetic. Thus, pointing out that, 'non-kinetic warfare' is dependent upon the intent of the physical action. His study also adds another key part to non-kinetic warfare, which is the population. It stresses that the population is vital to the success of the mission because they are the long-term sustainers of stability. By gaining the support of the population through non-kinetic activities, one increases the chances of providing sustained economic, social, and political stability.

The model which is a reflection of non-kinetic method at building sustainable peace accommodates the participation of civil society and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in conflict management. However, the study observed that the cosmopolitan nature and base of such groups as against that of Community-based Organisations (CBOs), as well as resource constraint, inhibit their level of success as role players in ethnic conflict management. Though they could be said to be useful in carrying out early warning, conflict prevention and peace building activities, they lack the power of enforcing whatever agreements they broker between contending parties, a development which necessitates the

study to recommend “a well-articulated regime of government/civil society partnership” as inevitable for the effective management of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts the Contact Theory for its analysis. The Intergroup Contact Theory as often referred, holds that when operating under normal circumstances and undisturbed, contact between persons leads to increase in understanding of one another as a result of the discoveries each side makes about the other during that period. This diminishes misconceptions, stereotyping, misleading guesses, discrimination and prejudices which develop during separation, because an atmosphere of silence encourages the birth and spread of unfounded thoughts, doubts guesses and negativism. It is one of the most productive ways of reducing issues of disagreement between groups or individuals and helps a great deal in situations of conflict. Developed by Allport (1954), this theory later gained relevance as a veritable academic construction which has been used differently by scholars and conflict therapists as a potent tool to promote interpersonal and intergroup relations. Its effectiveness in defusing tension and then consolidating friendship between previously antagonistic parties is fascinating

It is arguable that conflict, to a large extent, is perpetuated not only by visible things like guns, and scenarios like fighting and arguments, but also through intangible state of the mind and perceptions about the other party. To avoid such circumstances, it becomes necessary to create situations where strongly held negative perceptions of others can be corrected, or neutralized. This concept is a plus to any peace process and significantly fosters the possibility of intergroup understanding, making it possible for little efforts to produce great results as the prevailing atmosphere gets transformed from that of hostility and mistrust to that of recognition of errors and suppression of misconceptions. The theory resonates with genuine quest for possible avenues of creating opportunities that could enhance non-kinetic conflict resolution by security agencies in Rivers State of Nigeria. Such conditions Pettigrew (1999) assesses, could help peace to thrive with ease.

The foregoing notwithstanding, in assessing the possible avenues for non-kinetic conflict resolution methods by security agencies in Rivers state, this theory speaks to interventionist efforts such as negotiation, mediation, intervention, town hall meetings, seminars/workshops as well as perception management, among others as opportunities for bringing warring or conflicting parties in 'contact' with each other for easy and effective mitigation of combustive situations for attainment and sustenance of peace.

Discussions

Security agencies in the state have indulged in some non-kinetic interventionist efforts, that have made a difference in restoring peace in the affected areas. Activities such as regular and routine security patrol, sundry mediation efforts, are deployed by security agencies, as well as perception management initiatives, especially by the DSS, to resolve active and potential conflicts in the state. Meanwhile, possible avenues of non-kinetic conflict resolution methods for further exploitation include;

Intended motives of Course of Action

It is evident that in considering the avenues through which non-kinetic methods could be visualized and implemented, the intended effect of a particular course of action as illustrated by Hang (2005) is important. This is irrespective of the optics and actions associated with such activity. Thus, security agencies in the state, should therefore not wallow in stringent qualification of actions that could be termed non-kinetic, but consider and carry out actions that have the ultimate effects of nipping situations in the bud and resolving conflict without the intent of use of force. In the same vein, the cooperation of the local population in the success of non-kinetic methods adoption by security agencies is germane. This is especially where the state requires reconstruction endeavours in economic, political and socio-cultural spheres.

It is also important to allay the concerns of security agents, in clearly delineating the kinetic from non-kinetic methods of resolving conflicts by security agencies, as both approaches have been attested to co-exist in complimentary role to each other. Thus, security agencies in the state could evolve many ingenious methods of non-kinetic methods for implementation, with consideration for the thin line of distinction between them.

Concern for Conflict Suppression

The paper also reveals a cautionary advisory against the seeming inclination and tendency of security agencies for ‘conflict suppression’ as it is not an enduring avenue of achieving sustainable peace. Here, Imobighe (2005) through his Integrated Conflict Management Model suggests the identification and elimination of causal factors of conflict, which invariably makes possible the provision of early warning signal, thereby checking future reoccurrence of violence. Thus, the need for security agencies in the state to assess conflicts from the prism of their underlying causes, for proper interventionist approach and resolution.

Need for Collaboration with Civil Society Groups

In order to ensure an enduring conflict resolution structure, it is instructive for security agencies in the state to partner closely with civil society groups, in order to achieve deeper success in early warning and reconstruction activities.

Peace Education

Security agencies in the state could embark on peace education and sensitization programs aimed at preaching peace and creating awareness on its benefits. This is aside the need to also contribute in the area of establishment of academic institutions especially at the level of primary and post primary education, to check the level of illiteracy in the society. This is important as illiteracy is a key factor militating against peaceful coexistence of the populace, as such individuals are highly gullible and could be easily manipulated by stokers of conflict for their selfish gains.

Relevance of Social Events

Social events such as sports and festivals, among others, have proved effective as veritable platforms and fora, where belligerents have resolved age long conflicts and wars. Such avenues could be exploited by security agencies in the state, as useful non-kinetic method in resolving conflicts, especially where such conflicts are inter/intra communal or group conflicts in nature.

Factors Affecting the Use of Non-Kinetic Conflict Resolution Methods by Security Agencies in Rivers State

The use of non-kinetic methods in resolving conflict in Rivers State is plagued by intractable challenges. Prime among these challenges are; i. Lack of trust by conflicting parties in the capacity of the agencies to evolve enduring solution; ii. Preconceived negative perception of security agencies as always adopting coercive approach in handling conflict situations; iii. Deep seated age long acrimony between feuding parties; iv. Impatience on the part of some security agencies and operatives; and v. Illiteracy; etc.

Impact of non-kinetic Conflict Resolution methods by Security Agencies on Sustainable Peace in Rivers State

- i. Reduction in militarization of the state;
- ii. Nipping of potentially threatening situations in the bud before manifestation of full scale break down of law and order; and
- iii. Entrenchment of culture of civility in security agencies, etc.

iv. Conclusion

In assessing the involvement of security agencies in adopting non-kinetic methods in resolving conflicts in Rivers State of Nigeria, the paper has highlighted actual and potential areas of engagement, which have been somewhat oblivious to the perception of vast number of the people. This is against the popular and widely held notion that security agencies are prone to use of kinetic or coercive methods of settling rifts between groups and communities. With a lot of possible areas of engagements as shown by the related studies highlighted in the paper, it could thus be stated that, with the right approach and cooperation from and amongst relevant

stakeholders, a lot more could be achieved in conflict resolution and management by security agencies in the state.

Recommendations

This paper hereby makes the following suggestions, which if implemented would further enhance the use of non-kinetic conflict resolution methods by security agencies in the state;

- i. Sensitization of security operatives and agencies on the benefits and effectiveness of adopting non-kinetic conflict resolution methods in their efforts to maintain peace in the society;
- ii. The populace should be sensitized on the need to repose trust and faith in security agency's ability and sincerity in amicably resolving conflicts between warring groups;
- iii. The populace should be sensitized on the need to accord security agencies maximum cooperation in order to allow non-kinetic efforts succeed thereby discouraging resort to kinetic methods;
- iv. The concept of non-kinetic approach to conflict resolution should be included in training curriculum of newly recruited security operatives, in order to inculcate in them, the culture of civility.

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